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ABSTRACT 
Government intervention in land markets through public land policies increasingly sought 
for a more balanced development, better income and wealth distribution, and to satisfy the 
basic human needs such as housing and essential services in developing countries. Delhi's 
large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal policy has aimed at orderly growth 
of planned development, and universal access to housing land through public 
expropriation, banking, development and delivery. But the policy has been widely 
criticised for failing to promote planned development and consequently creating large- 
scale illegal land developments and sales. 
The present research investigates the impact of Delhi's public land policy on the 
creation of informal land developments and unauthorised housing in Delhi. The analysis of 
data gathered from office records and exhaustive structured interviews yield substantial 
evidence that the large-scale land policy governing the public authority's delivery of land 
for housing, has indeed been a major contributor to the creation of unauthorised land 
development and sales. 
Through interviews with 300 households living on illegally developed land, 106 
living on illegally resold (legally developed land), 28 who had illegally resold their plots, 
and 69 property agents, this study found that the large-scale public land policy has not 
provided adequate land for housing. The policy's inability to deliver timely and adequate 
quantities of affordable land in varying parcel sizes, and with flexible lease conditions, was 
a prime factor in encouraging a large number of households to opt for illegally developed 
or sold land. 
The responses of households indicate a substantial number sought illegally to obtain 
housing land, because the large-scale public land policy failed to offer them legal 
alternatives that were affordable, adequate in quantity, in the desired time and flexible in 
their lease conditions. The opportunities to obtain varying sizes of unauthorised plots, at 
cheaper prices, in the desired time, with flexible payments, and acceptable terms of 
construction and use have attracted a large number of middle and high income households. 
Equally, the policy of regularisation of some unauthorised developments has also 
encouraged investment in additional illegal development. 
This research also found that the public land policy's failure to deliver the right land 
to the right person at reasonable prices prompted unauthorised resales of legally developed 
plots, in effect, downward filtration of high income groups. The higher resale prices that 
these subsidised plots obtained, and the ability of some households to obtain an allocation 
of more than one plot encouraged a large number of households to illegally resell plots. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
I. I. PREAMBLE 
State intervention in land markets has been taking place in the form of either direct control 
or indirect control or general influence (Baken and Linden, 1992: 43; Penalosa, 1982: 17; 
Lichfield and Darin-Drabkin, 1980: 15). Government participation is sought for greater 
efficiency, equity and social justice in terms of production and distribution of essential 
goods and services (Lichfield and Darin-Drabkin, 1980: 80). In general terms, it is sought 
for efficient allocation of both land uses and the income from that land (Kitay, 1985; 
Whitehead, 1983: 108); to overcome the impediments represented by private land 
ownership; to provide adequate land for housing, recreation and infrastructure (Penalosa, 
1982: 17) by controlling land price-escalation (Kitay, 1985: 4; Lim, 1982: 26) and 
speculation of land. 
The decades 1970 and 1980 have featured a wide discussion on greater public 
control of the land market, and strongly supported increased public intervention to gain 
maximum benefit for the public (Kitay, 1985; Whitehead, 1983; Lichfield and Darin- 
Drabkin, 1980; Cullen and Woolery, 1982; Strong, 1979; Smith and Walker, 1977; 
Roberts, 1977; UNCHS, 1976; Flechner, 1974). Besides, in developing countries, 
government participation is increasingly sought for a more balanced development, better 
income and wealth distribution, and in order to satisfy the basic human needs such as 
housing and essential services (Devas and Rakodi, 1993: 32; Lim, 1982: 61). It is also 
strongly believed that unless land is socialised or at least placed under much stricter 
control, landowners will continue to make enormous profits at the expense of the 
community as a whole (Lim, 1982: 66). 
The government participation in land market is carried out through promulgated land 
policies that determine the kind of intervention and nature of the goals to be achieved. 
Land policy, as a means of implementation of programmes, aimed at planned development 
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and an increased supply to meet the land demand by public land acquisition, curbing 
speculation, preventing excessive increase of prices, capturing the unearned increments of 
land values (Lichfield and Darin-Drabkin, 1980: 98). Thus, various land policy measures 
exist around the world in the form of policy instruments or composite multiple 
instruments (Lichfield and Darin-Drabkin, 1980). Some of these land policy instruments 
are advocated as powerful tools for the achievement of a wide range of political, economic 
and social objectives (Lim, 1982: 69). 
One of these is Delhi's large-scale public land policy that aimed for orderly growth 
of planned development and the provision of access to housing land to all through public 
acquisition, land banking, development and leasehold delivery of land. It is said to be a 
"unique and imaginative approach to problems common to poor countries around 
the world. It is a program designedfor an urban environment where the distribution 
of income and wealth is unequal and incomes are low, where in-migration is rapid 
and where land is available and acquisition is possible " (Howland, 1977: 53). 
The policy is regarded as almost successful by the government (DDA, 1985; Maitra, 
1991), but only addressed as an competent intervention towards potential success 
(Howland, 1977; Acharya, 1988; Pugh, 1991; Mattingly, 1993), and also criticised as a 
failure in terms of promoting planned development that resulted in large-scale unplanned 
unauthorised land developments and sub-standard squatters (Sarin, 1983; Buch, 1984; 
Mitra, 1990; Misra, 1991). 
The existing theoretical observations and arguments emphasise the need for the 
empirical investigation into the effect of large-scale public land policy instruments and their 
viability in discouraging unauthorised land developments through the regulated delivery of 
adequate planned legal land for housing. Therefore, this empirical research study focuses 
on the contribution of a large-scale public land acquisition, development and disposal 
policy to the creation of unauthorised land developments in Delhi. Specifically, with the 
theoretical knowledge of land policy effects and of informal land developments gathered 
from prior observations and research, this research analyses the ways in which the Delhi's 
land policy contributed to the creation of unauthorised land developments and illegal sales 
of formal land. 
As the Delhi's land market was totally regulated through Delhi Development 
Authority's (DDA) development and delivery, preventing private land development, this 
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study investigates the viability of the major concepts and instruments of this public policy 
that are widely recommended for planned urban development, the provision of substantial 
access to legal land for housing, and the provision of adequate land for low-income groups 
through cross-subsidisation in developing countries. Furthermore, considering the 
uniqueness of Delhi's large-scale land policy and its continued operation for a period of 
over 30 years, this research also aims to highlight the theoretical scenarios of the effects of 
a large-scale public land policy in controlling land prices, speculation and land use, and 
preventing illegal land developments and encroachments in the cities of developing 
countries, with the experience of Delhi. 
Unauthorised land developments are defined as land that has been developed, sold, 
resold, obtained, and/or encroached upon without the authorised permission of the owner 
and/or the concerned city development authority and/or municipal corporations 
functioning under statutory parliamentary acts. The term "unauthorised" is context specific 
and includes informal, illegal and squatter settlements. The attitudinal survey and survey of 
'concerned groups' (property agents) for this thesis are carried out in informal land 
developments (housing land developments on unauthorised subdivisions) called 
unauthorised colonies, and in a formal plotted development promoted by the Delhi 
Development Authority at Rohini, during the period July to November 1994. In this thesis, 
unless specifically mentioned, the source of data is the field survey conducted by the 
author. 
1.2. RESEARCH ISSUE: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC 
Any particular land policy contains one or more policy instruments concerning land 
acquisition, planning measures including use regulation, development methods, 
disposal/delivery mechanisms, ownership rights, and taxation of unearned increments in 
land values etc., (Lim, 1982; Flatt et. al., 1982). These policy instruments are used in every 
city towards regulating use, controlling ownership, stabilising prices, preventing 
speculation, capturing capital gains, and managing planned urban growth. In cities, due to 
the concentration of large population and economic activities, these policy instruments are 
significantly active, and followed in various forms in order to ensure planned development 
and balanced distribution of land among 'haves' and 'have nots'. 
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These policy instruments are implemented primarily towards promoting orderly 
planned development, high quality environment for all people, and socialisation of land by 
providing access to housing land to all and particularly to unaffordable, low and moderate 
income households (Strong, 1979; Acharya, 1988; Flechner, 1974). In most of the cases 
greater efficiency in the stabilisation of prices, and equitable distribution of land are aimed 
by adequate supply of formal, affordable land for all appropriate uses and users, preventing 
land speculation, and capturing the incremental values of land for the public. 
The land policies containing combined instruments enabling public authorities to 
carry on land banking, land development, leasehold disposal and capture unearned 
increments are in practice in many countries around the world since before 1900 (Carr and 
Smith, 1977; Strong, 1979; Roberts, 1977; Flechner, 1974). These policies in similar 
manner have also been practised in some of the developing countries (Howland, 1977; 
Okpala, 1980; Kombe, 1993; Baken and Linden, 1992). But in practice, acaderrýics 
observed that these policies often fail to achieve their goals. As a consequence, many 
severe problems such as large-scale unauthorised land developments, illegal land sales, 
unauthorised constructions against building regulations, sub-standard squatters, and 
increasing slums have arisen in the cities of developing countries (Misra, 1991; Okpala, 
1980; Kombe, 1993). 
In Delhi, the capital city of India, a land policy has been promulgated with a 
prominent policy instrument called large-scale land banking which includes advance public 
land acquisition, development and disposal of land along with a land use regulation policy. 
This policy aimed to provide adequate land for planned development envisaged in the 
Master Plan, and attempted to ensure access to legal land for housing to all income groups 
through cross-subsidisation. The principle has been that the advance public land acquisition 
and banking of all undeveloped periphery land would prevent undesirable speculation in 
land dealings, and would enable public authority to regulate land price, and its uses 
(Acharya, 1988: 1430). A co-ordinated development and disposal of this land would ensure 
the access to land to all through the delivery of the right land to the right party/person, at 
the right time and at reasonable prices under a rigid regulatory mechanism of plot sizes, 
uses, locations, development timings and resells. 
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But, it is widely argued that public intervention through these land policy 
instruments has not achieved the policy goals. As a result, the poor are increasingly 
prevented from gaining access to land for housing. In reality, there is wide inequality in the 
ownership of land; and illegal developments, unauthorised housing and squatting are 
increasing in Delhi, irrespective of the extent of public intervention and subsidy provisions, 
etc. Therefore, the critical issues of the hour are: 
1. How to provide universal access to land for housing? 
2. What are the instruments that can provide substantial access to legal land for housing in 
developing countries? 
3. And how to ensure the equity of land ownership and legal land development in the cities 
of developing countries? 
1.3. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
There is acceptance by and declaration from many expert forums, conferences and land 
experts since 1960's that greater public control of urban land through multiple policy 
instruments can control city growth, combat increasing land prices and discourage the 
formation of informal settlements (Roberts, 1977; UNCHS, 1983). These experts also 
believe that the regulation of use and tenure of land through the creation of land reserves 
and land banks, expropriation, the pre-emption, and/or acquisition of development rights, 
and the conditioned leasing of public and communal land by public authorities, is an 
appropriate method of achieving planned development (UNCHS, 1976; Penalosa, 1982; 
Ofori, 1982: 23). It is also widely accepted that large-scale land acquisition, development 
and disposal of land and land use policies exercised by the city authorities are necessary to 
offset the market forces against the poor, and to increase the supply of legally affordable 
land available to the poor (UNCHS, 1983; Misra, 1986). Probably for this reason, it was 
also decided at the world congress on land policy held in 1980 that Delhi's 
"land policy provisions of a master plan may be implemented by bringing under 
public ownership the entire land in the urban region, disposal of the land oil 
leasehold basis, and sale of residential plots... " (Flatt et. al., 1982: 340). 
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The reality in Delhi suggests that the policy has not only failed in achieving its 
objectives but has also created negative impacts. It is also alleged by many scholars that 
the land policies operated through the large-scale public land acquisition programme are 
substantial contributors to the creation of unauthorised land developments and sub- 
standard squatters in Delhi (Misra, 1991; Mitra, 1990; Buch, 1984; Sarin, 1983). It is also 
believed that regularisation of some unauthorised colonies as part of existing land policy of 
Delhi has further aggravated the conditions of illegal residential developments, and 
facilitated an increase in their land prices (Mitra, 1990: 219). In spite of the claims of 
negative impacts, the large-scale land policy of Delhi is applied in other cities of India 
(Acharya, 1988: 1430; Misra, 1986: 35; Jha, 1984; Willcox, 1980; Howland, 1977), and 
often recommended by many expert committees as viable tool for ensuring planned 
development, and providing access to land for housing to all and especially to socio- 
economically disadvantaged households (Habitat-11 Delhi, 1996; UNCHS, 1983; Flatt 
et. al., 1982; UNCHS, 1976). 
However, the dominating argument is that the policy instruments and tools pursued 
under the large-scale land policy of Delhi have neither provided access to land for housing, 
nor eliminated the illegal developments, nor been successful in achieving its policy goals 
(Misra, 1991; Mitra, 1990; Acharya, 1988: 1431-34; Howland, 1977). Therefore, it is 
necessary as well as important to analyse the effect of the instruments of Delhi's large- 
scale land policy upon the creation of unauthorised land developments, in order to inform 
the extension of this policy to other cities in India, as well as in other developing countries, 
for the provision of access to legal land for housing. 
1.4. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
The use of land market intervention through public land banking, development and 
disposal, and land use policies to improve access to land has been an issue since the 
beginning of the seventeenth century (Kanazawa, 1996). The arguments arising from 
theoretical observations and prior research are of two kinds: 
1) One strongly supports the disposal of land through public policy instruments such 
as land banking (advanced acquisition and/or expropriation and/or pre-emption), land use 
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controls, and land disposal to control prices, uses, and speculation (Misra, 1986; UNCHS, 
1983,1976; Ofori, 1982: 23; Penalosa, 1982; Flechner, 1974). Scholars accept that the 
land banking and land use regulation polices are major tools to achieve planned land 
development (Roberts, 1977; UNCHS, 1983,1984; Sarin, 1983; Dunkerley, 1983; Misra, 
1986; Hallett, 1988). In fact, UNCHS (1983) and Atmer (1987) argue that land banking 
can over time increase public authorities' control on city growth and increase their 
influence over land prices and discourage the formation of informal settlements. 
Devoy and Rodrungruang (1983) add that land banking can increase the supply of 
legally affordable land to the poor. It is also further argued that land banking and the direct 
involvement of public authorities can appropriate unearned increments (UNCHS, 1984; 
Dunkerley, 1983), eliminate speculative profit (Carr and Smith, 1975; Robert and 
Svensson, 1977; Roberts, 1977), and moderate land prices and reduce carrying and 
servicing costs (Carr and Smith, 1975). Hallett (1988) argues that land banking can reduce 
land scarcity, the power of private land owners, and the cost of housing, and that it also 
can facilitate the construction of houses when and where it is desired. Besides, Okpala 
(1980) argues that public ownership provides land at the right time and right place, 
increases the efficiency of land use, improves social equity in land distribution, controls 
land values and prices, and ensures a healthy environment and security of tenure. 
2) The other contradicts this argument on the lines that these policy instruments 
restrict the supply and cannot control prices and speculation (Carr and Smith, 1977; 
Strong, 1979; Hamilton and Baxter, 1977; Martin, 1977). It is argued that these 
instruments will stabilise prices and improve planning by a steady flow of land, make 
development available where and when required, with a proper monitoring of supply 
(Smith and Walker, 1977). It is counter argued by many scholars that land banking and 
land use policies are not appropriate for effective land supply and development. Large- 
scale land banking is not a suitable answer to land supply because of its administrative 
delays, corruption, the use of inappropriate standards, and the risk of squatting (Rakodi 
and Devas, 1993: 276-77). For instance, McAuslan (1985) argue that land banking leads 
to land shortages and land price inflation. He also states that land banking is pointless, 
even counter productive, if the acquired public land is not used effectively and fairly. 
Smyth (1988) believes that land banking can increase land demand for private housing and 
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can cause high house prices. While reviewing the negative effects in the case of public land 
banking concept in Nigeria, Okpala (1980) also states that compulsory public acquisitions 
raise land prices. Besides, Vetter and Rzezinski (1980) also argues that government 
ownership of land creates lower levels of productive investment and labour absorption, a 
regressive spatial structure, very high costs of urban infrastructure, and a reduction of the 
growth potential of the house building industry. 
As for land use regulations, it is argued that they restrict the supply of developable 
land by setting up urban limits, and often by rigid use specifications (Dowall, 198 1; Geisse 
and Sabatini, 1980). This restricted supply greatly affects land costs (Dowall and Clarke, 
1991; Dowall, 1992; Mattingly, 1993). Therefore the interesting question is, what really 
does the Delhi's large-scale land policy do? Does this policy facilitate the provision of land 
for residential purposes (which is the major use in any city) and to low income groups (the 
majority in the city), or does it hinder such provision? And, if the policy does either of the 
above at all, the questions arise - why so, and how is it done? 
Irrespective of the above arguments, conferences and expert forums (Flatt et. al., 
1982; UNCHS, 1983; Habitat-11 Delhi, 1996) have suggested that land banking and land 
use policy are prime tools for the provision of land for the poor and a fundamental 
requirement for clearing the backlog of housing demand. The UN seminar on land for 
housing the poor held in March 1983 emphasised that the provision of secure tenure for 
land in adequate quantities, in suitable locations at affordable prices and on equitable 
terms, is a fundamental requirement for clearing the backlog of housing demand for the 
poor and meeting the rapidly growing need to house poor families, particularly in urban 
areas. The seminar also observed that without strong official will to improve housing 
conditions for the poor and an understanding of the key role of public intervention in the 
land delivery process, no impact can be made on the problem. The seminar recommended 
that public land acquisition, by expropriation if necessary, should be used to increase the 
supply of legally available land affordable by the poor (UNCHS, 1983). It is observed that 
quantities of land are rarely the problem. The break down is in the system of delivering this 
land to the poor on terms which makes the land legally accessible. 
Two decades ago, the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat) 
meeting in Vancouver (1976) declared that the use and tenure of land should be subject to 
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public control through appropriate legislation. The value added to land by public decisions 
and investment should be recaptured for the benefit of society as a whole. One principal 
method for exercising public control could be the direct intervention of the government 
through the creation of land reserves, land banks, expropriation and pre-emption, 
acquisition of development rights, conditioned leasing of public and communal land and 
public ownership to supply serviced land to those in need of it (Roberts, 1977). 
Prior research on experience gained from land banking programmes in developed 
countries shows that land banking can work well. Strong (1979) states that in Sweden and 
in the Netherlands the entire land use control system inhibits speculation. In France too, 
land banking has proven to be a potent force against speculation. Atmer (1987), with 
reference to the Stockholm land banking and municipal leasehold ownership, states that 
land banking solved, in a single operation, all problems in connection with private land 
ownership. Further, the leasehold system has helped to create houses for less well-to-do 
people, and to secure the price of the land, and to prevent speculation in case of future 
sale. The author asserts that public land ownership along with additional policies (land use, 
zoning, taxation, and land acquisition and disposal of land by leasehold) has determined the 
city's spatial growth during the 20th century and have not created any negative impact. In 
Scandinavia, advance purchase of lands by municipalities, and the creation of considerable 
land banks for housing, have enabled cities to expand housing construction without 
difficulties (UNCHS, 1984). 
Land banking and land use regulations have been prime policies in developing 
countries since 1960's. For instance, Delhi's large-scale land acquisition, development and 
disposal policy has been implemented since 1957. But, it is argued by scholars that the 
policy of bulk acquisition and monopoly ownership by the public authority has squeezed 
the supply side and has converted the market into a sellers market (Misra, 1986). Willcox 
(1980) argues that Delhi's land acquisition progranime does not seem to have succeeded in 
forestalling a steep rise in land prices, but he nevertheless seems to believe that the price 
rise would have been higher without the land banking programme. He states that the 
advance land acquisition program-me has put greater pressure on the lands not acquired 
and therefore itself contributed to the boosting of prices. 
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Howland (1977), although she describes the Delhi's land programme as a unique and 
imaginative approach, argues that the policy is accomplishing little more than what a free 
market would have done: to distribute the majority of the land to high income families. 
Furthermore, McAuslan (1985) also concludes that the policy of allocation of land for 
mainly upper income group housing and auctioning of land at high prices has led to the 
building of luxury housing in Delhi, has forced up the price of land for low cost housing, 
and has increased the squatting and illegal sub division of land. 
The failure of public land delivery also exists in other cities of developing countries. 
The literature states that illegal settlements also exist in Tanzania where public ownership 
of all land exists. Kombe (1993) observed with reference to Tanzania that the failure of 
current formal land delivery to cope with urban demand is the major cause for the creation 
of illegal settlements in Dar-es-Salaam. But in Delhi, the combination of large-scale land 
acquisition, development, and disposal policies with those of land use regulations appears 
to have further aggravated the condition of illegal settlements. Therefore, it is suggested 
that public land delivery has not significantly benefited a large number of people, and that 
they could be major users of unauthorised colonies in Delhi. 
It has been observed that informal developments and the process of organised take 
over of urban land began as early as in the 1940s (Geisse and Sabatini, 1982). They have 
been mostly addressed as 'spontaneous' in the forties, 'self-help' until the seventies, 
popular or informal or illegal or unauthorised during the seventies and eighties, and 
recently recognised as un-regulated or un-planned submarkets (Shakur, 1994; SPA, 1994; 
UNCHS, 1983; Geisse and Sabatini, 1982). Similar non-conventional ways of selling 
public and private land outside the formal market are observed in San Salvador, Mexico, 
Turkey, Valencia, and Bogota (Geisse and Sabatini, 1982: 152; Payne, 1985; Hardey and 
Satterthwaite, 1989). 
Informal settlements are seen in almost all developing countries including European 
capital cities (Payne, 1988). These developments occur by the invasion of both public and 
private land (Gilbert and Ward, 1985) and planned mass invasion in Lima (Lloyd, 1980); 
occupation of land by hiring squats or physical threats (World Bank, 1980); the purchase 
of land beyond the limits of conventional and legalised housing areas in Valencia; the 
purchase of community lands such as 6Ldo land (which has use right but not the right to 
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sell) in Mexico City (Gilbert and Ward, 1985); illegally sold lots in legally obtained tracts, 
and subdivisions of land carrying invalid ownership documents in pirate subdivisions 
(World Bank, 1980); the encroachment of public and private land, and the unauthorised 
development and sale of raw farm land (acquired, notified for purchase or likely to be 
notified) in Delhi (Misra, 1990). 
The major circumstances of their establishment are reported to be (World Bank, 
1980; Payne, 1988; Baken, 1990; Ward, 1984): 
1. long delays in granting permission for legal development; 
2. unexpected steady growth of population caused by migration; 
3. sale restrictions imposed on private and community lands; 
4. the existence of large amount of marginal lands; and 
5. the lack of a legal enforcement mechanism to check illegal lands. 
Many reasons for encouraging unauthorised land developments have been suggested. 
It is noted that the opportunity for profit, the possibility of obtaining adequate size of 
plots with acceptable levels of security, the expectation of infrastructure provision in a 
reasonable time, and inadequate quantities of formal land supply encourage informal land 
developments (Payne, 1988: 40). Dowall (1992: 15) states that the informal settlements 
exist because of government regulations in developing countries. Thus, formal housing 
delivery confined to legally sanctioned procedures, rules and regulations encourage 
unaffordable households to look for the informal sector. 
It is said to be a kind of corruption that involves subdividers, government agencies, 
political leaders and residents (Payne, 1988). It has also been noted that political 
patronage, government protection to subdivide vacant public lands, and lack of significant 
changes in the rules of the formal sector have widened the scope of agents and 
commercial entrepreneurs operating infori-nally in the land market (Baross and Linden, 
1990: 2; Durand-Lasserve, 1987: 332, Thirkell, 1995: 7; Gilbert, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 
1981: 112). With specific reference to Delhi, it has also been argued that illegal land 
development is a planned and highly lucrative business operated by specialised agents 
bringing together other professionals, and created due to the connivance of unscrupulous 
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colonisers, corrupt bureaucrats and politicians (Angel et al., 1983; Noronha, 1991: 7; 
Serageldin, 1990: 2; Doebele, 1994: 48). 
Informal land developers (who include farmers themselves and/or colonisers and/or 
property agents, and land owning residents themselves) also play a key role in subdividing 
land into different sizes of plots and selling them to individuals who look for this land for 
various reasons (Misra, 1991). They tactically reduce plot sizes, payments, and land 
development works to a level which people can afford (Mitra, 1987). In some cases, a few 
hundred lots are offered at non-dnal prices or given away free of cost as in Karachi, in order to 
attract settlers (Nientied and Linden, 1990: 234). 
It is said that most of the households occupying inforinal land are from low income 
groups because the land development sequencing of such land (occupation-building- 
servicing-planning) matches with their priorities (Devas and Rakodi, 1993: 83). Nientied 
and Linden (1990) and Thirkell (1995) argue that only the somewhat better-off amongst low 
income groups enter into informal subdivisions. But, it is also observed that an increasing 
number of middle income households enter the informal land market in Mexican and Latin 
American cities (Payne, 1988; Nientied and Linden, 1990; Thirkell, 1995), and high 
income groups also buy properties in the informal markets, mainly for capital gains in Delhi 
(NEsra, 1990: 58). 
However, the prime causes for illegal developments and the land policy's 
contribution in encouraging these causes are yet to be empirically analysed. The 
theoretical explanations of the causes of illegal developments and the ways in which policy 
could have contributed to the causes are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Therefore, the 
empirically unexplored fact is the impact of public land policies on the creation of informal 
land developments in developing countries. The thrust is whether the free urban land 
markets exclude the majority low income groups from obtaining a legal house site with 
basic services and suitable access to income earning possibilities or the policy intervened 
market exclude them from obtaining access to formal land due to the break down in the 
system of land delivery (UNCHS, 1983). 
It is also not clear whether illegal settlements are outcomes of excluding the low 
income groups from the formal land allocations, or the outcomes of individual speculation 
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by the higher and middle income families in the land markets which are the subjects of 
public intervention. Since no research has focused on these aspects, the UN expert 
committee (UNCHS, 1983) suggests that without an understanding of the key role of 
public intervention in the land delivery process no impact can be made on the problem. 
Therefore, in order to assess the contribution of public land policies (that are aimed to 
promote planned development through the provision of access to legal housing land) on 
the creation of informal land developments, Delhi's large-scale land policy is selected and a 
working hypothesis proposed to test it. 
1.5. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND QUESTIONS 
The following working hypothesis is proposed to explain the effect of land policies 
operated through the land banking and allocation programme: the large-scale public land 
acquisition, development and disposal policy which governs the public authority's 
delivery of land for housing is a major contributor to the creation of unauthorised 
land developments and land transfers in Delhi. 
In order to test this hypothesis the following questions need to be answered: 
1. Did unauthorised land development and land transfers of any kind emerge during the 
operation of large-scale public land delivery policy? 
2. What reasons are there for the creation and use of illegal settlements and unauthorised 
housing that could have been affected by the policy of public land banking and delivery? 
3. What are the ways in which the policy of land banking and public land delivery could 
have generated the stated reasons for the creation and use of illegal settlements? 
Apart from testing hypothesis and answering questions, it was expected that this 
research would find evidence that land policy operated through large-scale land banking 
and land use controls has contributed to the creation of illegal land development and sales 
for the following reasons: 
(i) Land use regulations executed as part of land policy have restricted the supply of land 
for housing and consequently increased the price of land in the formal market, because: 
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(a) The development control and planning regulations proposed high standards and 
at the same time prevented the private developments beyond (below and above) 
the standards in the plan. They did not block access gained by higher income 
group who can afford to pay for high standards, but the regulated formal land 
delivery and rising costs prevented the participation of lower income groups in 
the formal land market. 
(b) Land use zoning envisaged in the Master Plan often did not tally with the 
location of land acquired for residential development due to delay in acquiring 
fresh land for development. Therefore, the local development authority frequently 
modified the land use rules and regulations, and often changed the uses of land 
acquired (due to the delay in land acquisition) without considering the area 
already unauthorised and illegally developed in that land. 
(c) The prohibiting nature of these development rules and regulations contributed to 
rising social and economic status, and the exclusiveness of certain areas as 
legalised unauthorised developments. This, in turn, encouraged a concentrated 
demand for land in such areas, making its valuation process inseparable from the 
formal developed land and spatial segregation of socio-economic classes. 
(d) Much of the land provided for low income housing (particularly squatter 
resettlement) has been far away from the concentration of job opportunities in the 
city centre. Therefore many households settled themselves in informal housing 
provided by private developers in order to reduce the distance of travel. 
(ii) Disposal of land from the Government's land bank did not supply the right land to the 
right person at the right time, and that encouraged multiple illegal transactions of 
subsidised land either for profit or for resale as more than one plot, because of the 
following reasons: 
(a) As a policy, land for formal development was supplied by only the local 
development authority. Due to delays in land acquisition and development of 
acquired land, the authority released a very limited number of flats and plots every 
year. This process created an artificial scarcity in the supply of residential land and 
a large unsatisfied demand accumulated over the years. 
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(b) At the same time the criteria followed for formal land delivery and the selection 
of beneficiaries i. e. type of allotment, income category and number of allotments 
etc., have been ever changing due to Central Government's declarations on 
income category and type of schemes developed by the local authority. This 
facilitated the higher income groups to obtain more than one allocation under 
different schemes, and provided opportunities to illegally sell them. 
(c) The formal delivery of public land to households who have already found land in 
unauthorised settlements has encouraged them to sell their formally obtained land 
in the resale market (i. e. the market for illegal formal land transactions) for higher 
prices. 
(d) The land (flat/plots) sold through illegal formal land transactions were bought 
mostly by higher income group who could afford to pay the higher cost for future 
speculation and by property agents operating on profit motive. The multiple 
transactions of these land (plots) increased the price. 
(iii) Institutional deficiencies such as lack of co-ordination among the local government, 
local authority and municipal bodies, inadequate technical knowledge, delay in 
construction, and so called corruption and other institutional deficiencies (construction 
and design deficiencies, legal complications and political pressures etc. ) have contributed 
to delays in public land acquisition and development which resulted in the slow growth of 
the supply of legally developed land, and in turn increased land prices. 
(iv) The shortage of legally developed land and the higher cost of the land available which 
resulted from the above factors encouraged households to use alternative strategies for 
obtaining land that were illegal. 
1.6. THE VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research adds empirical knowledge to the extent to which large-scale public land 
policy instruments are responsible for the creation of informal land development in the 
context of developing countries by undertaking a study in Delhi. This study not only adds 
new knowledge to the concepts of advance public land acquisition and banking, land use 
controls, and land delivery but also explores the factors emerging from the circumstances 
30 
of public intervention and operation of an integrated large-scale public land policy through 
a multi-purpose autonomous development authority. 
The study adds knowledge to the effectiveness of certain widely recommended 
public policy instruments in providing substantial access to legal housing land. The 
research contributes to knowledge on constraints existing on housing for the poor, the 
reasons why illegal developments occur in different market conditions, the ways in which 
illegal land developments occurred, who benefit from unauthorised land developments in 
developing countries and which are the regulations that can attract the majority of people 
who prefer to live in informal land. This research, moreover, offers some insight into the 
minimum level of regulations and development standards that can effectively balance the 
affordability and access to housing land in developing countries. 
This research, therefore, attempts to add factual knowledge with which to answer 
questions such as: how can more efficient and equitable distribution of land be made? 
What are the means of controlling land prices and preventing speculation and the 
concentration of land in the hands of a small minority? It compares the suitability of the 
standards sought by the public authorities, standards built into the unauthorised houses and 
standards preferred and affordable by the general public. 
The hypothesis, if proven, has important urban planning policy implications which 
may help in reshaping policies which currently aggravate the problem of rising costs of 
housing land in developing countries. It will confirm the notion that policy instruments 
based on land banking, land use controls, and public land delivery can contribute to the 
creation of illegal settlements and informal housing in developing countries. In doing so, it 
will illustrate how such policy instruments influence land prices for housing in ways which 
are primary causes of illegal land developments. This will help planning agencies in other 
Indian cities and other developing countries to evaluate similar policies. 
1.7. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
As the research focused on investigating the impact of land policy instruments on 
unauthorised land development, the questionnaire data have been collected from only 
unauthorised colonies that are comparable with formal developments promoted by the 
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DDA. With regard to economic status, plot sizes and building standards it was assumed 
that the households of unauthorised land development are middle and high income groups 
who could have been provided with legal land by the large-scale land policy. Therefore, 
this study has not surveyed sub-standard informal squatter settlements called 'Jhuggie 
Jhonpris' that accommodates low income groups in Delhi (see Chapter 6). 
Most of the prior research on land policy instruments such as advanced land 
acquisition and banking, land use regulations, and public land delivery have been 
undertaken in wealthy countries where the nature of controls and the land market system 
are different from those of many developing countries. In the cities of Netherlands and 
Sweden, public land banking and land disposals are carried out by municipalities, whereas 
in Delhi, planning, land acquisition, development and disposal are carried out by a single 
authority: the Delhi Development Authority. The land is allocated for residential as well as 
other uses. In addition to building public housing, the DDA undertakes plot allocation, 
slum clearance, and the regularisation of unauthorised colonies. As the existing system of 
operation is very complex in terms of policy effect, the research focused on housing land 
delivery rather than commercial and industrial land. It assumed that the failure of public 
land delivery is the major part of the policy that contributed to the creation of large-scale 
informal land developments. The other land-related policies, such as the land ceiling act, 
the resettlement of slum and squatters and the regularisation of some of the unauthorised 
colonies, may have also encouraged the development of unplanned growth (see Chapter 
2). But this research primarily focused on the impact of large-scale land policy rather than 
on that of other policies. 
1.8. ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
This empirical study is presented in eight Chapters. Following the introduction Chapter 
that identifies the research issue, hypothesis and research questions, Chapter two reviews 
the literature. In this Chapter, the existing theoretical approaches to policy interventions in 
urban land markets, and the reasons for informal land developments are reviewed. It also 
discusses the contribution of land policy to the creation of illegal developments, as well as 
prior research done on the topic and the theoretical implications of the study. 
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Chapter three identifies an appropriate methodology to carry out this research 
discussing the ways in which the required data were gathered. This Chapter also presents 
the problems pertaining to data collection and to the analysis undertaken to prove the 
hypothesis. Chapter four describes the urban land policy of Delhi and the ways in which it 
is being implemented. It also examines the terms and conditions pertaining to large-scale 
land policy and the instruments of the policy. 
Chapter five analyses the large-scale land banking programme in Delhi and its 
contribution towards land allocation for different uses. This Chapter provides an analysis 
of the formal land supply and of its impact on formal and informal land markets. Chapter 
six examines the existing informal land market in Delhi. It looks at the kinds of illegal land 
markets, and the prominent reasons for their existence in Delhi. 
Chapter seven analyses the ways in which the large-scale land policy has contributed 
to the creation of unauthorised land development, using the data collected from the 
questionnaire survey and from office records. Finally, Chapter eight concludes with the 
findings. It identifies future research and makes suggestions to improve the existing policy. 
The questionnaires used for the survey, along with the letters of introduction to the 
respondents, and special features of survey methodology adopted for this research study, 
are appended to the report. 
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Chapter 2 
PUBLIC ALLOCATION OF LAND AND ILLEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1. PREAMBLE 
Public land policy which governs the transfer and delivery of land for housing in cities may 
contribute to illegal land development. This has received wide attention in literature, and 
numerous views in this regard exist: 
(i) one prominent view stressing a demand factor is that an increasing number of the poor 
households (low income groups) who do not have legal affordable options of fon-nal 
supply opt for informal or illegal settlements (Baken and Linden, 1992; Mohan and 
Villarnizer, 1982; Geisse and Sabatini, 1982); 
(ii) second view, from the supply side, is that the practice of public policy of land banking, 
use regulation and delivery, is unable to offer sufficient quantities of affordable land, 
and engenders individual speculation and monopoly, and thus prevents the needy from 
participating in the formal land market (Baken and Linden, 1992; UNCHS, 1976, 
1983); 
(Ili) a third view is that most legal land in the market is occupied by high income groups 
and speculators, and that results in a majority of low and middle income households 
who do not have access to affordable land to 'opt' for informal developments to meet 
their housing and income generating needs (Rakodi and Devas, 1993); 
(iv) yet another view is that the very policy creates a wide gap between affordable and 
unaffordable land leading to different kinds of option for buyers such as formal and 
informal; authorised and unauthorised; legal and illegal; regular and irregular, etc., 
(Dowall, 1992; Siembieda, 1994); and 
(v) another issue that cuts across this is corruption and malpractice among administrators, 
politicians, developers and residents in the cities of developing countries that encourage 
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a wide-spread illegal development (Payne, 1988; Baross and Linden, 1990: 2; Durand- 
Lasserve, 1987: 332; Thirkell, 1995: 7 Gilbert, 1981; Gilbert and Gugler, 1981: 112). 
Therefore, before attempting an empirical analysis, it would be appropriate to understand 
the theory. Accordingly, this literature review concentrates on the reasons why people opt 
for unauthorised/informal. developments, and the ways in which policy contributes to 
these. 
2.2. LAND POLICIES CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMATION OF 
UNAUTHORISED SETTLEMENT: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
TO THE CASE OF DELHI AND THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT 
2.2.1. Reasons For Singling Out Delhi For The Case Study 
Although, the policy of public land acquisition, development and disposal being executed 
by several city development authorities in India since recently, and the legislation of 
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 is being executed in all urban areas of 
India, Delhi's large-scale public land policy operation forms a unique model in the Indian 
context (Howland, 1977; Acharya, 1988: 1430; Mohan, 1992: 1990). This can be attributed 
to the following reasons: 
1. Delhi's land policy is the only one that aimed at providing universal public land supply 
to all land uses including housing, and thereby preventing private land development in 
Delfii; 
2. it was the first effort at the socialisation of urban land through a comprehensive 
package consisting of direct public intervention, planned land-use measures and 
regulation of co-ordinated growth through a single apex planning, land development, 
and controlling authority (Acharya, 1988: 1430; Mohan, 1992: 1990); 
3. Delhi's case is the only one that provides land expropriation power in addition to land 
ceiling and regulation controls to the government; 
4. Delhi is the only city in where exclusive large-scale compulsory public land acquisition, 
development and disposal policy has been implemented for a period of about four 
decades; 
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5. Delhi's case is also unique in terms of public land policy's impact on creation of large- 
scale unauthorised land development. This policy has resulted in the highest proportion 
of people living in informal settlements including slums and squatters amongst the 
largest Indian cities -a fact contrary to popular impression and policy's expectation 
(Gupta, 1985, Robben and Stuijvenberg, 1986: 336). 
Therefore, the Delhi's large-scale public land policy case is unique experience and 
can be singled out from other cases of land policies in India. This led to choose it as a case 
study of valuable experience that contribute empirical knowledge in this field. 
Among the public land allocation and regulation provisions of Delhi's land policy 
"the large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal" occupy unique position in 
encouraging informal land developments. In order to make the land policy effective and to 
provide affordable housing to a large number of squatter settlements (existed at the time of 
inception of the policy) large scale resettlement of squatter families has been executed by 
the local bodies during 1962-77. Under this scheme, DDA took up a massive operation of 
resettlements in Delhi (Sarin, 1983; Maitra, 1991; Misra and Gupta, 1981). But this 
scheme was concluded in 1977 as it became controversial, and a similar scale of operation 
has not been attempted since then. Another policy scheme for the regularisation of 
unauthorised colonies (existed prior to the inception of large-scale land policy) was 
executed by the government in 1977. Initially, the unauthorised colonies that existed 
before the execution of large-scale land policy were regularised and made eligible for 
provision of basic services. Later this policy has been replicated considering the increasing 
number of these colonies. 
Although these sub-policies (large scale resettlement of squatters and regularisation 
of unauthorised colonies) are subsidiaries to the large-scale public land policy, they were 
only periodically executed to enable the smooth operation of the public land policy. All 
these policies are integral parts of Delhi's composite land policy. But literature state that 
the public land delivery mechanism and the widespread malpractice in the operation of 
public land policy have contributed to the creation of large scale unauthorised land 
developments in Delhi (Bose, 1973: 173 and Howland, 1977). Consequently, the 
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contribution of large-scale public land delivery in the formation of illegal land 
development is further singled out from the other segments of this public land policy. 
2.2.2. Major Urban Land Policies Of India And Their Contribution To 
The Formation Of Unauthorised Settlements 
Although most land policies of India are believed to have encouraged informal 
settlements (mostly squatter settlements) in urban areas, Delhi's case highlights public land 
policy's contribution to creation of large scale unauthorised land developments. Delhi's 
land policy is unique (among the policies executed in metropolitan cities of India) in 
contributing to the formation of unauthorised land developments. It is a comprehensive 
package that comprised almost all components of Indian land policies (i. e. land use 
planning, public land acquisition, land ceiling, and taxation), besides thrusting on large- 
scale public acquisition, development and disposal (Acharya, 1988: 1428; Mohan, 
1992: 1990; Baken and Linden, 1992: 60). Gupta (1985) visualises Delhi's experience as a 
case in which illegal developments should not have arisen in its public policy context. 
The federal nature of the Indian Constitution provided for the diversification of land 
legislation in various cities and states. Consequently, a large number of composite land 
policy instruments have been executed in different cities in India. Although these 
instruments cannot be isolated into single policies, the composition of major instruments 
concerning land development and housing supply in urban areas can be grouped into two 
categories: (1) the ones that are mainly aimed through public sector effort, and (2) those 
mainly aimed through both public and private sector efforts. The second category contains 
a substantial involvement of private sector in the provision of housing in urban areas. The 
case of Delhi's large-scale exclusive public land policy is the only one that belongs to the 
first category. Other legislations' such as widely spoken Urban Land (Ceiling and 
Regulation) Act 1976, the techniques of plot reconstitution (which is similar to land 
pooling/readjustment), and land developments by both private and public sectors executed 
in different parts of India belong to the second category. 
In Delhi, unlike the policies practised in other cities, the public land policy aimed at 
providing all land required for housing and other land uses through large-scale public 
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disposal. The land acquisition, development and disposal have been carried out by a single 
development authority that intended to match the supply with demand without any private 
developer's assistance. The policy operation was facilitated by several special elements - 
e. g. compulsory public land acquisition, large-scale public development, cross- 
subsidisation, revolving fund generated from both the profits of land sales and recovery of 
unearned increments, and compulsory public (leasehold) disposal (Lim, 1980: 9; Srinivasan, 
1981: 1412; UNCHS, 1983). As a new approach, this policy required the Delhi 
Development Authority to provide developed land for residential purposes (developed 
land, built housing and slum and squatter resettlements) and other Master Plan designated 
uses. However, this approach resulted in a situation (unique among the largest Indian 
cities) where highest proportion of people live in informal settlements (most living in 
unauthorised colonies). This seems to be a special character of Indian urban housing scene 
(Gupta, 1985; Robben and Stuijvenberg, 1986: 336). 
The situation is different from this in other cities such as Calcutta, Bombay and 
Madras where private sector actively participated in land development and housing. In 
these cities, World Bank's site and service projects provided cross-subsidies through 
varying land prices worked out by their type, future use, size and location. Independent 
state housing boards have been functioning for the provision of housing, besides the urban 
development authorities involved in planning and land development. Although 
unauthorised land developments (similar to Delhi) do not exist in large-scale, there are 
widespread slums and squatters in these cities. One third of the total population of 
Calcutta Corporation area and one fourth of the population of metropolitan Calcutta was 
living in slums in 1985 (Gupta, 1985: 102). In Madras about 20% of the population are 
estimated to be living in unauthorised self-built settlements in 1981; and squatter 
settlements have been increasing by 4.5% annually in the 1970s (Gupta, 1985; Pugh, 
1989: 251). On the other hand, the Slum and squatter settlements' accommodate over 
40% of the city's entire population in Bombay (Sarin, 1980: 9; Robben and Stuijvenberg, 
1986: 336). These cities' policies encourage mostly squatter settlements except for a few 
cases such as unauthorised self-help housing of Madras and Thika tenants of Calcutta 
where landlords sell small plots (similar to squatter settlements) of undeveloped land to 
low income people (Shakur, 1987: 3-4). 
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Delhi's public land policy case demonstrates the experience of a policy framed 
against the inaction or delay by public authorities to execute effective legislative and 
administrative provisions to control the use of privately owned lands. This also shows the 
in controlling the monopolistic growth of private developers by preventing them from land 
development, and thereby hoping to control the accumulation of land in the hands of few. 
Delhi's policy also aimed at regulating the steady rise in land prices, and increasing the 
land revenues of government through public monopoly (Misra, 1986: 73). This situation is 
noticed in Madras and other cities where current land policies helped private developers 
trickling out supply for high-income groups at rates falling below the demand, and thereby 
resulting in higher prices. Bombay's experience of failure of land ceiling and regulation 
policy to transfer all the excess land from private to public ownership supports the notion 
that the compulsory policy of public acquisition, development and disposal can be able to 
acquire land on low prices and supply them to the poor at affordable prices. However, this 
public policy too failed in Delhi acquire A those lands identified for development and 
contributed in turn to the creation of large scale unauthorised developments (Misra, 1986; 
Sarin, 1983; Mitra, 1990). 
In Bombay, Calcutta and Madras the policies depended upon urban land ceiling and 
cross-subsidies provided through World Bank's support. Whereas in Delhi the provision of 
cross-subsidy depended upon the revolving fund built from the profits of commercial, 
industrial and high income residential land auctions. The land ceiling and regulation 
policies of other cities hoped to acquire all the excess (stated limits) land held by 
individuals to provide subsidised housing in urban areas. Furthermore, sites and service 
projects aimed to provide affordable housing to low income groups in several cities. 
Delhi's case provides evidence that the ambitious attempt of developing a large number of 
commercial and industrial uses that provided larger profits than the non-productive 
residential use has created artificial scarcity of land for formal housing and increased the 
waiting period of beneficiaries. This slow development of land and long delay in supply of 
formal land have become primary factors that attracted unauthorised land developments. 
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Delhi's public land policy's approach of running a single institution that provides 
planning, land development, housing, slum clearance and other activities of urban 
development has contributed to a large scale informal development. The policy's 
operational deficiency (expertise and municipal administration-based institutional 
structure) has disabled its efforts, and contributed in turn contributed to the failure in 
controlling the growth of informal settlements (Bose, 1973). On the other hand, in Madras 
and Bombay (where state Housing Boards were responsible for constructing new social 
housing and Slum Clearance Boards executed slum and squatter clearance schemes) public 
authorities' insignificant share of the land market contributed to the low volume of 
construction, higher cost, and largely inappropriate housing. Their operation resulted in 
increasing the proportions of people forced to live in informal settlements. In these cities, 
the land policies have also had a set back in targeting the right income groups, and 
devising strategies for meeting the individual needs. 
Although procedural delays, court injunctions, low rates of compensation, high 
standards of development, inadequate supply, high prices, legal and administrative 
constraints and poor management of land have consequently resulted in the creation of 
informal settlements in many cities in India, Delhi's public land policy experience is 
different from them. In Delhi, the large-scale public sector effort has suffered from the 
failure to match the supply with demand. The primary reasons for the formation of illegal 
developments in Delhi are: delay in acquisition of notified land, and inability of the policy 
to deliver timely adequate quantities of affordable land in varying sizes, with flexible lease 
conditions. Delhi's case proved that the public land delivery may not be able to provide 
right land to right person at right time and on reasonable prices. 
2.2.3. Lessons From The Land Policies Contribution To Informal 
Settlements In The Indian Sub-Continent 
in the context of Delhi, it is worth considering the cases of informal settlements in other 
cities belonging to the Indian sub-continent (comprising other countries such as Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) due to their socio-econom ic and political similarity. In almost 
all the cities in this sub-continent, informal settlements occurred mostly in the form of 
squatter settlements. But in case of Delhi they occurred mostly in the form unauthorised 
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developments. A large number of these unauthorised developments accommodate middle 
and high income households who could have been supplied with fon-nal land had the 
government monopoly not existed in Delhi. Nevertheless, the increasing scale of 
widespread unauthorised developments and their high standards make them different from 
the squatter settlements. 
The experiences of public land development and the existence of infon-nal 
commercial land subdivisions such as Katchi Abadis can be traced from the cities of 
Pakistan. These Katchi Abadis exist due to economic status of their occupants (mostly 
low income groups) and active participation of formal private land developers (Siddiqui 
and Khan, 1994: 277). Most informal developments have occurred despite the government 
developed planned schemes as well as formally approved small and large private land 
subdivisions in Lahore and Hyderabad (Qadeer, 1983: 238). The related issues of some of 
the major settlements follow. 
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), Karachi 
In the first impression, Orangi's commercial illegal subdivisions are similar to Delhi's 
unauthorised land developments. But their prime characteristics (such as a high level of 
security of tenure guaranteed by illegal brokers with the informal protection of politicians 
and often key persons in the administration) make them different from Delhi (Kool et al., 
1989). Their occupation of public lands owned by national, provincial and local 
governments (Nientied and Linden, 1991: 350; Hasan, 1992: 1982) is unique in its context. 
Most of Karachi's land is either unattended desert land transferred to government 
departments, or bought by the development authority for lowest prices from land owning 
departments. The Karachi Development Authority (KDA)'s task of large-scale land supply 
is same as the objective of Delhi Development Authority but it had less burden on land 
acquisition than DDA who had to acquire large number of private lands. However, in spite 
of having active formal private involvement, the major reasons suggested for the informal 
developments in Karachi are high cost of formal land supplied, long cumbersome and 
bureaucratic procedures, and long delay in formal land allocation (Nientied and Kalim, 
1991). 
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Orangi's formation process is also similar to Delhi. It is a very large squatter 
settlement subdivided illegally all around the plot-township scheme developed by Karachi 
Development Authority (Selier and Mare, 1987). It has a character of reasonably well laid 
out area with a rather acceptable infrastructure. 
Khuda-ki-Basti, Hyderabad 
The existence of Katchi Abadis in the form illegal subdivisions of clusters of very simple 
huts in Hyderabad are another kind of experience. This situation occurred in spite of both 
Hyderabad Development Authority (HDA) and private sector providing plots for housing 
(Linden, 1989). The primary reasons for inforinal developments are: unaffordabiltiy of 
formal land supplied and allocation of excess number of plots to middle and higher 
income groups (ibid). Private developers disappearing after collecting money from 
purchasers, long delay of private development of allocated plots, poor standard of 
development of joint-venture schemes, delays in generating the funds required for private 
development and lack of supervision of private development by the HDA seems to have 
contributed to the formation Katchi Abadis (Siddiqui and Khan, 1990: 311). 
Hyderabad Development Authority (HDA)'s new Incremental Development Scheme 
called 'Khuda-ki-Basti' designed exclusively for low-income group is a new experience in 
the South Asian context (Ali, 1987: 53; Linden, 1989; Siddiqui and Khan, 1994; Mumtaz, 
1991). Its emphasis on public land delivery through targeting affordability, simplified 
procedure of allotment, immediate construction and provision of a small piece of land with 
limited initial services are some extent similar to land allocation method of DDA. This 
public allocation has been facilitated on the basis of some new norms (Linden, 1989; 
Mumtaz, 1991): (1) no standards and layouts have been imposed, and the rules and 
procedures were simple and minimal; (2) a filtering mechanism has been adopted to keep 
investors and speculators out; (3) the idea of reception area and HDA's refusal to issue 
allotment orders and the concomitant cancellation of vacant plots; (4) infrastructure comes 
about as the inhabitants pay their instalments; and (5) engaging middlemen for some tasks 
such as checking illegal subdividers is a new experience. 
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This incremental development scheme shows that the poorer section of the 
population can be reached successfully even without bringing about basic changes in 
societies power structure, political programme and unequal relationship between actors. It 
also shows that development authorities may successfully assume the role of the informal 
subdividers and follow their strategies partially to eliminate illegal land developments, 
speculation and land grabbing that were unsuccessful in the case of Delhi (Siddiqui and 
Khan, 1994: 289). 
This scheme's success was also contributed by its operational conditions: (1) 
provision of house-to-house water connections, sewerage, electricity and road paving etc., 
on longer run, through furnishing monthly instalments; (2) very simple and open allocation 
criteria decided by the government official on the spot (Linden, 1989: 9); (3) the 
requirement of potential allottees to bring their families and possessions before allocation 
and to live in a makeshift huts Ohuggis) until constructing their house incrementally; and 
(4) construction of house on a self-help basis, while internal services were provided 
incrementally and financed through deposits by community groups (Siddiqui and Khan, 
1994). This scheme also demonstrates a new experience that official commitment of 
administrators has reduced the number of innumerable leaders, brokers, social workers 
and other middlemen who try to get their share by obtaining many plots in the fonnal 
scheme. The obtain more than one plot either by simply encroaching upon the area, or 
through direct contacts with the staff of the implementing agency, or through (fake) 
applicants (Ali, 1987: 53; Linden, 1989: 15). 
Some of the other conditions that contributed to the success of this scheme were: (1) 
full ownership documents issued only after the house has been built and the allottee has 
paid all his dues; (2) eligibility of ownership is considered on the basis of continuous 
possession of the plot by the beneficiary; (3) the authority's liberty to cancel the 
reservation and give possession to another applicant if the plot is found vacant; and (4) the 
speciality of involving some element of the role of the informal sector in fori-nal 
development. 
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2.3. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EFFECTS OF 
PUBLIC INTERVENTION THROUGH LAND POLICY 
The land market is marked by special features: heterogeneity of products, limited number 
of sellers, varying mobility according to location and supply and demand, and distorted 
view of market conditions. The subject of land is a focus of many disciplines: Geography, 
Economics and Building Sciences. Hence, many theories exist on location and spatial 
distribution of land. Nevertheless, the urban land market and its divisions into specific sub- 
markets are not well represented by the available theories (Mattingly, 1993: 104). 
Concerning housing land development, there are two major traditions lying down 
theoretical perspectives and analytical explanations: "neo-classical" and "Marxist" 
(Yiannakou, 1993; Mattingly, 1993; Baken and Linden, 1992; Geisse and Sabatini, 1982). 
The former is incorporated in the theory of urban or welfare economics, and the latter 
concentrates on land rent theory. The first focuses predominantly on n-kro/agency 
behaviour. Here macro level trends are considered as a basis on which an agency operates. 
On the other side stands Marxist tradition, in which social relations are considered as a 
source of land values (Mattingly, 1993: 104), and macroscopic/structural aspects are the 
generators of agency behaviour (Yiannakou, 1993). 
These two traditions differ in their basic approaches on public intervention in the 
operation of land market. The neo-classical tradition is preoccupied with the discipline of 
(urban) economics, thereby contributing the analytical tools to the study of different types 
of land and property markets, and the nature of land rent. It concerns with the supply and 
demand, the transaction prices which result from their interaction, and efficiency of market 
functions. It seeks to identify barriers to the smooth interplay of supply and demand 
(Mattingly, 1993: 104). A major division, public welfare economics, has focused attention 
on public intervention in land and property markets, and also widely examined the relative 
merits of different types of intervention such as regulatory, financial and direct 
development (Barrett and Healey, 1985). 
Geisse and Sabatini (1982) note that the neo-classical urban economics tradition 
does not question the desirability of land speculation or rises in price or profit. Speculation 
is an expected response of those whose interests are damaged or denied by the general 
objectives, content, and procedures of urban planning. Thus, it treats urban land 
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speculation as a regulatory function contributing to market efficiency. For their part, 
profits from land speculation are justified as compensation for risk entailed as all the land 
held back from supply at any given time may not turn out to be as valuable as expected 
when finally sold. 
On the other hand, the Marxist view is that urban land ownership is, concentrated 
inevitably in the hands of land owning monopoly. This land owning monopoly uses its 
power to extract a tribute from other classes in the form of "absolute" rent in addition to 
"differential" rent. The essence of this is that the land owning monopoly manipulates land 
values and land uses to enrich itself at the expense of the rest of the society. To counteract 
this effect the public policy objective supports the idea that private property and the use of 
the price mechanism in real property be replaced by a system public intervention in the 
allocation of land (Hallett, 1979). 
Urban economics, however, is preoccupied with locational or spatial differentiation. 
It analyses land value (price/cost) as a key factor in the allocative mechanism, using 
"household" as the basic unit of decision making. Thus, it argues that the residential and 
land-use allocation process is one of competition among single actors, households or firrns. 
Therefore, every mediation process (such as public policy) is external to the price 
mechanism either modifying it or influencing a household's decision (Yiannokou, 1993). 
Urban economics is preoccupied too with consumption space. Marxists, on the other hand, 
stress the 'production' of the built environment. Both approaches analyse state 
intervention in the market and land allocation, but Marxist theorists are concerned with the 
implications to the development process than the effects of policy as such. 
Further, in regard to the theoretical perspectives on the other part of the research 
question (i. e. illegal developments and unauthorised housing), Devas (1993: 81) notes that 
"Marxist analysis identified informal sector housing as one aspect of the 
exploitative economic system, which allowed the poor no alternative access to 
adequate shelter" (also see Drakakis-Smith, 1981: 67). 
45 
Most theoretical discussions on informal developments and unauthorised housing are 
very recent and by scholars concerned with built environment and self-help housing 
(Shakur, 1994; Baken and Linden, 1992; Baross and Linden, 1990; Payne, 1984). There 
are many views on the causes and creation of illegal settlements. One is that the illegal 
settlements (for example squatters) is caused by a mismatch between demand and supply, 
and it exists as an alternative to formal housing (Payne, 1984; UNCHS, 1983). Another 
view is that the illegal developments result from speculation in land and property, and 
exploitation of circumstances for profiteering. 
Nevertheless, these established theories do not provide a sufficient explanation of 
policy intervention and the resulting impact in the form of unauthorised land development. 
The present study has accordingly reviewed various theories and country experiences to 
yield a postfactum or ex postfacto theory (see Section 3.2). The focus is on the reasons 
and circumstances surrounding the creation of illegal developments, and the ways in which 
the policies affect these reasons. 
2.4. ILLEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: REASONS WHY PEOPLE 
CREATE ILLEGAL SETTLEMENTS 
The following reasons have been suggested for the occurrence of infori-nal land 
developments: incompatibility between high standards of formal development controls and 
ability of households to pay; mismatch between demand and supply; lower entry costs of 
informal land; efficiency of housing land delivery; better locations; economic gains; 
malpractice and corruption in land delivery; speculative role of property agents and 
developers; and socio-economic reasons. 
2.4.1. Development Standards 
Illegal developments exist in response to the higher standards of formal land and housing 
developments, their affordability being a serious constraint (Baken and Linden, 1992: 7). 
They do not conform to pre-determined plot sizes, services provision and similar standards 
of urban habitation and convenience that are the major concerns of all land policy 
regulations (Vernez, 1973; Payne, 1989). Rather as suggested by Baken and Linden 
(1992: 54) the "spontaneous settlements approach" side steps the need for planning 
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permission and conforn-ýity to standards, and has proved to be the most appropriate to low 
income groups with respect to land servicing, prices, procedures and locations. 
On the contrary, lack of affordability of informal settlements was stressed by 
Haarhoff (1983). His study of low income housing in the Durban Metropolitan Region 
found that spatial standards in informal settlements were equal to, and in many instances 
better than, those set out in the "housing code". Households were seen to regulate their 
accommodation spontaneously according to individual need and financial resource, and 
significant relationships found to be existing between mean income levels and floor area of 
dwellings. However, Dowall (1992: 15) argues that in developing countries, formal housing 
is confined to legally sanctioned procedures, rules and regulations which can be honoured 
only by those earning at or above the median household income, and the households 
earning less are forced into the informal sector. Thus, informal approaches are efficient, 
producing low-cost shelter, developed on hillsides and flood-plains, and of acceptable 
standard (ibid. ). 
Mitra (1990) observes that unauthorised colonies accommodate more higher income 
families than what slums and squatters do in Delhi. Baross and Linden (1990) argue that 
where there is a lack of investment opportunities any land is attractive, especially under 
inflationary conditions. They also hold that a fan-dly looking for any kind of property, or 
those who have been waiting for allocation of formal land for a long period, may invest in 
informal housing as an alternative to legal land, and with greater confidence if there is 
some scope for legalisation of illegal developments. Thus, the empirical findings have 
obliged the theory to take cognisance of access to land for housing and investment, in 
addition to the existing and pressing issue of affordability. 
2.4.2. Mismatch Between Demand And Supply 
Illegal settlements are observed to emerge when the unmet demand for residential land 
exceeds the volume supplied by formal channels (Ferreira et al., 1985; Kombe, 1993). The 
increasing speculation and complex mechanisms of formal land delivery prevent access to 
middle and low income groups. Doebele (1987) argues that low income families do not 
seek informal access to land and its development not because it is cheaper but because they 
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have no other choice. Maasdrop and Pillay (1983) found that a growing backlog of 
housing need under conditions where expensive public housing is available encourages 
informal settlements. Their survey in South Africa found that 90% of the respondents in 
informal settlements had not been allocated accommodation by public housing. The local 
authority simply had been unable to keep pace with demand. 
Mitra and Nientied (1989) have also suggested that in South Asia inadequate supply 
of government plots forces the poor into various informal options. They reported that 
housing promoted through formal schemes was inaccessible to the target group for reasons 
of limited supply, non-existence of credit facilities, and steeper market value of plots. 
Payne (1984) states that the corollary to mismatch in demand and supply is growth of 
squatter settlements and increased densities in existing low income areas. 
2.4.3. Lower Entry Costs Of Informal Land 
The existence of illegal developments has been explained using a 'cost of entry' analysis 
(Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Doebele, 1987; Yonder, 1987; Mitra and Nientied, 1989). The 
lack of legal status, insecure tenure and dubious locations make illegal settlements initially 
cheaper than formal sector options (Benninger, 1986; Ward, 1984; Basu, 1988; Baross and 
Linden, 1990). Also, informal land deliveries are credited with flexibility, responding best 
to public needs in terms of price and related procedure, as well as location (Baken and 
Linden, 1992: 96). 
Baross (1990: 7) and Mitra and Nientied (1989) argue that there is no price 
difference between legal and illegal settlements. On the contrary, the opportunity of 
payment of land cost in instalments, their low initial costs, and the possibility of 
incremental building construction and servicing that are available in illegal settlements 
encourage large scale unauthorised developments. As a result, a large volume of cheap 
housing on illegally subdivided or occupied plots exist in several cities. They are 
increasingly becoming the major source of new cheap housing (Baken and Linden, 
1992: 17). Here the key related variables are defacto security of tenure, density, level of 
servicing and location. An important feature of illegal subdivisions is the opportunity for 
building incrementally without being obliged to comply with construction standards. This 
allows flexibility and spreading of costs. Siembieda (1994: 147) has observed that buying 
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land in irregular settlements continues to offer a series of 'progressive' cost arrangements 
that facilitate land access to a large number of households. 
2.4.4. Efficiency Of Housing Land Delivery 
Illegal developments are said to release land quickly and efficiently. This is because it is a 
simpler procedure for an informal private developer to acquire, develop and dispose of 
plots than it is done by the public sector. A private developer can also develop sites 
intensively and sell them to the poor at low prices (Silas, 1988). Therefore illegal 
developments are quicker, better organised and widely available than legally provided ones 
(Vernez, 1973; Doebele, 1987; Yonder, 1987). Mitra and Nientied (1989) have also 
observed that metropolitan governments in South Asia supply by no means the number of 
plots required to settle the growing low income demand. In their search for a place to live, 
these groups often have no choice but to search for a piece of land in the illegal market. 
Barross and Linden (1990) also argue that informal developers offer their clients' 
solutions cheaper than those done by public and private developers who supply plots 
within the rigid framework of formal planning practices. They claim that the farriiIies who 
buy plots in illegal subdivisions have confidence in the developers' efficiency to arrange 
tenurial security. Not only do they receive written documents registering their sale, but 
crucially, believe that the promoters are well connected enough to keep demolition squads 
at bay (ibid). The World Bank (1980) also states that not only quick delivery but also the 
large supply of inexpensive privately owned land close to the city that matter. A history of 
lax enforcement of land use and subdivision regulations is also a major reason making 
informal land developments so widespread (ibid). 
Regarding an efficient delivery system it is also argued that illegal subdivision and 
sale of land have indeed developed into a principal land supply mechanism. Unlike legally 
provided formal developments, illegal supply uses flexible procedures (Benninger, 1986). 
People who are not literate and/or unaccustomed to dealing with bureaucracies find it 
difficult to arrange for the fulfilment of required conditions within the stipulated period, 
losing thereby the means to participate in formal land allocations. Inevitably, such people 
tend to be on low incomes (Howland, 1977). Additionally, registrants unable to wait for 
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formal land deliveries have found alternatives in illegal and semi-legal processes (Pezzoli, 
1987). 
2.4.5. Suitable Locations 
Another reason facilitating illegal settlements is suitability of location. Such settlements 
serve the vast majority of new sites and are better located in relation to work place and 
urban services (Benninger, 1986; Basu, 1988). It has pointed out that public plot 
allotment often ignores employment opportunities, real wages, the cost of construction 
materials, and the nature of the land market. UNCHS (1983) also state that with regard to 
lower price and suitable location, informal settlements often match better with low income 
groups' needs/priorities than do public housing, or site and service schemes. 
2.4.6. Economic Gains 
Informal settlements provide opportunities for extra revenue through econon--iic activities, 
renting, subletting and sale of part space, etc. Silas (1988) notes that informal housing 
provides accommodation for sale or rent; using part of the plot for economic activities 
provides yet another opportunity missing in formal developments. Further, as informal 
settlements are not subject to development controls, residents often sublet part of their 
house, or sell part of the plot to earn profit. The formal housing does not usually allow 
these transactions. In this regard we may recall UNCHS (1984) report which says: 
"it must be borne in mind that a good proportion of economic activity in low 
income settlements is carried out in association with housing, and that solving 
problems of housing tenure will automatically accommodate significant elements of 
income earning operations for poor house holds ". 
UNCHS (1984) therefore recognises that low income and disadvantaged groups are 
excluded from legitimate access to housing land located close enough to jobs, especially 
self employment. Tenurial security of illegally acquired plots and income opportunities 
such as renting, subletting rooms, sale of part space, and capturing profit from changing 
land values, encourage middle and higher income groups as well (Silas, 1988; Mitra, 
1990). Hence all income groups may gravitate to informal settlements for different 
reasons. 
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On the contrary, if inexpensive lands were peripheral or outside municipal 
boundaries where administrative controls are non-existent or relaxed (as observed by 
Baross and Linden, 1990) it would be an open question whether poor or low income 
people would still prefer those places. Low income families are also said to prefer to live in 
places nearest work (usually, the city centre) in order to reduce travel costs. But, the 
general understanding is that informal business has poor prospects in peripheral areas, 
where housing is preferred by middle and/or higher income households only. Low income 
earners prefer locations which are 'better'(if not good in an absolute sense) in terms of 
employment potential or proximity to city centres. Thus, Zetter (1984) may be right that to 
a large extent illegal development is therefore the risk faced by land-owning elite who want 
to maintain their ownership status and profit from land values relatively unfettered by 
public intervention. This allows them to capitalise on any surplus value by illegal land sales 
or obtaining higher rents on upgraded and now titled land. 
2.4.7. Malpractice And Corruption In Land Delivery 
Malpractice such as corruption, nepotism and favouritism in the formal land allocations 
(Kombe, 1993), and involvement of land owners, subdividers and local officials 
(councillors, police etc. ) encourage the growth of informal land allocation practices (Arnis, 
1984; Kombe, 1993; Mitra and Nientied, 1989). UNCHS (1984) observes that popular 
settlements are usually assisted by a variety of actors such as organisers of invasions, 
politicians, etc. Ward (1990) and Devas (1993: 84) hold a view that occupations of public 
and/or private land and unauthorised land subdivisions are increasingly organised by 
landgrabbers and illegal developers, often supported by politicians. 
2.4.8. Exploitation And Speculative Role Of Developers And Property 
Agents 
Payne (1984) hold another view altogether: unauthorised settlements are usually 
premeditated and planned by agents (such as real estate sharks, politicians, local leaders, 
mafia racketeers, and even directors of housing agencies) with clear interests in sponsoring 
such developments. Ward (1984) observed three mechanisms of formation of unauthorised 
settlements: (i) illegal subdivision of marginal lands for the sale of unserviced plots; (ii) 
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encroachment by squatters whose claims to a parcel of land are assisted and usually 
stimulated by political motives, or government infighting; and (iii) land transfers as rights 
of occupancy ceded to low income residents. Plots are therefore sold off by individual 
payment when the authorities intervene to legalise land holdings through expropriation and 
compensation for the loss of their land (Payne, 1984). 
Habitat-Il Delhi (1996) observed that informal land delivery may exploit the plights 
of households seeking shelter. World Bank (1980) records that the 'pirate' subdivisions 
that accommodate families on moderate incomes charge higher prices for land in 
undesirable or environmentally sensitive areas (such as flood zones and steep slopes). 
Delays in the formal development process, opportunities to buy and sell lots in illegally 
obtained tracts, and illegal sales using invalid ownership documents, are among the 
numerous factors spawning informal settlements. Furthermore, lack of legal accountability 
of sellers, and lack of information to buyers, enables unscrupulous land dealers to take 
advantage of their clients' tenuous position (ibid). Developers and contractors operating in 
the formal spheres too are involved in Hlegal or serrý-Iegal dealings. Also, a political and 
bureaucratic culture featuring widespread clientelism and corruption allows developers to 
ignore regulations and to skip or shorten formal procedures (Baken and Linden, 1992: 8 1). 
2.4.9. Other Socio-economic Reasons 
Evicted squatters who cannot afford accommodation in the formal sector will inevitably try 
to squat elsewhere. Those who can afford it may move to unauthorised colonies, or even 
construct some sort of shelter in the development areas against Master Plan provisions 
(Basu, 1988). Also, increase in unemployment and decrease in salaries dampen effective 
demand for formal low income housing land, and divert it to the illegal market (Geisse and 
Sabatini, 1982). 
Baross and Linden (1990) argue that the reasons for the growth of infon-nal 
developments can be found in a number of interrelated factors such as: (i) the continued 
process of urbanisation which increases demand for cheap land; (ii) economic 
consolidation in third world cities which changed the structure of demand for housing land 
substantially; and (iii) the state of stable jobs and higher pay which economically lift the 
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low income group to a level where they can, on the basis of their own financial resources, 
enter the housing market at the level of unserviced suburban plots. 
2.5. POLICY EFFECTS: THE WAYS IN WHICH POLICIES MAY 
AFFECT THE REASONS FOR THE CREATION OF ILLEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Existing theoretical understanding and the prior experiences gained around the world 
indicate that land policies affect illegal settlements in different ways. Large-scale advance 
land acquisitions, planning regulations, plot sizes and layout designs, increasing land 
values, insufficiency of formal supply, regularisation of unauthorised housing, speculation, 
cross-subsidisation, and failure of formal land delivery are among the specific factors that 
foster illegal settlements. 
2.5.1. Advance Land Acquisition 
Literature suggests that public land acquisition processes encourage unauthorised land 
developments in many ways. The theoretical arguments for Delhi's large-scale land 
expropriation demonstrate this very well. The advance public land acquisition programme 
of Delhi put pressure on lands that are not acquired, pricing them beyond the reach of 
even n-fiddle-income households (Misra, 1986). This is because the acquired land caters 
deliberately to specific housing need (often auctioned for higher prices) and not to the 
needs of the urban community as a whole. The policy of acquiring land below market 
value, only to auction it as developed plots to the highest bidder, has generated speculative 
motives among the original landowners compelled to part with their property. Once aware 
of the development value floating over their land most landowners were galvanised into 
seeking alternative means of profiteering sale. 
Delays in acquisition are also cited as a major reason for delay in supply, and for 
consequent price rise of unacquired land. The policy of freezing the prices of sites to be 
acquired and purchasing them at a later date has led to prolonged court battles leading to 
serious delays in payment of compensation to land owners. As a result, areas negotiated 
for acquisition but not yet possessed, and sites acquired but not yet developed (both due to 
litigation) have become easy targets of squatting and unauthorised encroachment (Misra, 
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199 1). UNCHS (1984) also noted that the high costs of acquiring and developing land for 
housing by the public and corporate sectors have curtailed land supply to low income 
families in developed and developing countries. This can therefore be expected to 
constrain the access of low income groups to legitimate housing on legally acquired land. 
In contrast, Sandercock (1979) says that in Sweden, despite slow and cumbersome 
acquisition procedures, advance land acquisition policies have succeeded in stabilising land 
values. Further, public acquisitions of all land prior to development and its subsequent 
release under public leasehold tenure, have ensured comprehensive planning. The 
government has recovered the increase in value through a system of land rents, revised at 
regular intervals. The conditions written into leases allow planning authorities greater 
control over the timing of development and use of land. 
2.5.2. Planning Regulations 
Also, it has been argued that planning regulations in developing countries were, in the first 
instance, inherited from colonial administrators or copied from developed countries. 
Hence, they are unduly high standards given the financial capacity of low income 
households (Dowall, 1992: 19; Baken and Linden, 1992: 75; Zetter, 1984). Income groups 
who cannot in effect afford these standards are forced into illegal channels of land delivery 
(Okpala, 1980; UNCHS, 1984; Baken and Linden, 1992: 75). The insistences on high 
standards of development and the provision of complete infrastructure by the public 
authorities' prices land out of reach of low income groups by increasing the costs in formal 
land supply (Mohan and Villamizar, 1982). 
These high standards amidst a growing housing shortage have led to higher income 
groups taking over low-income housing. Policies, as in Delhi, have encouraged illegal 
transfers of public low-income plots/houses to high income groups, lowering even further 
the de facto supply to poorer households (Mitra, 1990: 216; Baken and Linden, 1992: 64). 
The sequencing of public development, planning-servicing-building-occupation, reverses 
the preference of households for occupation-building-servicing-planning (Baross, 1990). 
However, Rakodi and Devas (1993: 275) claimed that public sequencing is intended to 
increase land supply and reduce costs, and requires empirical testing. 
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Furthermore, Baken and Linden (1992: 45) argue that land-use planning controls fail 
to overcome speculation, increasing instead monopoly control by public authorities and 
red-tape. Land use zoning which separates residential use from other uses narrows the 
opportunity of working close to home, or of running small enterprises on the premises 
(ibid). Land use regulations have usually resulted in the restriction of supply by setting up 
urban limits, putting up the price of land (Dowall, 1981; Geisse & Sabatini, 1982: 156; 
Cullen and Woolery, 1982). Land use control programmes also affect residential land 
values by requiring large lots for development and imposing additional costs on developers 
that are then passed on to buyers. 
Land use planning as practised can restrict the range of choices available to land 
owners in the following ways (Eve et al., 1992: 5; Monk, Pearce and Whitehead, 1991; 
Parsons, 1992; Dowall, 1992). 
1. Restricting the total quantity of legal housing land available for development at any one 
time, thereby diluting the locational advantage associated with job and investment 
opportunities. 
2. Restricting the location of land made available. This often leads to change of land use 
by public authorities, creating obstacles to implementation of large-scale land 
development projects and delaying residential development in notified areas of land 
acquisition. As a result, the area becomes vulnerable to squatting, and encourages 
households to look for alternatives in either formal or informal systems. 
3. Restricting the ways in which available land is developed by imposing lengthy and 
complicated allocation procedures and strict regulatory conditions. This motivate 
families to search for flexible procedures. 
4. Altering the timing of development that consequently delays the implementation of 
development plans/projects. 
5. Restricting the availability of legal land for housing that constrains land supply 
(Parsons, 1992; Dowall, 1992). 
Thus, theoretically, the planning system does not affect supply in the event of lack of 
demand for housing, the release of large quantities of a variety of land and/or land 
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allocations replicating the market (Eve et al., 1992: 19). Sandercock (1979) points out that 
if a government becomes sufficiently active as a developer of land it can dominate the 
market and determine to a large extent the general level of prices for both raw and 
developed land by its control over supply. 
It is believed that the way policies are implemented creates considerable market 
pressures to evict low income families. Attractive locations (close to commercial centres 
or high income housing) where the poor find economic opportunities are denied to them. 
Their segregation and isolation in outlying or remote areas reduce drastically their ability 
to earn leading to squatting and encroachment on government lands. 
2.5.3. Plot Sizes And Layout Designs 
In many countries land is inefficiently used with mean plot sizes more than twice the 
affordable standard in low income residential areas. This has effectively reduced the 
amount of land available for housing, increased development costs and created urban 
sprawl (Zetter, 1984). Mattingly (1993: 111) observed that minimum plot size standards 
and coverage regulations have had the unintended effect of increasing the demand for land 
and enlarging its scope. Also, the quality of services attracts a unsatisfied demand with 
greater resources than the targeted demand. Further, the unsatisfied standards and other 
requirements that they contain often demand the human being to behave in ways they 
cannot if they are to survive. Constraints on access to land by high and middle income 
groups result in competition for land being made available, legally or illegally, for the poor 
(ibid). 
2.5.4. Increasing Land Values 
Increase in land values effected by land policy encourages informal developments. The 
increase in prices results (in peripheral areas) in the following ways: (1) from the 
household housing subsidy system and growth of subsidised loans; (2) increased demand 
for single family dwellings; (3) inflation and encouragement given to home ownership; and 
(4) the ability to pay higher rents and prices reflecting a new expectation among 
households (Walters et al, 1974). 
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Sandercock (1979) argues that increasing population and economic growth has 
intensified the competition for the scarce resource that land already is, forcing up its 
market value. Rising prices can explain the attraction of land for investment and/or 
speculation, especially in view of the inflationary conditions in many developing countries, 
where there may be a lack of alternative investment opportunities (Baross and Linden, 
1990). Eve et al., (1992: 35) noted that land prices modify significantly both plot sizes and 
type of dwelling built in an unintended way when government controls fail. 
The regulated supply of land affects land values in the following ways: the inordinate 
delay in supply from land banks delays in turn supply of serviced land; seriously upset's 
development targets; and leads to an artificial squeeze in the land market causing land 
prices to soar (Misra, 1986). Irrespective of these circumstances, a constant argument on 
the supply side is that an over-regulated zoning system where development is authorised, is 
a major cause of land price increases. 
In Delhi, where plot allocations are done by lottery, the government-fixed prices 
result in tremendous upward pressure in the open market. On certain occasions, prices for 
new allocation are fixed arbitrarily, or pegged to auction prices in that locality. The auction 
price, which may be the highest affordable price in that locality, does tend to raise the 
overall price in subsequent auctions. In Delhi, even the predetermined rate bears no 
relationship to the ability to pay of low and middle income groups (UNCHS, 1984). The 
wide gap between the plot price fixed by the housing agency and the open market price has 
been a principal reason for resale of plots and increasing individual speculation. This too is 
one major reason why the poor sell out and/or opt for illegal developments. 
2.5.5. Insufficient Land Supply To Demand And Failure Of Regulated 
Public Land Allocations 
In literature, one also finds that the main cause for illegal developments is the failure of 
current formal land delivery to cope with urban demand (Kornbe, 1993). It is strongly 
argued in this context that existing public delivery mechanisms do not allocate adequate 
quantities of land to the right persons, at reasonable prices when and where needed 
(Howland, 1977). This increases demand and fierce competition for affordable plots 
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offered by government, and encourages red tape, malpractice and corruption. In result, 
entrepreneurs with underground connections subdivide and sell public lands to the poor 
who cannot afford formal land (Yonder, 1987). In certain cases, higher prices offered to 
formally allocated legal land, low income groups are tempted sell their plot or their plot 
allocation papers before occupation (Mitra and Nientied, 1989). Mitra (1990) holds views 
that public land delivery does not serve the locational interests of low income families. 
This leads to unauthorised colonies catering exclusively to the demands of low income 
groups. 
Public allocation criteria and selection of beneficiaries are seen to favour middle and 
higher income groups. The annual household income criterion through which beneficiaries 
of formal land allocations are selected, may categorise high income families below their 
actual income, affecting genuinely low income groups. It is also noted that due to legal 
powers public land allocation authorities act like private landlords, protecting their interest 
in the land and often refusing to allocate adequate land for housing. Consequently, enough 
land may not be allocated for low income group housing (UNCHS, 1984). 
The monopolistic growth of public authority in Delhi seems to have suppressed 
small-scale private developers and made it attractive for them to engage in illegal 
developments. McAuslan (1985) argues that there will always be temptation as in Delhi to 
finance development by selling land to the highest bidder. But this gives no incentive either 
to the seller or to the buyer to allocate resources for housing the poor. In such 
circumstances, the landowner will prefer to illegally subdivide and sell rather than sell to 
government for lower prices. 
2.5.6. Regularisation Of Unauthorised Housing 
Existing literature also suggests that land supplied legally by commercialised private and 
public sectors were always beyond the reach of low income households (Mitra, 1990). 
Attempts to enhance the supply of land through regularisation of previously unauthorised 
colonies as policy is relaxed and concomitant provisions of infrastructure have had 
perverse effect: raised land prices beyond the reach of low income households. This 
believed to have promoted heavy resells, with low income people moving altogether or 
retaining only part of their original plot. Such resells are also noticed in subsidised public 
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housing areas (ibid). Thus, the improved tenure through regularisation of illegal 
settlements is reported to have created instability rather than consolidation by putting up 
rents and land values, and by encouraging invasion of low income areas by middle income 
groups who can invest in affordable, now titled, land. 
However, the experiences suggest that deregulation in the regularisation policy 
neither stabilises nor reduces land prices, creating dualistic evolution instead, with 
booming land prices in some areas (Acosta and Renard, 1993). Further, when fixed long 
term leases are issued, increase in value tends to accrue to the structure, not to the land, 
enlarging the process of subleasing or capitalising the enhanced values (Zetter, 1984). The 
transfer, being illegal, will probably be at sub market value. Legally permitted, it may at 
least allow the allottee to capitalise at full market value. 
By contrast, difference in land supply in effect, has been institutionally determined, 
by a land banking policy that results in quasi monopoly over raw land supply. Sandercock 
(1979) stated that if a government becomes sufficiently active as a developer of land it can 
dominate the market and largely determine the general level of prices for both raw and 
developed land by its control over supply. 
2.5.7. Speculation 
Speculation is considered to be a factor affected by policy. Neo-classical economics 
defines a speculator as an "economically rational actor" forecasting accurately and 
improving the economic efficiency of the market (Hallett, 1979). He can also be described 
as a harmful actor, using any loophole in the legislation to reap windfall benefits that often 
result from public works. There are two categories in speculation: (1) active speculators, 
who look for a windfall gain on land and take into account any relevant information that 
will allow them to buy or sell at the right movement; and (2) passive speculators, whom 
are active operators waiting for profit because they do not need cash at the moment and 
think that property is a good hedge against inflation. 
The policies such as Delhi's public disposal theoretically prevents any kind of 
speculators. But from the way the policy was operated it is believed to have encouraged 
private land developers or owner subdividers in the peripheries and also in the area beyond 
59 
the urban municipal limits . Those are similar to active speculators 
described above. In the 
central city area the land policy seems to have replaced speculators by property agents 
who deal with rental housing, vacant plots/flats and resale of leasehold properties, in part 
time or full time. It is argued by Mitra and Nientied (1989) that at Rohini plotted 
development area about 80% of the plots have been transferred by original allottees 
through power of attorney to property brokers who in turn transfer them to a third party. 
Further, it appears from their argument that these processes have created an illegal formal 
land market (so called legal open market) against the lease condition of restricted resells. 
It also appears that the property agents are more active than that of speculators in this 
formal open market and restriction on resells noted to have provided wide opportunity for 
them to strengthen their role of illegal transactions. 
Zetter (1984) also stated that besides the above deficiencies weak institutional 
structures for land administration, surveying and title registration accentuate market 
imperfections and create opportunities for speculation. The unexpectedly greater number 
of bidders and their greater capacities to pay have fostered price rises, and much of the 
land serviced has found its way into the hands of others than those for whom it was 
intended (Mattingly, 1993: 111). 
2.5.8. Cross-subsidisation 
It is argued that the subsidy provided to low income groups mostly reaches the middle 
and upper income brackets (Ratzka, 1981; Yonder, 1987; Misra, 1986). The specific case 
of New Delhi's public policy of provision of land and services almost free under subsidised 
public housing schemes appears to have attracted a large number of speculative and 
ineligible people who have managed to obtain land. This led the original allottees to sell 
their plots to speculators or ineligible groups and return to squat again elsewhere in the 
city (Misra, 1986). In general, the middle income group (MIG) land is in short supply and 
low income group (LIG) tend to sell their plots for profit motive. In result the MIG tend to 
occupy LIG plots as public authority could neither provide enough plots nor could prevent 
transfers. 
This process is believed to have forced a large number of households into informal 
settlements as a result of the downward mobility and the inability of the public authority to 
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provide sufficient land in a large scale (Misra, 1986; Yonder, 1987). The other side of the 
argument is that the public authority's action of auctioning plots to HIG and commercial 
use has biased towards higher and middle income groups leaving most of the low income 
households unattended. These circumstances are believed to have increased the backlog of 
formal low income housing, and resulted in rising speculative price levels in the formal 
urban land market leaving no option except informal land to the poor (Yonder, 1987). 
2.5.9. Bureaucratic Favouritism And Malpractice 
It is argued that both in Delhi and Karachi, where development authorities either owned or 
acquired large fringe areas for urban development, the actual practice of land allocation 
favoured the middle class and plot speculators (Baross and Linden, 1990). This is evident 
from the accounts that substandard commercial residential subdivisions do not develop in a 
policy vacuum, and governments are highly involved in their creation explicitly or 
implicitly (ibid). UNCHS (1984) also states that the subsidised public housing programmes 
directed towards low income groups are often appropriated by middle and high income 
groups through illegal transfers or bureaucratic favouritism. 
2.6. PRIOR RESEARCH AND NEW DIRECTIONS OF THIS 
RESEARCH 
The Sections 2.4 and 2.5 showed that illegal developments are created by specific reasons 
and circumstances. They also explained various ways in which land policies affect the 
reasons that contribute to the creation of illegal land developments. This review observed 
that the land banking worked well in Sweden, Netherlands, Scandinavia and in France. In 
Delhi, however, it appears to have given adverse effects especially in residential 
development. The effect is seen in the form of large scale unauthorised land developments 
and illegal land transfers that should not have been existed with its unique vision and 
primary goals. 
Nevertheless, illegal settlements can be found widespread in Latin America and many 
other countries where public land banking and allocation policies had not been followed. 
Therefore, the issue is critical in terms whether to continue the public land policy in Delhi 
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and other cities, or to discard the policy altogether (Mitra, 1990; Howland, 1977). In 
either way, it is necessary to find alternatives, stimulants, and means to improve the 
performance of public policies that are aimed to enhance the supply of land for housing, 
especially for the poor. Mitra (1990) suggested that it would be worthwhile to find the 
ways to improve the performance of the land banking policy in order to make it more 
responsive to household demand and land requirement. The ways of improvement may 
directly depend upon the present position and existing empirical situation. 
2.6.1. Prior Research Findings 
The Sections 2.4 and 2.5 highlight that the public policies such as land banking, land use 
regulation and land deliveries advocated as major instruments for the supply of land for 
housing have affected the reasons that contribute to the creation of illegal developments. 
Moreover, there are very little, if any, empirical researches to find out the reasons why 
people choose illegally developed or transferred land as a result of land policies - although 
they are aiming to satisfy the needs of these people for land. 
Most of the reported researches were context-specific and hardly any literature 
exists on the researches that integrate more than one instrument. Also, there are no 
empirical researches reported on policies' effect on unauthorised land developments except 
for few higher study dissertations. The literature however reports that some studies on 
land banking, land use controls and land allocations. Some of the useful findings of these 
researches found in the review of literature are given in the following subsections. 
Effects Of Land Banking Policy 
Howland (1977) in a study on large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal 
found that Delhi's land policy has not achieved its objectives, and land values have 
increased dramatically. She argued that Delhi's public delivery has created inordinate 
demand, acute shortage of supply, artificial scarcity of land, and consequently, increased 
illegal transactions in formal land market and encouraged illegal developments. The major 
reasons identified to have contributed to rapid rise in land values are migration, the 
economic insecurity that resulted in increased investments on land, the arrival of non- 
resident Indians, and the inability of socialisation of urban land to control speculation. 
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In a similar context, Ratzka (1981) after analysing land banking in Stockholm and 
residential leasehold as a public finance and housing subsidy instrument inferred that the 
inefficiency of subsidising through below-market fees has not benefited much of targeted 
groups. It rather benefited the middle and upper income brackets mostly. Carr and Smith 
(1975) in their theoretical analysis of public land banking and the price of land concluded 
that the introduction of a public banking will be able to reduce the price by reducing the 
level of speculation, allowing cheaper land assembly, and enabling lower carrying costs and 
servicing costs. 
Effects Of Land Use Controls 
Shilling, Sirmans and Guidry (1991) in their research on 'the impact of state land use 
controls on residential values' have found that the land use regulations had significant 
impact on both the demand and supply of residential land. They suggest that the 
competition among households determines the price at which residential land be supplied 
to households, who determine the quantity of residential land they wish to buy (the 
demand relation), and urban land developers, who face these prices and determine the 
aggregate supply of developed land. 
Hannah, Kim and NERs (1993) in their study on land use controls and housing prices 
in Korea have identified that a substantial part of rise in house prices has resulted from the 
government's tendency to underallocate land to urban residential use, although part of 
government's surplus is used to subsidise low income housing within the same projects. 
The government's control over the supply of land for urban development (subsidised 
housing, biding of commercial and industrial land) introduces the possibility of 
undersupply. This undersupply would make it possible for development projects to finance 
infrastructure investment through prices of land sold to developers, to pay the subsidies to 
low income rental housing in development projects, and to make government profit from 
urban development. 
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2.6.2. Additional Empirical Research Required 
Although the review of the theoretical framework provides the basic idea about what 
could be happening in cities with land and housing. More empirical information is 
necessary to prove the argument concerning the impact of Delhi's public land banking 
policy on illegal developments. The missing ideas required to be investigated in order to 
analyse the contribution of policies towards creating informal settlements are: 
1. the specific reasons for living in informal. /illegal settlements, although they are both 
risky in terms of legality and expensive in long term than formal housing schemes; 
2. the residents attitudes and specific needs of those who could not be allocated fonnal 
housing land; 
3. socio-economic structure, occupational and employment pattern of residents living on 
informal land; 
4. the exact difference of cost between formal and informal land; and 
5. the contribution of different actors towards the formation of illegal land developments. 
Some of the aspects that need empirical evidence are the market mechanisms that 
could not be tackled by the policy regulations, and which in turn resulted in increased 
speculation and investment on land. The difference of development standards that were 
offered by the public allocation policy and those was afforded by people in illegal land 
developments. The effect's subsidiary policies such as regularisation unauthorised colonies 
and resettlement of slums and squatters and their contribution to creation of large scale 
new illegal developments. The role of increasing population, migration and economic 
growth in creating more competition-based demand for the land, and thereby forcing up its 
market value. Relative cost proportion of land development elements in public housing 
schemes and illegally subdivided land. 
2.7. SUMMARY 
It has been observed from the literature review that illegal settlements are created by 
various causes including coherent circumstances and policy impacts. They exist as a result 
of unaffordability of higher standards of development and cost of entry. They are also 
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viewed as an alternative option not provided by formal developments. The literature also 
suggests that the effectiveness of illegal developers in providing quick and better-organised 
cheap lands have attracted large number of settlers. The flexible procedures of informal 
land delivery and their suitable locations with reference to work place and urban services 
also motivate people to opt illegal settlements. It is argued in the literature that the 
opportunities of earning extra income through informal economic activities such as 
renting, subletting and shopkeeping encourage households to prefer informal land. 
However, the illegal developments are also viewed as an activity of malpractice and 
corruption in formal land transactions and city governance. As stated in the literature these 
illegal developments also occur due to premeditate process and land speculation that 
involves agents, local leaders' officials of housing agencies. 
It has been argued in the literature that the public land policies such as land banking 
can increase the public authorities' control on city growth over time, and can increase their 
influence over land prices and thereby can discourage the formation of informal 
settlements. It can also increase the supply of affordable land to low income households 
by appropriating unearned increments and eliminating speculative profits. The land 
banking along with public ownership and direct involvement of public authorities can 
moderate the land prices by reducing the power of private land owners. It can also increase 
the efficiency of land use, and would be able to provide affordable land when and where 
needed. The experiences gained by Sweden, Netherlands and France reveal that the 
government intervention through public policy has been successful. 
However, it can also be found in literature that similar land policies affect the 
reasons for creation of illegal developments in developing countries. They are argued to 
be happening due to many reasons including expropriations, payment of inadequate 
compensation for compulsory public land acquisitions, higher prices charged for formal 
land, the high standards of planning regulations, and use restrictions of land use 
regulations. Especially in Delhi, it has been cited that the public policy's failure to allocate 
adequate quantity of affordable land was a prime reason for illegal developments. It is also 
argued that discriminate allocations and irregularities in public land deliveries have not 
only favoured the middle class and plot speculators, but also promoted down-ward 
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filtration of higher income groups into low income land. Public authorities are found to be 
acting like private land lords protecting the land and allocating small amount of land for 
low income groups. This in due course is encouraging large number of low income 
households into illegal land. The following Chapter identifies appropriate methodology to 
test the theoretical statements reviewed in this section. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
METHODS, DATA PROBLEMS 
FRAMEWORK 
3.1. PREAMBLE 
INVESTIGATION 
AND ANALYTICAL 
This Chapter highlights the manner in which this research study was conducted to 
identify the reasons why people choose illegally developed or transferred land and the 
ways in which public land policies affect the reasons that contribute to the creation of 
unauthorised land developments. A sample survey research method was used to ensure 
the reliability and accuracy of the data collected, and Delhi's land policy was chosen as a 
case study for cost effectiveness and analytical viability (Majchrzak, 1984: 63). The 
implementation of Delhi's land policy in a rigid and monopolised way for 33 years 
ensures its suitability towards generalising the case study findings at a country level, and 
extending it to the broader level of developing countries. 
This Chapter is primarily concerned with the reasons and rationale for using a 
sample survey investigation, and its validity and reliability in the context of unavailable 
reliable secondary data to answer the research questions of this study. It also explains the 
investigation method adopted, the field administration of the survey questionnaire, and 
how results are portrayed and analysed using some statistical standards. A note on the 
limitations of the method of the study and analysis is also provided in this Chapter. 
3.2. STRATEGY FOR INVESTIGATING LAND POLICY EFFECT 
ON ILLEGAL LAND DEVELOPMENTS 
The research aims were to investigate the effect of a composite policy and to answer 
specific questions. Therefore, this study has been conducted along a policy research 
strategy that tactically and theoretically differ from both applied and basic researches 
(Etzioni, 1983: 77; Majchrzak, 1984; Hakim, 1987). Its approach focuses on a particular 
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problem to seek out alternative ways of solving that problem, and to identify specific 
potential differences in the intentions of the policy and their effects. However, there are 
two broad divergent methodological approaches distinguishable (Majchrzak 1984: 58): 
(1) the moral/philosophical approach that selectively pulls together and synthesises 
theoretical literature, data and existing research findings from a variety of sources in 
support of an argument or hypothesis; 
(2) the empirical approach that emphasises collection and analysis of survey data 
by: i) investigation to test a conceptualised preliminary model and to answer specific 
research questions (Majchrzak 1984 : 43), and/or ii) empirically proving the "grounded 
theory or post facturn or ex-post facto theory" built from the theoretical observations 
and prior research findings (De Vaus 1991: 12). 
The utility of these methods varies depending upon the type of research questions 
and hypothesis. A common understanding among researchers is that the philosophical 
method of focused synthesis would be appropriate when required data is readily available 
and reliable. Otherwise, the methods involving various kinds of empirical data collection 
would be appropriate (Majchrzak 1984: 59). 
Moreover, policy research is pursued along two broad dimensions: (1) policy 
analysis i. e. in-depth analysis of a particular effect of a policy (Patton and Sawicki, 
1993: 6); and (2) policy evaluation, i. e. to judge the utility of existing programmes 
(Majchrzak, 1984: 14). However, there is no clear cut distinction between policy analysis 
and evaluation research as both of them focus on studying the policy effects. 
The literature presents different methods for investigation and data collection on 
policy impacts and occurrence of informal land developments. Some of the major 
investigation methods (Patton and Sawicki, 1993; Etzioni, 1983: 90; Siembieda, 
1994: 151; Bryman and Cramer, 1990) are: (1) analysing systematically compiled 
information from secondary sources; (2) survey investigation to enlist the possible 
determinants of effect; and (3) personal observation of (instead of asking) people's 
motivation and their behaviour with regard to post-programme impact or pre-programme 
information. 
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Although analysis of secondary information is widely known for research on land 
related issues and past researches have used land registry records, newspaper 
advertisements for sales and office records, researchers caution the reliability, 
consistency, and accuracy of most available secondary data (Amitabh, 1994; Siembieda, 
1994: 151). The researchers noted that secondary information on land related issues are 
mostly under-reported, undervalued, inaccurate, and further it is time consuming to 
collect the accurate information (Majchrzak 1984: 66; Pervar, 1993: 134; Amitabh, 1991, 
1994; Siembieda, 1994: 152). 
Survey investigation is also a widely used data collection method in research 
(Pervar 1993, Patton and Sawicki, 1993: 107). This can be subdivided into two types: (1) 
self-administered questionnaires; and (2) questionnaire interviewing. The former method 
is conducted through postal survey, whereas the latter is undertaken through the telephone 
and/or face to face. Questionnaires can be non-structured, semi-structured and structured. 
The interviewing can be intensive or non-standardised, semi-standardised or focused, and 
elite or specialised or mass or large scale interviewing. 
The required data for field researches are also gathered through the observation of 
people (Bryman and Cramer, 1990: 4; Patton and Sawicki, 1993: 96). This source requires 
observation of an activity over a long period of time, standardised recording procedures, 
pre-determined categories for recording data and many other steps to ensure the quality 
and representativeness of the data. This technique could also be time consuming, difficult 
to quantify, usually depends upon small samples and challenges the accuracy. 
Sources Of Data And Problems In Obtaining Reliable Data In Delhi 
The literature survey has revealed a very limited number of empirical studies conducted 
on land policies impact on informal land developments. Furthermore, this research 
expected no advertisement of land sales due to the nature of illegality of unauthorised 
plots and restricted resales of formal plots supplied by the DDA. Similarly, the study 
realised the difficulty in obtaining reliable data from informal developers or colonisers 
who subdivide and sell different sizes of plots because of its nature of illegality, 
sensitiveness and threat of demolition actions by the DDA or disturbance to their 
business. Instead, it hoped that this data could be collected from informal households and 
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property agents (who are also colonisers in some areas). In these circumstances, the ideal 
strategy seems to be the one combining a number of different methods which could 
provide additional insight that one method alone may not be able do (Majchrzak, 
1984: 66). 
Although secondary sources of data could be important for land research, they were 
inadequate in the case of Delhi. Some of the data readily available gathered from the 
Delhi Development Authority, Delhi Administration, the Ministry of Urban Development 
and Municipal Corporation of Delhi etc., were found to be inconsistent, unreliable and 
extremely time consuming to derive reliable data from those sources. (The most useful 
secondary data could have been the census of India data. But the census contains very 
little information on housing land and does not provide information on the basis of the 
legal status of settlements. Therefore, the aggregate data of the census as a secondary 
source of information could not be used in this research. Similarly, the information 
published in other sources usually had specific focuses which were not useful to this 
research). 
Another source of ready-made data is property registration records available from 
the land registration courts in Delhi. But as a large number of leasehold transactions and 
unauthorised land sales take place illegally on transfer of power of attorney against lease 
restrictions these prices are mostly regarded as unreliable. The prices of properties 
advertised for sale in newspapers have not served as important data base because most of 
the sales are not advertised due to their illegal status. 
Despite the case study area, Delhi being the Capital of India and land development 
being a public activity in Delhi, this research found that recent data was not available at 
the required scale and/or the available information was inconsistent within the official 
records and published annual reports. It also found that only rough estimates were 
available for informal land developments and not much information was available on 
unauthorised resale of formal plots and constructions. 
There are more than three official prices (i. e. pre-determined subsidised prices, 
auctioned formal prices and government notified formal prices) exist besides illegal 
resale market prices in Delhi (Misra, 1990). Although land prices for formal transactions 
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are published by the Land and Development Office of the Government of India, these 
periodically monitored prices are also suggested to be unreliable. Because the publication 
is delayed by a period of several months to one year, the assessed prices are based on 
only few spot transactions, and on official records these prices are invariably very much 
underquoted (ibid). 
Therefore, in order to gather sufficient reliable information to answer research 
questions, the research basically entailed obtaining opinions from users of illegal lands 
regarding the reasons why they use such land rather than that provided by the DDA. The 
research required opinions on the ways in which illegal land developments occur, 
reasons for their large-scale occurrence and the motives of households for obtaining 
illegally developed or sold land. 
Therefore, the most reliable data sources for this research found to be opinions from 
households living on formal and informal plots, and records of government offices and 
property agents. Thus, considering the limitations of quality and reliability, it was decided 
that the best possible source of useful data would be a survey investigation along with 
secondary data analysis. The research aimed to collect as much relevant primary 
information as could be found, since this data is cost efficient and enhances perceived 
validity (Majchrzak, 1984 : 67), and was required to identify universe/sample frame for 
scientifically valid surveys (Patton and Sawicki, 1993: 105). 
In order to ensure that the strategy adopted for research investigation was 
appropriate, discussions were held with the experts in local universities, the School of 
Planning and Architecture, Delhi Development Authority, other government departments, 
and NGOs involved in research and field studies in Delhi. Their advice helped in 
choosing realistic criteria for sampling interviewees. 
3.3. THE SURVEY INVESTIGATION METHOD: THE PURPOSE 
AND RATIONALE FOR IT 
A wide range of factors and processes seem involved in the determination of wide-spread 
large-scale illegal land development and sales in Delhi. With these in mind the general 
questions that the present study seeks to answer were fonnulated. These questions were 
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practice to be approached from a synthetic or holistic perspective, which emphasises the 
interdependence of the factors and process, or from an analytic or constituent perspective, 
which focuses on the role of the constituent parts that make up the total phenomenon. By 
synthetic or holistic, we mean an approach that allows us to view the separate factors or 
processes as a coherent whole. By analytic, we mean an approach that will identify a 
single factor or a cluster of factors which at some level are constituents of one of the 
major systems. While each type of research has legitimate purposes or value by itself, 
synthetic/holistic research and analytic/constituent research may be seen as 
complementary to each other. 
Related to what we discussed above is the objective or the purpose of the research. 
Research may have as a heuristic objective the discovery or description of the patterns or 
relationships, or its aim may be to test a specific hypothesis. In the latter case, and unlike 
the former, the aim is to test a hypothesis in order to develop a theory about the 
phenomenon under investigation. As suggested by Seliger and Shohamy (1989) in 
heuristic research, data are collected in an attempt to include as much of the contextual 
information as possible. These data may then be categorised and analysed descriptively. 
The deductive approach, as distinct from the heuristic approach, is hypothesis driven 
(begins with a question or theory). 
Being an exploratory study the purpose of the present survey research can be seen 
as mainly descriptive. However, and as having a policy purpose, the design incorporates 
some analytical element. The present survey research, though aimed at Practical policy 
problems, seeks to find the determinants of large-scale illegal land development and sales, 
and identify variables that are susceptible to manipulation in the policy process. 
Therefore, the sample survey research adopted has the advantage in providing us with 
extensive qualitative and quantitative data. The sampling procedure employed made the 
generalisation finally legitimate. 
Weaknesses And Degree Of Error Of Survey Investigation Strategy 
An unavoidable weakness of the method used is the degree of error involved in the 
memory of respondents and the personal biases of respondents in stating their actions, 
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attitudes and motivations. Although this research aimed to collect the real facts related to 
respondents' reactions towards rigid land policies and the exact reasons for obtaining 
illegally developed or sold land, it became necessary to depend upon their opinions. 
There was no other suitable method for investigation to collect opinions on incidents of 
exploitation of low income households by infon-nal developers and the possibility of 
malpractice and corruption. Similar attitudinal surveys have already been used by many 
researchers to gather factual information (Shakur, 1991: 522). 
The household data compared with the information provided by property agents 
have further enhanced the accuracy and validity of data collected by this attitudinal and 
motivational survey. It was also possible to record some items of data through 
observations. This provided information for cross checking which enhanced the reliability 
of data from interviewees. Data gathered through observation, include nature and type of 
built structures, front set backs, side set backs, location of the plot with reference to major 
attributes such as roads and community infrastructure etc. The collection of past and 
present land prices and related facts from the inter-views of sample households has been 
found reliable by other researchers (Siembieda, 1994: 154; Pervar, 1993). 
3.4. INVESTIGATION METHODS AND SAMPLE SURVEY 
FRAMEWORK 
After finding inadequate sources of secondary and primary data that were posing 
challenges towards consistency and reliability for ensuring originality in academic 
research, this study found no option than conducting a survey investigation. A household 
survey of owner-occupied residents of formal and informal plots was chosen in order to 
learn about the processes of informal land developments, the agents involved and the 
reasons that motivate households to opt for informal ownership. The research opted for a 
structured, face to face interview of four categories of respondents. The structured 
interview provided an opportunity for the researcher to convince the respondents about 
the utility and confidentiality of the research and allowed observation of the physical 
characteristics of the unauthorised land developments. Three different types of structured 
questionnaires with closed as well as open ended questions were administered to 
households and property agents. A cross sectional (several target populations at one point 
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of time) household survey was conducted to produce reliable data. A special emphasis 
was given to collection of household data. 
3.4.1. Investigation Methods 
In order to answer research questions, and to explain the processes of illegal 
developments and land policy's contribution to their creation, a 'tripartite' social survey 
investigation method was undertaken for this study. The data were collected from a field 
trip to Delhi during July- November 1994. The components of this method are as follows 
(see Chart 3.1): 
-A socio-economic and attitudinal survey of the present day allottees/residents of 
formal land and unauthorised land in Delhi. 
- Interviewing a 'concerned group' consisting mainly of property agents, 
government officials, academics and experts attached to non-governmental 
organisations. Although this group has not provided sufficient information that is 
adequate to compare with attitudinal survey data, their information helped in cross- 
checking and in the collection of secondary information required for various 
analyses. 
- Data collection from the secondary sources mainly on the aspects covered in the 
above fields of investigation for cross-checking, and collection of any other 
additional information about formal and informal land delivery. It was thought that 
these would help in obtaining an adequate understanding of the factors contributing 
to unauthorised land developments. 
3.4.1.1. Attitudinal/ Opinion Survey Of Households Living On Formal And 
Informal Plots 
The household survey was based on two sets of questionnaire survey: (1) allottees/ 
residents living on formally allocated land; and (2) Plot owners of unauthorised land. The 
first set of questionnaire consists of two parts: (i) present residents of formally allocated 
land, and (ii) original allottees who sold off their formal plots. 
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Allottees/ Residents Of Formal Land 
The DDA claims that so far one million formal dwelling units (allocation of built-flats 
and serviced land) have been provided under the development schemes promoted through 
its large-scale public land development and allocation policy. Out of them, 2 major 
schemes provide mainly developed plots for house construction by individuals and co- 
operative societies. The rest are for mainly constructed group housing flats and some are 
land allocated to co-operative housing construction undertaken by the societies. 
Chart 3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METTIODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Did unauthorised land developments 
and land transfers emerge during the 
operation of large-scale public 
land policy? 
What reasons are there for the creation 
and use of illegal settlements and 
unauthorised housing that could have 
been affected by the public land banking 
and delivery? 
What are the ways in which the 
policy of land banking and public 
land delivery could have generated 
the stated reasons for the creation of 
illegal settlements? 
Review of Analysis of operation Analysis of Analysis of attitudinal Analysis of attitudinal Analysis of 
literature of large-scale public attitudinal data of households data of households who attitudinal 
on public land acquisition, data of living on resold formal sold off their formal plots data provided 
land development & disposal households plots supplied by Delhi supplied by Delhi by property 
allocation of Delhi Development living on Development Authorit) Development Authority agents 
& illegal Authority unauthorised (concerned 
development land groups) 
METHODOLOGY 
This part mainly focuses on the Rohini scheme developed for about 82,000 
households of the Economically Weaker Section (EWS), Low Income Group (LIG) and 
Middle Income Group (MIG). The households were selected by income proxy indicator 
and plot size. This scheme had many advantages: (1) large number of low income groups 
would be accommodated, (2) prices were cheaper than in other schemes of the DDA, and 
(3) developed as a integrated sub-city development scheme with other sectors. Recently 
developed (after 1981), it would also represent the effect of changes of allotment criteria 
over times. In this scheme, the layout, the size of plots, the standard of infrastructure and 
the costs were especially worked out considering a large number of low income groups to 
be accommodated. This special element makes this scheme peculiar and most suitable, 
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and it also reduces biases in findings with reference to the criteria of unaffordability of 
low income groups. 
Residents Of Unauthorised Land Develop ment/Ho using 
The target group of this part of the survey was the households living on newly developed 
clusters of unauthorised housing. As the situation of regularised unauthorised colonies is 
different from new developments (Benjamin, 1991), this survey focused on fresh 
subdivisions. An accurate sample frame for this group could not be derived due to lack of 
information from published sources (including census) and office records about the fresh 
unauthorised developments. Therefore, a reconnaissance survey was carried out in order 
to choose appropriate samples (discussed in following section). The Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi also helped to make a list of new unauthorised colonies from the 
applications received towards their likely regularisation. In the absence of accurate data 
on the exact number colonies, their area coverage, population, legal status and uses etc., 
the samples were stratified according to their location and plot sizes. 
3.4.1.2. Interviewing 'Concerned Groups' (Property Agents/Government 
Officials), and Data Collection From The Secondary Sources 
The research also selected real estate property agents, government officials dealing with 
land transactions, academics and experts attached to NGOs. This group include 
experienced individual concerned with informal land developments in Delhi. However, in 
the absence of accurate information about the number of property agents and their sales 
performance, the research surveyed only the agents who were prominent in the area and 
could provide information about recent sales. The survey found that most of the 
government officials dealing with large-scale land developments were new. Therefore, it 
conducted only discussions with them and considered their advice for selection of 
samples. Similarly, a wide range of discussions were held with academics and experts 
attached with Non-Governmental Organisations. The required secondary data was 
collected from government departments, published documents, and unpublished reports 
such as research papers and theses. 
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3.4.2. Sample Survey Framework 
In developing countries sampling frames are either lacking or inaccurate. In this regard 
Bulmer and Warwick (1993) argue that, in developing countries, such extensive 
information is either not available at all, or where it is available is subject to considerable 
degrees of error. In the absence of an accurate sample frame the researchers are compelled 
to adopt poor quality and non-comparability of sampling frames in a variety of Asian 
surveys (ibid). In this research as well, the investigator found that the pre-existing frames 
were inadequate. Therefore, the investigator was left with no choice but seek an 
acceptable deviation from standard probability sampling, namely a quasi-sampling 
technique. In selecting the sample respondents, the investigator fixed the size on a 
convenient basis. 
The samples for the household survey were chosen on the basis of the following 
elements to achieve an accurate picture: (i) the precise picture of the population from 
which they are arawn; (ii) making it small and economically possible; and (iii) ensuring 
the representativeness of target groups to include the characteristics of universe. 
Considering the sensitiveness of unauthorised lands and resulting unavailability of 
accurate universe of sample frames, and difficulty faced in maintaining the rigidity in 
sample choice, the size of the overall sample was determined more as an outcome of 
convenience rather than as a proportion of the population size. As cautioned by Weber 
(1984) sophisticated statistical models were not used to estimate the sample error. 
However, the difficulty of sampling choices was overcome by stratifying the samples in 
terms of geographical area (Lee, 1993: 60), location, and income groups (see Figure 3.1). 
Their stratification reduced the possibility of locationally generated biases. 
3.4.2.1. Key Assumptions and Definitions 
This research assumed that the unauthorised land subdivisions mostly accommodate HIG, 
MIG and LIG households who could have easily participated in the formal land delivery 
process. It also assumed that the plot sizes vary according to their income earning 
capacity. Therefore, a small plot means low income group and a large plot means that is 
owned by a higher income household. Accordingly, the strata for samples were selected 
77 
on the basis of plot sizes rather than their actual income categories which was not 
available before the completion of household survey. It was realised during the pilot 
survey that choosing samples on the basis of income group is extremely difficult, as it is 
very insensitive to ask for household income in a first instance and it would be time 
consuming to conduct a separate survey to identify the income groups of households. 
This research focused on land development that are not authorised by the local municipal 
or planning authority with reference to subdivision regulations as well as building bye- 
laws. The recent income criteria notified by the government has been adopted for 
categorising the surveyed households. 
3.4.2.2. Sample Frame: Unit of Analysis, Target Groups And Respondents 
The survey administered three kinds of questionnaires, each designed for different 
households and groups - one for informal plots, one for formal plots (allotted/residing)', 
and a questionnaire to gather information from property agents. The research also 
conducted informal discussion with government officials dealing with the operation of 
the large-scale land policy. 
The questionnaire administered to allottees of formal plots contained two parts. The 
first part aimed to collect the status of the current user i. e. whether allottee or non- 
allottee, and socio-economic details and type of land transactions that took place. This 
part also aimed to collect the address of the original allottee who sold off his formally 
allocated plot. The second part of the questionnaire gathered facts from original allottee 
who sold away the formal plot allotted by the DDA. Although some of the questions of 
these two interviews were similar, the method of data collection for each of the 
questionnaire was slightly different. The sampling frame which defines every element or 
unit in the population varied as per the kind of survey conducted. 
The household was selected as a convenient unit of analysis for this study (Varley, 
1994; Siembieda, 1994). This matched with the large-scale land policies' definition of the 
family as a household in regard to land delivery. The research also found household as a 
suitable unit because of the usual practice of more than one family living together in an 
extended family, and their space requirements and increased earning capacity influencing 
78 
the household decision. Besides, the research selected property agents as individuals for 
unit of analysis. 
The survey investigation selected the head of the households or allottee of formal 
and informal plots, and property agents as respondents rather than knowledgeable people 
or individuals who have specialised knowledge on the process and have access to 
unpublished materials (Patton and Sawicki, 1993: 98; Hakim, 1987; Bryman and Cramer, 
1990). These respondents were in a position to provide comprehensive data that is 
required for the research either from their personal records or in the forrn of their attitudes 
and motivations because they are themselves role-holders rather than private individuals. 
In order to gather relevant and factual information this research found owner occupied 
plots as appropriate representative units. 
Allottees And Residents Of Formal Land 
1. Households residing in resold formal plots 
The random cluster sampling stratified according to size of plots (based on income group, 
EWS, LIG and MIG) was used to choose the samples of this category of respondents. A 
list of allotted plots by first draw (200 each of EWS, LIG and MIG) held in 1981 were 
obtained from the DDA as sample list. This ensured the accuracy of details with regard to 
name of allottee, date of allotment and other information, and avoided duplication and 
misinformation. It also helped to trace the multiple sales. Of the list supplied by DDA, the 
sectors (number 3,7 and 8) containing plots for all three income groups (EWS, LIG and 
MIG) were chosen as clusters. Then households living in sample plots (list supplied) of 
these clusters were contacted and the original allottees were replaced by their neighbours. 
In all (see Table 3.1), out of 366 households contacted, 106 non-allottee households 
living on formal plots who agreed to participate in survey were interviewed. 
The overall response rate was low as a large number of plot owners of resold plots 
refused to be interviewed. The possible conditions for their refusals include: (1) multiple 
resells that are yet to be registered with the DDA (this violate the condition of resell 
restriction and payment of 50% unearned increments in case of officially permitted 
resells), (2) persons who bought their houses in resells from builders (who sell 
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houses/flats built on vacant lands bought from original allottees), (3) persons occupying 
houses violating building bye-laws in terms of number of floors, amalgamated with one 
or more plots, prescribed designs and uses. 
Table 3.1. Samples collected from the field survey 
Category of Sample Sample Type Numbers 
Contacted 
Number of 
Interviews 
Completed 
Households of unauthorised land Stratified random 625 300 
developments multistage cluster 
sampling 
Formal allottees of Rohini Stratified random 366 106 
cluster sampling 
Formal allottees who resold DDA plots Stratified random 106 28 
Property agents Stratified random 100 69 
In order to gather real facts and addresses of original allottees, this survey had no 
option than to replace in the sample vacant plots, plots under house construction, refused 
respondents, and houses locked (after third contact) with adjacent plots. The research 
found it extremely difficult to obtain the correct addresses of original allottees who sold 
off their formal plots due to large number of informal multiple resells. The address of the 
original allottee and important information such as the cost of sale and number of times 
already sold etc. (which required referring original documents), were collected during a 
second or third trip. 
2. Original allottees who sold off their formal plots 
This part of the formal household survey aimed to survey 106 original plot owners who 
resold their subsidised plots. The overall survey was stratified in terms of income 
category of plots. In order to reduce the waste of travel time and money, only the 
addresses that were complete and advised to be correct by present residents and property 
agents who dealt with those sales were taken up for the search for face to face interviews. 
This survey was conducted by the author himself with the help of a multi-lingual 
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interpreter. After tremendous efforts, 28 "resold allottees" out of 106 plots found resold 
were interviewed. 
Residents Of Unauthorised Land Subdivisions/Housing 
This part of the household survey adopted stratified random multistage cluster sampling 
to select appropriate samples from the target group. Multistage cluster sampling (De 
Vaus, 1991: 67) involves a technique of obtaining a final sample from several different 
samples. Initially, larger areas are selected and then progressively smaller areas within the 
larger ones are sampled. Multistage cluster sampling allows geographically dispersed 
populations to be adequately covered while simultaneously saving interviewer time and 
travel cost. Stratification ensures that clusters are properly represented (Bryman and 
Cramer, 1990: 103). Clusters were chosen first by zones, second by colonies and third by 
plot sizes and use status. 
Because it was assumed that a large number of middle and high income households 
may have chosen unauthorised land subdivisions for investment, commercial and 
speculative reasons, the random samples were further stratified. The stratification was 25 
plots each in the plot categories, 25-100 sq. yards, 101-200 sq. yards, 201-400 sq. yards 
and above 401 sq. yards. In total, out of 625 informal samples proposed, only 300 could 
be filled due to the absence of the head of the households and/or unwillingness to 
participate in the survey. 
In order to increase the accuracy and representativeness of the samples, a maximum 
number of 25 households of each, stratified by plot size, was chosen from each zone. This 
selection helped in checking the reliability and the external consistency but was found 
difficult to maintain due to colony characteristics. The variation of colonies in terms of 
limited plots in a certain category, vacant plots, unavailability of the head of the 
household and refusals have made it difficult to follow rigid sample selection. In all, 40 
colonies varying from I household to 34 households were surveyed 2. 
The most difficult part of this survey is the rigidity towards sample selection. This 
is because of the illegality of plot status and the sensitiveness of the survey. Some of the 
sample households did not agree with the sample choice and few could not be convinced 
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even with the help of colony presidents (see Section 3.5.4). Therefore, this survey could 
not insist and/or approach any household more than once on the basis of sample choice. 
For this mostly newly developed clusters of unauthorised housing were selected 
randomly on the basis of their location in North, South, East, West and Central parts of 
Delhi and colonies were chosen on the basis of their number of plots/houses, nature of 
mixed plot sizes and economic activities (see Figure 3.1). Because sample criteria aimed 
for sufficient samples as per their stratification rather than the whole colony as a case 
(colony sizes vary from a few number of plots to a large number of plots), some clusters 
included more than one colony. 
These colonies were chosen and approached on the basis of infori-nation collected 
from a reconnaissance survey and with the help of information and base map provided by 
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi/ and the DDA. The stratification by one major 
unauthorised settlement in each zone (with the housing standards comparable with the 
plots provided by the DDA) has reduced the prices based biases involved in determining 
the choice of colony/plot. 
Property Agents 
Experienced property agents located around household survey areas were selected 
through stratified random technique. Stratification was done on the basis of location of 
their firm and experience in property transactions. In all, 69 property dealers were 
surveyed. This sample size is sufficient and no further stratification of data was required 
for the analysis since their information is only supportive to household data. 
3.4.3. Explanations For Choosing Samples[Unit Of Analysis And 
Possible Biases And Their Effect On Accurate Samples 
This survey investigation method focused on both formal and unauthorised plots has 
ensured the reliability and in addition reduced the sample error associated with undefined 
large universe. The choice of structured-questionnaire in face to face interviews with 
households and property agents, instead of a postal or telephone survey, increased the 
response rate. 
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Figure 3.1. Location of Surveyed Settlements In Delhi 
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This was because the alternatives are biased to populations having access to postal and 
telephone services, and tend to yield unreliable data to sensitive questions. Furthermore, 
the sampling techniques of stratified random and multistage and/or cluster sampling 
ensured all fractions of population were included and enabled a more representative 
sample of the universe. They have also reduced the possible serious bias towards a 
particular income group and/or a particular use of land that can be promoted by simple 
random and systematic samples. Moreover, the most sensitive information, such as 
informal transaction price, current resale market value, and reasons for unauthorised sales, 
are difficult to obtain through other methods based on rigid samples and unfocused survey 
investigations. The structured face to face interviews with full anonymity and 
confidentiality not only reduced the supply of wrong answers, they also gave an 
opportunity to gather accurate factual information through additional clarifications and 
questions. 
Furthermore, the reliability of the data, the higher rate of response, the credibility of 
the survey amongst the respondents and the authenticity of the survey were established 
through the following ways. (1) The author's temporary affiliation with the local 
university (School of Planning and Architecture) and possession of a introduction letter 
issued by the head of the department of urban planning helped to establish credibility (see 
appendix); (2) the identity letters carried by interviewers and the practice of leaving a 
copy of thanks letter containing full details of the author for future reference for the 
respondents reduced the sensitiveness and established the authenticity of survey; (3) the 
anonymity of the respondents established through not maintaining formal record of 
respondents assured the reliability of the data and also reduced the sensitiveness and 
refusals that are usually observed during household interviews conducted in India 
Srirangan, 1994). 
3.5. METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
Unlike the usual statistical hypothesis testings of causal process of single dependent 
variable and numerous independent variables, this study found numerous dependent and 
independent variables (Hakim, 1987). Therefore, initially the theoretical arguments were 
converted into concepts and then measurable indicators for the appropriate analysis. Some 
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of the concepts were operationalised by defining the variables in terms of specific 
measurable indicators rather than testing relationship between variables. The attitudinal 
data collected from households was analysed in three levels (Chart 3.2). The data 
collected from property agents was analysed in a single level. 
Chart 3.2 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD DATA 
LAND DELIVERY IN DELHI 
Owners of formal land 
Sample size 134 
Owners of unauthorised land 
Sample size 300 
Owners who bought Owners who resold Unauthoised 
resold formal plots formal plots supplied colonies 
supplied by DDA by DDA located in 
Sample size 106 Sample size 28 Delhi 
Sample 
size 84 
Unauthorised Unauthorised Unauthorised Unauthorised 
colonies colonies located colonies located colonies 
located in the in Central Delhi in the North located in the 
West Delhi Sample size 10 Delhi South Delhi 
Sample Sample size 96 Sample size 19 
size 91 
Although the data acquired for the research is predominantly quantitative in nature 
(about 500 subjects), the required analysis of research questions circled around simple 
quantitative, exploratory and qualitative analysis than sophisticated statistical testings. 
The data collected from different sources were analysed in three ways: (1) descriptive 
analysis (mean, mode and median); (2) frequencies; and (3) percentages. It was found that 
the simple descriptive analysis shows clearly very large differences or unexpected 
patterns and associations. Similarly, simple, thoughtfully reported percentages, ratios, 
charts, illustrations, and graphs can lead to powerful insights in policy analysis (Patton 
and Sawicki, 1993: 115). Besides, summarising data by frequencies and categorised 
multiple response sets for certain questions (that involved more than one answer from 
each respondent) has supplied adequate results of univariate or single variable for reliable 
findings. Cross-tabulation and scatter diagrams are used to observe pattern of direction of 
85 
change between two or more variables (Bryman and Cramer, 1990: 6; Patton and Sawicki, 
1993: 121). 
This study had certain limitations in the analysis. Some of the households who 
bought their property as a built house from builders have stated their prices as total 
package (land and house) price rather than just land price. There is no fixed formula to 
isolate this price because of various other factors playing dominant roles in determining 
house prices. Therefore this research has not utilised the property (house) price 
information supplied by households who did not know their land prices. Due to time 
constraint and the specific focus of this research, the formal household survey was limited 
to only the developed formal plots allocated by the DDA. 
Although an approach that seeks to examine the possible associations/relationships 
or interrelatedness seems useful, rigorous linear or exponential multivariate analysis is 
beyond the scope of the present study. The statistical standards employed shed some light 
on the possible co-occurrences, associations and directions of some key variables. 
3.6. CONVERSION OF LAND PRICES AND MEASURING UNITS 
The measurements of land prices and area vary from place to place. In Delhi the prices are 
referred in Indian Rupees and they are often said in total plot and house prices. As the size 
of the plot owned varies from person to person, and the size of formal land allocations 
varies according to income earning status of the household, the prices are uniformly 
converted into a single unit called square metres. The process and method of conversions 
are shown below. 
Land Prices And Money Value Changes 
Land prices are reported in the form of either absolute prices and/or real prices. Recently, 
the Fitzwilliam Memorandum (1991) has suggested the conversion of all prices into real 
prices using consumer price index because the rate of change in land price in absolute 
terms do not signify a change in the real terms due to money value changes over the years 
(also see Pervar, 1993: 152). Therefore absolute land prices are either converted (Amitabh, 
1994) or used as they are (Pervar, 1993: 152). The conversion operation is performed to 
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enable an accurate comparison to be drawn between years regardless of inflation. This is 
mostly used when the prices are analysed over a period of time or the price increase is 
gauged for drawing some important conclusions. 
This research neither analysed the prices in terms of their increase nor performed 
any time series analysis. It compared formal prices with informal prices and mostly 
analysed the people's opinion on entry costs. Therefore it did not require to convert 
absolute prices into real prices. Furthermore, the consumer price index for Delhi is 
reported in three categories such as industrial workers, non-manual employees and 
agricultural labourers. The first two categories have connection to the study because they 
are confined to the urban part of Delhi. However, the third category cannot be neglected 
as there are large numbers of agricultural land in the Delhi City State. Therefore the 
prices reported in this study are absolute prices in Indian Rupees. 
Conversion Of Measuring Units 
As the informal land sales take place in square yards where as formal land sales/plot 
allocation is done in square metres in Delhi, this study uses square metres to maintain 
consistency and to facilitate a comparison of different data sets. This conversion method 
is also adopted to plot sizes and prices that are stated in square yards, square feet and 
other local traditional measurement units such Bigas and Biswas etc., in office records 
and household interviews. During the initial period of land disposal, the DDA and other 
developers used square yards as the unit of measurement of public land disposal and, 
similarly, some of the private developers used this measurement. These units were also 
converted into square metres. Wherever land prices and plot sizes were quoted in square 
yards and square feet they were converted into square metres using the standard 
conversion tables. The traditional units are converted on the basis of Bigha = 27,220 
square feet or 2529 square metres (Amitabh, 1994). This study felt the median value (that 
splits a distribution in half) as an appropriate indicator to compare land prices due to the 
limited observed values reported in the survey investigation (Rowntree, 1981). 
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3.7. SUMMARY 
This study adopted the survey investigation approach in order to gather the appropriate 
data required to answer the research questions. The data was collected from three major 
investigation methods: attitudinal survey of formal (134 households) and informal land 
owners (300 households), concerned groups primarily concerning property agents (69 
agents) and secondary sources. Due to unavailable accurate sample frame, the study 
adopted convenient non-probabilistic sample frame. The stratified random sample 
technique (and stratified them by multistages and clusters) was used to reduce the sample 
error. The samples for informal were chosen all over Delhi were stratified by proxy 
indicators such as location, plot size and uses. Samples for formal plots selected from 
Rohini formal integrated land development project were stratified by proxy indicator plot 
size. 
The data acquired through face to face questionnaire survey and questionnaires 
were pilot surveyed before the final survey. The questions were designed considering the 
availability of information, level of sensitiveness, respondent's interest and 
appropriateness to the study. The collected data were entered through spreadsheet 
package and analysed in SPSS package. The analysis of the data was carried out on three 
levels and it primarily used exploratory data analysis. The analysis of this data and the 
conclusions drawn from them are explained in Chapters 5,6 and 7. The following 
Chapter 4 describes the growth of Delhi and the origin of the large-scale public land 
policy. 
Endnotes for Chapter 3 
' In order to ensure adequate representativeness and accuracy of data, the research has not 
used the information gathered from a questionnaire aimed to collect facts from registered 
applicants of DDA (non-allottees of formal land) who are waiting for plots/flats and 
government officials whose information was felt to be useful in the beginning. The 
reasons for rejecting this information supplied by these respondents are explained in the 
following section. 
88 
2A colony is a housing settlement locally meaning a group of houses. Their names vary 
depending upon the colonisers and the people living in them. They also vary in terms of 
plot sizes and socio-economic characteristics. A large number of colonies form part of a 
big unauthorised settlement (ex. Uttarn Nagar) but they are referred to by different names. 
Due to unavailable data, these colonies could not be clustered for the purpose of a sample 
frame. The survey was confined to available sampled plot sizes in a colony rather than the 
colony's total plots. 
89 
Chapter 4 
THE GROWTH OF DELHI AND URBAN LAND 
POLICIES 
4.1. PREAMBLE 
It is still unknown what kind of land policy and public intervention would enable the land 
markets to provide all users with sufficient land for planned uses and affordable housing. 
As a result, in literature, a large number of discussions can be found addressing the 
problem, i. e. what should be the appropriate policies and their instruments, and levels of 
government interventions that would guarantee an efficient land allocation. These 
discussions also concern with the policies that would provide greater efficiency in urban 
planning, and a greater equity or social justice in providing access to land for housing 
(Kitay, 1985: 4). A large number of governments have, therefore, adopted innovative 
policies to keep the supply ahead of demand, and consequently to provide access to land 
to all users and especially to economically disadvantaged groups. Some of these suggested 
policies have demonstrated competence in addressing these issues. For example, the public 
Swedish municipal leasehold system that existed since 1924 (UNCHS, 1983: 45), and 
Delhi's scheme of large-scale public land acquisition, development and disposal that has 
been existing since 1961 (Maitra, 1991). These policies aimed at providing sufficient land 
for planned development and for housing through public acquisition, development and 
leasehold disposal. 
Although, these polices concern with basic objective of public intervention for 
achieving efficiency and equity in the methods, modes and uses of land supply their history 
indicate that they were rather aiming to solve a particular problem. Therefore, this Chapter 
discusses the basic issues that gave rise to Delhi's large-scale public land policy and the 
basic concepts concerning to those issues. It also describes the specific instruments, tools, 
terms and conditions of this policy that are expected to promote appropriate supply, use 
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controls, building regulation, and control of investment and speculation to stabilise land 
values and ensure access to housing land to genuine users. 
4.2. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF 
INDIA 
India, a union of states, is a Sovereign, Secular, Democratic Republic with a Parliamentary 
system of Government. The country is divided into 26 states and 6 Union Territories for 
administrative purpose. India is the second most populous and the seventh largest country 
in the world. It is a major democracy in South Asia with variations in cultural, climatic and 
geographical features of sub-continental proportions (Sundaram, 1989). The 1991 census 
revealed that the country has a population of 846 million spread over an area of about 3.3 
million square kilometres. The rate of growth of urban population was 3.1 % per annum 
during the decade 1981-91 (Jain et al., 1993: 27). The economy is predominantly 
agricultural, with about 34.5% of the national income being derived from agriculture and 
allied activities at 1989 prices, and about 68% of the working force engaged in 
agriculture and allied sector in 1991. The economy has been undergoing structural 
transformation, with an increasing proportion of the national income being derived from 
secondary and tertiary activities, and a decline in the workforce in agriculture (Sundaram, 
1989; Sarin, 1980). However, it is also noted that there were serious inequalities in the 
distribution of urban incomes, with 40% of the households having less than 16% of the 
total income, and the top 20% having 49% of the total income (Sundaram, 1989). About 
38.2% of the urban population is estimated to have been living below the poverty line in 
1983-84. Another significant by-product of inequality has been the problem of rising 
unemployment and under employment (Sarin, 1980: 94). 
The Indian Constitution lays down a division of functions and powers between the 
Central and State governments, and also a Concurrent List (common functions). Functions 
such as housing, urban development, water supply and civic services fall within the 
purview of the state governments, and they are legally competent to formulate and execute 
schemes and policies for human settlements, mobilise resources and implement various 
programmes (Sundaram, 1989). The state governments have enacted different laws and 
regulations concerning the municipal bodies, urban development authorities, functional 
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agencies for housing and services, town and regional planning, and regulation of private 
development etc. Despite the constitutional position, the Central Government plays a 
significant role in the governance of urban areas. Since the country has adopted the 
strategy of development through centralised planning, all policies for econon-fic and social 
planning are co-ordinated at the national level by the Central Ministries concerned within 
the framework of Five Year Plans and devolution of the resources to the states. Apart 
from the outlays for housing and urban development made in the State Plans, the central 
budget makes provision for earmarked outlays on schemes of special importance and for 
assistance to specialised housing and urban institutions. This is of course over and above 
the direct expenditure on schemes in the special territories like Delhi. The Central 
Ministries control much of the investments in the National capital. In certain cases, the 
Central Parliament enacted legislation for a particular aspect of urban development or 
housing with the concurrence of the states as in the case of the urban land ceiling law, or 
pollution control laws (Sundaram, 1989). 
India has recorded a relatively slow but stable rate of growth in its urban population 
since 1921 during which its levels of urbanisation rose from 11.3% to 25.7%. The rate of 
growth of urban population was 3.1 % per annum during the decade 1981-91 (Jain et al., 
1993: 27). The urban-rural growth differential has since then increased steadily. There 
were 3768 urban areas/towns in 1991 of which 23 cities with population exceeding one 
million. India has a stable settlement structure, where there is a progressive accretion to 
existing settlements of all sizes. Analysing 1991 census results, Jain et al., (1993) stated 
that the urban population is increasingly concentrated in the cities, and particularly in the 
million plus cities, and economic activities are gradually getting localised in such places as 
well as in their surrounding areas. They also noted that due to this process cities attract 
more and more people from neighbouring rural areas and other parts of the country. 
The four major metropolitan cities of Calcutta, Bombay (now called Mumbai), Dell-ii 
and Madras (now called Chennai) are of vital importance as their prosperity and efficient 
functioning are of national concern. Although, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras are state 
capitals and major centres of commercial and financial activities in their respective regions, 
Delhi has emerged as the major manufacturing, trading and financial centre for the entire 
northern region apart from its political and administrative importance as the capital of the 
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nation. Delhi, a historic city, being the capital of India since before the independence of 
India in 1947, it has been a focal centre of the country's development and growth. It plays 
a crucial role during social, ethnic and community violence. In the Indian federal set up, 
Delhi was a Union Territory directly administered by the Central Government until 1991 
when the National Capital Territory Act was enacted to provide a special statehood status 
to the city. 
All the urban local bodies are in the domain of the state governments under the 
constitutional division of powers. In Indian urban planning, the concept of a metropolitan 
region is of recent origin. The Delhi Development Authority was the first metro-level 
agency to be set up, and it was charged with the responsibility of planning and co- 
ordination, land development and housing, and provision of developed land to meet the 
needs of different state agencies and for low income housing. Delhi's set-up functioned as 
a model for setting up of a metropolitan level authority for planning and execution of 
priority schemes in Calcutta in 1970, and later in many other cities including Bombay and 
Madras. The metro authorities in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras have benefited from the 
interaction with the World Bank, at least financially, while the Delhi authority is nurtured 
by the Central Government. All Indian metro agencies continue to search for a role, the 
choice varying between several models (Sundaram, 1989): (i) real estate development and 
city beautification as in Delhi; (ii) public works programme tempered by a growing 
planning and facilitatory role as in Calcutta; and (iii) region wide investment progranu-ning 
and co-ordination as in Bombay and Madras. 
4.3. URBAN GROWTH OF DELHI AND RESIDENTIAL LAND 
PROBLEMS 
As shown in Table 4.1, Delhi's total population has grown from 0.9 million in 1941 to 1.7 
million in 195 1, and it has further increased to 9.4 rnillions in 199 1. However, the decadal 
growth rate of population which was 90% in 1951 has gradually decreased to 51% in 1991 
supporting the suggestions of researchers that Delhi received a large number of in- 
migrants due to the partition of India during post-independence period (Srinivas, 1995: 66; 
Jerry, 1991: 4; Sundaram and Gambhir, 1990). 
93 
The Census of India reports have also recorded that the number of urban households 
has grown from 0.8 million in 1971 to 1.2 millions in 1981 (50% increase). It has further 
rose to about 1.7 miflions in 1991 (42% increase). This indicates that the growth of 
households is faster than the growth of total population in Delhi which may have been 
caused by change in family structures. 
Table 4.1 Demographic growth of Delhi 
Indicators 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 * 
Total Population (millions) 1.7 2.7 4.0 6.2 9.4 12.8 
Urban Population (millions) 1.4 2.4 3.6 5.7 8.4 12.2 
Rural Population (millions) 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.6 
Decadal growth of Population +90 +52 +53 +53 +51 +36 
Urban area (sq. km) NA NA NA 448 
(30%) 
NA 688 
(46%) 
* indicates estimated figures; ** indicates % of total area. 
NA means data not available. 
Source: Census of India, 1971,1981,1991 and DDA records. 
It is also noted in literature that the growth of migratory population is more than the 
natural growth due to Delhi's attraction as the administrative capital of India and its 
position as a major centre of commercial and economic activities in northern part of India. 
The Census of India recorded that the ratio of increase of natural growth to migration 
which was 1: 2 in 1951 has declined to 1: 1.1 during 1971-76 has slightly increased to 1: 1.5 
in 1991 and projected to be about 1: 1.3 during the decade 1991-2001 (Master Plan, Delhi 
2001). However, it is observed from secondary data that the share of natural growth of 
population has been declining over years and in-migration has emerged as a main factor for 
the rapid growth of Dell-ý (NCRPB, 1988: 14-15). Thus, it cannot be denied that migration 
is a factor that contributed to the growth of Delhi's population. As an effect of the 
population growth, the urban area is likely to expand from 30% of total Delhi State 
territory to an estimated 46% in 2001. Figure 4.1 shows the directions of physical 
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expansion during various time periods. Thus, Delhi being the administrative capital of 
India it had experienced large number of forces acting against the strategy of a planned 
urban development and provision of adequate infrastructure and services. 
4.3.1. Land Supply For Housing And Urban Development Prior To 
Large-scale Public Land Policy In Delhi 
The origin of large-scale public land policy in Delhi concerns with certain circumstances 
that demanded direct public intervention. Those important circumstances are: (1) inability 
of the government to supply adequate housing and civic services to the growing number of 
in-migrant households due mostly that the land was primarily owned by private who 
preferred to subdivide and sale plots themselves; and (2) the government was unable to 
I supply adequate 
land for housing and planned development due to the lack of public 
control on privately owned land. Moreover, the newly-formed independent government 
was enthusiastic to find solutions to the problems that affected large number of 
households. They felt the necessity of public control on city land. The following discusses 
the formal mechanisms of land supply that existed prior to Delhi's large-scale land policy. 
The government supplied both leasehold and freehold plots along with private land 
developers for urban development and housing during pre-independence period. The 
territory of Delhi was known as the Imperial Delhi Estate and it was a part of Punjab 
province (GOI, 1989: 20). Later, after the change of capital of India from Calcutta to 
Delhi, a statutory body called Delhi Improvement Trust (DIT) was set up in 1937 through 
a parliamentary Act to control building operations, land use, and development schemes. 
The DIT carried out development and it disposed of plots on leasehold in some areas and 
also sold developed plots on freehold in some areas such as Shakti Nagar and Roop Nagar. 
Land supply during post-independence period has undergone many changes. The 
partition of the country after the independence in 1947, caused a massive influx of refugees 
from Pakistan, and most of them moving into the major cities. During this time haphazard 
growth of housing and slum creation has taken place in Delhi due to both scarcity of 
accommodation and increasing land prices caused by land speculation. 
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Figtire 4.1 Physical Growth and Directions of Spatial Expansion of Urban 
Delhi at Different Periods of'rime 
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As stated in DDA records, the situation continued unmanageable with shortage of 
civic services, old city bursting at the seams, and unauthorised land grabbers invading the 
periphery of Delhi. A mass of humanity were sheltered in common places such as 
Dharamshalas', Temples, Mosques, Gurdwaras, River bank mausoleums, old forts, and 
other structures in and around the city. The residential places turned partly into factories. 
This situation has been further accentuated by the influx of migrants arriving from 
neighbouring states in search of employment. The DIT and municipal bodies were not 
adequately equipped to deal with the grave situation. As a result, serious problems such as 
increasing land prices, increasing unauthorised land developments, and deterioration of 
planned development etc., could not be tackled by the local authorities (GOI, 1989: 20). 
During this time, in order to meet the housing demand and to bring down the 
housing shortage, the Ministry of Rehabilitation developed about 11,077 double storey 
units, 16317 single storey units with provision for adding another floor, 652 flats, 1,760 
staff quarters, 10489 cheap houses, 3685 developed plots covering in all some 64,827 
households and 845 shop-cum-residence units. Besides, various Government departments 
such as the Ministry of Works, Central Public Works Department, Municipal Corporation 
of Delhi, New Delhi Municipal Committee, Delhi Administration, Railways and Police 
etc., have developed their staff quarters. Furthermore, private developers, with the 
approval of layouts by the DIT, sold plots on freehold basis. In the 1950's many Co- 
operative housing societies were also indulged in land acquisition, development, marking 
plots and later allotting them to their members for construction of houses. 
However, due to increasing unsatisfied housing demand, clandestine colonisers sold 
cheap, undeveloped and/or marginally developed plots in unauthorised colonies without 
the permission of DIT. In these colonies, the land sales were made legal under the transfer 
of property act, 1982 but land development was illegal as the planning permission was not 
obtained. Apparently, the provision of services were not extended to these areas. These 
private developers developed land informally around refugee rehabilitation colonies and 
camps, and along major access routes, taking advantage of existing infrastructure and the 
lack of government control. 
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In 195 1, the DIT inquiry committee headed by G. D. Birla found that the DIT's 
operation has prevented even a partial solution to the housing problem in Delhi, because: 
1. several agencies were entrusted without proper co-ordination of efforts, and there was 
no supervision and planning of their activities; 
2. DIT's development regulation was pursued without a Civic Survey or Master Plan, and 
without proper zoning; 
3. it was mostly depending upon CPWD for execution of development works; and 
4. its policy of selling land on highest bidder or tender regardless of the considerations of 
their requirement for genuine housing encouraged land speculation. 
This committee then recommended a ýjjýle planning and controlling authority for 
the whole urban area of Delhi with full independence, extensive planning powers, and 
financial autonomy. Consequently, in 1955, a Town Planning Organisation was 
constituted, and an Interim General Plan was prepared as prelude to the Master Plan; and 
the Delhi Development Authority (Provisional Authority) was set up to implement the 
plan. Later, through the Delhi Development Act, 1957, all the employees of DIT and DDA 
(Provisional) became the employees of Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The DDA 
transferred the Interim General plan into Master Plan and brought into effect in September 
1962. The DDA then framed its own building bye-laws. The Master Plan for Delhi 1961- 
81, conceived a policy scheme of large-scale public land acquisition, development and 
disposal2 to facilitate the implementation of the plan by securing a high degree of public 
control on land. This scheme later continued as a public land policy. Literature also 
suggests that besides land supply constraints colonial land use perspectives have played a 
crucial role in determining informal land developments and supply in Delhi. The following 
section discusses the situation of colonial land use and its influence on formation of 
unauthorised land developments. 
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4.3.2. Colonial Land Use Perspectives Prior To Large-scale Public Land 
Policy In Delhi 
Delhi, witnessed many invasions and power changes over centuries. In fact, it consists of 
seven cities in it. The arrival of the British in 1803 marked the beginning of a new period in 
Delhi's history. Under British rule, Delhi grew to become a large city. It came under 
British rule after 1857, and in 1911 the British decided to make it their capital. In 1912 
the British moved the capital of British India from Calcutta to the partially completed New 
Delhi. Construction of New Delhi was completed by 193 1. 
In Delhi, New Delhi part (the 20th century colonial settlement) largely still is, an area 
of very low residential density, originally planned and built according to the values of the 
metropolitan society, as interpreted by and for the use of a colonial culture (King, 1976: 6). 
Since the end of colonial rule, this extensive area has been modified, though not 
fundamentally changed, by further development (ibid: 8). King (1976) believes that 
technology, levels of living, capital available for improvement, caste and ethnic-linguistic 
and religious diversity, and other cultural concomitants influenced development of Delhi 
since its origin. It can be assumed that these factors have also contributed to 
encouragement of formation of illegal land developments. 
Pre- independence Land Use Perspectives 
The colonial administration has created two culturally and functionally specialised areas: 
one colonial urban settlement, primarily military and administrative; and the second 
indigenous settlement, primarily residential, commercial and industrial (King, 1976: 209). 
There has been a cultural boundary between colonial urban settlement and areas occupied 
by indigenous people. The new settlement that was planned as a political, administrative 
and residential area has been continued, and a century later similar provision was made, 
albeit on a larger scale (ibid). 
King (1976) believes that Delhi was built on the principle of duplication, of 
providing separate and different provision for each cultural section in the city and cultural 
as well as political factors that accounted for spatial use deternfined by its size. There were 
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startling differences in living standards. It could be possible that having been linked to 
metropolitan social, political and cultural models for years, the de-colonised society found 
replacement task easily unachievable. 
Therefore, the "... levels of urbanisation, space standards and the quality of urban 
life have historically been a consequence resulting from what is desirable and what is 
attainable at any particular time and within a particular economic, political and cultural 
context" (King, 1976: 281) could have played a vital role in encouraging infon-nal 
developments. 
Because the institutionalisation of norms, whether they relate to housing or law, is 
governed by what is socially, culturally and politically acceptable and despite 
modifications in most cities the basic pattern has often seem to have remained. As 
suggested by King (1976), this initial structuring of inequalities for housing, services and 
spatial standards could have encouraged newcomers of the city to restore the old 
structural pattern. They could have also attracted new elite's flow into the expanded area 
of the old colonial settlement. Thus, urban development of Delhi began with the de-facto 
or implicit recognition of racial inequality and discrimination that would appear to continue 
to divide rich from indigenous poor. 
As suggested by King (1976: 285) at 'independence' the new occupants of the 
colonial city inherited a physical-spatial structure tailor-made to reproduce a system of 
'housing classes' and stratification identical with the old. The colonial bungalows of New 
Delhi still function as major symbols of status whether occupied by foreign diplomats, 
business elite's or government ministers. Their style and pattern of urban residence 
introduced during colonial era could have become a reference model with a liberal spatial 
norms, and could have encouraged the rich and affordable groups to violate the planning 
regulations introduced by the Master Plans and regulated through public land policy. 
Post-independence Land Use Perspectives 
It is suggested that the post-independence developments have led to a spatial, if not a 
cultural or social integration of spatially separated units by a process of residential and 
institutional 'infilling'. A permanent process of in-n-ligration from neighbouring areas has 
added squatter settlements to the urban fringe as well as vacant lots in the city. During the 
19th and 20th centuries - the most rapid period of growth for the industrial city - vested 
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interests prevailed in the competition for urban space, with the planning authority 
performing either a negative or delaying function (ibid: 24). Functional specialisation of 
land use had taken place, resulting in the separation of place of work from place of 
residence. Socially, the elite-mass dichotomy characteristic of pre-industrial society had 
been replaced with a social structure that was increasingly differentiated in terms of 
occupation, income, life-style and, location, style and scale of residential expectation 
(ibid: 36). Thus, the metropolitan society, as part of processes of social differentiation, an 
emerging middle and upper-middle-class elite from whose ranks the residents of colonial 
urban development were drawn could have played a crucial role in violating planning 
standards of Master Plan and land development process of land policy. 
However, the literature also indicate that the growth rate of Delhi has been very high 
during post-independence era due to partition and in-migration and the city administration 
had to cope with rapid increase of land demand with comparatively less resources. From 
this point of view, the government's attempt to supply adequate land has been an 
unparalleled achievement. This could be possible only by the advantage which the 
government has had in owning a large part of the urban land and therefore being in a 
position to control development to a certain extent (King, 1976: 275). 
4.4. URBAN LAND POLICIES FORMULATED IN RESPONSE TO 
LANDPROBLEMS 
A variety of land policy instruments were executed as part of government intervention in 
land (UNCHS, undated: 44; Baken and Linden, 1992) in order to control land market and 
to promote planned urban land development and management. It is observed that all of 
these instruments have certain benefits when they are exercised by the government. 
Moreover, in developing countries where private sectors hold vacant land at prime 
locations off the market until the demand increases the price emphasised a special 
approach with more than one policy instrument that could not only put the private 
speculation off, but also ensured that the government intervention was successful (Kitay, 
1985: 4; Mattingly, 1993). Therefore, the government of India's concern for a large-scale 
integrated land policy for the whole nation and effective special policies for cities need no 
emphasis in aiming to promote balanced growth and provision of shelter for all. 
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4.4.1. Urban Land Policy of India 
Ribeiro (1992) noted that an exclusive national urban land policy was not adopted by the 
Central Government but several co-ordinated measures were in operation. These 
measures supported the formation and execution of the policy for land development, 
disposal and management in Delhi. Thus, although the overall land policy of India and 
public land policy of Delhi are logically different, the former is always connected to latter 
because some of the national objectives are followed in the latter (Delhi). 
On the basis of recommendations submitted by a high level committee on Indian land 
policy, the following objectives were set to be possible to be achieved by the governments' 
active participation and controls in the land market (Baken and Linden, 1992: 59; Acharya, 
1988: 1428; Howland, 1977: 54, DDA, 1982: 2; DDA, 1986: 16; Sundaram. and Gambhir, 
1990: 3): (a) to achieve an optimum social use of land; (b) to make land available in adequate 
quantities at right times, and for reasonable prices consistent with the requirements of various 
sectors including public authorities, individuals and especially the poorer households; (c) to 
promote co-operative and community effort including legitimate activities of private developers 
(through individual builders in housing land development and construction); (d) to control 
unfettered increase in land prices, and to prevent speculative profits and concentration of land 
ownership in a few private hands; and (e) using land as a major resource for development. 
The economic development plans such as the third National five-year plan (1961-66) 
also gave direction to the control of urban land prices through public acquisition of land. 
The fourth five year plan stressed the urgency of an integrated urban land policy 
concerning land acquisition and stabilising land values. It also favoured positive steps for 
balanced economic activities so as to reduce pressure on large urban agglomerations 
through a regional approach to the problems of urban development. These objectives not 
only demanded an integrated land policy with more than one prominent instrument, but 
also encouraged the execution of a large-scale public land allocation policy. This further 
facilitated the continuation of execution of large-scale public land policy for more than 
three decades in Delhi. 
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4.4.2. Land Policies of Delhi - The Scheme of Large-scale Public 
Acquisition, Development And Disposal Of Land 
The main goals of large-scale land policy scheme were to: 
(i) check land speculation and investment; 
(ii) stabilise land prices in urban areas of Delhi; and 
(iii) ensure that plots are obtained by those people only who need them for permissible 
uses. 
The salient features of this scheme can be described as: (1) ensuring optimum 
utilisation of land by restricting the size of residential plots to affordable level, and 
allocation of housing land to households who do not own a house or residential plot in 
Delhi; (2) stabilising land prices by cross-subsidisation through auctions and subsidised 
allocations to selected parties and/or individuals who otherwise would not have been able 
to afford housing; (3) facilitating private investment in housing through leasing out certain 
number of residential plots by public auction and promoting co-operative sector; (4) 
checking speculation by leasehold public allocation to individuals (allocation of only one 
plot per family), co-operative societies, institutions and local governments, restricting 
transfer of plots, and urging construction on allocated plot within a specified time; and (5) 
ensuring planned development according to Master Plans and building bye-laws. 
Major thrust of the policy is to implement the land use plan proposed by the Master 
Plans. Figure 4.2 shows the land use plan of Delhi, 2001. It shows the proposed 
distribution of planned land uses and their spatial allocation. Its superimposition on the 
spatial distribution of existing informal settlements shows the situation of violation and 
misuse of planned land uses. It also shows the proposed distribution of non-residential 
land uses and transportation network with an idea of possible expansion urban area. 
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4.4.2.1. Major Concepts, Instruments And Tools Of Delhi's Land Policy 
In order to implement the major objectives of the land policy, Delhi's land policy followed 
many concepts. These include advance public land banking, public development, leasehold 
delivery, cross- subsidi sation, and revolving fund. The Chart 4.1 shows the major policy 
instruments and their respective objectives hoped to be achieved in Delhi. 
The concept of advance public land banking was conceived in order to ensure that 
public acquisition is possible, and the existing land is put into right use envisaged in the 
Master Plan. This concept facilitated notification and acquisition of the entire land within 
the urbaniasable area proposed in the Master Plan earlier. This concept was implemented 
through the expropriation and price-freezing tools that reduced the land acquisition prices 
to a lower level which the government could afford. 
In order to prevent resale of subsidised land and to prevent speculation and 
investment on land, the policy proposed leasehold public land delivery to all uses. Land 
acquired under this scheme vests in the name of president of India. Here, land allocation 
was restricted to plot sizes not exceeding 800 square yards for individuals. Also the land 
allocation terms and conditions ensured that the land would be allocated to only genuine 
leasehold users (non-speculators) as identified by the policy. Leases of 20 years and 90 
years have been granted. 
In order to provide affordable housing land to all users, the public land policy 
proposed cross-subsidisation formula. Under this formula, a considerable amount of land 
auctioned for commercial, industrial and high income residential uses. The profits earned 
from auctions facilitated for cross-subsidisation of prices to low income groups. Besides, 
land was allocated on pre-determined (reduced) rates to following groups: (1) land 
owners whose land was acquired for development; (2) industrialists who are being asked 
to remove their factories from their present locations; (3) co-operatives housing societies 
belonging to low and middle income groups, and (4) certain other categories as approved 
by the government from time to time. The revenue accrued from these auctions were used 
to finance city development projects and acquisition of land for land bank. 
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Another major instrument proposed in this policy was the concept of revolving fund. 
It functioned as a method of financing large-scale land supply and sustaining the urban planning 
effort by establishing a revolving cycle of acquisition-development-disposal-acquisition. In the 
beginning Rs. 50 million were placed by the Central Government. Later it was augmented by 
another 73 million to meet the requirements of the scheme. Afterwards, the government has 
widened the utilisation of revolving fund for the expenses including construction of 
factories/industries, warehouses, bus terminals, special markets, and development of 
district/community centres etc. 
Initially, the large-scale land policy had proposed four modes of land supply: (1) 
government housing by Central Public Works Department; (2) supply of land for private housing, 
industrial and manufacturing use, shopping centres and business premises, public and private 
institutions, and public utilities and community facilities by Delhi Development Authority; (3) 
supply of land slum/squatter relocation and allocation of land for the industries to be relocated 
by Municipal Corporation of Delhi; and (4) land development and allocation by co-operative 
house building societies and industrial co-operatives. To start with the policy attempted to 
provide limited undeveloped land. Later it supplied only developed land. Some of the strategies 
that formed integral part of this policy were freezing of private land development activities in 
order to reduce the competition and to abolish market-oriented approach. 
4.4.2.2. Policy Tools Of Regulatory Planning And Urban Development 
The tools available from the Master Plan for the implementation of this policy are: land use 
measures; development controls; and unified building bye-laws. The Master Plan also regulated 
the size of the plots, height of the buildings, ground coverage and floor area ratio, etc. It also 
prescribed norms and standards for the public and semi-public facilities. It provides yardsticks for 
subdividing land into housing, commercial, industrial and other uses. Building construction is 
being controlled by the DDA in the areas declared as "development area" under Delhi 
Development Act, until their transfer to Municipal Corporation of Delhi for maintenance of 
building activity. 
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The land use in the city is controlled through the land use plan prepared as a part of Master 
Plan (see Figure 4.2). In order to maintain appropriate land use and control the development, the 
areas have been designated as "use zones" as per the development code of Master Plan. The 
development in these use zones is carried out in accordance with the regulations as laid down in 
the development code. The plan also proposed a gross residential density of 350-400 persons 
per hectare at the city level, and an overall density of 180 to 200 persons per hectare. 
Maximum size of private land holding in Urban Delhi is 500 square metres as per Urban 
Land Ceiling Act. This is further reduced to a maximum of 350 square metres in case of 
residential development by the Master Plans for Delhi. Land subdivision is done as per the norms 
and standards earmarked in the Master Plans and land is allocated as per the terms and conditions 
of development schemes derived from the land policy. The residential land is allocated (allotted 
or auctioned) on the basis of income, affordability, residency and other eligibility criteria. The 
beneficiaries have primarily been selected by the income range decided by the DDA from time to 
time. 
Land developed for different uses have been allocated on seniority basis and mostly on 
draw of lots and/or auctions depending upon the use and allotment criteria. The land is delivered 
either on the basis of temporary allotment of short term lease or perpetual lease allotment of long 
term. The residential plots are allocated through auction for higher income households and 
allotted by draw of lots to others. The land delivery also controls the administration of lease 
deeds, mortgages, extension of time for building construction, sale permissions, and mutation to 
the legal heirs of the deceased original leases. The land developed for commercial and industrial 
uses were mostly allocated through auctions. The plots were also allotted for parking lots, taxi 
stands on licence fee basis and conveyance deed is being executed for built-up properties. 
4.4.2.3. Public Land Delivery Terms And Conditions Of Housing Land 
The Delhi Development Authority imposed a number of terms and conditions in allocation of 
land for housing and other uses as part of formal public land delivery in Delhi. Those conditions 
can be grouped into three sub-categories: (1) general terms and conditions for the selection of 
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beneficiaries; (2) lease deed conditions for the regulation of use, subdivision, building bye-laws, 
resale or speculation; and (3) tenure, financial and legal obligations. 
General Terms And Conditions For Selection Of Beneficiaries 
Some specific terms and conditions have been applied in land allocations. These are: (1) applicant 
has to be a citizen of India and an adult at the time filling application; (2) only one plot or flat Is 
allocated per family; (3) a condition of considerable period of time of residency in Delhi; (4) the 
total annual income of the individual from all sources including the income of spouse and minor 
children should be as per the prescribed income criteria; (5) advance deposit as prescribed by the 
scheme concerned should be paid at the time of submitting application for registration; (6) the 
allotment plots/flats made on phases by draw of lots among the eligible applicants; (7) variable 
plot sizes fixed as per the schemes concerned and as per prevailing standards at that time; and (8) 
allotment of developed land is done on prescribed predetermined (PDR) and auctioned rates. 
Lease deed conditions for the regulation of land 
Further, the following conditions were imposed on residential lease deed execution and 
regulation of land: (1) the residential building should be erected, after obtaining, and in 
accordance with, the sanction of the building plan with necessary designs, plans and 
specifications of Municipal or other authority; (2) the construction to be completed within two 
years of the delivery of the possession of the plot; (3) the plot or building thereon will not be 
used for a purpose other than that of residence; (4) the lessee shall not be entitled to subdivide 
the plot or to amalgamate it with any other plot; and (5) the lessee shall not sell or transfer the 
whole or any part of the plot before or after the erection of the building without the prior 
permission of the lessor. The permission of resale refused for a period of ten years from the 
commencement of the lease. However, 50% of unearned increase in the value (i. e. the difference 
between the premium paid and the market value) of the plot to be paid to the lessor at the time of 
transfer. 
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Tenure, Financial And Legal Obligation 
A number of conditions have been executed as part of obligation norms: (1) allocation of land 
(allotted or auctioned) only on perpetual (99 years) leasehold right basis and as the lessee of the 
President of India; (2) the ground rent will be charged at the nominal rate of Rupee I/- per 
annum per plot for the first five years (10 years for co-operative societies) and thereafter the 
annual ground rent shall be payable at the rate of 2.5% of the total premium originally paid. The 
rate of ground rent is liable to be enhanced after every 30 years; (3) the lessee shall have to pay 
within such time the additional sum towards premium, as may be decided upon by the lessor, on 
the ground of increase in the cost of acquisition and development; (4) the lessee will be liable to 
pay all taxes, charges and assessments of every description in respect of the plot whether 
assessed, charged or imposed on the plot; (5) if the lease of the plot is obtained by any mis- 
representation, mis-statement or fraud or if there is any violation/breach of the conditions of the 
lease, the lease will be determined and the possession of the plot and the building thereon will be 
taken over by the lessor and the lessee will not be entitled to any compensation; (6) special 
provision of reservation of allotment provided selected groups; (7) alternative plots were also 
provided on pre-determined prices to households whose land were acquired for development; (8) 
in order to encourage private investment in housing and to promote sufficient rental 
acconunodation, certain number of residential plots were proposed to be leased out regularly by 
unrestricted public auctions waiving the condition of owning more than one plot or house in 
Delhi; and (9) in certain cases permission for allotment is allowed under special circumstances. 
4.4.2.4. Public Land Delivery Terms And Conditions Of Commercial, Industrial And 
Institutional Land 
The commercial lands are the most important source of revenue of DDA and it is the major 
source for subsidy schemes executed by the public land policy. The commercial plots are 
disposed of through auction/tenders as per disposal of developed nazul land rules 1981. The 
purchaser should be a citizen of India and should be competent to enter into contract. No bid is 
accepted on behalf of proposed company and change of name of intending allottee is allowed. 
The conditions are same as other auctions. However in the event of the consent given for 
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sale/transfer, the lessor is entitled to impose suitable terms and conditions and also be entitled to 
claim or recover 50% of the unearned increase in the value of the land. The lessor is also entitled 
to exercise pre-emptive right of purchase as and when the built up space is required for public 
use. The lessee may sell or transfer/sub-lease the floor space constructed on the plot subject to 
the permission of the lessor and payment of 50% of the unearned increased value. 
Shops/stalls/ office units in various commercial estates and shopping centres developed by 
DDA are disposed of either on auction or tender, and/or through allotment made on (subsidised) 
reserve price to special groups with a provision of recovery of reserved price in instalments. The 
auction purchaser of plots in which the permitted floor space exceeds 1000 sq. ft is authorised to 
sell or transfer the floor space constructed on the plot subject to certain conditions. DDA has 
also launched self-financing commercial development scheme in 1984 and 1985. 
Land is allocated to use on auction/tender purchase to all except few special categories. 
The conditions are same as other auctions/ allotments and construction of industrial unit is urged 
as early as six months and complete the same within a period not exceeding two years. See Chart 
5.3 for allocation method. Land policy also allocates land to institutions that serve the interest of 
the population of Delhi directly. Land allotment for various institutions is also regulated through 
certain conditions fixed by the government and they vary from time to time depending upon 
government decisions taken in regard of land allocations for institutions (see Chart 5.5). 
4.4.2.5. Premium/ Price For Allotment And Auction Of Land 
The rates are fixed by taking into account the following elements: (i) cost of acquisition of land 
for plotted area (pool rates fixed by the Delhi Administration for various zones from time to 
time); (ii) cost of development of land calculated on the basis of Delhi schedule of rates, cost- 
index; (iii) minimum additional charges such as departments charges, administrative charges and 
interest charges; (iv) beautification charges (green areas and landscape charges) fixed from time 
to time; (v) charges on construction of zonal roads fixed from time to time; (vi) urban village 
redevelopment charges fixed from time to time; and also (vii) deficiency charges at the rate of 
2.5% on items (ii) and (vi) above. 
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The remunerative area for the purpose of fixation of pre-determined rates is normally in the 
range of 45% to 50% of the gross area of the scheme which is usually determined on the basis of 
details worked out in the project report of a scheme. Additional charges for use and occupation 
are also added according to sizes. For the purpose of differential rate for subsidy to MIG and 
LIG categories, the cost of land was excluded from the rate for LIG but added to the rate for 
MIG. Since April 1985, this differential rate is calculated by adding 10% of the cost for the MIG 
and by reducing 5% for the LIG. In the case of Rohini Residential Scheme, the general pre- 
determined rates calculated as above on the basis of the remunerative area are spread in the ratio 
of 1: 2: 3 for residential, industrial and commercial in order to subsidise the rate of residential 
plots. This scheme was conceived essentially for weaker section of the society. An additional sum 
of Rs. 100 and Rs. 50 respectively are added on account of equalisation charges in south and 
central and north and west respectively. 
The reserve price for auction of residential plots are fixed with reference to the 
predetermined rates for MIG plots by giving 100% increase to the rates fixed for formal colonies 
in South Zone and by giving 10% increase to the pre-determined rates fixed for MIG plots in 
other areas. These rates are rounded to the next fifty rupees. These rates were fixed with no 
relevance to market rates received in the various auctions. But since 1985 they are linked with 
the average auction rates of the preceding year. 
The reserve price for commercial land is fixed by taking into account the total floor space 
allowed the building to be constructed on the plot. The floor space is then multiplied by the 
average auction rate per square metre of floor space obtained in the auction of plots with similar 
peri-nitted use, floor area ratio, number of storeys etc., in the same area in the recent past. In the 
absence of earlier auction rates in that area or in adjacent area or comparable area, the rate for 
fixing of reserve price is calculated on the basis of average auction rate obtained in the latest 
auction held in that area and adding thereto or deducting therefrom percentage of increase or 
decrease in the market/auction rates of other plots since the last auction. The pre-deterrrýned 
market rates fixed by the government for commercial purpose are also taken as a guide for the 
purpose of fixing reserve price for auction. However, recently in view of the slump in the 
commercial market, reserve price for commercial plots were fixed by reducing the average 
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auction price in the inunediately preceding year by 10% subject to its not being less than the cost 
of acquisition and development of the plot. 
Reserve price for commercial units in commercial estates is calculated adding actual cost of 
construction with the cost of land and additional charges decided from time to time. The rates 
were reduced in view of depressed market conditions. Reserve price for industrial plots were 
fixed on the basis of the average of the previous auction prices for the area concerned. 
Institutional land is allotted on either no-profit no-loss (NPNL) rates or concessional rates that 
are less than NPNL rates or 1.25- 4 times of NPNL/market rates depending upon the institution. 
The rates also vary depending upon the development nature of the land, i. e., whether they are 
undeveloped, serni-developed and fully developed. 
Disposal of DDA-built flats/shops were priced as follows: (i)cost of construction including 
discharged liabilities if any, (ii) overhead charges such as departments(10% for MIG/LIG, and 
8% later reduced to 6.5% in 1978 for EWS), interest charges (7.5% per annum for a period or 
1.5 years for all categories of houses which later revised as 9% per annum for MIG, 7.5% for 
LIG and 6% for EWS for period of 9 months since 1978, and administrative charges (2% per 
annum for a period of 1.5 years later since 1978 it is revised to 1% per annum for MIG/LIG only, 
(iii) cost of land charged at pool rate fixed by Delhi Administration for 75% of the group housing 
area excluding areas earmarked for shopping centres, schools, electric substations but charged for 
community facilities. The prices were worked out by colony to colony from time to time. 
4.5. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DELHI 
The municipal office records state that the Delhi urbanised area is about 50% of its jurisdictional 
area. This means that a large part of rural land was designated as part of the capital and expected 
to be urbanised in due course. Special characteristics of Delhi also include its large number of 
settlements (about 231 villages) out of which many retained the characters of urban villages. It is 
also observed that farming potential is gradually decreasing and as a result farmers are attracted 
to other activities. 
It is also observed that the existence of local municipal bodies such as MCD, NDMC, 
Cantonment Board (for the provision of civic infrastructure and management) and local authority 
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(such as DDA for planning, land development and housing) and Delhi Administration (for 
administration and land acquisition) has made Delhi's institutional set-up quiet different from 
what is existing elsewhere (see Chart 5.2). In addition, Delhi's growing potential for commercial, 
institutional and employment activities has made it the primate city within the northern region of 
India. 
4.6. SUMMARY 
It is observed in this Chapter that the Delhi's large-scale public land policy has evolved in order 
to solve the housing problem and especially to eliminate illegal land developments that were 
widespread during the post-independence period. The policy, initiated as early as 1960's, had 
conceived in it many theoretical concepts, instruments and tools that were expected to provide 
quick solution to the problems appeared in the past. It was believed that the public land 
acquisition, development and disposal policy implemented through some effective instruments 
and tools would be able to provide sufficient land for housing to all users. It was also believed 
that this policy implemented through a single organisation having planning, development and 
allocation powers and financial self-sufficiency would be able provide adequate land for planned 
development and in retrospect can eliminate all unauthorised developments. The following 
Chapter analyses the performance of this policy in terms of land demand and supply. 
Endnotes for Chapter 4 
1 Religious or charity run houses where free or subsidised accommodation is provided. 
' This scheme is called in many names such as Delhi's large-scale land acquisition, 
development and disposal policy (Howland, 1977), scheme of large-scale land acquisition 
(DDA, 1992) and in this research it is called as large-scale public land policy. 
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Chapter 5 
LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION, 
DEVELOPMENT AND DISPOSAL POLICY AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS ON HOUSING LAND SUPPLY 
5.1. PREAMBLE 
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal 
policy of Delhi, ' a scheme of unique, imaginative (Howland, 1977: 53), and systematic 
approach with adequate principles and policies (Pugh, 1991: 378) aimed to solve problems 
common to poor countries around the world (Howland, 1977: 53). The policy was 
introduced in 1961, and the first Master Plan for Delhi approved in 1962, identified the 
required planning provisions and urban development mechanisms for the operation of land 
development schemes under this public land PoliCY. 2 The policy combined some effective 
instruments informed by the concepts of public land banking, expropriation, leasehold 
disposal, and management, and was believed to be the best way to supply sufficient land 
for all planned urban uses and prevent unplanned haphazard developments (DA, 1961). 
The policy thereby aimed to provide the required land for planned urban development by 
arresting land speculation and controlling increase in land prices through regulated priority 
allocations, capturing subsequent unearned increments from resales, and allotment of 
housing land at subsidised prices for selected groups who may not be able to afford it 
otherwise. 
The policy also aimed to make available adequate quantities of land at the right time 
and at reasonable prices to public authorities, co-operative sectors and individuals. 
Considering the increasing number of low income households, and their inability to afford 
formal open market land, the policy aimed to protect the interests of econorMcally 
disadvantaged households by: (i) ensuring adequate and timely delivery of housing land to 
all sections of the society, (ii) preventing ownership of land in the hands of few private 
individuals; (iii) checking speculative rise of land values by restricting resales; and (iv) 
simultaneously promoting the ability to afford among economically and socially 
disadvantaged households through a cross-subsidised pricing system (Mitra, 1990: 194). 
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The Delhi Development Authority (DDA)3 claims that over the years it has created a 
long list of achievements (DDA, undated; DDA annual report 1992-93): 
1. generating over a million dwelling units; 
2. resettling and/or relocating more than 0.25 million slum/squatter dwellers (the highest 
in the world); 
3. developing Inter-state Bus Terminus, Asiad complex/stadiums, sports complexes/ 
multigyms and sports fields (also hosting national and international level tournaments); 
4. developing about 15,000 acres of green; and 
5. allocating land for 2200 social institutions of medical, educational and cultural, etc. 
Such an achievement could not have been expected in the absence of this policy. 
These developments are financed mostly from the revenues of public land sales for which 
an initial revolving fund had been set by the Central Government for land acquisition by 
Delhi Administration, and loans obtained from public financiers and Banks etc. However, 
few programmes operated for squatter resettlements and upgradation have been partly 
financed from the Five-year plan funds of Central Government. 
The success of this public land policy is also observed in terms of rise in its 
revolving fund capital (Pugh, 1991: 376; Misra, 1986: 68; Acharya, 1988: 1434; Sarin, 
1983: 244), and supplying housing land to low and middle income households at low prices 
(Mitra, 1990: 194), especially, to a large number of lower income range households who 
would have otherwise been driven out of urban Delhi, with no means to enter the fon-nal 
housing market operated by private developers (Maitra, 1991: 345). Researchers state that 
this policy has also provided comparatively cheap housing to high income households 
through self-financed flat allocation schemes (ibid), and developed some societal and 
community requirements normally ignored by the market forces (Misra, 1986: 63). The 
DDA also believes that the resettlement of squatters in a large number, large-scale 
developments of fon-nal individual and co-operative housing, conu-nercial complexes, 
industrial estates, and development of large parks for community use etc., in a planned 
manner have become possible only because of this public land policy, enforced as early as 
the late fifties (DDA, 1985: 21). 
On the other hand, the public land policy operated by DDA has been regarded as a 
failure that contributed to large-scale illegal developments. The major reasons stated for 
the failure of the public land policy are (Pugh, 1991: 381; Sarin, 1983: 249): 
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1. inherent deficiency of policy objectives; 
2. inadequate legal provisions and operational capacity; 
3. lack of institutional co-ordination; and 
4. misuse and/or mismanagement of land management tools and planning provisions. 
It is argued that at the end of its 34th year of public land management, this policy has 
resulted in delay in land acquisition, led to the building of luxury housing against people's 
affordable need, forced up the price of land for housing particularly low cost housing 
(Baken and Linden, 1992; Acharya, 1988; McAuslan, 1985), and in turn contributed to 
unauthorised land developments and illegal sales of formally allocated land (Baken and 
Linden, 1992; Mitra and Nientied, 1989). 
Specifically, it is argued that in the processes of operation of public land supply, 
DDA was forced to make huge profits in the name of cross- subsidi sation (Buch, 1984), 
thus losing sight of its primary purposes and abandoning its public welfare objective of 
allocation of sufficient subsidised land for low income housing (Mattingly, 1993; Sarin, 
1983: 249). In result, DDA behaved as a monopolist and speculator (Pugh, 1991: 368; 
Misra, 1983; Howland, 1977). It acquired land in advance only to release it slowly 
(Howland, 1977). It did not supply adequate quantities of land for low and middle income 
group applicants and did not ensure the availability of formal housing land at the right 
prices, when, and where needed. Thus, it could not prevent land price inflation through 
illegal transfer of subsidised plots (Mitra and Nientied, 1989; Acharya, 1988: 1435; 
Howland, 1977: 61), and priced out a large number of households opting for informal land 
developments (Acharya, 1988: 1435; Misra, 1990: 56). 
It is also argued that the DDA's failure owes to its inadequate managerial and 
technical capabilities to undertake land developments on a large-scale (Sarin, 1983: 249; 
Misra, 1986: 66,1990: 55). Researchers note that the DDA's inability to provide adequate 
housing land was due to its later-opted priorities such as city beautification and Asiad 
complex projects that failed to exploit the implementation potential existed for planned 
development through large-scale public land policy (Pugh, 1991: 378; Sarin, 1983: 249). 
The research community (Acharya, 1988: 1435; Misra, 1990: 57; Pugh, 1991: 378) also 
state that the way the public land delivery was operated has mostly benefited higher 
income businessmen, politicians and public servants, and favoured the rich at the cost of 
the poor. It is also noted that the large-scale public leasehold operation promoted 
corruption in land disposal and administration of transfer of leases (Acharya, 1988: 1435; 
Misra, 1986: 67; Pugh, 1991: 378). Pugh (1991: 378) also highlights that there is a widening 
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influence of "black money" which has its origins in land policy regulations and restrictions 
in the urban property market. These reasons are believed to have contributed to failure of 
public land policy operation and the creation of unauthorised land developments on a 
larger scale. 
The policy operators argue that the increasing number of land encroachments and 
unauthorised colonies are primarily due to (Jolly, 1994: 41): (1) delay in public land 
acquisition precipitated by the large number of court cases filed by vested financial 
interests; (2) lack of co-ordination between various development organisations and their 
working priorities; and (3) some economic and political factors that played a significant 
role in favouring the formation of unauthorised land developments. The DDA records also 
state that the biggest problems faced by DDA in achieving successful completion of land 
development projects and delay in land acquisition, development and disposal were: (i) 
lack of inter-agency co-ordination between DDA and other local authorities in supplying 
the required trunk services (water, sewage and electricity), building city level roads in the 
development areas; (Ii) slow operation of land acquisition fully entrusted to Delhi 
Administration; and (iii) inordinate delay in handing-over of developed colonies to MCD 
for civic management (DDA, undated). 
Therefore, although, it may be interesting to examine the conception of the above 
policy in terms of whether it is right or wrong, and/or what could have happened in its 
absence, the general research observation seems fair: that the contribution of this policy 
remains as one of the few substantial land management episodes that demonstrate 
competent intervention and manipulation of urban land markets (Mattingly, 1993: 109), 
especially in developing countries where the poor outnumber rich, and most of the public 
policy operations lack dedication and determination. Thus, it becomes necessary to find 
out what has really happened under the operation of Delhi's public land policy, and what 
kind of household response exists in regard to the operation of large-scale public land 
allocation policy? 
Of the two kinds of views observed above, the views criticising the policy operation 
dominates the argument. Therefore, we start with the assumption that although the 
concept of large-scale public land policy of Delhi was conceived as a theoretically viable 
approach, the operational inability of this policy has constrained the supply of legal land 
for housing, thereby encouraging unauthorised land supply. This Chapter also attempts to 
answer the following questions in order to assess the kind of effect that encouraged the 
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creation of unauthorised land developments and led to the failure of public land policy. 
Those are: 
I- Did large-scale public land policy acquire adequate land for planned development and 
housing? 
2. Did it offer adequate affordable housing land? 
3. What are the views of households and concerned groups on DDA's formal housing land 
supply'? 
4. What are the ways in which Delhi's public land policy could have encouraged illegal 
settlements? 
5.2. PERFORMANCE OF OBJECTIVES, OPERATIONAL 
MECHANISM AND INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF LARGE-SCALE 
PUBLIC LAND POLICY 
The origin of large-scale land policy, in the circumstances of unequal distribution of wealth 
and income earning capacity, large migration resulting from partition of the country, ' and 
early notification of large tracts of land for expropriation on the basis of draft Master 
Plan/Interim General Plan witnesses the strong political commitment, and determination to 
achieve equity in distribution of housing land as part of planned urban development in 
Delhi (Howland, 1977: 53; Misra, 1986: 67). There is no doubt that this policy firn-dy 
embodied a fairly comprehensive package of measures including certain elements of 
(Misra, 1986: 67; Mitra, 1990: 194): 
(i) land banking to make available desired quantities of affordable land in advance for 
proposed planned development; 
(ii) public ownership of land in order to prevent resales leading to investment and 
speculation that might raise prices, and to ensure the availability of disposed land when 
required by the government; 
(iii) land use planning and building regulations to control the use of built-up space; and 
(iv) public land management to ensure adequate supply of land for all planned urban uses, 
and provision of necessary access to affordable land to all households through a cross- 
subsidisation formula. 
The overall idea of policy makers has been quite simple: when the city's urban land 
is under the virtual control of a single public authority responsible for planning and 
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development, it can achieve efficient and equitable use of land by avoiding wastage and 
underuse of land, especially done by the private sector in the past (Maitra, 1991: 344; 
Misra, 1986: 67). The idea of a single powerful authority is supported in view of the 
experience of the local authorities' inability to control large-scale profit oriented illegal 
land developments of private colonisers in Delhi (GOI, 1989: 20). The idea is that public 
land banking and the public land allocation (with free of speculation) policy be best 
conducted by a single authority (Flechner, 1974; Devoy and Rodrungruang, 1983). 
But an inherent deficiency in the aims and objectives, operation of regulatory 
mechanism and institutional co-ordination has been observed by researchers. There are 
four sets of reasons said to have contributed to the failure of this policy, which in turn may 
have encouraged formation of illegal land developments. 
The first set of reasons advanced to explain ineffectiveness of public land policy 
relates to the overall supply constraint, unrealistic objectives, and inadequate legal 
provisions' for land acquisition and development (Misra, 1984: 21-23; Baken and Linden, 
1992: 63). These were held responsible for the ever-widening gap between the Master 
Plan's proposed phasing of development and the actual phasing (Gupta, S. C, 1991: 35). 
The second set of reasons relate to poor co-ordination: - 1) the DDA's managerial 
and technical capabilities were not up to the task of full implementation of public land 
policy (Misra, 1986: 66; Sarin, 1983: 249; Pugh, 1991: 378). DDA was empowered too late 
and the lack of co-ordination within DDA compounded the general lethargy in taking 
action against land Mafia, resulting in encroachment on acquired land (Jolly, 1994: 40). 
2) secondly, under the pattern of Delhi's urban development/ municipal management 
set-up, some of the development and maintenance functions alternated between DDA and 
MCD, and the operation was not tackled in totality. The multiplicity of land-owning public 
authorities (ibid, 1994: 40), lack of fiscal co-ordination among DDA and MCD in 
maintaining the infrastructure constructed by DDA (Pugh, 1991: 377) and untimely 
provision of essential trunk services (water and electricity, etc. ), greatly diluted the overall 
achievement. 
3) thirdly, there has been a complete technical, administrative and financial mis- 
match between DDA and Delhi Administration. Land acquisition, payment of 
compensation, transfer of acquired lands (especially by Delhi Administration's Land and 
Building Department) and maintenance of land records (Jolly, 1994: 40), all inevitably 
constrained the very availability of land. 
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The third set of reasons contributing to the failure of Delhi's land policy relates to 
the regulatory mechanism faulted for mismanagement of provisions and failure of public 
land allocation (see Section 5.4). The fourth set of reasons relates to external controls: 
late approvals of Master Plans by the government, and delay in approvals of large-scale 
land development and housing projects by the Delhi Urban Arts Commission (GOL 
1989: 24). 
5.2.1. Aims And Objectives Of Large-scale Land Policy Of Delhi 
As discussed in the Section 4.4, the primary aim of the large-scale public land policy of 
Delhi has been to acquire, develop and dispose off sufficient land in order to achieve 
overall development proposed by the Master Plan, that is to organise various sectors in a 
proper way and prevent haphazard development. (DA, 196 1: 1). This primary airn6 and the 
ousting of profit-motivated private developers were the concerns of this policy. 
The absence of an independent objective has not prevented a series of scholars 
identifying a clear one: public welfare of low income housing, and socialisation of land 
through cross-subsidisation from auctions. The policy contained inherent limitations in its 
approach, and these limitations generated vagueness, confusion and ambiguity (Acharya, 
1988: 1431). It has led to target years were unestablished (Howland, 1977; Acharya, 
1988: 1431-34). But the DDA claims that the policy aimed to promote and secure the 
planned development of Delhi according to Master Plans. This contradiction emphasises a 
need for a new research in this field. 
Yet it is clear that the policy intended to achieve: (i) a more efficient and equitable 
distribution of land for housing as well as for industry; (ii) to save urban land from 
speculation and/or profiteering (DA, 196 1: 1); and (iii) to ensure universal availability of 
land at reasonable prices (Baken and Linden, 1992: 62). Thus, the overall objective of 
Delhi's land policy could be interpreted as an attempt to control and keep the supply ahead 
of demand in order to keep land prices stable, and to make housing land affordable by 
every party (Maitra, 1991: 344; Sarin, 1983: 242). The more detailed objectives are 
subsidiary, and the overall framework remains that of the Master Plan. Nevertheless, it 
shows that the operational and/or regulatory mechanisms, and administrative and/or 
institutional structures of large-scale land policy could have encouraged illegal 
developments more than any inherent deficiency of policy objectives. 
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5.2.2. Operational Mechanisms And Regulatory Controls Of Delhi's 
Large-scale Land Policy 
The Master Plan for Delhi approved in 1962 and the large-scale public land policy are 
virtually inseparable for Delhi. The Master Plan proposed large-scale public land 
acquisition, development and disposal in order to control land prices and curb speculation; 
in turn, the large-scale public land policy was conceived to facilitate the implementation of 
the Master Plan by securing a high degree of public control of land (Ribeiro, 1992: 39). 
Thus, the operation of this land policy depended upon the concerned Master Plans which: 
(1) identified land for current use zones; (ii) prescribed appropriate norms, standards, 
subdivision regulations, and development controls for different uses; and (iii) devised 
specific building regulations and bye-laws that could monitor the construction activity. 
The Master Plan proposals were translated on the ground into Zonal Plans (which 
act as link between the Layout Plans and Master Plan), converted into suitable 
development schemes/projects. Later, these were executed according to terms and 
conditions of the operational mechanism. The large-scale land policy, besides facilitating 
the land acquisition for development schemes/projects, also controlled the land use and 
building operations through its land allocation norms and conditions (see Chart 4.1). The 
present system of Master Planning and building regulations were primarily aimed to check 
the unintended growth and to ensure the planned development in all parts of Delhi. Thus, 
the DDA's operational jurisdiction extended all over the Delhi, but its building regulation 
applied only to the areas developed by DDA, leaving the rest to be controlled by the 
respective Municipal Authorities. 
Delhi's regulatory set-up is somewhat similar to the widely acclaimed success stories 
of Sweden and the Netherlands, where municipalities prepare their plans within the 
purview of approved provincial plans and are empowered to dominate local land markets 
in order to ensure the availability of sufficient land for future urban growth. These 
municipalities are also responsible for the provision of infrastructure and all public housing, 
besides their municipal functions. DDA, however, provided only peripheral services within 
the formal developments, assigning the responsibility of supplying trunk services (such as 
water, sewers and electricity) to local bodies particularly MCD for bulk supply to new 
developments in peripheries (Chart 5.1). Road building (proposed by Master Plans) was 
the responsibility of Delhi Administration. The overall idea is quite simple: that the DDA's 
focus on new developments would enable it to supply as much newly developed land 
according to Master Plan as supplying municipal services. 
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Functionally, Delhi's Master Plans identified appropriate areas for development, and 
these areas were declared as Development Areas through the legal provisions of the Delhi 
Development Act, 1957. The Central Land Acquisition Act (1894 amended in 1984) 
facilitated the acquisition of these areas notified, and the too] of expropriation and 
payment of compensation below market prices were applied to acquire land on cheap 
prices. In the declared development areas, no land development including any building 
activity was permitted without DDA's building plan approvals. Retrospectively, all 
executives have been vested with the necessary powers to pass demolition orders on 
unauthorised developments. But the literature observes that DDA has not acquired all 
proposed lands, and it also lost large amount of acquired land to encroachments. This 
aspect is discussed in detail in Section 5.3.1. 
5.2.3. Administrative And Institutional Set-up Of Large-scale Land 
Policy 
Delhi has three levels of administration involved in planning, acquisition, development and 
disposal of land (see Chart 5.2). The Ministry of Urban Affairs, ' Government of India, at 
central level, controls the DDA's land policy operation, approves Master Plans, facilitates 
declaration of development areas for DDA's land development, and issues directions for 
the efficient administration of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (GOI, 1989: 23-4). At 
state level, the Delhi Administration was assigned the responsibility of notifying and 
acquiring all the identified land, and the operation of the revolving fund for land acquisition 
on behalf of government and DDA. The Lt. Governor, who is Chief Administrator of the 
Delhi state, ' is the ex-officio Chairman of DDA. The Vice-Chain-nan of DDA is appointed 
by the Central Government. The full administrative and financial powers of the 
government on land acquisition lie with the Lt. Governor and/or Chief Commissioner of 
Delhi Administration (Ribeiro, 1992: 35). 
DDA consists of II core members appointed/ nominated from time to time by the 
Central Government. Operations and decision making in DDA's large-scale land 
development involves three committees: (1) the Advisory Council of about 17 members of 
local governments and departments nominated by the Central Government, two members 
from Lok Sabha, and one member from RaJya Sabha; (2) Standing Committee with Lt. 
Governor, an appointed Vice-Chairman and 13 other members. All the major projects 
related to urban development must be approved by it; and (3) Technical Committee which 
examines all projects for conformity with the proposals in the Master Plan. It is chaired by 
the Vice-Chairman and includes all agencies concerned with co-ordination of plan 
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implementation and development. The Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of 
Delhi is an ex-officio member of DDA and intended to ensure MCD's co-ordination for 
DDA's development programmes. 
Concerning DDA's institutional and technical capacity, its annual reports show a 
growth from about 500 staff in 1957 to a massive technical and administrative strength of 
about 30,000 in 1983, over 33,000 in 1990, now reduced to about 28,000 regular and 
work-charge employees. DDA consists of 8 core technical departments: Architecture and 
Planning; Engineering and Horticulture; Land Management and Disposal; Housing; 
Accounts and Auditing; Systems and Training; Personnel; and Slum wing (recently 
transferred to MCD). Each department has technical and administrative staff, and a 
training cell has functioned since December 1983. DDA collaborated with the Ford 
Foundation and Town and Country Planning Organisation of Ministry of Urban Affairs to 
prepare the first Master Plan for Delhi, 1962. But, in the 1980's, it prepared the revised 
Master Plan for Delhi 2001 (approved August 1990) with its staff and expertise. 
DDA reports (DDA, Undated: 3; DDA annual report 1992-93: 4) show that it was 
called upon to perform a variety of functions and activities, and asked to contribute to 
several important events. Apart from the ancillary and voluntary activities that led to the 
inevitable expansion of DDA, involuntary expansion made additional demands upon it. 
These involuntary activities include regularisation of unauthorised colonies, and 
maintenance of urban villages, dairy colonies and transit camps, etc. DDA has also been 
asked to establish industrial and commercial complexes, support and assist the IX Asian 
Games Committee in building some prestigious landmarks, decongest the Walled City, 
and preserve electrification, sewerage, roads, and other basic amenities in concert with 
other civic bodies (DDA annual report 1992-93). Major additional functions that exceed 
the very purview of large-scale land policy and Delhi Development Act include: 
administration of Delhi Lotteries until 1992-93; running the Inter-state Bus Terminus it 
had long developed; large-scale flatted housing construction that had not been proposed by 
the large-scale land policy; maintenance of resettlement colonies and slum clearance 
related activities entrusted to MCD until they were transferred to MCD during middle of 
1988; some Asiad projects; and maintaining the colonies developed by DDA (GOI, 1989). 
Of about 512 colonies developed by DDA, only 226 have been transferred to MCD 
for civic management since 1990-91. This is contrary to the proposals of land policy, that 
is to transfer the developed lots to the concerned municipal body for maintenance (supply 
of civic services and collection of taxes to augment new services). DDA reports also show 
that it provides technical expertise to Delhi Administration, MCD and NDMC for 
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preparing road alignment plans, intersection design and transportation studies, etc., (DDA, 
undated: 17). The delay in handing over developed colonies to the MCD have reduced the 
work-force that ought to be used for developing new areas, and delayed its new 
operations. Similarly, a constraint in the way DDA's response is some delay in the 
provision of services such as water and electricity by the Municipal Corporation Delhi and 
Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking (DESU) respectively during 1969-70. 
Secondary sources also show that although DDA has been granted statutory 
autonomous power to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land independently, it was 
obliged to depend on the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Delhi Administration for the 
declaration and acquisition of land respectively. Land may be acquired only by the Delhi 
Administration and transferred to DDA. Besides, large-scale building, engineering 
projects, or indeed any development proposals which might affect the skyline or aesthetic 
quality of surroundings were required to be approved by the Delhi Urban Arts Commission 
(DUAC) (GOL 1989). Other departments scrutinised building bye-laws, provision of 
infrastructure, etc., (see Charts 5.1 and 5.2). 
Similarly, the reason for DDA's lack of internal co-ordination is due to a large 
number of administrative staff involved in land, housing and engineering departments 
whose engineering and allied functions leave them little time for planning due to other 
functions. The prime objective of quick Master and Zonal Planning and monitoring suffers 
thereby (GOI, 1989: 23). This state of affair is partly exacerbated by the policy of revolving 
fund and cross subsidy. 
5.2.4. Finance Mobilisation For The Operation Of Large-scale Public 
Land Delivery 
The experience of land development in other developing countries points to finance as a 
serious obstacle, but Delhi has shown that large-scale land supply can be successfully 
financed by public development. This is ascribed to expropriation of land below market 
prices and its later auction to the highest bidder for HIG residential, commercial and 
industrial uses. This is theoretically justified as pern-iitting subsidisation of low income 
households, and development of land for social infrastructure and recreational use, but 
criticised in operation for being 'nothing short of looting' (Sarin, 1983: 244-, Pugh, 
1991: 376). The Public Accounts Committee review of Delhi's land development noted 
that DDA's margin was excessive and that the revolving fund was based on this inordinate 
difference between buying and selling prices (ibid). Sarin's observation supports Grimes 
(1974) who acknowledges a "threshold percentage of betterment capturable by public 
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authorities". The attempt to exceed this threshold would provoke landowners to seek 
redress through the court system. This is noticed from the cases of success stories such as 
Sweden and the Netherlands where the acquisition assessments were often much lower 
than compensation awarded. In the Netherlands, Central Government was obliged to offer 
the landowner a price higher than existing use value to avoid lengthy expropriation 
procedures. 
DDA records shows that the revolving fund was indeed used mostly for land 
acquisition. The Central Government provided a seed capital of Rs. 50 million, later 
augmented to Rs. 123.1 million (Jha, 1984: 64). The expenditure incurred by DDA on land 
development was to be met from the proceeds of the sale of industrial, commercial, and 
residential plots, with the surplus credited periodically to the revolving fund administered 
by the Delhi Administration to acquire new lands or to meet the liabilities of old land. The 
revolving fund intended to maintain a single account of land development, with sales 
proceeds ploughed back to the fund for financing new acquisition and development. It was 
stipulated that the surplus from the disposal of developed land would also be credited to 
the revolving fund. The fund is deposited with the Delhi Administration and DDA pays for 
land acquisition every year out of its revenues. 
DDA annual reports also state that loans were obtained from the Government of 
India (Rs. 28 million repayable by instalments during 1961-62), for large-scale land 
development and disposal of developed land. The DDA has also obtained loans from LIC 
(10 millions each in 1968 and 1969) for constructing LIG/MIG houses. DDA's annual 
reports also state that fresh loans were taken from banks every financial year and sinking 
funds created with Punjab National Bank and State Bank of India, whose repayment the 
DDA met by floating debentures. This indicates that DDA has not depended only upon the 
revolving fund. 
The revolving fund was established to avoid financial problems in land acquisition. 
To this end, DDA contributes part of its land sales every year to the Delhi Administration. 
Money paid by DDA is compensated with the land acquisition payments pending with the 
Delhi Administration. DDA submitted a recent proposal to the Government of India for 
loans of about Rs. 200 million from HUDCO, SBI, NHB, HDFC and other banks. In 
1985-87, the financial resources of the DDA remained tight from an earlier commitment of 
the funds to Asiad works and other schemes, and failure to recover the maintenance cost 
of resettlement colonies. However, DDA continued uninterrupted with its land 
development and disposal with the help of land auction revenues. 
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Jha (1984: 63) defines the revolving fund as a method of revolving initial working 
capital in such a way that it yields a handsome return on investment which along with the 
principal is ploughed back. This secures an increasing return in each cycle of investment. 
In fact, the financial success of DDA's public land development can be appreciated by the 
fact that in a period of 20 years, the initial seed capital (revolving fund) has expanded 
frorn Rs. 123 million to over Rs. 2 billion in 1980-81 (Pugh, 1991: 376; Misra, 1986: 68). 
The seed capital increased due to land auction for high income residential, commercial and 
industrial use (Misra, 1986,1990: 55-56; Pugh, 1991), as well as revenue earned from 
self-financing flats for higher income group (Maitra, 1991). But the revolving fund is not 
profit: it is the money reserved for future land acquisitions. Therefore, the accumulation of 
the revolving fund alone does not indicate the success of revolving fund or auctions of land 
by DDA. DDA makes valid claim of profits through auctioning commercial plots to private 
builders and higher income group. Hence, what seems important here is the overall 
performance of large-scale public land policy in the context of Delhi. 
5.2.5. Performance Of Operational Mechanism & Institutional Set-up 
Previous sections had noted that Delhi's large-scale land policy suffered deficiencies on 
account of vague objectives, operational weaknesses and lack of co-ordination. 
Nevertheless, Delhi's land policy confirms the theory that effectiveness of government 
intervention in the urban land-market depends a great deal on publicly owned land (Linn, 
1979: 240; Acharya, 1988: 1428). It gives adequate flexibility and power to local 
government to make land available to various housing programmes, upgrade slum and 
squatter settlements, provide security of tenure to squatters and provide access to housing 
to econon-&ally and socially disadvantaged (Misra, 1990). The idea of large-scale land 
policy is therefore logical given that more than 30% of Delhi's households are poor and 
socio-economically disadvantaged (ibid). Private ownership would have posed serious 
problems to the legal and financial resources of any other form of public intervention for 
low and middle income housing land (Acharya, 1988: 1428). 
DDA faces problems of co-ordination with other agencies or authorities discharging 
connected or supplementary functions. But most of the DDA's functions were assigned by 
the Central Government with consideration to DDA's institutional and financial capacity. 
Furthermore, the surplus profits received from DDA's extra functions were used for its 
land development operation, and, specifically, lottery profits financed the construction of 
social and physical infrastructure. These activities enhanced the financial capabilities of 
DDA rather than constraining its development potential. 
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The response of interviewed households who bought illegally sold land indicate that 
formal land delivery procedures, and the opportunities for investment and extra income 
earning were prominent reasons for their choices (see Table 5.6). Similarly, the responses 
of large number of households who bought plots in unauthorised colonies indicate that 
they were mostly attracted due to their feeling of unaffordability of formal land prices, and 
supply based reasons. This points to inefficiency of DDA's land development and disposal 
operation rather than inherent deficiencies involved in policy operation. On the other hand, 
researchers argue that DDA's land acquisition, development and disposal have been slow 
since its inception, and therefore ineffective. The following sections 5.3 and 5.4 analyses 
these reasons in detail. 
5.3. PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
As envisaged in the Master Plans, the major concern of Delhi's large-scale land policy 
operation has been to make available sufficient quantities of serviced land, and release it at 
right intervals to all planned uses and users. In order to keep the supply ahead of demand, 
the DDA, a single high-powered public authority, assumed the entire responsibility of 
planning, large-scale advanced land acquisition, development and disposal. It has invoked 
compulsory land acquisition laws which include effective tools such as expropriation, 
price-freezing and advance public acquisition (see Chart 4.1) to assemble land at cheap 
prices. Furthermore, DDA developed most of the land on its own and restricted private 
development to certain activities. To avoid financial problems in large-scale land 
development, it auctioned land mostly for commercial, industrial and some residential uses, 
and raised loans from public institutions, and also recovered profits from unearned 
increments from resales. This practice has provided many advantages such as cheap land 
acquisition, and greater control over land development and use regulation, and provided 
financial autonomy towards curbing land speculation and stabillsing prices (Pugh, 
1991: 378). 
DDA proudly claims to have developed over 47,000 acres by the end of 1983 
(during first Master Plan period 1961-8 1) and almost 60,000 acres by the end of 1993. Its 
announced aim is for planned and balanced development in totality, and developing land 
for all uses including recreation. Its target is for 40% of space to be built-up, and 
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remaining 60% for essential amenities and public services, such as roads, parks, 
playgrounds, dispensaries, educational institutions, shopping facilities, milk booths, 
recreational centres, etc. DDA records suggest that land development suffered as a result 
of numerous factors: the pressure to mobilise funds through various sources in order to 
sustain the cross-subsidy mechanism; and other major tasks assigned by government such 
as resettlement of slums/squatters, regularisation of unauthorised colonies, development of 
infrastructure for the city's prestigious events, and investment of its land revenues in 
construction of sports complexes and community services. 
Yet, it has been argued that the DDA's large-scale land acquisition and development 
is inefficient. Ever since Delhi began its land banking programme, DDA has been slow to 
acquire and develop land, leading inevitably to a "distorted" development (Howland, 1977; 
Basu, 1988). The major reasons have been identified as legal complications of land 
acquisition law, financial constraints, and physical implementation constraints (Gupta, 
1985-, Misra, 1986). 
DDA's commitment to remunerative land development such as for commerce, 
industry and higher income residential areas have resulted in shortage of housing land 
(Ribeiro, 1992: 41 and Acharya, 1987). However, these were not as remunerative as 
expected because a large number of commercial units were not sold immediately. The 
Times of India (12.11.1994) reported that about 5630 commercial structures (over 4000 
shops) developed by DDA were lying unsold. DDA then began to auction commercial 
plots rather than constructed structures to beat the spiralling cost of their dead investment. 
5.3.1. Land Acquisition Performance Of Large-scale Land Policy 
Many legal and operational bottlenecks operated in the process of land acquisition for 
large-scale land development in Delhi (Misra, 1986: 66). Specifically, inadequate statutory 
acquisition powers of DDA and delay caused in the Central Land Acquisition Act slowed 
the first phase during 1961-81. Despite the existence of a provision for public land 
acquisition and advance notification thereof, the DDA's lack of legal powers to directly 
acquire land without involving Delhi Administration, and restriction on advance acquisition 
beyond the Master Plan period has handicapped it from acquiring entire land already 
notified (Misra, 1986: 66). This resulted in delayed acquisition of notified land, 
subsequently delaying the integrated development by the Master Plan. Partial acquisition, 
and with patches of unacquired land within notified areas, delayed land development and 
attracted illegal development and squatting in those areas (DDA, 1985: 19; Misra, 1986). 
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Mattingly ( 1993: 110) has observed that a price freezing policy generates enormous 
pressure from politically powerful landowning classes who are potential investors and/or 
speculators of private land and motivate them to resist public land acquisition. He also 
believes that delays in acquisition could have resulted in middle and low income 
households and/or land owners taking advantage of rising market prices by resisting the 
sale of land to government and/or illegally subdividing or claiming unauthorised land. 
In practice, the Central Land Acquisition Act (1894, revised in 1984)' and Delhi 
Development Act, 1957, enabled easy advance land acquisition of the entire notified area 
in the following sequence: preliminary notification, inviting objections, final notification, 
declaration of the preliminary award, settlement claims, payment of compensation, and 
transfer of acquired land for development and disposal. By the Act, acquisition lapses in 
the event of failure to settle the process within two years of notification. Compensation 
award is based on market value on the date of preliminary notification, with an additional 
15% solatium for compulsory acquisition and cost of structures where applicable (Singh, 
199 1; Misra, 1986). The market price for the award is usually evolved from the registered 
sale deeds and land records. In cases of prolonged delay, the land is frozen and barred 
from any other use. This encourages many land owners to challenge the acquisition in 
courts on technical grounds such as motion lapse, frozen land, and inadequacy of 
compensation paid, etc., thereby further delaying the transfer of private land. 
Landowning farmers interviewed by this study, who had subdivided their land 
themselves and/or sold to colonisers, admitted that compulsory public land acquisition 
performs poorly because of profit seeking in the face of expropriation policy (see Table 
7.5). Cheap rates of compensation (33%), and other reasons such as bribes involved in 
land sales to government (17%), long process and harassment during acquisition (I I%), 
prolonged court cases that delayed their payments (I I%) were also cited by them as 
having weakened public land acquisition in Delhi. 
The performance of public acquisition is seem to have improved slightly after the 
revision of the acquisition process and enhancement of solatium from 15% to 30% in 1984 
(Singh, 1991). DDA records state that although the government rates had become more 
attractive to the farmers, the legal disputes, court cases and encroachments continued due 
to the inability of DDA to actually afford the enhanced prices. However, in the wake of 
recent improvements in land acquisition, about 5800 acres out of 10000 acres being 
planned in Dwarka Project and about 1200 acres in Narela were acquired by DDA (DDA, 
undated: 17). This shows that there is a slight improvement in land acquisition after the 
enhancement of compensation. But this has not stopped the formation of fresh 
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encroachments and unauthorised developments in Delhi. Thus, despite legal complications, 
the governments' failure to protect the acquired land could have encouraged large-scale 
encroachments and unauthorised developments and that in turn could have constrained 
public land development. 
DDA has depended on the strategy of demolition after encroachments rather than 
protect the acquired land encroachment and/or illegal development. DDA depended more 
on local police than its own land protection force during the initial phase of land 
acquisition. However, a special protection cell headed by a Deputy Commissioner (Police) 
established by Delhi Administration removed about 8028 encroachments, of whom about 
2000 families were then provided with alternative plots during 1961-81. The recent 
experience with establishing its own land protection force has proved to be a success 
(Gupta H. C, 1991: 32-34). Fencing 45 Kms (about 3000 acres) of acquired land and daily 
patrolling by a trained protection force/squad, have been effective in curtailing 
encroachments and illegal developments. 
Legal complications could have been reduced and more land acquired by enacting a 
new acquisition law exclusively for Delhi. But the government's ability to enact a new law 
and the fact of the majority of wealth owned by a powerful few are empirical realities. The 
quickest action that might have reduced illegal encroachments and unauthorised 
developments would have been amendment of the Central Land Acquisition Act earlier 
than 1984. This still not the best solution because DDA seems to be finding it difficult to 
acquire sufficient land due to enhanced compensations since 1984, and revolving fund fell 
short of the expenditure on infrastructure (Noronha, 1991). Thus, DDA's ability to 
discourage illegal developments had depended upon its ability to supply adequate land for 
planned developments at the appropriate time. The following section 5.3.2 examines 
DDA's land development performance and its impact on supply of sufficient land for 
residential and other uses. 
5.3.2. Land Development Performance Of Large-scale Public Land 
Policy 
The literature state that the DDA's primary functions such as land planning and monitoring 
were increasingly relegated to second place due to its active involvement with engineering 
and allied functions (GOI, 1989: 23). Further, DDA's additional functions such as city 
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beautification (parks, city forests, flyovers and city highways) and Asiad complexes have 
also been held responsible for its failure to exploit the land development potential of the 
large-scale public land policy (Sarin, 1983: 249; Pugh, 1991: 378). Its purposive public 
monopoly and most low-yielding urban investments delayed its returns (Buch, 1984: 5 and 
Sarin, 1983: 244). As a result, the resources were not utilised for land development 
schemes. It is also argued that DDA has not developed adequate land for residential use as 
it was aiming to make profit from other developments. 
Table 5.1 shows the various uses of land developed by DDA. It shows that land for 
residential use has increased from 50% of its total by the end of first Master Plan (1983) 
to 65% by 1994. Chart 5.3 indicates that by the end of August 1994, DDA has developed 
almost all the land that was acquired and transferred by the Delhi Administrationlo, and 
that the land use distribution is somewhat closer to Master Plan proposals envisaged for 
urban extension (Government, 1990: 121). The data also indicate that the additional land 
development progress was not as rapid as it might have been because between 1983 and 
1994, DDA had developed only 26% more than that of land developed during the first 
Master Plan period. This shows that DDA concentrated more on construction activity than 
land development during the second phase of development (1983-994). This supports the 
argument that DDA's involvement in Asiad projects and large-scale construction of 
commercial, industrial and office complexes has slowed the development of land already 
acquired for public housing. 
Chart 5.4 shows DDA major development functions carried out during its land 
development and disposal operation. Its functions include priority and voluntary activities 
in addition to planning, land development and housing as part of execution of large-scale 
public land disposal in Delhi. Among them, land development for housing and other uses 
seem to be major functions. But the function such as development of infrastructure 
facilities and execution of special projects seems to be an additional activity that was 
entrusted to DDA considering its responsibility of land planning, development and 
disposal. 
5.3.2.1. Land Development For Housing And Integrated Residential Towns 
DDA is the prime developer of land for housing in Delhi. Table 5.1 shows about 38177 
acres of land developed by August 1994. This took the form of specific housing 
("residential") schemes executed by DDA (Figure 5.1) and housing developments executed 
as part of integrated development schemes ("subcity projects" or "integrated 
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developments") (Figure 5.2). Details on housing land development that formed part of 
DDA's land allocation are discussed in section 5.4. 
Table 5.1. Land developed and disposed as Nazul land 11" (in acres) by DDA 
Use Land % To Land % To Land % To 
Developed Total Developed Total Developed Total 
Upto 1983 Land Upto 1990 Land Upto 1994 Land 
Developed Developed Developed 
Residential 23422.6 50 29083.5 50 38177.2 65 
(OPlots/flats 13298.9 (57) 18487.5 (63) 26495.0 (69) 
(ii)Cooperative 4563.9 (19) 4805.6 (17) 5806.1 (15) 
group housing 
(iii) Slum and 5559.7 (24) 5790.3 (20) 5876.0 (16) 
squatter 
relocations 
Commercial & 8616.3 18 9774.0 17 10048.7 17 
institutions 
Industrial 2693.3 6 2555.3 4 2790.8 5 
Horticulture & 7230.1 15 7289.3 13 8289.6 14 
green 
Balance/vacant 5404.0 11 8376.6 15 217.2 0.4 
[Total 47366.6 - 57078.8 21* 59523.6 26*_j 
Data in the brackets shows the percentage to total residential land developed. 
* Percentage of additional land developed since 1983. 
Source: Compiled from DDA records. 
Note: There is a problem of accuracy data in published information on land development in 
Delhi. The aggregate data in DDA's annual administrative reports too do not tally with its 
other documents such as Vikas Varta and factsheets as they are mostly derived from the 
additions of annual totals rather than cumulative data. 
136 
Chart 5.3 Land developed (Nazul 11) by DDA for different uses by August 1994 
Chart 5.4 Major Development Functions Carried Out by the Delhi Development Authority 
housing 
development of land for plots; 
construction of houses/ flats; 
resettlement of squatters and/or industrial 
creation of facilities for them 
I 
commercial 
development land for 
commercial LISCý construction of' 
commercial facilities: different 
levels of shopping areas and 
commercial complexcs/centrcsý 
fruit & vegetable markets. 
-z 
institutional 
development of land for 
DDA's 
major 
inctions 
I imstitutional use II re cre at lonal /green 
development and maintenance 
of land for recreational usesý 
construction of recreational 
centres/ sports complexesý 
preserving greens and parks 
already developed 
land development for new 
and relocated industries; 
construction of industrial 
units/sheds 
facilities & special 
projects 
development & maintenance of 
infrastructure facilities. 
construction & management of 
bus terminuses; 
construction of flyoversand 
cultural centres etc.. 
regularisation of unauthorised 
colonies; 
development and maintenance of 
villages/colonies: 
decon,, e.,, t walled ci tv 
137 
Figure 5.1 Location of Some of major Hotising Schemes Developed by DDA 
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DDA has also planned and developed a new residential project called Rohini. DDA 
refers to it as a symbol of comprehensive multi-purpose township with (homes, work 
centres, recreational centres, etc. ) conveniently located with parks, playgrounds and other 
facilities (health, education, social and cultural, etc. ). The development is spread over 
6,170 acres in 19 sub sectors, each covering 247 acres and providing 5700 plots. As a 
measure of equity and social justice, 97% of these plots were provided to EWS, low and 
middle income groups. In this scheme, land was also developed for 148 co-operative 
group housing societies providing flats for about 23,000 families. Land was developed for 
a large number of low income group households and heavily subsidised to enable them to 
own a house of their own (DDA, 1983: 2). 
Recently, DDA has started large integrated development projects on a new idea 
called 'city within the city'. These new projects are: Rohini and its extensions (for 0.8 
million population); Narela (1.4 million population); and Dwarka/Papankalan (1.06 million 
population). These projects are formulated within the parameters of the current Master 
Plan and concerned zonal plans, and aim to meet the housing requirements with sufficient 
physical and social infrastructure. 
5.3.2.2. Land Development For Other Uses 
Commercial Use: As part of planned development and auction policy, DDA has 
developed land for commercial use in the form of plots and estates/complexes. As 
proposed in the Master Plans, DDA has dispensed commercial activities all over Delhi. 
They form four strata: convenient shopping, local shopping, community and district 
centres. The convenient shopping adjoins residential complexes, while local shopping 
serves local areas, and community centres cater for much larger sections. District centres 
cover commercial and institutional facilities (DDA, undated: 9). Most of these 
developments were taken up during the second Master Plan period (1981-2001). It 
developed about 405 convenient shopping complexes, 93 local shopping complexes, 25 
community centres and 5 district centres by the end of 1993. The plots/shops developed in 
these centres were auctioned except for some allotments for special categories. In 
addition, DDA has also demonstrated its ability in developing and disposing off (mostly 
auctioned) about 3500 commercial plots for hotel sites and other commercial uses. 
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Industrial Use: By the end of 1992, DDA had developed 22 industrial areas/estates (of 
which 5 have been allotted to co-operative industrial estates and rest are maintained by 
DDA). This amounts to 11,881 plots developed. Of these about 7740 were proposed for 
allotment on predetermined rates to industries shifting from non-confon-ning areas to 
conforming areas, industrial societies, and unemployed engineers and military officers. A 
limited number of plots (3876) are disposed through auction and the rest encroached 
(DDA, undated: 7). DDA's annual reports state that since 1987-88, the Slum Wing of 
DDA has started auctioning it's built up conimercial units in the same way as DDA in 
order to augment its financial resources. 
Institutional Use: Land development and disposal for institutional use was also done by 
DDA. Plots were provided to departments of states/central governments, registered 
societies, and social, cultural, educational and religious institutions. Plots are also allotted 
for colleges, schools, hospitals, court buildings, milk booths, various infrastructural 
facilities, and residences of government employees. DDA had allotted about 1800 plots 
(3554 acres) of varying sizes to these institutions by the end of 1992. 
Recreational and Greens: DDA develope and maintain green areas in Delhi. In 1991 it 
had developed a total green area of about 18,184 acres in Delhi (DDA Vikas Varta, 199 1). 
Of these about 8289 acres of land from Nazu] land 11 was developed into different kinds of 
greens, parks and gardens by August 1994. They were developed in the form of green 
buffers (16), playing fields (10), district parks (850), city forests/woodlands (56), sports 
complexes (8), lakes (16) and picnic spots (8), etc. DDA has planned and developed 
sports complexes to provide sports facilities to people who cannot join prestigious social 
clubs in the city. It also fosters and encourages young talent for participation in national 
and international sports activities (DDA, undated: 11). DDA has developed seven sports 
complexes with various indoor and outdoor games, and developed children's parks and 
fitness trails with required equipment and track. In 1990, it had developed two divisional 
level sports centres, six district level centres and many small play centres. 
Ix Asiad Projects: DDA claims a special achievement during the 1980's, towards the end 
of first Master Plan period. During 1982, DDA was selected to take up the planning and 
construction and management of four prestigious Asiad projects namely, Indraprastha 
Indoor Stadium (third largest in the world and largest in Asia and Europe), Yamuna 
Velodrome, Asiad Games Village (4200 rooms, with a multi-purpose tower, cultural 
auditorium, Asiad hospital and other facilities) and Tughlaqabad Shooting Ranges. These 
were created within 24 months to make Delhi the befitting host of the IX Asian Games. In 
addition, the government called for flyovers and sports complexes (Golf Driving Range 
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and Yarnuna Sports Complex of 28 hectares), built to a standard by the DDA which 
attracted much acclaim (DDA, undated: 14). Besides, DDA has also undertaken special 
projects such as construction of fruit and vegetable markets at Azadpur and Okhala, and 
construction and maintenance of Inter state bus terminus, Haz Manzil. 
5.3.3. The Implications Of Integrated Land Development For Housing 
Land Supply In Delhi 
In the Netherlands and Sweden municipal public planning and sizeable land reserves 
through advance land acquisition were successful in slowing down the rate of increase of 
land prices and reducing the speculation by bringing unimproved and agricultural land into 
urban use at a rate roughly corresponding to demand (Grimes, 1974). In Sweden, 
municipalities were empowered and even encouraged to dominate local land markets in 
order to ensure the availability of sufficient land for urban growth. But, it appears that in 
both the countries, unlike Delhi, the land acquisition policies ensured acquisition of 
sufficient land through voluntary purchases and enforcement of expropriation powers in 
the event of their failure. 
These governments also made provision for "worsement" benefits compensating land 
owner claims about decrease of value of his holdings caused by municipal planning 
decisions. A unique feature of this process is that the Swedish government incurs all the 
costs of expropriation procedures, including the court costs of private parties. The 
application of same method may have provided different results in Delhi, but it is an open 
question as to how far the government could afford it in the light of its own lack of 
financial autonomy and stiff resistance from landowners. Speed takes precedence over 
foresight in the urban land planning, and acquisition of land reserves at reasonable cost in 
particular (Grimes, 1974). This inevitably leads to policy decisions in favour of 
expropriation as the tool. 
The development of land acquired through large-scale land policy was mostly carried 
out by DDA, and local bodies such as CPWD were also engaged in development of land 
transferred to them (Government, 1990: 186). The Master Plans 12 that provided the 
necessary guidance for land development has envisaged that 62,000 acres be developed by 
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the end of 198 1, and further proposed acquisition of additional 45,000 to 60,000 acres 
more for development to 2001. The second plan has also extended the urban area by an 
additional 9884 acres. Only 47366 acres have been allocated to different uses by 1983 and 
59,524 acres by August 1994, indicating that progress is slower than anticipated. 
As discussed in Section 5.3.1 some of the land acquisition procedures and 
development provisions available to DDA, and the landowners' resistance to expropriation 
at off-market prices have contributed to delays in public land development operation in 
Delhi. However, more important to infon-nal land developments and unauthorised housing 
is the insufficient supply of land for public housing and the general failure to deliver the 
right land to the right person. The following Section 5.4 discusses the impact of formal 
housing land supply on overall demand. 
5.4. FORMAL HOUSING LAND SUPPLY AND REGULATED 
DELIVERY PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC LAND POLICY 
DDA claims that its land development activities drew wide praise and that it has put Delhi 
on the Asian development authorities map (DDA annual report, 1992-93). It claims that 
its large-scale public land policy has supplied one million dwelling units in 28 years, the 
highest in the country. It also claims to have settled/relocated the largest number of 
squatter and slum dwellers in the world. Despite legal complications, it did succeed in 
meeting most of the demand estimated by the Master Plans and supply housing to low 
income groups, and satisfy other public uses, all of which might have remained unrealised 
in the absence of Delhi's public land policy. 
Specifically, it is noted that lease conditions and terms followed in leasehold 
allocation has ensured the supply of land to the right person at right time and at reasonable 
prices in order to control speculation and stabilise land prices. These conditions along with 
Master Plan development controls have also ensured appropriate land uses and planned 
development. While public land allocations are admitted to have taken as long as six 
months, sometimes further delayed by technical formalities such as approval by committee, 
they are said to have conformed to the land policy's terms and conditions, and as quickly 
as possible under the circumstances. 
The DDA's monopoly in land delivery, effected by eliminating formal private land 
supply, been said to intensify scarcity and distort other parts of the housing land market 
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(Pugh, 1991: 370). Thus, the policy has been criticised for neither eliminating the 
speculative private market nor meeting the growing land demands of low and Middle 
income households (Mitra, 1990: 194). 
The policy did not envisage, therefore administration could not cope with monitoring 
illegal transfers of leasehold properties, unearned increase of property values, and 
violations of land use and building controls (Acharya, 1988). Leasehold land allocation 
involved a large staff and created potential for rrýsmanagement and high overheads, and 
promoted corruption in the administration and transfer of leases (Misra, 1986: 67; Acharya, 
1988). The practice of leasehold disposal and restrictions on legal transfers aimed at 
greater control on allocated use, and resale restricted the spatial mobility of people and as 
a result provided an incentive to illegal transfers (Misra, 1986: 6). 
DDA's leasehold land allocation policy followed the theoretical principles of high 
productivity (Acharya, 1988: 1435; Doebele, 1983: 84): (1) sophisticated lease 
administration to restore market elements amid public domination; (2) an integrity in the 
bureaucracy to corruption and favouritism; and (3) monitoring quick construction on the 
site. DDA's policy was also founded on public ownership combined with leasehold 
delivery, (Doebele, 1983: 86). But in Delhi housing demand was not met because: (1) 
the Master Plan/DDA had under estimated it; and (2) this demand increased steadily, 
widening the gap on account of DDA's reluctance to supply adequate land for un- 
profitable low income housing (Acharya, 1988: 1432; Ribeiro, 1992: 58; Misra, 1990: 56) in 
favour of auctions to higher income households for profit (Acharya, 1988: 1433; Pugh, 
1991: 381; Ribeiro, 1992: 4; Baken and Linden, 1992: 63). Howland (1977) and Maitra 
(1991) argue that DDA auctioned more plots against the policy norms. This was only 
slightly better than what the free market might have done (Howland, 1977). This 
unsatisfied demand has then attracted to illegal formal land sales and unauthorised land 
developments. 
People bought user-righted property instead of lease ownership in view of delays in 
formal land delivery by DDA. Formally allocated land was sold illegally using invalid 
powers of attorney. " This promoted corruption in land lease administration in two ways 
(Misra, 1986): in verifying the genuineness of lease papers on illegal sale without official 
proceedings; and negotiations with concerned staff for obtaining a valid power of attorney 
against the condition of restriction of sales for 10 years period and/or by payment of 
comparatively lesser conversion charges. 
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It is also argued that the following reasons have attracted a large number of 
households to informal land. Maitra (1991) states that the DDA's discriminatory practice 
of auctioning plots over 167 square metres in area to higher income households with no 
suitable formal housing provision for Economically Weaker Section was a reason for the 
latter's preference for encroachment. It is also believed that the annual surplus of revenue 
from land sales was not channelled to land development for the poor (ibid). 
Land allocated to low income groups' relocation colonies were away from 
employment sources (Baken and Linden, 1992: 63; McAuslan, 1985: 88; Mitra, 1990: 216; 
Acharya, 1988: 1428). Their isolation from city also seems contrary to Master Plan 
recommendations and believed to have encouraged low income groups to seek their most 
suitable options that were illegal (Sarin, 1983: 242; Acharya, 1988: 1428). Further, it is 
believed that DDA's insistence on high development standards and their locational 
disadvantages have paradoxically served to encourage illegal transfers of designated low 
income plots/houses to higher income groups, lowering even further the 'de facto' supply 
to low-income households (Baken and Linden, 1992: 64; Mitra, 1990: 216). 
5.4.1. Housing Need And Methods Of Registration Of Demand For 
Regulated Public Land Delivery 
There are many ways through which housing demand might increase in a given time (see 
Section 7.2). Ratcliff (1949: 88) noted an aggregate potential demand for a quantity of 
housing sufficient to accommodate the entire population. This demand may fluctuate 
depending upon the natural increase of population and/or migration and/or by fanulies 
changing in to single or extended families through changing marital status and age at 
marriage (Lean and Goodall, 1966: 323). In conjunction with this fluctuating potential 
demand the change in family incomes, sizes and structure can affect the type of 
accommodation sought at any given time. 
In fact, the Delhi's public land policy expected that this potential demand could be 
adequately met by supplying land in the form of regulated delivery, i. e. for residential use 
alone, precluding investment and/or speculation. The policy also hoped that the regulated 
delivery on the basis of a registered priority list would substantially discourage the demand 
and enable the public authority to meet it. Accordingly, Delhi's Master Plan 1962 
envisaged construction of 887,000 dwelling units during 1961-1981 to eliminate the 
housing shortage. Further, the second plan approved in 1990 estimated 1.62 million new 
housing allocations. 
145 
Researchers argue that the Delhi's public land supply strategy had miscalculated, and 
that the DDA's register of need was only part of the actual demand (Acharya, 1988; 
Ribeiro, 1992; Misra, 1990). The DDA's land allocation conditions did not include the 
current changes in income levels, relative affordable prices and household sizes, all of 
which affect the characteristics of housing demand (Gupta, 1985). It is also believed that 
various developments and improvement programmes such as large-scale land 
development, squatter relocation and provision of additional facilities on squats and 
informal areas have contributed to increase in the demand by attracting more migrants into 
the city (Srinivas, 1995; Singh, 1991). In this context, the following sections analyse the 
actual demand and public land supply. 
5.4.1.1. Estimated Housing Land Need /Demand In Delhi 
Sundaram and Gambhir (1991: 108) provide alternative estimates of Delhi's annual 
housing demand, using the principal component method" and minimum norm approach. 
The former yields an annual demand of 127,590 dwelling units for the year 1990-9 1. The 
latter method segregates demand as follows: (1) housing need for additional population; 
(2) need based on existing housing conditions that require alternative housing; (3) housing 
shortage that exists during the year of estimation; and (4) housing registrants awaiting 
formal allocations. This yielded a figure of 1,472,909 dwelling units for 1990-91. Both 
estimates are higher than that of the estimated fon-nal housing supply that included 
regularised unauthorised colonies during the period 1981-91. Also, Srinivas (1995: 67) 
noted that Voluntary Health Association of India has estimated Delhi's housing stock 
(including slum, squatter and unauthorised colonies) as 1.6 million, with a shortage of 
0.44 million in 1989 (projected to over 0.8 million in 1995). 
In a similar way, the actual segments of demand that could have attracted informal 
land developments (illegal and unauthorised housing) are estimated for the year 1990-91 
as follows (Table 5.2). In this estimation, D= dw+de+dr+dn+dc+ds. It yields a total 
demand that was vulnerable to the influence of illegal developments. This demand (D) is 
derived by adding, demand due to registrants awaiting formal allocations from DDA 
(dw), demand from encroached squatters who need relocation or legal accommodation 
(de), demand from replacement requirements (dr), demand for new houses from 
population increase (dn), demand from families living congested dwellings/sharing houses 
(dc), and demand from dwelling shortage brought forward from previous years (ds). The 
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total number of households aspiring to housing land in 1990-91 was thereby 
approximately 1.5 million households. 
Table 5.2. Estimated housing need/demand as on 1990-91 
Housing Need/Demand Component Number Of 
Dwelling Units, 
1990-91 
1) Housing need due to registrants waiting for formal land 367,909 
allocations (dw) 
2) Housing need due to encroached squatters who need 240,000 
alternative housing or replacement (de) 
3) Housing need due to dwellings that need immediate 68,000 
replacement (dr) 
4) Housing need due to additional families (natural increase and 329,000 
migration) desiring new housing (dn) 
5) Housing need due to families living in congested areas and/or 145,000 
sharing houses (dc) 
6) Housing need due to shortage that brought forward from the 323,000 
previous years (ds) 
Total housing demand based on need (D=dw+de+dr+dn+dc+ds) 1,472,909 
Source: Data compiled from DDA records. First used in Sundaram and Gambhir, 199 1. 
DDA records indicate that it allocated about 0.62 million dwelling units (DDA, 
undated), including serviced but unbuilt plots, against a potential demand of 1.5 million. 
There are no other large formal channels in Delhi, and DDA was charged with a very 
serious mission, using mechanisms such as revolving fund to generate resources. The 
following section discusses the performance of public land delivery. 
5.4.1.2. Formal Registration Strategy Of Regulated Public Land Delivery 
The methods of registration and public allocation of land for housing and other uses 
followed a number of sequential actions (Chart 5.5): acquisition of land as proposed, 
invitation of applications, development of land, and allocation of developed land on the 
basis of delivery norms, conditions and procedures. All registrants are required to pay a 
deposit and submit required documents. 
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Selection of the proposed number of applicants is done by drawing lots whenever 
the number of qualified applicants exceeds the limit. DDA in certain cases provide a choice 
of location or storey in a high rise building of Self-financing and Group Housing Schemes. 
Applications for land allotment and auction are invited through advertisement in leading 
dailies (DDA, 1980-81). In special circumstances, the transfer of registration from one 
scheme to another is permitted and forms a separate priority in the allotment. Allotment of 
plots is done in phases by lot. The DDA's housing demand registration strategy can be 
categorised in two types: (1) registration for built houses/flats; and (2) registration for 
developed plots. The details of registration are as follows. 
DDA's Formal Constructed Housing Demand Registration Strategy: the DDA has 
attempted to tap the right demand by registering the households in different priority 
schemes as follows (Table 5.3). 
1. General housing registration scheme: 
This is the first scheme floated by DDA in 1969; later ones were launched in 1971-72, 
1972,1972-73 and 1976. Of the five, the one launched in 1972-73 was aimed exclusively 
at socially disadvantaged families belonging to the designated communities. The schemes 
promoted built houses in the form of flats and the plinth area coverage was 60-100 square 
metres for MIG category, 40-70 square metres for LIG, and 23-37 square metres for 
EWS/Janta. The eligible beneficiaries were selected on the basis of annual household 
income, financial capacity to pay initial deposit, minimum five years of living in Delhi, and 
other terms and conditions (see Section 4.4.2.3). 
Half plots were allocated higher purchase basis for repayment on equal monthly 
instalments, and the rest on cash down payment basis. In the beginning popular demand 
was sluggish. Requests from public sector bodies such as LIC, banks and other public 
sector undertakings for staff were honoured by DDA. This scheme was extended in 1982, 
1985 and 1989 for retired and retiring persons, and special scheme for socially 
disadvantaged designated communities. These sub schemes had the same plot size and 
income category as the previous 1969 scheme, but the initial deposit, allocation ratio and 
method of payment were slightly changed. 
DDA annual records state that under this group housing scheme about 11,000 (23%) 
flats were allocated to the government institutions and about 27% of total registrations 
were cancel led/refunded due to un-met terms and conditions. 
The rest are allocated to 
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individuals according to land delivery norms and conditions (see Chapter 4). Except the 
recent registration called Ambedkar Awas Yojna, allocations of all other sub-schemes 
were completed allotment in 1988-89. 
2. New Pattern (HUDCO Model) housing registration scheme: 
This scheme aimed to follow the HUDCO pattern of construction and pricing of flats. It 
was launched in September 1976 in continuation of earlier schemes but with changes in 
plinth area coverage, income criteria and registration deposit amount. This pattern aimed 
to increase the supply and affordability to by reducing the standards. The plinth area was 
reduced due to steep rise in construction cost, and the income criteria was lowered due to 
increased cost of living. Initial registration deposit was reduced and further reduced for 
socially disadvantaged households. All EWS flats are allotted on hire purchase basis and 
repayment period is 20 years. In all 75% of LIG flats, and 60% of MIG flats are allotted 
on hire purchase. Relaxation was provided on repayment of instalments, and reservation 
provided to selected categories. 
This scheme did not succeed in meeting its registered demand within the proposed 
time. DDA records show that as on August 1993 about 26 % of registered households are 
still waiting for allocation (see Table 7.7). In 1990, DDA had to make a new provision for 
long queues of MIG and LIG registrants to form co-operative group housing societies in 
the name of Awas Sakar Yojna and permitted them to construct their own houses on plots 
supplied by DDA. 
3. Self financing housing registration schemes: 
This housing scheme has been launched for higher income group, and seeks financial 
participation from allottees during construction. No income limit is observed, but 
applicants are charged 25% of the estimated cost and an initial deposit. The rest is payable 
at 20% , 25% and 20% at six monthly 
intervals, and 10% at the time of taking possession. 
A computer based draw finalised the list of successful allottees. The amount deposited by 
the unsuccessful applicants was refunded. The non-nal period of construction is 2.5 years, 
and in case of delay, 7-10% per annum, interest is paid (Times of India, 1994). There are 
eight self financing registration schemes launched under this category between 1977 and 
1985, and two special schemes opened for retired/retiring persons. Upgrading from a 
registered income category to an upper one was enabled in 1987, considering the 
increasing household income and family size. Since 1985 a master seniority list has been 
drawn in order to estimate the time registrants must wait to secure an allotment. 
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4. Housing registration for slum tenements: 
Slum Rehousing and Residential Flats Registration Scheme was opened to clear certain old 
buildings declared dangerous by the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956. 
This resettled the inhabitants in other places. It provided for 23 square metres each for 
about 20185 flats. Later, in 1985, the Housing Scheme for slum dwellers and other who 
do not own a residential unit in Delhi, was launched and 27,693 applicants registered. 
Until 1990, only 1264 flats were allocated; these registrants are now organised into co- 
operative group housing societies and expect allotment soon. 
Table 5.3 Method of DDA's housing registration and supply from 1961- 1993 
Scheme/sub-schemes and year of Number Number Number 
commencement registered supplied as waiting as on 
on 31.3.93 31.3.93 
Built houses/flats 338,855 223,126 73,003 (22%) 
1. General Housing Schemes for LIGs & MIG 72,538 65,590 Nil 
1-8 schemes, 1969-1989 
Recent scheme (launched in 1989) 20,000 989 18,689 (93%) 
11. New pattern scheme, 1976 -LIGs and MIG 171,272 118,909 45,735 (27%) 
111. Self financing scheme - HIG 77,672 68,270 9,402 (12%) 
I. Self financing scheme (SFS) 
1- 8,1977-1985 
Developed plots 
1. Allotment of plots to individuals 
(i) General NA NA NA 
(ii) Rohini Project, 1981 82,384 41176 39,679 (48%) 
(iii) New Projects NA NA NA 
11. Allotment of plots for co-operative NA NA NA 
societies 
111. Supply of plots for relocated squatters NA NA NA 
Source: Compiled from DDA records. Note: data in the brackets shows percentage to 
total number of registrants in that category. NA: Not available. 
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DDA's Formal Housing Plots Demand Registration Strategy 
The DDA has launched five types of plotted housing schemes: (1) allotment of plots for 
residential use under general scheme as and where is basis; (2) allotment of plots in Rohini 
sub city area, (3) allotment of plots for house building and group housing societies, (4) 
allotment of plots for squatter resettlement and (5) allotment of plots in new mega city 
projects in new urban extensions i. e. Dwaraka and Narela. All these projects have included 
allotted plots for EWS, LIG and MIG, and auctioned plots HIG households. 
Among them, the scheme one pertains to the land that was not acquired by large- 
scale land policy but transferred from different sources such as Delhi Improvement Trust 
and Central Ministries who were involved in land development prior to DDA's formation. 
Under Scheme Two, Rohini plotted development, about 82,384 EWS, LIG and MIG 
households were registered for fixed plot size of 26 square metres, 32-48 square metres 
and 60-90 square metres respectively. Scheme Three registered households in the form of 
co-operative societies who would be able to build their houses together in the pattern of 
multifamily group housing buildings. These co-operative societies are registered with the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Delhi Administration and the seniority list forwarded 
to DDA. The fourth category was squatter relocation, and The fifth new extensions 
aimed at accommodating the waiting list of individual and co-operative societies. Zn 
5.4.2. Methods Of Regulated Public Housing Land Delivery/Supply 
In order to cater to the affordability and preference of households, DDA has followed 
various methods of supply of housing land. In 1965-1967, it changed its approach from 
selling serviced plots to the provision of constructed houses/flats (both cash down and 
hire purchase). During 1975-77, it resumed delivery of developed plots as well in order to 
meet the rising demand. On the directions of government, it undertook the resettlement of 
squatter families and regularisation of unauthorised colonies to increase the housing stock. 
During 1980-84, DDA conceived Rohini residential township to accommodate a large 
number of households who had been waiting for housing land. Since then, the emphasis 
changed from small area development (200,000 population) to subcity development (a 
million population). Table 5.4 shows the total amount of housing land delivered by 
October 1994. Chart 5.6 indicates that DDA has distributed more plots for individual 
and/or society constructions than flats or housing. 
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Table 5.4 Number of dwelling units supplied by DDA by October 1994. 
Category Dwelling Units 
(millions) 
Flats/houses constructed by DDA 0.24 
Dwelling units on squatter resettlements plots 0.24 
Dwelling units on plots provided to co-operative societies 0.195 
Dwelling units on plots provided at Rohini township area 0.085 
Dwelling units on plots developed by DDA in various parts 0.25 
Total 1.00 
Source: Compiled frorn DDA office records 
Chart 5.6 Number of dwelling units supplied by DDA by the end of 1992-93 
3 
.0 
0.0 
category of allocations 
DDA has undertaken various schemes of housing land supply catering, to the 
purchasing capacity of different strata of society. It supplied housing land through 
allocating built flats, and providing developed plots for construction to individuals and to 
co-operative aroup housing societies. t7l 
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Flats DUs on society plots DUs on other plots 
DUs of resettled DUs on rohini plots 
Delivery Of Multifamily Built-Flats 
The approach of supply of multifamily built-flats as group housing was devised by DDA 
when it found allottees are either delaying the construction on their newly allocated plots 
or reluctant to move to newly developed areas, in spite of its attempt to deny 
infrastructure to allotted plots lying vacant. This built-flats approach was believed to be an 
advantage in regard to allottee's reluctance to raise structures and to those who prefer 
built flats/houses instead serviced land. In order to accelerate the pace of construction of 
flats/houses under this approach, an independent construction cell was created in DDA in 
November, 1967. 
DDA had provided about 244,036 dwelling units to registered households in the 
form of multifamily group housing buildings by August 1994. Of these, 32% were allotted 
to EWS households, 29% to LIG households, 22% to MIG households, and about 16% 
to HIG households through self financing schemes. DDA records show that some of these 
flats were allotted on hire-purchase basis (cost repayment on instalment basis) to ease the 
affordability of poor. But hire-purchase schemes were found to be unsuccessful due to lack 
of cost recovery in spite of DDA's administrative efforts towards of arrears (Noronha, 
1991: 7). 
Delivery Of Developed Plots For Individual And Multifamily House Construction 
DDA's land development programmes started in 1962 and supplied serviced plots to 
individuals as housing land allotment to registered low and middle income groups and 
persons whose land was acquired, and auctioned allocations to un-registered higher 
income households. Among registered applicants, DDA supplied plots to individuals and 
co-operative societies. Noronha (1991: 6) states that earlier in the 60s and early 70s, the 
option was in favour of plotted development with serviced plots ranging from 25 to 500 
square metres each offered to registrants and co-operative societies. Realising that large 
plots were an unaffordable luxury due to increasing pressure on land and transportation 
facilities, DDA opted for group housing schemes for both co-operatives and registered 
individuals . 
The DDA also allotted land to co-operative house building societies that were 
initially registered by Delhi Administration. Later, in 1970, DDA introduced the concept of 
co-operative group housing societies in which individuals were encouraged to forrn 
societies and build their flats in the form of multifamily group housing. DDA's main 
function then was to allot developed land and recover ground rent. Mortgage permission 
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was granted to raise loans for their construction, and flats were allocated among their 
registered members. Ribeiro (1992: 58) deemed it unsuccessful in promoting quick 
affordable housing stock and fullfilling residential need, because until 1985, of 29,412 
plots allotted to various societies, about 11,995 plots (40%) lay vacant. 
Delivery Of Plots For Squatter Relocations 
As early as in 1950, a scheme called Jhuggie-Jhonpri (huts, lean-tos, adshanties) 
removal, and resettlement of inhabitants was initiated by the Central Government and 
entrusted to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). Under this scheme, 19,999 
squatter families from 19 settlements were relocated by MCD until March 1968 and then 
by DDA until June 1988. DDA relocated about 57,368 squatter fan-fflies and supplied 
individual plots and tenements in 1975. During the political emergency period (1975-77), 
16 new colonies covering an area of 987 hectares, with a total of 148,262 plots were 
developed by DDA. This scheme had provided 67 square metre leasehold plots in the 
beginning reduced in 1962 to 21 square metre: DDA once observed that a large number 
of these plots had been resold in benami names (DDA, 1969-70). 
As these squatters further increased, some were resettled on the peripheries of Delhi 
with basic amenities on a smaller scale. In these settlements, plots were also allotted to 
private organisations for organising cultural and social activities and DDA supplied water 
through sink tube wells in the absence of municipal supply. It reports having by 1981 it 
developed 44 resettlement colonies by 1981 covering 8,649 acres of land with adequate 
care to their needs for employment, and physical and social amenities. However, DDA 
also reports heavy expenditure on these resettlements and redevelopment, which severely 
affected its financial position. DDA has also contributed to development of civic amenities 
in regularised colonies and urban villages transferred to MCD in 1987. 
Land Delivery Through Slum Rehousing And Supply Of Residential Flats 
The Slum Wing has cleared certain old buildings declared dangerous by an clearence Act, 
and resettled the inhabitants in other places. This scheme was operational till the end of the 
6th five year plan and about 20,185 flats of 23 square metre have been constructed under 
this scheme. Later, in 1985, the Housing Scheme for slum dwellers and others who do not 
own a residential unit in Delhi but live in slums, was launched. The slum and squatter 
families affected by the clearance of dangerous and dilapidated buildings, have been 
allotted 20,030 flats (DDA, 1987-88). These flats were provided by DDA on licence fee 
basis and later converted into leasehold ownership. The shelter needs of the poor are also 
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best met through self help: about 50,000 serviced plots have been provided to the urban 
poor for incremental housing. 
The Slurn Wing has also been involved in improving the environment of the slums 
through making provision for essential services in declared slum areas. It has also taken up 
slum katra repair and renewal programme for the maintenance of dilapidated buildings, and 
provided about 83 multi-purpose community facility complexes for socio-cultural facilities 
in various congested slum areas. The Slum Wing has provided accommodation facilities to 
the absolutely homeless migrant population in 16 night shelters. Recently, since 1991-92, it 
has introduced a new squatter alternative accommodation scheme. 
Besides, large-scale land development and house construction, stringent measures 
have been taken to ensure quality in DDA built housing, design and development 
programmes since early 1983. Quality control and inspection are performed in all DDA 
works. Intensive and extensive supervisions of all works at various levels are ensured, 
while efforts are made to supply more materials departmentally. Sample houses are 
constructed prior to mass housing building in order to identify and avoid the possible 
mistakes that may otherwise become repetitive. The DDA's works are subjected to open 
technical inspection by the Central Vigilance Commission etc., (DDA, 1983: 3-4). 
DDA has also permitted mortgage with any recognised institution since 1987-88. 
The income criteria laid down in the new pattern of registration scheme and retired 
persons scheme were scrapped as they had caused harassment and generating corruption in 
the housing department. Now, allotments are made in respect of registered categories 
without insisting on documents to determine eligibility by income group. 
DDA also states that it attempted to ensure awareness of DDA's schemes, and 
during 1987-88, emphasis was laid on streamlining the working procedure, redressing 
public grievances and improving the working atmosphere. The counter system has been 
improved, and publicity given through the press about fresh proposals and guidelines so 
that the general public is kept informed. Since beginning of 1990, as a special significant 
feature, DDA has simplified its procedures of allotment and provided all information to 
allottees at one window: the "single window clearance". Efforts are made to give extensive 
publicity through the press regarding allotment dates, procedure, and also regarding the 
dates on which eligibility lists will be displayed. The demand letter for the required 
payment is issued on production of identification documents, and semi-decentralised zonal 
centres are put up to facilitate speedy and convenient issue of demand letters to allottes. 
The system of redressal of grievances of the registrants and allottees has also been 
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introduced. Self explanatory booklets containing guidelines and specimen proforma for all 
activities of DDA are printed and supplied to public at a nominal charge. 
5.4.3. Land Delivery Performance And Its Impact On Supply Of 
Sufficient Land For Housing- Household Response 
DDA claims to have supplied a large amount of land for residential use through its 
regulated land delivery: over a million dwelling units were made available by the end of 
1994, and a large number were provided to low income groups on subsidised prices. 
Maitra (1991) and Misra (1986) also believed that without this public land policy the poor 
would have been forced out of the city and planned development would have been 
difficult. 
Yet the DDA has been faulted: its selection criteria seems to have blocked the 
access of households who could not afford to register with DDA and left them 
unfortunates in some way. Furthermore, DDA's promotion of flats for higher income 
households under Self Financing Scheme in order to prevent "downward filtration"" 
benefited upper income groups and provided better accommodation than is available in 
private sector (Maitra, 1991: 345). 
DDA's regulatory policies are also said to have failed to provide LIG housing as per 
Master Plan targets (Payne, 1988: 43; Jerry, 1991). Daily newspapers note that besides 
individual registrants, there are numerous co-operative group housing societies (912 
societies with around 0.11 rnillion members) registered with the registrar of co-operative 
societies have waited for housing land since 1983. These figures were never lower because 
Howland (1977: 73) estimated in 70s that this policy has accomplished only a little more 
than a free market might have done it. 
It is also argued that the supply shortages, high standards and subsidies promoted by 
large-scale land policy have encouraged the commercialised recycling of the state-run 
formal housing system and encouraged a proliferation of illegal property dealers in all 
DDA built areas (Payne, 1988: 43). This encouraged a large number of resales of DDA 
plot/flats in the form of a "downward raiding" (Thirkell, 1995: 11) process, in which 
middle income group households have a tendency to buyout the land supplied to low 
income groups. This commercialisation of DDA flats/plots, unauthorised constructions and 
encroachments of open spaces has been noted in the DDA developed formal colonies such 
as mini city of Rohini (Indian Express, 19.9.92). 
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It is also noted that some of the lease conditions have attracted illegal sales of DDA 
allocated land and in turn attracted households to move to unauthorised colonies or obtain 
illegal land in order to overcome inadequate formal supply. On the other hand, Lee (1994) 
suggests that unduly expensive legal development to the effective exclusion of private 
sector developers offers scope to unauthorised development outside the urban regulations 
with most n-iinimal services and environmental protection, such as reported be happening 
in DDA colonies. 
Despite the existence of legal provisions against misuse and unauthorised 
construction, there is general misuse of residential space for commercial use, and a large 
number of residential buildings are partly or fully converted into commercial shops (Figure 
5.3). The reasons could be what Jerry (1991) noted as ample corruption in the civic 
administration and enforcement of land use laws. It thus becomes necessary to analyse the 
situation of formal land delivery with reference to residents opinions. 
In the Rohini plotted scheme, most of the formally allocated plots were resold to 
middle and higher income households. Of 366 households contacted, only 24% admitted 
being the original allottees. Interviewees also reported that a large number of plots were 
resold repeatedly, as many as 83% of resale purchasers had procured their plots through 
property dealers. Also, the DDA's decision to withdraw the 10-year restriction on flat 
resales has increased the number of sales. This seems to have intensified the active role 
played by property dealers in transacting plots subsidised for LIG and EWS households. 
The Rohini data also reveal that the present occupiers of DDA resold plots are 
generally upper income groups (see Table 7.14). Most EWS plots are occupied by MIG 
households, and most LIG and MIG plots bought by HIG households. Thus public land 
delivery has contributed to the creation of "downward raiding" affecting mostly low 
income groups. Furthermore, the lease condition of delivery of only one plot per 
household and restricted authorised private developments leave no doubt that these 
households will opt for cheaper semi-formal or regularised unauthorised plots and/or 
infon-nal land developments. 
Table 5.5 shows that 86% of the households who had bought resold plots had 
never applied for DDA plot/flat. A small number of households who either had sold off 
their DDA plot/flat and/or whose land allotment was refused by DDA, and/or awaited 
allocations, have also been encouraged by resold plots. Most belong to higher income 
groups (57%). This indicates that DDA's strategy of formal registration and priority 
allocations have not satisfied higher income housing land demand. This unsatisfied demand 
encouraged middle and high income households to obtain resale plots. 
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Figure 5.3 Violation of use criteria on formal land: misuse of residential space for 
commercial actvities at Rohini, Delhi 
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Picture above shows residential building converted into commercial shops along 
main access roads 
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Picture above shows residential space misused violating both use criteria and 
permitted floors along major access roads at Rohini, Delhi 
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Table 5.5 Formal housing registration status of respondents who bought resale plots 
Registration status Households Percentage Cumulative 
percent 
Waiting for DDA flat 7 6.6 6.6 
Waiting for DDA plot 2 1.9 8.5 
Waiting for DDA slum plot/nat 1 0.9 9.4 
Applied but withdrew 2 1.9 11.3 
Sold DDA allotted nat/plot 2 1.9 13.2 
Allotment was refused by DDA 1 0.9 14.1 
Never applied 91 85.8 99.9 
Total 106 100 
The major reasons given by interviewees at Rohini (Table 5.6) for their purchase of 
resold plots were the inadequate supply of formal land for housing and investment. Most 
were higher and middle income groups, and a majority (59%) engaged in self-employed 
business; hence, it could be concluded that DDA's slow housing land delivery encouraged 
thern to opt for resales. DDA's slow operation of commercial land development and 
building of commercial estates has also accelerated the exploitation of shopkeeping 
opportunities among retailers who could not otherwise have easily afforded residential 
space with commercial potential due to land use restrictions and the practice of auctioning 
commercial land. Business opportunities in a new township and the permission to build 
two floors have encouraged some to convert their ground floor to a shop and/or sell the 
ground floor for commercial use. This gives reasonable grounds to conclude that the 
flexible lease permitted to auctioned plots for sale of their ground floor has attracted 
higher incorne households to resold formal properties. ZD 
Therefore, auction policies and slow pace of land development resulting frorn 
DDA's monopoly and delays in housing supply have contributed to resale and violation of 
building regulations and lease conditions in Rohini. This phenomenon has been widespread 
in all of DDA's 520 colonies with some exceptions to intensity of resales, plot/flat prices 
and nature of violations. 
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Table 5.6 Reasons for buying DDA resale plots - Rohini 
Reasons Number of 
responses 
Percentage 
ofresponses 
Avenues for investment & extra income earning 37.7 
Commercialibusiness related purpose 13 22.4 
Cheap land rates/prices 4 6.9 
Property investment and business 2 3.4 
Formal land allocation terms and conditions 3.4 
Long procedure of permission for unbuilt flats 1 1.7 
Could not make cash down payment 1 1.7 
Formal quality, standards and choices 5.1 
Dissatisfied with DDA allotment 2 3.4 
Wanted low rise flat 1 1.7 
Formal supply/delivery based 37.8 
No other option was available 5 8.6 
Could not find cheap rental accommodation 5 8.6 
Could not wait longer for DDA allotment 2 3.4 
Recently moved from out side Delhi 5 8.6 
Desperate for better accommodation 3 5.2 
Close to employment 2 3.4 
Others 13.7 
Good environment and location 5 8.6 
Nearness to school for children 1 1.7 
Relatives around 2 3.4 
Total responses 58 96.2 
On the other hand, the DDA's practice of building self financed flats for higher 
income group has not reduced the practice of 'downward filtration'. Income criteria that 
determined the subsidised allotments were not successful in finding the right income group 
using the existing evidences of documents/income certificates and affidavits. In result, it 
provided land to wrong persons and tempted them to resell when prices boomed. Table 
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5.7 showing that of 28 resoled DDA allottees of Rohini plotted scheme who were finally 
located and interviewed, very few number of households are still in the same group. The 
rest were in the respective upper income groups. This shows that either these households 
had downward filtered or their income earning had increased. About 57% of the 
interviewees had moved to larger size of plots than those allotted to them. This shows 
that DDA's method of selecting EWS, LIG and MIG beneficiaries has not succeeded in 
providing subsidy to the right person due to change of household income and/or 
downward filtration of high income group to whom residential plots are auctioned. 
Table 5.7 Down ward filtration of DDA plot allotments at Rohini 
Employment Allotted Category Allotted Category Allotted 
Status EWS; Plot Size: 26 Square LIG; Plot Size: Category 
Metre (Sq. Mtrs. ) 32-48 Sq. Mtrs. MIG-, 60-90 
Sq. Mtrs. 
Current Income Current Income Current Income 
EWS LIG MIG HIG LIG MIG HIG MIG HIG 
Salaried in - - 1 1 2 1 1 2 
Government 
Salaried in Public - - I - - I - I 
Undertaking 
Self-employed - - 4 - - 3 - I 
business 
Employee in Private - - 2 1 1 - - I 
Retired from service - - I - 1 - - - - 
Unskilled Labour - - - - I I - - - 
Total - - 2 7 4 4 5 1 5 
(22) (78) (31) (31) (38) (17) (83) 
Note: Figures in brackets shows the percentage of respondents' current income 
category 
Nevertheless, it is observed from the reasons stated by sellers of DDA allotted plot 
that the prime reason (Table 5.8) for resale of their subsidised plots is the higher 
appreciation by market terms (from Rs. 100-200 per square metre in 1982 to Rs. 1538- 
14,844 per square metre in 1992). Other major reasons for resale were: acquiring another 
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plot through formal or other sources, closeness of work place to residence, small size of 
the plot provided by the DDA, etc. 
Table 5.8 Reasons for reselling DDA plot allotted at Rohini 
Reasons Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Stated As Stated As Stated As Stated As Third 
General First Most Second Most Most Important 
Reason Important Important Reason 
Reason Reason 
Higher sale price of 96 36 29 11 
DDA plots 
Acquired another plot - 21 29 14 
Acquired plot before 64 - - - 
allotment 
Acquired plot after 25 - - - allotment 
Work place close to 46 14 14 4 
residence 
Small size of the plot - 11 4 19 
allotted 
Problem of finance for 18 4 11 4 
construction 
Lease conditons- 7 - 7 4 
building bye laws 
Restriction to start 7 4 - - 
business 
Otherreasons 14 7 4 
Therefore, Delhi's public land supply, and the strategy of regulated priority delivery 
of formal land has not made available adequate residential and conu-nercial space at the 
right time and at the right place to potential aspirants. Its impact has contributed to large- 
scale resales of formal plots. This process has also encouraged downward riding of upper 
income groups. 
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5.5. DELHI'S LAND MARKET SITUATION BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE EXECUTION OF LARGE-SCALE LAND POLICY 
In Delhi's history, an idea land bank for public land development was discovered as early 
as 1911, and that bank supplied land for the development of New Delhi as a new capital of 
British India. This land bank also supplied land for ma or developments such as housing 
and creation of infrastructure then. Later, the public land development was continued by 
the Delhi Improvement Trust (the then local body responsible for planning and 
development) on a small scale. During that time, the increased demand for urban land and 
operation of many private land developers has made the land market attractive to 
investment and speculation. This resulted in formation of informal housing areas during 
early 1950's but on a small scale. 
This situation has changed after the introduction of large-scale public land policy in 
Delhi. On the one hand, it is argued that in spite of implementation of large-scale public 
land policy the land prices have risen frequently and illegal land developments continued 
growing. On the other hand, it is appreciated that the leasehold land (market) prices are 
only a fraction of freehold land (market) prices that were not under the direct control of 
large-scale public land development and disposal (Misra, 1990). It implies that the prices 
would have been higher than the present prices in the absence of this public land policy. 
The literature also argues that in spite of the policy efforts to facilitate the implementation 
of Master Plans to eliminate unauthorised land development, and informal private 
operations have not changed. 
5.5.1. Land Market Situation In Prior To Large-scale Land Policy 
The literature notes two major modes of land supply before the commencement of large- 
scale public land policy in Delhi (Mitra, 1990: 195). The local body called Delhi 
Improvement Trust (DIT) developed formal land in order to check haphazard growth and 
it provided land at reasonable prices for residential, commercial and slum improvement 
activities since 1937 Jbid: 196). But, it was accessible only to high income households; 
low income groups were priced out of formal and private land markets. They mostly 
depended upon rentals, government subsidised tenements and overcrowded inner city 
slums Jbid: 96). 
At the time the government's administrative and financial capacity was limited, and 
hindrances such as time consurning process stipulated by the land expropriation law, the 
limitation of technical personnel, the rising costs of construction and lengthy procedure of 
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land acquisition etc., existed. These constraints reduced the amount of land supplied to 
various uses (Mitra, 1990: 197). 
The DIT controlled the quality of development in residential areas developed by the 
private sector, yet large-scale legal and illegal subdivision of agricultural land for 
residential plots by real estate and land development agencies was wide spread for profit 
making reasons (Mitra, 1990: 198). Bonafide land developers and real estate companies 
called colonisers acquired agricultural land from original landowners on agreement and/or 
negotiating sale and subdivided it with DIT's layout approvals. Plot sizes varied between 
200 and 800 square yards, and infrastructure was provided in a planned manner. Flexibility 
in terms of instalment's facility was available. Profits varied from 33% to about 600% 
(Mitra, 1990: 198). However, the insistence on high standards of development and profit 
making motives of colonisers/landowners kept land prices high, thereby restricting access 
to higher income groups (Mitra, 1990: 199). 
During 1947-63, a major private developer called Delhi Land and Finance (DLF) 
agency developed plots ranging between 200 square yards and 1000 square yards. It 
accommodated 13,063 households on 1,547 acres of developed land at an annual supply 
rate of 934 plots per year. The low density areas with spacious houses with wide lawns 
confirmed that they could only supply 7% of the demand, when about 65% households 
lived in one-room houses (Maitra, 1991: 344). Later, in 1960, the second major developer, 
Ansals, began commercial development. During this time there was no large-scale building 
activity in Delhi. However, low income groups had no access to this private market and 
the housing shortage was about 155,726 dwelling units. In result, squatting rose: there 
were 12,749 squatter households (199 clusters) in 1951 and 78,346 (599 clusters) in 
1961. 
Misra (1990: 54) notes that during the 1950's the absence of a public land policy 
meant that the city grew fast and haphazardly. The land market became highly speculative 
and quickly priced out the majority of households including a large number of low 
income groups. As a result, shanty towns and marginal settlements grew all around the 
city. In the process, a number of informal land markets started operating. During that time, 
the need of the hour was to provide shelter on a large-scale to all aspirants, especially for 
the low income groups who can not afford private housing. 
Gambhir (1991: 9) has also observed that prior to the large-scale land policy, there 
was no institutional arrangement for public housing either built or plotted. Major fon-nal 
government housing was done by the CPWD for Central Government employees, and by 
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local bodies for their employees. The Ministry of Rehabilitation took the responsibility of 
providing housing to displaced persons who came to Delhi after Partition. 
In order to offset haphazard urban growth, and to promote planned development 
along with access to affordable land for housing, the government proposed a 20 year 
Master Plan for Delhi. Adopted in early 1960s, the first in the country, conceived of 
public ownership over the bulk of the land: this was to become the large-scale public land 
policy. 
5.5.2. Land Market Situation After The Execution Of Land Policy 
Large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal policy envisaged as early as 1950 
proposed cheap land acquisition through public land expropriation and aimed to provided 
affordable land through public land development and disposal. It aimed to lower land 
prices, and set up a public land financing system called revolving fund. It is appreciated 
that Delhi's experience of leasehold system and large-scale public land delivery has to 
some extent restricted the spiralling of the land price and the price of leasehold land is 30 
to 40% lower than that of freehold lands (Misra, 1990: 58). 
It is also argued that the overall prices increased by many times due to the slow pace 
of land acquisition, development, and the public land disposal policy's inability to release 
an adequate number of plots at the right time and at the right location (Acharya, 
1988: 1433). Specific reasons for price rise in Delhi are listed as (Singh, 1991; Misra, 
1986; Acharya, 1988: 1434): an increasing gap between demand and supply; the artificial 
scarcity created by DDA's practice of auction disposals and slow supply of acquired land; 
the trickles of plot auction which fetched a higher price in subsequent auctions but rise 
prices; and lack of assessment of requirements and priorities. Researchers observe that the 
rising prices have restricted the chances of obtaining legal land and pushed the majority, 
particularly the poor, to fringes, yet, further away from their workplaces (Acharya, 
1988: 1434). It is also criticised that the subsidy norm of allotting land to MIG on 10% 
more than the actual cost and for LIG 5% less than the actual cost has not been followed 
(Maitra, 1991). As a result, even the subsidised prices are regarded as unaffordable by 
many families. 
It was observed from field surveys that Delhi's large-scale public policy operation 
has created many segments of housing land markets (Chart 5.7). They are broadly 
categorised into two: formal and informal. Each sub-market could be subcategorised 
depending upon their legal status, plot standards and house structures and land prices 
prevailing in them. Among fon-nal segments, they could be subcategorised from illegal 
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leasehold to formal freehold. On the other hand, among informal they vary from infonnal 
substandard squatters to unauthorised large sized farms. The peculiarity of Deihl's land 
market is more than one element of illegal transactions. Large-scale public land allocation 
has not only created formal and informal segments but also encouraged illegal resales of 
formal land sales/allocations, and resulted in a variety of illegal categories such as squats 
on public land, benan-d sales/transfers of unauthorised lands, and transactions of 
unauthorised housing lands. 
Chart 5.7 Land market segments of Delhi 
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Another peculiarity of Delhi's land market is its prices and speculation. An additional 
limitation to state involvement concerns its ultimate ability to control land speculation, 
once it has disbursed developed plots to individuals, organisations and firms, and once 
such plots are allowed to command a free market price. The second time such plots change 
hands, they will no longer be sold at the original price but at a new market price 
commensurate with their real market value. The condition is worse when government tries 
to control the demand by priority and conditioned supply, because registering only part of 
the actual market demand creates artificial competition. This increases the price many 
times as observed in the Rohim plotted scheme (Table 5.9). DDA has created many 
categories of price structures through its allocation methods: subsidised or predetermined; 
auctioned; and informal resale price. Table 5.9 shows predetermined prices is lower than 
informal resale prices. But, auctioned prices to the highest bidder are often higher than 
the other two categories. 
Table 5.9 shows that the resale prices of DDA allotted plots in Rohini have increased 
many times in 12 years. The first draw was held in 1982 and plot resales started as early as 
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1985 and the median prices have reached 9 times the average pre-determined prices on 
which the DDA plots were allotted. However, the higher ranges are more than the median 
prices. This shows that the large scale land policy has not controlled the prices 
considerably. 
Table 5.9 DDA allotted Pre Determined and resale prices-Rohini 
Year PDR DDA Plots Average Median Agent Range 
Average Resale Price Resale Price Resale Price Quoted Price 
1984 155 - - - 769-6667 
85 190 1146-2967 2057 2057 - 
86 190 2917 2917 2917 - 
87 314 1538-1667 1603 1603 - 
88 314 2308-4688 3324 3436 - 
89 380 1250-5208 3451 3594 - 
90 763 1269-6667 3838 3642 1346-3000 
91 763 2083-8654 4476 4141 3125-10000 
92 763 1538-14844 6643 6172 3462-33333 
93 - 2500-8750 4898 4861 2692-41667 
94 2604-14167 7999 9135 2656-26667 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
The scheme of large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal of Delhi has enabled 
acquisition, development and disposal of a considerable amount of land for all uses in 
general, and for residential use in particular. The DDA claims that it has made a tremendous 
success because the land ownership pattern in Delhi was highly unequal at the inception of 
this policy, during the early post Independence period. DDA's data also shows that it 
developed a large amount of land for recreational use, and allocated a considerable number 
of plots for low income squatter resettlement through cross-subsidisation by profits from 
land auctions. Its data also shows that a large number of plots and flats were allocated to 
low and middle income groups on subsidised prices. 
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The analysis of field data indicates however, that subsidised plots were illegafly 
bought by higher income households for investment and extra income earning. This is clear 
downward raiding of upper income groups into low and middle income group plots. On the 
other hand, the resales of subsidised land took place due to higher prices offered, the desire 
to acquire more than one formal plot, distance of place of work from residence, and small 
size of the plot. This indicates that the DDA's strategy of formal registration of housing 
demand and priority allocations of fon-nal land has not supplied the right land to the right 
party, and has resulted in accumulation of unsatisfied demand. 
Public land delivery has therefore contributed to "downward raiding" and unsatisfied 
demand mostly affecting low income groups. The major reasons for purchase of resold land 
stated by interviewees at Rohini were inadequate supply of formal land for housing and 
investment. Most respondents were from higher and middle income groups, and a majority 
(59%) in self-employed business. 
Nevertheless, Delhi's public policy practice has provided many advantages in terms of 
cheap land acquisition, greater control over land development and use regulation, and 
provided financial autonomy towards curbing land speculation and stabilising prices. But, 
DDA's land development progress was slower than anticipated by the Master Plans. This 
was because: (1) legal constraints of land acquisition, and landowners' resistance to public 
land expropriation at off-market prices; (2) land development affected by the DDA's 
primary goal of mobilising revenues for cross-subsidisation; (3) DDA's concentration on 
construction rather than land development during the second phase of development (1983- 
1994) and additional functions that delayed its progress; and (4) delay in technical 
formalities such as approval of concerned comrnittees of government/DDA. 
Having concluded that a large amount of unsatisfied demand resulted from the 
inefficient and ineffective land supply of public land acquisition, development and disposal 
policy, it is assumed that this unsatisfied demand along with new demand created informal 
or unauthorised land developments. Land allocation in Delhi was a DDA monopoly and 
alternative channels were absent. To this extent, DDA does bear responsibility for the 
distortion outside its jurisdiction. Chapter 6 analyses the nature of informal land 
develoments in Delhi. 
Endnotes for Chapter 5 
The public land policy was executed in the name of large-scale land acquisition, 
development and disposal scheme during its inception. This scheme later continued in the 
169 
same name and also referred in different names (Howland, 1977; DDA, 1992). In this 
research, it is referred as large-scale public land policy. 
2. Misra (1986) observed that Delhi's large-scale public land policy came into force from 
mid-1961 along with a comprehensive land use development plan (Master Plan) 1961-81 
to guide the development. The public land acquisition was initiated even before the 
finalisation of Master Plan, on the basis of Interim General Plan for Greater Delhi issued in 
September 1956 (Sundaram and Gambhir, 1990: 2). 
3. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is a single, high powered (acquire, hold, 
dispose and contract property) public autonomous body mandated for the implementation 
of large-scale public land policy and Master Plans for the planned growth of Delhi. 
4. India was partitioned into two countries: India and Pakistan in 1947. During that time 
most of the families who migrated to India settled down in major cities: Bombay, 
Calcutta, and Delhi. 
5. The inadequate legal provisions contribution to insufficient land acquisition, 
development and disposal is discussed in the sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
6. It sometimes appears that there has been no independent aim or objective addressed by 
this large-scale public land policy. It was framed to facilitate the implementation of Delhi's 
Master Plan, envisaging systematic land use and prescribing guidelines for appropriate 
supply and distribution of land and other activities. Therefore, the large-scale public land 
policy of Delhi helped to execute Master Plans. The Delhi Development Act, 1957 
mandated the DDA to achieve the objectives of the National Urban Land Policy as 
enunciated by successive five year plans (Sundaram and Gambhir, 1990: 3). 
7. The Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment was renamed from the Ministry of 
Urban Development. 
8. Delhi was recently given the status of a state; it had been an Union Territory. 
9. The Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which had provisions for advance land 
acquisition on expropriation, and award of compensation at below market value, was 
enforceable to all parts of India. This Act was found most useful and applicable to Delhi 
due to its coverage of urban and rural land in its capital territory. 
'0 
. Singh (199 
1) has noted that 89,678 acres were acquired by the government during the 
period 1960-1989, of which 70,000 acres were acquired for DDA and 19,583 for other 
government agencies for non-plan developments. He has also noted about 93,243 acres 
of land acquired for plan-schemes during the period 1948-1989. Non-plan developments 
were carried out by Flood and Irrigation Department, Delhi Transport Corporation, Delhi 
Electricity Supply Undertaking, Indian Oil Corporation and Municipal Corporation of 
Delhi, etc. 
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''. Nazul land 11 is the category of land that was acquired through large-scale public land 
policy for planned development by DDA. DDA also developed, disposed and/or maintains 
about 691 acres of land procured from the then Ministry of Rehabilitation, about 6,649 
acres of land transferred from the Ministry of Urban Affairs and/or Gram Sabhas (Village 
Panchayats). 
12 
. So 
far two Master Plans were prepared and approved by the government. The first plan 
approved in 1961 was in force from 1961 to 1981. The second plan approved in August 
1990 will guide development to 2001. 
13. Invalid power of attorney is the one obtained through judicial processes without making 
required payment (50% of the unearned increase) to Delhi Development Authority. This 
gives the user right of occupation until either lessee or lessor revokes the ownership right. 
The valid power of attorney is the one executed by concerned department of Delhi 
Development Authority after the required payment has been made. 
14 The simple formula used for this estimation is D= db+dp+dr, where D is demand, db 
demand due to backlog, dp demand from population increase, and dr demand from 
replacement requirement. 
15. Maitra (1991: 344) note that as the HIG plots were auctioned, there was no provision 
for HIG in flatted housing scheme at that time. In result, the problem of "downward 
filtration" occurred widely as HIG applying for relatively lower income group housing 
producing false affidavit and documents. 
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Chapter 6 
INFORMAL LAND DEVELOPMENTS: 
CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF 
THEIR EXISTENCE 
6.1. PREAMBLE 
In Chapter five we ascertained that Delhi's public land policy, operated under the statutory 
land planning requirements (expropriation, public development and leasehold disposal), has 
supplied a large amount of land for all activities including housing. But, it is argued that in 
spite of its large-scale public allocation, there is a large amount of land occupied by 
substandard informal settlements such as squatter areas and unauthorised settlements of all 
sorts in contravention to the public policy. 
Concerning the intensity of such informal settlements, Hardoy and Satterthwaite 
(1989) argue that in 1982 half or more of Delhi's population lived in very poor conditions. 
Basu (1988: 103) estimated about 75% of Delhi's population living in sub-standard areas: 
1.4 million in unauthorised colonies, 1.0 million in squatter areas', 1.0 Million in 
resettlement colonies, 0.3 million in urban villages, 1.8 million in slum areas and 0.5 million 
in rural areas. Ali (1990: 15) estimated about 45% of the capital city as substandard in so 
far as establishment of minimum essential environmental facilities are concerned. Indian 
Express (21.3.91) reported that about 40% of Delhi's population were living in informal 
settlements within Delhi: 20% in Slums and 20% in unauthorised colonies. 
Recently, Ali (1995: 73) argued that out of the 9.3 million population, as per 1991 
census, that three quarters of Delhi's population live in substandard areas with features 
similar to slums. These include 1.4 million in unauthorised colonies, 1.3 million in squatter 
areas, 1.2 million in resettlement colonies (areas where squatter families are relocated), 
0.15 million in urban villages and about 0.5 million in rural areas. In addition, there are 
about 0.25 million slum households. Thus, at any given time, the population living in 
informal lands is not less than 40% as reported by the Indian Express (1991). This is 
against the conception of the large-scale public land policy proposed by the Master Plan 
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for Delhi of 1962, and the experiences gained by Sweden, Netherlands and other countries 
who operated similar land policies. 
However, the literature states that informal settlements exist in almost all developing 
cities, regardless of the nature and type of urban land policy intervention undertaken. 
Many argue that the land issue is inevitably bound by the cultural tradition and historical 
conditions of every country, making each system to a large extent unique (Angel et al., 
1983: 8; Doebele, in Thirkell, 1995: 13). Gilbert and Ward (1985) suggest many types of 
unregulated submarkets and state that they vary among each other and in comparison with 
the legal or formal alternatives. Their cost of entry, land cost repayment methods, 
according to perceived levels of security and their household affordability make them 
wide-spread. 
Therefore, to understand the real existence of these settlements, their similarities 
with the informal settlements found world wide, and to identify the reasons for their 
existence, it becomes necessary to analyse the creation process and their causes and 
effects. This study focuses on unauthorised land developments that are believed to be 
different from substandard squatter settlements, and which comprise affordable households 
that contravene the public land policy regulations in Delhi. The Chapter attempts to 
answer following questions: 
1. Is there a substantial number of informal settlements in Delhi? 
2. Are informal settlements in Delhi similar to informal settlements observed world wide? 
3. What are the causes and effects of these informal settlements? 
4. What type of informal land market emerged under the implementation of large-scale 
public land policy in Delhi? 
6.2. EXISTENCE OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
informal settlements are defined in terms of the nature of their formation. Thirkell (1995) 
noted two main distinctions: (i) the alienation, delivery and occupation of land which is not 
formally owned by title by the occupant or trader; and (ii) the subdivision and sale of lands 
which are formally owned by the seller but are disposed off without formal subdivision 
and/or planning and/or building permission as stipulated by the local authority concerned. 
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Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) also observed that housing in squatter settlements is 
illegal in two senses: land is occupied illegally, and the site and building are developed and 
built illegally - contrary to zoning, subdivision and building regulations. In Delhi, informal 
settlements are recognised as either encroachments (mostly squatters) or the subdivision 
and sale of land without the formal permission of the concerned local governments. 
The informal settlements or group of spontaneous, unplanned, unregulated, 
unauthorised, self-help, slums and squatters, illegal, and popular areas are called barrios 
p: irate, colonie illegales and barrios clandestinos in South America and ! ýjLidos in Mexico 
(Payne, 1988: 5; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). They are also known by a number of 
local terms such as 'gecekondus' in Turkey and 'bastis' or katchi abadis in Pakistan, and 
jpgýi jhonpris' and unauthorised housing in Delhi. Although all these illegal settlements 
are called inforinal settlements, there is a difference in terms of their location, plot size, 
building material, occupied income group and land tenure status. 
It is observed in the literature that informal settlements have been in existence since 
the early 1950's and are to be seen in almost all developing countries including European 
capital cities, for example in Portugal (Ferreira et al., in Payne, 1988). Payne (1988: 6) 
argues that in some cities, informal submarkets have grown rapidly, representing up to one 
third of the entire housing stock, and it is the most common means by which poorer 
households obtain residential land and housing. He quotes from Durand-Lasserve (1987) 
that in the Philippines they account for 86% of housing production; in Brazil, 82%; in 
Venezuela, 77%. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) have also estimated about 44% (7 out 
of 16 million) of people living in some form of uncontrolled or unauthorised settlements in 
Mexico City in 1982, and in Nairobi (Kenya) about 40% of the city's population are 
housed in unauthorised units. By the late 1970s most of the Third World's multi-million 
cities had each more than a million living in settlements that had developed illegally. Sao 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, Lima, Mexico City, Manila, Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, 
Lagos, Cairo and Bangkok are among them. Therefore, infort-nal settlements are wide 
spread regardless of the nature of the land policies enforced. 
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6.3. SIMILARITIES AMONG SPONTANEOUS CHARACTERISTICS 
AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ENCOURAGE THE CREATION OF 
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
Informal land developments are often argued to be a by-product of some circumstances, 
characteristics and causes that are common to many socio-economic environments rather 
than the effect of public policies designed to achieve certain objectives. However, Payne 
(1988: 40) suggests this submarket as a provider of service that could not be met on a 
sufficient scale by the public sector. He regards informal market as a private sector that is 
more pragmatic and efficient in identifying what most people want and are willing to pay. 
This is because there are no restrictions on standards, and they are quicker and better 
organised. Gilbert and Ward (1985) found the Bogota informal system as neither equitable 
nor efficient, but functioned well in the context of the city's working pattern. Although 
Angel et al., (1983: 11) argues that informal practices exist due to the ability of developers 
to provide housing stock to a great majority of low income groups that were not achieved 
by official attempts on a significant scale. 
These informal settlements occur in the circumstances of availability of a large 
amount of marginal lands such as environmentally sensitive areas: flood zones, steep 
slopes and low lying river beds etc., (Ward, 1984; World Bank, 1980). They are believed 
to coincide with certain cohesive characteristics such as socio-economic conditions, 
cultural tradition, administrative systems, law and order. Pirate subdivisions exist due to 
long delay in granting pen-nission for legal development (World Bank, 1980). 
Infrastructure seems to be a reason for the growth of informal settlements. Better 
standards of development of illegal subdivisions with some basic infrastructure (unpaved 
roads, water and electricity) have encouraged a large number of people in Bangkok 
(Payne, 1988). In Karachi, as an exception, these settlements exist without any provision 
of the essential services and facilities. As noted by Nientied and Linden (1990: 233-34), 
except for layout demarcation and hopes to arrange water through the metropolitan 
agency, the informal developers do not provide essential infrastructure. Assurance given to 
provision of infrastructure for informal settlements seems to be a common electioneering 
technique in Latin America (Collier, 1976; Gilbert and Gugler, 1981; Thirkell, 1995). 
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Thirkell (1995) observed illegal infrastructure (electricity tapping) and/or unenforced laws 
encouraging infon-nal land developments in Cebu. 
The availability of a wide range of plot sizes is noted to be a prime character of 
informal developments. Payne (1988) state that pirates in Bogota is characterised by small 
plots rather than local standards. EiLdo settlers in Mexico are believed to acquire adequate 
size of plots with acceptable levels of security with the hope of infrastructure provision in 
the reasonable future. 
Investment seems to be a motivating character in informal developments. Misra 
(1990: 58) suspects that middle and high income groups in DeH buy properties in the 
informal markets mainly for capital gains. But there seems to an increasing number of low 
and middle income groups entering the informal land market in Mexican and Latin 
American cities for various reasons (Payne, 1988; Thirkell, 1995). Informal land market in 
Cebu houses a broad cross section of urban society in terms of income, education, 
occupational and migrant status rather than the poorest urban residents (Thirkell, 1995). 
Similarities in land acquisition are also noted to be one of the characters that 
encourage informal developments. There are three types of informal land acquisitions 
noted in the literature: (1) invasion of land (both public and private); (2) purchase of land 
beyond the limits of conventional and legalised housing areas such as in Valencia, Mexico 
City and Bogota (Gilbert and Ward, 1985); and (3) purchase of community lands such as 
pjLldo land (which has the right to use but not the right to sell) in Mexico City and its 
transfer from agricultural to urban informal use (fraccionamientos clandestinos, illegal 
subdivisions), outside the federal boundary. It is also noted that lack of a legal enforcement 
mechanism encourages land acquisition by hiring squats or physical threats, and selling 
lots carrying invalid ownership documents in pirates (World Bank, 1980). 
Informal actors/agents play a crucial role in encouraging the creation of informal 
settlements in many places. Payne (1988: 40) noted that in Karachi informal subdividers 
are motivated by the "opportunity for profit and in some cases employ gangs to ensure 
cost recovery irrespective of hardship, and others make promises, such as provision of 
services, which they do not, or cannotfulfil". 
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There is a strong belief that an intimate relationship between subdividers and 
government agencies exist in many developing countries. The evidence for this is the local 
administrators' control over informal areas in Nairobi, and the profit share provided to 
government officials in Karachi (Payne, 1988). 
It is also noted that relationships among political leaders, administrative leaders and 
their personnel, developer and his personnel and residents encourage informal 
developments (Payne, 1988). Especially, the following relationships seem to be 
encouraging infori-nal developments around the world: pirate subdividers who are key to 
the political system because of their source of patronage (Gilbert, 1981; Thirkell, 1995); 
politicians who negotiate with the bureaucracy for planning permission and the provision 
of services to pirate urbanisers (Gilbert and Gugler, 1981: 112; Thirkell, 1995); informal 
subdividers in Karachi who obtain government protection to subdivide vacant public lands, 
and commercial entrepreneurs who either circumvent the administrative apparatus or 
corrupt it (Baross and Linden, 1990: 2). Lack of significant changes in the rules of the 
formal sector have widened the scope of agents operating informally in the land market 
(Durand-Lasserve, 1987: 332; Thirkell, 1995: 7). 
As some researchers have noted, informal land developments are a planned and 
highly lucrative business operated by specialised agents, which bring together lawyers, 
brokers, land officials, court clerks, kin groups and local civic and political leaders 
(Serageldin, 1990: 2; Doebele, 1994: 48). Thirkell (1995) suggests that undocumented links 
exist between institutions and informal land developers in the Philippines. Researchers also 
argue that although a majority of popular settlements have been created illegally in a 
planned and premeditated manner by coalitions of economic and political interests, 
unauthorised developments are also created due to the connivance of unscrupulous 
colonisers, corrupt bureaucrats and politicians in Delhi (Angel et al., 1983; Noronha, 
1991: 7). 
Circumstances such as the provision of selling plots for nominal prices and often 
donating for free of cost, can also encourage people to choose illegally developed land. In 
Mexico, farmers are tempted to sale their land to informal subdividers instead of selling to 
the formal projects. It is because such informal sales obtain a reasonable price for their 
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land and they also fetch an opportunity of payment of compensation by the government 
when formal titles are issued to plot occupants (Payne, 1988). 
Community organisation at the settlement level for lobbying for services, and 
political and social movements seem to be a prime factor in the context of Latin America 
(Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Thirkell, 1995: 207). This increases the security of informal 
settlements through collective action against potential evictors, and creates a strong force 
for lobbying for services and infrastructure and increased self-reliance through 
participation in community projects (Thirkell, 1995: 207). 
Durand-Lasserve (1990), Thirkell (1995) and Jerry (1991) have observed that the 
practice of payment of property tax for informal land in the name of fresh farming land or 
rural use fetches a certificate of proof of occupation of informal land and provides 
confidence of informal residence in many places. 
A large amount of discussion exist about the unexpected growth of population in 
Delhi. Researchers estimate about 85,000 to 200,000 migrants from many sources 
migrating every year to Delhi (Misra and Gupta, 1981; Parashar, 1994: 36). They argue 
that squatter settlements are the by-product of government programmes and urban plan 
administration because: (1) on one hand, a large sum of money spent for rehabilitating 
these migrants helps a lot in catching the attention of the poor people living in other parts 
of India to migrate to Delhi which in turn results in increasing the number of its 
population; (2) on the other hand, the public housing programmes have lagged behind to 
provide shelter to these people (Parashar, 1994: 36; Suri, 1991; Misra and Gupta, 1981). 
But the experience of Delhi is yet to be explored empirically. The following Section (6.4) 
analyses unauthorised developments in Delhi with the support of field data. 
6.4. INFORMAL LAND DEVELOPMENTS IN DELHI 
Unlike the planned mass invasion in Lima (Lloyd, 1980),! ýýdo land conversions in Mexico 
or pirate subdivisions in Latin America, the informal settlements of Delhi developed in the 
form of either encroachment of government and private land or subdivision of fresh farm 
land (acquired, notified for purchase or likely to be notified) in and around the city Iiii-dts 
or unauthorised constructions against building bye-laws applicable at the time of 
construction. These encroachments and subdivisions are not legally accepted because the 
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large-scale public land policy of Delhi regulates land planning through public land supply, 
land use planning and zoning and building bye-laws. Only the operators of large-scale land 
policies are allowed to subdivide, develop and allocate land for any purpose in Delhi. 
Every development is supposed to be undertaken only with the permission of the local 
government bodies concerned (i. e. Delhi Development Authority, Municipal Corporation 
of Delhi, New Delhi Municipal Committee, and Delhi Cantonment Board. However, in 
regard to formal new development, only the Delhi Development Authority has the power 
to grant permission. Therefore, any land development undertaken without the permission 
of local governments are called encroachments or unauthorised depending upon their 
nature and standards of development. 
6.4.1. Types Of Informal Land Developments In Delhi2 
Similar to more than one informal settlements in Mexico such as illegal subdivisions, illegal 
transfer sale of ! ýjLido land, and squatter invasions (Payne, 1988), many types of informal 
settlements exist in Delhi. These informal settlements are divided into three categories: 
-squatter settlements (Juggiý Jhonpris' clusters); 
-unauthorised building constructions on formal leasehold and freehold land; and 
-unauthorised colonies (unauthorised land subdivisions/developments). 
6.4.2. Squatter Settlements 
Squatter settlements are substandard housing land with poor environmental conditions. 
Squatting is mostly believed to be encroachment of government land. Squatters are viewed 
as families unable to afford housing through rent or ownership in the private formal 
housing market or through the housing agency as per their preferred location (Sundaram 
and Gambhir, 1991), and who can usually only afford to rent rooms and shacks (Angel et 
al., 1983: 4). The total estimated population of these squatters were about 566,930 persons 
in 1983 (DDA, 1983) and about 1.3 million persons living in these 929 Jhuggie clusters 
alone (School of Planning and Architecture (SPA), 1994). In 1994, SPA (1994) also 
estimated about 0.27 million families living in informal squatter settlements. These squatter 
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clusters have grown from 928 clusters in 1991 to 1276 clusters in 1994 and an average 
squatter settlement size is 280 living units in (ibid). 
Table 6.1. Spatial distribution of squatter settlements (clusters) in Delhi 
Zone Number of' Number of Number of Squatter 
clusters in clusters in Auggies in Population in 1990-91 
1990-1991 1994 1990-91 
East Zone 123 190 41958 209790 
Central Zone 92 127 21877 109385 
North Zone 227 300 65901 329505 
West Zone 204 270 42573 212865 
South Zone 282 389 87035 435175 
Total 928 1276 259344 L-296720 
Source: Slum Wing of Delhi Development ALIthority, and SPA (1994). 
6.4.2.1. Location And Typology Of Squatter Settlements 
Unlike the usual location of squatter settlements (such as hillsides around Rio de Janeiro 
and Lima; marshy and malarial valleys around Bahia; and canals, lagoons and rivers in 
Saigon, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Bangkok, etc. ), most squatter clusters in Delhi are 
located on plain areas owned by the government, and some occupy vacant private lands 
(Basu, 1988: 28). They are "spread over the length and breadth of the city staring the 
conscientious urban planners in theface" (Ali, 1990: 15). Large concentration of squatters 
are seen in Trans Yamuna (Planning Division E) and South Delhi (Planning Division F) 
Figure 6.1 shows the location and distribution of squatter clusters in 1990-91. 
Squatters' areas are found located on public lands (Sundaram and Gambhir, 1991; 
Benjamin, 1991: 3); gardens, open spaces near railway tracks, beneath bridges and planned 
public housing sites (Benjamin, 1991: 3), amidst surrounding residential areas (Misra and 
Gupta, 198 1), near old and new industrial and commercial complexes, fruit and vegetable 
markets, within unauthorised colonies, and resettlement colonies (DDA, 1983); open 
spaces left out in resettlement colonies where previous squatter households had been 
rehabilitated and who even complain that the basic services made available to them are 
inadequate (All, 1990). 
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Table 6.2 Growth of squatter settlements in Delhi 
Period Number 
Squatter 
Units 
Number 
Squatter 
Families 
Total 
Squatters 
Colonies 
Resettled 
Families 
Resettled 
Number 
Plots 
Upto 1951 - 12,749 12,749 
Upto 1956 - 22,415 22,415 
Upto 1958 - 40,000 - 
Upto 1961 - 42,815 42,815 
Upto 19622 - 66,000 - - - 
Upto 1966 73,693 42,668 77,693 10 34,925 
Upto 1971 115,961 62,594 62,594 8 - 
Upto 1973 141,755 98,438 151,302 18 32,864 - 
Upto 1975 - 150,000 - 34 57,368 52,864 
1976-77 - 20,000 214,684 1 194,684 148,262 
Upto 1978 - 70,000 267,684 - 197,684 
Upto 1980 - 98,709 - - - - 
1981-1983 - 113,386 - - - - 
Upto 1985 - 171,000 - - - - 
Upto 1988 - 190,000 - - - - 
Upto 1990 - 230,000 - - - - 
Upto 1992 - 260,000 - 45 - 
Source: Compiled from Gupta (1994: 17), Suri (1991: 25), and SPA (1994). 
Blank cells indicate the non-availability of reliable data. 
DDA (1983) has sub-categorised them into (i) regular squatters and (ii) temporary 
squatters (labour camps). Regul squatters are camps having ration cards (entitlement to 
subsidised food items supplied by the government fair price shops) facilities and residents' 
names appear in the census lists of the concerned area. Some of these squatter settlements 
have brick paved streets. Temporary squatter settlements do not avail of ration card 
facilities and mostly inhabited by construction labour. They seem to be purely temporary 
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and mobile depending upon construction work, and normally located around construction 
sites. 
Squatter settlements consist mostly of huts constructed out of mud, brick, straw, 
bamboo, wood and such other sundry materials (Misra and Gupta, 198 1). Well established 
squatter units are made out of improvised materials without any infrastructure provisions 
(Sundararn and Gambhir, 1991). About 95% are occupied on an individual ownership 
basis. About 80% contain 10-15 square metre area, and 88% are single room units (Basu, 
1988: 138). 
Squatters are engaged in manual labour in the industrial areas, in domestic work and 
in construction, and factors such as distance of workplace and transportation costs 
encourage them to stay in these settlements (DDA, 1983). Most squatters are recognised 
as rural migrants of utter poor and poverty-stricken labour class households who move to 
the city in search of better wages (DDA, 1983; Basu, 1988: 138). Their household income 
is low and they do not manage to save anything (SPA, 1994). 
6.4.2.2. Reasons For Squatter Settlements 
Many reasons have been suggested as having encouraged squatter settlements during the 
operation of large-scale public policy in Delhi: (1) unaffordable standards of government 
built legal housing motivated the poor to squat vacant land (Basu, 1988: 242; Sundaram 
and Gambhir, 1991); (2) acute housing shortage for low income groups (mostly in- 
migrants who find it difficult to afford the costs of public housing) lead to squatting on 
public places (Basu, 1988; Parashar, 1994: 36); (3) inability of government land 
management and controls of resale of resettlement plots encouraged squatting on 
government land (Suri, 1991); (4) resettlement of squatter families on legal plots located 
on peripheral locations attracted them to illegally sell their land and move nearer to their 
places of employment (Payne, 1977; DDA, 1983); (5) possibility of building home 
progressively according to their own values of space and amenity, and regulate the 
expenditure within their limit (Basu, 1988: 242); (6) political patronage motivated large 
number of squatters (Ali, 1990: 26; SPA, 1994). 
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Figure 6.1 Location of Squatter Settlements in Delhi, 1990 
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6.4.3. Unauthorised Building Constructions 
Unauthorised constructions are violation of planning and building standards. They are 
prominent on formal leasehold, freehold land and regularised informal land. Substandard 
areas such as slums are often included in this category. The Hindustan Times (28.12.92) 
and Indian Express Metro News (1.1.93) reported that there were about 6000 properties 
all over the city that had deviated from the approved building plans in 1992 (Table 6.3). 
These include 1000 places of worship. But action seems to be taken only against a few 
hundred unauthorised constructions due to political pressure to spare the main 
encroachers. 
Corruption in the plan approval system is noted as one of the prominent reasons 
wide-spread in Delhi (Hindustan Times, 1992). But the planners blame political patronage 
for these illegal activities. It is believed that initial hesitation on the part of the authorities, 
omnibus stay orders, lack of action and monitoring encourage unauthorised constructions. 
Table 6.3 Unauthorised constructions in Delhi, 1992. 
Zones (MCD) Unauthorised 
Buildings 
Buildings 
Sealed 
Court 
Stays 
Buildings 
Demolished 
City 265 26 49 12 
Civil lines 312 17 13 13 
Shahdara (South) 374 12 5 Nil 
Shahdara (North) 396 14 Nil 12 
Sadar-Paharganj 263 27 9 6 
Karolbagh 864 4 Nil 5 
West Zone 751 34 4 28 
New Delhi - 48 11 3 
South Zone 509 95 23 7 
Najafgarh 234 1 5 14 
Narela 145 4 Nil 51 
Rohini 392 21 22 53 
Total 5714 303 141 204 
Source: Indian Express, Metro News, 1.1.1993 
184 
6.4.4. Unauthorised Land Developments 
The literature states that unauthorised land developments/colonies 3 have been growing 
steadily (Mitra, 1987; Basu, 1988; Payne, 1988; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989; Ali, 
1990,1995). They grew from I 10 in 1961 (before the enforcement of large-scale land 
policy) to 471 in 1975, to 750 in 1983 and about 900 in 1994. The Tables 6.4 and 6.5 
show spatial and time series growth of unauthorised colonies. Prior to the enforcement of 
large-scale land policy, unauthorised colonies were present in East Delhi (Shahadra), West 
Delhi and North Delhi. They continued in the same way after the enforcement of policy. 
Recent field work conducted for this study has observed the existence of large number 
colonies all over Delhi (see Figure 6.2). 
An attempt was made during the field work to list and estimate the actual number of 
unaUthorised units existing in Delhi. But the attempt has only helped a little due to the lack 
of authentic sources of data and time constraints. It was found that there is no government 
department which has taken up the tremendous task of counting this ever-growing new 
colonies and subdivision of existing plots in old colonies. However, the secondary 
information compiled from MCD and DDA records shows that more than 900 
unauthorised colonies exist as on March 1994. Chart 6.1 shows the growth of these 
colonies since 1961. 
Chart 6.1 Growth of unauthorised colonies in Delhi 
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Table 6.5 shows that these colonies are located all over Delhi except in the New 
Delhi Municipal Committee zone, Delhi Cantonment and Sardhar Pharganj zone. Most 
colonies are concentrated in the Najafgarh zone located in the western part, Shadhra North 
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and South zones located in the eastern part, followed by South Zone of South Delhi and 
Narela Zone in the rural part of Delhi. 
Table 6.4 Growth of unauthorised colonies in Delhi 
Year/ period Number Number Families Population Prime Locations Area 
Colonies Units (Million) (Million) (acres) 
196 1 (Prior to 110 - - 0.2 Shahadra, West 
large-scale land Delhi, North 
policy) Delhi 
1974-75 (after 471 142,000 0.15 0.8 Shahadra, West 7,413 
large-scale land Delhi 
policy) 
1978 - - - 0.6 7,500 
1983 750 1.2 11,120 
1994 847 1.4 - 
Source: Compiled from Gupta (1985), Basu (1988: 103), DDA (1984) and Jerry (1991). 
Blank cells indicate the non-avai lability of reliable data. 
Table 6.5 Distribution of unauthorised colonies over municipal zones as per their 
status of grant of No Objection Certificate (NOC) for electrification. 
Zones (MCD) NOC 
Given 
NOC 
Pending 
NOC 
Rejected 
New 
Regist 
-ration 
Newlist 
Supplied 
by MPs & 
MLAs 
Total 
Civil lines 4 - 2 2 5 13 
Shahdara (South) 73 3 12 7 2 97 
Shahdara (North) 108 9 23 9 26 175 
Karolbagh I I - - 11 13 
West Zone 19 1 1 3 6 30 
South Zone 1 10 3 19 6 39 
NaJafgarh 165 17 23 39 156 400 
Narela 18 2 3 7 38 68 
Rohini 4 - - 1 7 12 
Total* 393 43 67 87 257 847 
Note: * MCD total is 402 NOC Given, 88 new registration and grand total ot 857. Source: 
Compiled from information collected from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). 
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Figure 6.2 Location of* Unauthorised Land Developments in Dellti 
N 
r Ip 
21 
Haryana 
Ot 
Uttar Pradesh 
17r- 
2 
L eu end 
0 Unauthorised Colonies. 
Regrularised Unauthorised 
Colonies 
12345678 
, SOL I I-CC: - 
W011tC(I 1'1-0 111 1 11C 1( )c, It it),, pjýl I, ()I' I mauthonscd colunics I ii cx ismice pri( )I, I() 
. 
1a [I I I'll-v IQxI. "v WD I'mk IIIILII ill ill g( )H"I CC. I )c Ill i. 
Now: Hirs map ý, Ilow,, ýipprommatc scale 
L87 
6.4.4.1. Physical And Socio-economic Characteristics Of Unauthorised Land 
Developments 
Physical Characteristics 
In Delhi most unauthorised developments have mushroomed on farming lands (see Table 
6.6). They are similar to illegal subdivision of marginal lands for the sale of un-serviced 
plots (Payne, 1984) and pirate subdivision of environmentally sensitive areas for moderate 
incomes families (World Bank, 1980). These illegal developments are taking place around 
urban villages and new legal developments promoted by the DDA. They are also seen 
along major access roads to the city. Farming land was demarcated into different sizes of 
plots without servicing and sold to approaching individuals approaching for plots. 
Although Gupta (1985) argued that the colonies have generally sprung up on lands 
notified for acquisition by the government, the field survey conducted for this study reveals 
that about 90% new subdivision have taken place in fresh farming land (see Table 7.4) 
located all over Delhi. Of the interviewees residing on unauthorised land, about 2% stated 
that the land they occupy was once acquired by DDA, and about 4% said that the land 
they are residing now was notified for acquisition by the DDA. 
Table 6.6 Physical condition of the unauthorised plots before house construction 
Physiography Plots Percent 
Floodable area 8 2.7 
Steep slope 23 7.7 
Water logging area 108 36.4 
Plain (farming) area 158 
- -- 
53.2 
------- 
Total 
--- - 
297 100.0 
In Delhi there is evidence that even court-stayed lands have been illegally subdivided 
contravening court orders and their land title documents were issued on a date prior to the 
date of issue of the stay order. For example, the illegal subdivision of Arjun Park (West 
Delhi) was stayed in the court by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in 197 1, but finally 
subdivided in 1983 before the completion of court proceedings. This process is sirr6lar to 
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the illegal sale of land awaiting legal development permission in pirate subdivisions noted 
by the World Bank (1980). But no incidences have been reported about acquisition of land 
by hired squats or physical threats. There is also no incidence that legally obtained tracts 
are sold illegally. 
Socio-economic Characteristics 
The literature states two major views about the economic characteristics of the users of 
informal land: (1) it is a major means to most poorer households who require residential 
land (Payne, 1988: 6; UNCHS, undated); (2) it is an inexpensive land demand of low and 
middle income groups in Mexican and Latin American cities and in Cebu (Durand- 
Lasserve, 1990; Nientied and Linden, 1990; Thirkell, 1995). This research found that, in 
Delhi, there is a clear distinction between the poor (lowest income group) and low, middle 
and high income group. These colonies accommodate all categories of income groups but 
the proportion of middle and high income groups are considerable number (Table 6.7). 
However, there are exceptions like Sainik Farm that accommodates most higher income 
households. 
Table 6.7 Average monthly household income of interviewed households 
Valid Cumulative 
Value Label Households Percent Percent 
Less than RS. 1250 (EWS) 22 7.3 7.3 
Rs. 1250-2650 (LIG) 122 40.7 48.0 
Rs. 2650-4450 (MIG) 92 30.7 78.7 
Above Rs. 4450(HIG) 57 19.0 97.7 
No income 1 0.3 98.0 
No response 6 
------- 
2.0 
------- 
100.0 
----- 
Total 300 100.0 
The response of the interviewees reveal that the majority of them are low income 
households (see Table 6.7) followed by middle and high income groups. It is also to be 
noticed that the proportion of the lowest income group (Economically Weaker Section) is 
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very low. Very little evidence has been obtained to support the belief that higher entry 
prices charged by informal subdividers exclude some of the lowest income groups causing 
a shift in the nature of social groups entering into such settlements (Durand-Las serve, 
1987; Thirkell, 1995: 9). However, the presence of a large number of substandard 
squatter settlements suggests that most of the lowest income groups may have been 
accommodated in squatter areas (Basu, 1988; Ali, 1990; SPA, 1994). 
This research finding agrees with prior research findings that the somewhat better- 
off amongst the poor (low income group) enter unauthorised subdivisions (Thirkell, 
1995: 9; Baken, 1990: 15). This may be due to the peripheral location of their settlements 
which involve large transport and service costs (Baken, 1990; 15). Nevertheless, property 
agents and presidents of unauthorised colonies feel that in the beginning most informal 
plots are bought by low income labourers, but later they are occupied by middle and high 
income groups due to increasing land prices in the informal market. This needs to be 
explored in a separate research. 
Table 6.8 shows that the unauthorised colonies of Delhi accommodate people 
engaged in a wide variety of employment, including public and private sector workers and 
self-employed business people. Among them, self-employed business people form a large 
number (45%) due to the possibility of establishing their own business-cum-residence at 
cheaper prices. However, it is noticed in most of the unauthorised colonies that households 
group according to their place of origin. Colonies such as Budh Vihar and Soinia Vihar 
accommodate more people from Uttar Pradesh than other neighbouring states such as 
Haryana, Bihar and Rajasthan. It is also noticed that colonies such as Mitnagar 
accommodate more residents working for the Delhi Transport Corporation and the Delhi 
Police, and Punjabi Basti in central Delhi and Joshi colony in eastern Delhi accommodate 
most of the residents working in the neighbouring industrial areas such as Anand Parbat 
and NOIDA respectively. Therefore, unauthorised colonies in Delhi have established 
themselves into a status like any regular submarket which encourages socio-economic and 
cultural mixes. However, it is noticed that colonies such as Mustafabad accommodate 
more of Muslim households than others. 
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Table 6.8 Nature of employment of informal households 
Employment category Households Percent Cumulative Percent 
Salaried person in government 67 22.4 22.4 
Salaried person in public sector 14 4.7 27.1 
Employee of private sector 70 23.4 50.5 
Own private enterprises 134 44.8 95.3 
Other 11 3.7 99.0 
No employment 1 0.3 99.3 
No response 2 0.7 100 
Total 299 100 
6.4.4.2. Unauthorised Development TypologieS4 
Although it is difficult to categorise the typologies of unauthorised developments in Delhi, 
they can be grouped into four major types. They vary in terms of their legal status, 
prevalent plot sizes, income group and built up structures existing in the colony (see Table 
6.9 and Figure 6.3). The major groups found in this study are: - 
(1) Substandard unauthorised subdivisions consisting more of semi-pukka (semi- 
permanent) constructions, small plot sizes and accommodating economically weaker 
section and low income group households mostly. These markets include subdivisions on 
public acquired land or land earmarked for Master Plan roads and public services 
(example: Budh Vihar phase 11, Ashok Nagar, Sangam. Vihar). Colonies such as Jeevan 
Park and Punjabi Colony have similar characteristics but accommodate a large number of 
the low income group (43% and 70% respectively). 
(2) Standard unauthorised colonies that are similar to the standard of formal 
housing and accommodate most of the middle and high income groups. Most of the 
unauthorised colonies (about 75%) accommodate only permanent structures and 90% of 
the surveyed plots consist of permanent constructions. Although all colonies accommodate 
all income groups, some of the colonies such as Sainik Nagar, Patel Garden and Vikas 
Nagar accommodate more people from the middle and high income groups. 
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(3) Farms of huge plot sizes, occupied by mostly the rich industrial and political 
elites. Almost 100% of them are high income and the majority of them belong to the 
highest income group. The Times of India (4.11.90) states that the Sainik farms, in a 
supposedly rural part of the Union Territory of Delhi, have become country retreats of the 
rich. Land there currently fetches an incredible Rs. 100 Lakh (10 NEllion) per acre. It is 
observed that, as stated by The Sunday Times of India (21.2.93), most farm houses in the 
area fail to meet the stipulated minimum size for farm land mandated in the city's Master 
Plan (see Figure 6.3). The Hindustan Times (21.3.94) states that some of the unauthorised 
farm houses were owned by a senior union minister (4 bungalows) and one mango grove 
by former secretary to the President) and the top industrialists of Delhi have their farrn 
houses in the colony. A large number of multinational company chief executive officers 
and important functionaries have rented bungalows in this colony. 
(4) Regularised previously unauthorised colonies. These colonies accommodate a 
substantial number (see Table 6.9) of middle and high income households rather than low 
and lowest income households. 
Table 6.9 Categorisation of unauthorised subdivisions in terms of representative 
household income group (approximate % worked out from field data) 
Income 
Group 
Substandard Standard Previously 
Regularised 
Farm-houses 
EWS 30% 10% 6% 
LIG 50% 30% 36% 
MIG 10% 40% 24% - 
HIG 10% 20% 30% 100% 
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Figure 6.3. House structures and plot sizes in unauthorised developments in Delhi 
Picture above shows substandard type of unauthorised developments adjacent to Sonia Vihar, 
East Delhi. 
"qw- 
_4; 
Picture above shows standard type of unauthorised developments at Vadav Nagar, North 
Delhi. .ýý7, 
Picture above shmi s high standard unauthorised deý clopments at Sainik Farm, South Delhi 
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6.4.5. Methods And Process Of Unauthorised Land Developments And 
Causes Of Their Existence 
Although the unauthorised developments of Delhi are dissimilar to the planned mass 
invasions of Lima, they are to some extent similar to the pirate subdivisions of Bogota 
where large tracts of inexpensive periphery land have been legally purchased, subdivided 
with few public utilities (bulldozed streets and a few water standpipes and sold by 
entrepreneurs (UNCHS, undated) and eýdo land transfers of Mexico City where informal 
transfers are taking place since 1940 in the form of purchase of community lands (Ward, 
1985). 
This research observed that private colonisers are subdividing and selling farmland 
without providing community facilities. The current situation is similar to what was 
happening prior to implementation of large-scale land policy but there are cases in which 
colonisers allocated space for essential community facilities and master plan roads. 
Although unauthorised subdivisions in a large number of colonies commenced in as early 
as 1970, the intensive subdivision and resale of plots started in the early 1980's coinciding 
with three successive announcements made in 1977,1978 and 1982, regularising all 
unauthorised colonies in Delhi (Gupta, 1985: 108; DDA, 1984). Colonies such as Sangam 
VIhar (South Delhi) notified in 1984 were subdivided soon after in 1986 due to expected 
regularisation. They also came up around urban villages (within municipal limits) and 
villages in the rural Delhi (outside municipal limits). 
6.4.5.1. Methods And Processes Of Unauthorised Land Developments 
Informal Land Acquisitions In Delhi 
The informal land acquisition in Delhi is similar to a few other methods as observed by 
Gilbert and Ward (1985) in Valencia, Mexico City and Bogota where most of the land is 
purchased beyond the limits of conventional, legalised housing areas. In fact, in Delhi, 
there are three patterns of land acquisitions observed- 
In the first pattern land is not at all acquired, instead farmers themselves or in 
association with colonisers demarcate it into different sizes of plots, which are sold and sell 
them to potential customers who are known to them or introduced by other plot owners. 
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In this pattern a subdivider first constructs his little office, and if required employs few 
socially influential staff to look after the sales. This office is later converted into property 
agents office which deals with second hand sales as well as new subdivisions around that 
area. In this pattern, a power of attorney signed by the land owner is supplied as land title. 
This pattern is noticed in the Budh Vihar (North West Delhi) and Uttam Nagar (West 
Delhi) area. 
The second pattern is inforinal land acquisition made by a coloniser, who is a 
politically or socially influential person, or financier in that locality and has sufficient 
sources of funds to acquire land. Then the coloniser buys land from farmers with or 
without paying land acquisition cost but a contract is signed between land owner and 
coloniser. Later, the coloniser subdivides the land into different sizes of plots, and sells 
them to customers who are known to him or introduced by his friends, plot owners and 
relatives. 
In the third pattern, property agents/dealersibrokers buy plots from coloniser and/or 
land owning farmer and then sell them to customers who visit their office, or arrange 
meeting between buyers and sellers. In this pattern, it is also noticed that some of the 
private individual buy large plots when there are cheap and then subdivide them it into 
smaller plots when the price increases. 
Patterns two and three are similar to Bogota's case where the poor purchase lots 
lacking planning permission from subdividers (land which normally belong to or is in the 
process of being purchased by the subdivider) and the tenure offered to the purchaser is 
not secure (Doebele (1975) in Payne, 1988). However, in Delhi, the power of attorney 
supplied by subdivisers entitles them to register their purchase and sell in land registry 
court as transfer of power of attorney of property and this is a valid document in the 
absence of a sale deed. 5 
Plot Size And Standards Of Unauthorised Land In Delhi 
Payne (1988) noted that pirates in Bogota comprise small plots (local standards). But, in 
Mexico, 6Lido settlers are able to obtain adequate sized plots with acceptable levels of 
security and expectation of infrastructure provision in the reasonable future (Payne, 1988). 
In Delhi, on the other hand, unauthorised plot sizes vary between 8 and 836 square metres. 
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The most prevalent plot sizes (see Chart 7.1) are 42 square metres constituting 15% of 
plots, 84 square metres constituting about 23% of plots and 167 square metres that 
constituting about 11 %. It is observed that the smallest plots (10-20 square metres) are 
exclusive commercial shops (such as paramedical and drug stores) run by self-employed 
entrepreneurs who live in another plot in the same colony or in a nearby colony. 
The predominant categories of plot sizes varied from colony to colony depending 
upon the majority income of the colony and age of the colony. The colonies such as part 
of Punjabi Basti and part of Mit Nagar constitute residential plots of a rrunimum of 21 
square metres to a maximum of 167 square metres. There are many large plots reported to 
be owned by financiers and speculators, still lying vacant in many new colonies surveyed. 
The interesting feature noticed in unauthorised plot sizes is the large size of plots 
obtained at cheaper prices. As shown in Table 6.10 about 40% of households obtained 
larger sizes of plots equivalent to formal plots that were not allocated to low and middle 
income groups. Rather formal plots of these sizes were auctioned to high income category 
and/or allocated to landowners whose land was acquired for public land supply. 
Unauthorised land developments have provided wide options in regard to plot sizes and 
provided flexibility to obtain the size of plot that suits family structure rather than trying to 
accommodate families with the formal plot sizes provided by the DDA. 
Table 6.10 Category of unauthorised plot sizes equivalent to recent formal categories 
promoted by the DDA 
Cumulative 
Plot Category 
(Square metres) 
8-27 
28-33 
34-48 
49-60 
61-90 
91-125 
126-151 
Above 152 
Total 
Equivalent Plots Percent Percent 
Formal 
EWS 15 5.0 5.0 
LIG 1 4 1.3 6.4 
LIG 11 52 17.4 23.7 
MIG 1 18 6.0 29.8 
MIG 11 89 29.8 59.5 
30 10.0 69.6 
HIG 8 2.7 72.2 
Alternative 83 27.8 
-- 
100.0 
------- ----- 
299 
---- 
100.0 100.0 
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Essential Services And Infrastructure 
The major source of water supply in unauthorised plots is the occupiers' own private hand 
pump installed in their plot. As shown in the Table 6.11,53% of households depend upon 
this source, followed by about 14% who rely on public municipal supply (either common 
municipal water points or municipal mobile water tankers, individual municipal supply 
(13%) and public hand (deep bore well) pumps (8%). However, about 14% in the past and 
5% presently depend upon neighbours and purchase water from other sources. The 
situation was almost similar at the time of buying the plot. There are some households who 
have access to both public municipal supply and own private hand pumps. This condition is 
somewhat different in new subdivisions in which most of them have to depend upon their 
own private shallow hand pumps or near by public hand pumps or public municipal supply. 
Table 6.11. Sources of water supply to unauthorised plots 
Source of water supply Responses 
Individual Municipal Supply 38 (12.6) 
Public Municipal Supply 42 (14.0) 
Bore well 2 (0.6) 
Public hand pump 21 (7.0) 
Own hand pump 159 (53.0) 
Mobile Tanks 0 (0) 
Individual municipal & own hand pump 1 (0.3) 
Public Municipal & Own hand pump 22 (7.3) 
Public and Own hand pumps 1 (0.3) 
None 14 (4.6) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis shows percentage to total number of responses of sources 
reported by households. 
The response of interviewees shows that about 49% of households use illegally- 
tapped electricity from overhead lines of Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking. About 24% 
admitted that they are surviving without electricity (Table 6.12). 
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Table 6.12 Sources of electricity for unauthorised plots 
Type of source 
DESU supply 
Illegal arrangements 
Generator 
No electricity 
Total 
Plots Percentage 
61 20.3 
148 49.3 
18 6.0 
73 24.3 
300 100.0 
Most households of unauthorised plots (81%) use their own septic tank toilets and 
the rest use open space or vacant plots for defecation. No sewer and drainage exist in the 
surveyed unauthorised plots except a negligible number of open municipal sewer (0.7%) 
and make shift drains (I %) and most of them drain their waste water into the streets. 
Figure 6.4 shows the physical condition of some of the unauthorised colonies. 
It was observed that plots are mostly demarcated in the form of straight lines and 
some form of uniform space is left for main streets and service lanes. In some colonies 
roads are levelled through their residential welfare association/group action but in many 
colonies properly built roads do not exist. In most colonies, main roads/streets (in some 
colonies wide streets in the inner area) are converted into commercial streets all along the 
colony and accommodate commercial shops and commercial-cum-residential houses. 
The DDA (1979) is right in describing them as mere conglomeration of houses built 
by individual plot holders at different sites. Gupta (1985) notes that most of these 
unauthorised colonies are constructed on undeveloped or semi-developed land with hardly 
any provision for roads, drains, and other civic and community facilities. Because most of 
these colonies are located around formal developments and urban Emits, they do not have 
proper transport, health, educational facilities. 
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Figure 6.4. Physical and aesthetic condition of unauthorised housing land 
developments in Delhi 
Picture above shows poor condition of drainage and water logging in a new 
unauthorised colony 
-S 
Picture above shows poor condition, water logging and uncleanliness in a 
regularised colony 
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Unauthorised developments depend mostly upon neighbouring formal and/or 
regularised colonies for social infrastructure and community services. Some residents have 
complained that government schools located in nearby formal colonies refused to provide 
admission to children living in unauthorised colonies. However, it was noticed during field 
work that there are some private schools; and some doctors running private medical 
practices. It is observed that the majority of households feel that essential services such as 
shopping complex, bus stop and school are close enough to their residence (Table 6.13). 
Therefore, the non-availability of services and community facilities did not discourage 
households in preferring unauthorised plot sold by colonisers. 
Table 6.13 Residents' attitude on availability of communal facilities 
Facilities Very near Near Little away Far way 
Shopping 14% 30% 32% 24% 
Bus stop 17% 33% 33% 17% 
School 12% 18% 22% 48% 
The most prevalent Latin American feature of common electioneering technique 
such as an assurance of provision of infrastructure for informal settlements (Collier, 1976; 
Gilbert and Gugler, 1981; Thirkell, 1995) has been observed in Delhi as well. Delhi, being 
the capital and centre of political attraction, all political parties (ruling parties and 
opposition) are active in visiting unauthorised as well as squatter colonies. The issue of 
regularisation and provision of infrastructure to unauthorised colonies and squatters is a 
most powerful debating issue since the introduction of large-scale land policy in Delhi. 
Consequently, it is found that about 96% households living in unauthorised plots 
have not been provided with essential infrastructure by colonisers. Only few households 
reported that there were some instances in which colonisers arranged for essential services 
(less than 2% of households each reported that colonisers arranged water and electricity 
individually, both water and electricity, and water, electricity and road). Responses of 
interviewees indicate that very few (10%) colonisers promised to deliver essential services 
such as water, electricity, road, sewer and government approval, individually and/or with 
other services soon after they moved in to the colony (Table 6.14). Only 2% (0.3%, 0.7%, 
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I% for water, water and electricity, and water, electricity and sewer respectively) reported 
that they were promised delivery of some essential services in due course of time in the 
future. 
Table 6.14 Number of services promised to be delivered by colonisers 
Services Plots Percentage 
Water 1 0.3 
Electricity 4 1.3 
Water & electricity 12 4.0 
Water, electricity & sewer 4 1.3 
Water, electricity, road and 
Government approval 1 0.3 
Water, sewer & roads 1 0.3 
Water, electricity, sewer and roads 8 2.7 
None 269 89.7 
Total 
------- 
300 
------- 
100.0 
The situation in Delhý is to some extent similar to Karachi where informal 
subdividers have not provided any facilities except layout demarcation (Nientied and 
Linden, 1990: 233-34); the majority of colonisers of Delhi have not promised to deliver 
services to users. One of the colonisers' statement indicates that they are proud of what 
they did: "We had power to do it and we did it", that they took advantage of the 
circumstances of insufficient formal land supply, large number demand for cheap land (a 
large part of it for cheap land without building regulations) and other favourable factors 
such as political patronage and misuse of law and order, etc. 
6.4.5.2. Relationship Among Subdividers, Government Agencies And Agents 
Prior studies conducted in other countries show that informal developments occur due to 
informal subdividers collaboration with government agencies and agents. Researchers 
noted that such things were happening in Nairobi where local administrators controlled 
the allocation of building rights in infon-nal areas (Payne, 1988). In Karachi government 
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officials received a percentage of the sums agreed as compensation and officials and police 
employed regular agents to collect money on their behalf (ibid). 
In Delhi too, a relationship exists between the police and informal subdividers. 
Colonisers admitted that they had to respond to the desires of the police officials in all 
stages whether beginning of subdivision or consolidation of vacant plots. However, after a 
series of regularisations, processes of corruption have gradually decreased and evidently 
only 14% of those interviewed reported that they were harassed by police and/or officials 
of the MCD and the DDA. 
In Delhi, local government officials have no relationship with colonisers. It has been 
observed that some local government staff are living in unauthorised subdivisions as well 
but they had no connections with the colonisers. Their presence might have provided 
confidence to the colonisers because they would be able to watch the decisions taken by 
local government regarding the fate of unauthorised colonies and communicate the news 
to colonisers and fellow residents. This would help them to take prior action, to avoid 
demolitions and, if required they could seek local political leaders' help in time. There is 
some evidence provided by the presidents of informal residential welfare associations that 
bribes were paid to government officials in the form of plots. This was done in order to 
speed up the process of regularisation and in some cases the applications were processed 
only after bribes had been paid. 
Researchers noted a firrn understanding among political and administrative 
personnel, informal developers and users (Nientied and Linden in Payne (1988). Baross 
and Linden (1990: 2) observed in Karachi commercial informal subdivision of government- 
owned land and informal developers identifying vacant public lands and then seeking 
informal government protection to subdivide them. This practice was not observed in 
Delhi. Rather, Delhi's experience is similar to pirates where informal agents are key to the 
political system (Gilbert and Gugler, 1981: 112; Gilbert, 1981; Thirkell, 1995). The 
politicians represent a source of patronage and they negotiate with bureaucracy for 
planning pern-fission and provision of services for informal developments. 
In fact, the situation of Delhi is similar to the observation Payne (1988) that illegal 
developments are initiated by the land owner, farmer or coloniser, and later sustained by 
the residents through gaining political support for the provision of essential services such 
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as electricity, water and sewer. In this process, informal development decisions are 
governed by an inner network of informal connections and sources of information 
operating in parallel with official rules and written requirements (Benjamin, 1991: 18; Jerry, 
1991). It is reported by the interviewees that some of the colonisers have well connected 
political links and are supported by local political leaders and vice-versa. Households of 
Sonia Vihar, a new colony located in the East Delhi along the Yamuna river, narrate the 
history of that colony: land allocated to landless labourers of socially disadvantaged 
community was subdivided by colonisers with the support of local political leaders in that 
locality. 
The recent situation of informal subdivisions is similar to what the Hindustan Times 
stated (20.2.94): "political parties in Delhi have been patronising their vote banks in 
slums, squatter areas and unauthorised residential colonies only with the hope that 
during elections, they could get political dividends". As the population increases in 
unauthorised colonies, they become potential vote bank for the local politicians. It is 
because of mutual interaction emerging in the form of "reciprocal advantage " between 
unauthorised households and political leaders. The advantage is "reciprocal"; I mean 
reciprocal advantage because politicians look on the informal households as their potential 
voters and informal residents consider the politicians as their supporters who would be 
able to stop legal demolition of their residences. 
This "reciprocal advantage " benefits informal households mostly, and, on their 
behalf, colonisers, property dealers/agents and land owning farmers. So far not many 
demolitions have taken place in unauthorised colonies due to what Misra (1991: 38) 
describes as the effect of political clout and the non-coordination among various 
government agencies involved in development and administration of Delhi. In fact, this 
advantage exists without intimate links between the actors of unauthorised subdivisions 
and political leaders. Most of the households (Table 6.15) and land owners interviewed 
reported that they had not received any help or support from others. 
Researchers (among them Serageldin, 1990: 2; Doebele, 1994: 48) noted that the 
phenomenon of illegal subdivisions developed into a pre-planned and a highly lucrative 
business of specialised agents, bringing together other kin's groups (lawyers, brokers, land 
officials, court clerks, local civic and political leaders). This research observed that the 
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increased commercialisation of informal developments and their enhanced opportunities of 
profit making caused by series of regularisations have encouraged large-scale illegal 
activity. Lack of significant changes in the rules of formal property business sector and the 
government's negligence to recognise the crucial role played by property agents/brokers 
have widened the scope for illegal sales. Ultimately, this resale market of a large number 
of agents operating illegally in the land market and this market have fallen under the 
control of informal agents who operate for profit but are not subjected to the constraints 
of the formal sector. Similar circumstances were observed by Durand-Lasserve (1987: 332) 
and Thirkell (1995: 7). 
Table 6.15. Sources of help to unauthorised households 
Percentage 
Sources of help Responses Response 
Property dealer 87 28.6 
Government staff 3 1.0 
Coloniser 8 2.6 
Politicians 4 1.3 
Local leaders 3 1.0 
NGO's 2 0.7 
Neighbours and relatives 5 1.6 
None 192 63.2 
----- 
Total 
------- 
304 100.0 
6.4.5.3. Migration And Increased Subdivisions 
Studies noted that a large demand for land is generated by a steady growth of population 
caused by unexpected migration (Srinivas, 1995: 66; Jerry, 1991: 4). Unexpected additional 
in-migration contributed by political rallies that invite people from the country side and 
urban employment opportunities that attract a large number of unskilled and/or semi- 
skilled labours believed to have exasperated the situation. The government's inability to 
meet this unprecedented demand by formal sector land and housing programmes is a 
reason for the creation of informal settlements (ibid). Illegal developments began in 
Karachi soon after partition in 1947 as a result of the influx of refugees from India 
(Schoorl, Linden and Yap in Payne (1988). It is argued that in Delhi too a massive 
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population influx resulted from the partition generating a big demand for both land and 
housing (Jerry, 1991). This seems to have led to the growth of unauthorised colonies and 
squatter areas on a large scale in Delhi (Basu, 1988: 103; Ali, 1995: 73). 
Among the interviewed residing on unauthorised land, about 77% stated that they 
arrived from neighbouring states including Pakistan (Table 6.16). A majority migrated 
from Uttar Pradesh followed by Haryana, Punjab and other states. Most acquired 
unauthorised plots after a considerable period of stay (more than 5 years) in Delhi (see 
Table 7.1) and were eligible to obtain housing land allocated by the DDA. A majority of 
them are employed in the public and private sectors and not many are working outside 
Delhi. Exceptionally, few interviewees reported to be working in neighbouring cities 
located in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (New Okhala Industrial Development Authority). 
This implies that the process of regularisation of unauthorised colonies and 
resettlement of informal squatters could have attracted these households. Table 6.17 
shows that a majority stated to have arrived after the second phase of regularisation in 
1969. A substantial number (about 50%) stated that they arrived after the third phase of 
regularisation in 1977. This indicates the possibility of large-scale land development and 
regularisation of unauthorised colonies creating employment opportunities in public and 
private, and/or self-employed sectors and in turn encouraging additional migration. This 
needs further research and empirical testing. 
Table 6.16 State of origin of households residing on unauthorised plots 
State born Households Percent 
Delhi 69 23.0 
Bihar 7 2.3 
Haryana 53 17.7 
Himachal Pradesh 7 2.3 
Madhya Pradesh 1 0.3 
Punjab 19 6.3 
Kerala 1 0.3 
Rajasthan 13 4.3 
Uttar Pradesh 125 41.7 
West Bengal 1 0.3 
Pakistan 4 
- 
1.3 
------ 
Total 
------ 
300 100.0 
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Table 6.17 Period of arrival of unauthorised households 
Period of arrival 
Arrived before 1962 Master Plan 
Arrived after lst regularisation, 1962 
Arrived after 2nd regularisation, 1969 
Arrived after 3rd regularisation, 1977 
Arrived after 4th regularisation, 1982 
Total 
Cumulative 
Households Percent Percent 
30 13.0 13.0 
16 7.0 20.0 
46 20.0 40.0 
51 22.2 62.2 
87 
----- 
37.8 100.0 
-- 
230 
------- 
100.0 
------- 
100.0 
Researchers believed that factors such as insecurity in squatter settlements, and 
their susceptibility to demolition encourage the growth of illegal subdivisions (Basu, 1988; 
Blaesser, 1981). This displaced and/or affordable squatters try to squat elsewhere, or shift 
to unauthorised colonies or even start constructing some sort of shelter in the development 
areas against the Master Plan regulations. The response of those interviewed indicates that 
a negligible number of households (1% squatter areas and 4% unauthorised colonies) 
moved from unauthorised or squatter evicted sites to unauthorised plots in Delhi. This has 
also been contributed by a limited number of demolition drives undertaken by the 
government, and the users' stiff resistance to demolitions. 
6.4.5.4. Actors And Agents Of Unauthorised Land Subdivisions 
It is argued that although environmental conditions, land tenure and settlement formation 
status of informal land developments vary from city to city, the powerful land dealers take 
advantage of households' lack of knowledge on fon-nal legislation and finance. Baken 
(1990: 16) quotes from Linden that in Karachi the processes of illegal subdivision are an 
uneasy co-operation of various actors who transform public means into private value and 
each actor needs other actors to achieve this and each one of them charge a price for 
enabling others to benefit. Among them, politicians and high level administrators represent 
the state by protecting or sanctioning illegal subdivision, and the police as well as the 
Karachi Metropolitan Corporation personnel use their public power to receive their share. 
As a result, residents are exploited to transform a tract of desert land into an urban area. In 
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this process, governments treat the users as prime offenders rather than the subdividers 
who act against law (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). 
Researchers suggested that more than one set of actors were involved at one or 
more stages in the transformation of agricultural land into urban informal residential land 
(Payne, 1988: 58). Younder (in Payne, 1988) observed four major actor groups in Turkey: 
(1) land owners (who avoid responsibility for the development of their land once it is sold 
to the developer who is protected by his political connections); (2) land dealers; (3) single 
or multi-unit owners; and (4) renters. Similarly, Varley (in Payne, 1988) noted many 
actors in! ýýdo developments in Mexico City: (1) land owners; (2) developers (speculators, 
initial developer or subsequent consolidator); and (3) finally the residents themselves as 
prime actors. In Cebu, Thirkell (1995) identified three kinds of agents: (1) 
farmer/caretaker; (2) organised comi-nercial subdividers; and (3) renters of public lands. 
This research observed many actors individually or in collaboration with others 
involved in the conversion and subdivision of acquired, notified for acquisition and fresh 
farming rural land into informal residential colonies. The prime actors reported to be 
involved in the initial subdivision of the informal land in surveyed colonies were (Table 
6.18) coloniserS6, followed by land owning farmers (who subdivide themselves alone or 
with coloniser, or sell their farm land to colonisers rather than to the state), property 
dealers, religious-based societies. Besides, some informal plot owners seem to have 
themselves become unregulated suppliers and property dealers (Mitra, 1987). 
Table 6.18 Agents involved in unauthorised land development in Delhi 
Agents Colonies Percent 
Coloniser(developer/ financier) 26 57.8 
Land owning farmer 
Property Dealer/Agent 
12 26.7 
3 6.7 
Land owning farmer and Coloniser 3 6.7 
Coloniser, Property Dealer and Society 1 2.2 
Total 45 100.0 
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The informal land subdivisions and land sales have taken a different shape recently. 
About 36% of interviewees residing on illegal land stated that they acquired their plots 
from property dealers. About 34% bought from previous plot owners and the rest obtained 
their plots from colonisers (25%). The interesting feature of Delhi is that most 'property 
dealers' work on the basis of conunission from both sellers and buyers and their presence 
is very common in DDA-developed colonies due primarily to illegal transfers. We 
observed during the field work that some of the colonisers have continued their job as 
property agents after completion of subdivision of plots in the colonies of their illegal 
development (also see Mitra, 1987), and in some colonies property dealers together 
subdivided and sold the illegal land. (also see Jerry, 1991). A large number of property 
dealers are involved in full time property business in Delhi. There are also some 
storekeepers and vendors who are involved with this informal property dealings using 
their personal sources within the unauthorised colonies. 
The informal land development process and plot sales consist of four distinct stages 
and involve more than one actor at each stage. Chart 6.2 shows the different stages of 
informal land subdivision, development process and mode of interaction observed in Delhi. 
An increasing demand for informal land has created a new land market that is operated by 
commercial agents such as property dealers (Angel et al., 1983; Baross and Linden, 1990; 
Thirkell, 1995). Figure 6.4 reveals that the number of informal transactions has gradually 
increased over the years and most of the informal transactions have been handled by 
property dealers followed by informal plot owners and colonisers. 
It has been argued that informal subdividers of Delhi have succeeded in reaching the 
down market to gain profits of 100-150%, by reducing plot sizes and land development 
works to a level which people could afford, by selecting sites in unobtrusive locations that 
reduces risks of inciting official hostility (Mitra, 1987), and by concentrating on sites not 
approved or zoned for urban residential development (Payne, 1988: 40). Field data shows 
that plot sizes have not changed much; rather the number of large plots have increased 
during recent years (Chart 6.4). Land prices increased frequently from 1980, rising from 
less than Rs. 500 per square metre to above Rs. 4000 per square metre in 1994 in actual 
unadjusted prices (Chart 6.5). This is in spite of the colonisers' inability to provide any 
service. 
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It is believed that one of the reasons for peoples' attraction to informal plots is the 
confidence created by the colonisers. Some property dealers (colonisers) said that they 
were trying to persuade government officials and political parties to consider the provision 
of essential infrastructure and community facilities in the vicinity of settlements they 
developed. Some interviewed households (3%) have also stated that they have been 
remitting electrification charges towards the regularisation and provision of infrastructure 
in their colony to colonisers who have been functioning as president of their colony 
association. The author observed during the field work that most of the plot owners have 
formed their residential welfare associations and these associations conduct regular 
meetings towards monitoring the progress of regularisation, and some of the colonisers 
are presidents of the colonies they developed. (also see Jerry, 1991). 
The discussions with colony presidents and office bearers of the associations yield 
new directions that their demands for services are heard and supported by local political 
leaders due to their attraction towards votes and public support in future elections. It is 
also noticed that since Delhi Union Territory has become a city state, some colonisers 
have increased their political activities and/or are closely involved with political activities 
due to their present enhanced economic status and anticipated support from the colonies 
they developed. This activity not only creates trust in the colonisers, but also helps them to 
carry on their subdivisions confidently on a large scale. This new direction has been 
noticed during the field work which sought for their empirical reality. 
6.4.5.5. Causes Of Their Existence 
Unauthorised land developments are the result of a persistent gap between formal demand 
and supply of houses (DDA, 1979; Mitra, 1987; Payne, 1988). Failure of the formal 
housing land delivery system to provide land at a price and speed to meet the needs of 
both the poor and middle income groups. Lack of adequate legal housing, locational 
choices, and lengthy legal allocation and development procedures contribute to the 
creation of a large demand for informal land. The gradual increase of unsatisfied housing 
demand encouraged land owning farmers, small scale developers and large, organised 
commercial enterprises to subdivide public, community and suburban private lands and sell 
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them to those who have some savings but were not wealthy enough to invest in the formal 
housing land market (Thirkell, 1995). A large number of these low income households 
exist who in due course valorise informal land by turning them into urban use and fighting 
for the provision of services. They also turn the process of invasion of formal land into a 
commercialised mode of supplying cheap (poorly serviced) peripheral land (Baken, 1990). 
These growing informal commercial submarkets have utilised favourable 
circumstances (Payne, 1988) such as: (1) the existence of a pluralistic housing supply 
market (freehold, leasehold and traditional type), with several options available to serve 
the needs of all income groups and each having to compete efficiently to maintain its 
market share; (2) an abundance of land under state control which can be made available 
officially or unofficially for housing development; and (3) the political context in which 
politicians are accountable to the population whether on a regular basis or during 
elections. Durand-Lasserve (1990: 46) observed that persistently high levels of inflation 
coupled with stagnant or declining incomes in developing cities have accelerated the 
withdrawal of money and capital invested in formal housing. This money is then channelled 
towards other economic sector, or to informal land and housing sector, because prevailing 
rampant speculation encourages people to buy land simply as a hedge against inflation and 
not to earn an annual return (Times of India, 4.11.90). 
This study reveals many causes and circumstances that encouraged unauthorised 
land developments and sales in Delhi. Those circumstances can be categorised into three 
sets: (1) constraints on the formal large-scale land policy operation that motivated most of 
the households to choose alternative informal options such as unauthorised subdivisions, 
rather than to wait for the DDA to supply formal land; (2) feed-back effect of the survival 
and regularisation of unauthorised colonies which encouraged speculative motives among 
the households that were already allocated formal housing land, and/or had applied, and 
those still waiting for formal land; and (3) a traditional, social and political set-up that 
could not be controlled fully by the public policy of re-distribution of wealth through 
cross- subsidi s ation and compulsory public land development. Groups of colonisers and 
property dealers who took the risk of illegal developments and their sales. 
The response of those interviewed living on unauthorised land reveals (Table 6.19) 
that a large number of them did not seek formal land because of the expected 
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unaffordability of formal land prices (40%). Their response also indicates that inadequate 
quantities of formal land deliveries (27%), the unavailability of alternative formal options 
and choices within formal delivery (15%), and the impact of fon-nal lease conditions of 
public delivery (9%) have discouraged them from applying for formal land. 
Table 6.19 Reasons for not applying for formal land allotment of DDA 
Reasons Households % Responses 
Affordability and formal land prices 40.1 
Inadequate income of the household 58 18.6 
Expansiveness of formal land 67 21.5 
Formal supply/delivery based 27.5 
Illiteracy and no awareness of DDA schemes 31 9.9 
Lengthy and complicated procedures 12 3.8 
No DDA schemes while purchasing this plot 8 2.6 
Couldn't wait longer for formal land 2 0.6 
Delay in formal allotment 22 7.1 
Paying bribes for formal delivery 10 3.2 
Formal lease conditions (planning/building 
controls) 
9.3 
Restriction of commercial use in the premises 5 1.6 
Restriction on design, expansion & 
construction 
8 2.6 
Wanted freehold land 5 1.6 
Insufficient formal space standards 11 3.5 
Alternative formal options and choices 14.7 
Prefer low rise instead multistoried flat 6 1.9 
Wanted quick accommodation on arriving in 
Delhi 
6 1.9 
Unexpected to live in Delhi 9 2.9 
Not satisfied with DDA's development 15 4.8 
Poor quality of construction 10 3.2 
Others 8.7 
Have own property 14 4.5 
Awaiting staff rented flat 5 1.6 
Prefer relatives and friends around 3 1.0 
No faith and ignorance of DDA 5 1.6 
Total 312 100 
84 missing cases; 216 valid cases 
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The second most important circumstance emerging out of households' motivation is 
the continued existence of large scale unauthorised colonies and their periodical 
regularisation. Table 6.20 shows that about 58% of interviewees who moved from formal 
plots to informal plots have reported factors such as the possibility of commercial and 
industrial use of their informal plots, anticipated regularisation, price rise after 
regularisation, cheaper land prices and investment on land property as prime reasons for 
their informal plot purchases. However, some of these households (see Table 6.20) 
reported they were dissatisfied with formal plot/flat in terms of quality, planningibuilding 
controls, residential space available, and the opportunities to purchase plots close to their 
residences. 
Household data collected from users of unauthorised land shows that about 8% were 
already allocated formal land by the DDA. Their response indicates the following reasons 
for their attraction to illegal land: restrictions for commercial use in residential land (70%); 
high resale market prices of formal plots (65%); small size of formal plots allotted (57%); 
lack of space for expansion (44%); and inadequate space for further subdivision (35%). 
Their presence at unauthorised colonies provides evidence for the regularisations effect on 
the motivations of households who are not satisfied with and/or find inaccessible public 
land delivery. This group includes some of the households who were already allotted 
formal land, households who had registered for formal land, and who later withdrew or 
were still waiting in the queue. 
The third circumstance that motivated unauthorised subdivisions is the traditional, 
social and political set-up that constrained the achievement of re-distribution of wealth 
among the masses. This determined the active role played by informal developers and 
property dealers in the resale of illegal plots and the sale of fresh urban land. Although, not 
many households reported that they purchased the informal plots as investment against 
inflation (Times of India, 4.11.90) or as alternative economic investments (Durand- 
Lasserve, 1990: 46), the field survey observed a large number of plots lying vacant in the 
newly developed colonies. Households and property dealers reported that most vacant 
plots belong to financiers who due to increasing prices of regularised plots have recently 
started investing in informal plots. 
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Table 6.20 Reasons for moving from formal registration to informal plots 
Reasons Applied & 
withdrew 
Applied & 
still 
waiting 
Fori-nal 
plot/flat 
allotted 
Total 
Avenues for investment & extra 
income earning 
60.0 49.5 67.5 58.4 
Anticipated price rise 10.0 2.6 12.5 7.4 
Anticipated regularisation 30.0 15.3 10.0 13.8 
Commercial and industrial use 10.0 13.2 25.0 18.1 
Investment in land property - - 2.5 2.1 
Cheaper land prices 10.0 18.4 17.5 17.0 
Formal lease conditions - - 2.5 1.1 
Lease expired - - 2.5 1.1 
Formal quality and standards 10.0 2.6 25.0 13.8 
Not satisfied with formal plot/flat - 2.6 22.5 11.7 
Insufficient space in formal plots 10.0 - 2.5 2.1 
Formal supply/delivery based 30.0 31.6 2.5 19.2 
Urgently needed a plot - 2.6 - 1.1 
Late allocation of formal plot 10.0 5.3 - 3.2 
Formal plot/flat was not provided 10.0 15.8 - 8.5 
No other option available - 2.6 - 2.1 
Corruption in formal land delivery 10.0 5.3 2.5 4.3 
Others - 15.8 2.5 7.5 
Close to work place 15.8 - 6.4 
Health problems - 2.5 1 .1 
Valid cases and (% to total 
surveyed) 
10(3.7) 16(5.9) 22(8.1) 50(17.7) 
It was also observed during the field survey that property dealers and colonisers 
were taking advantage of the large number of in-migrant households arriving in Delhi from 
the neighbourhood. They increase the demand for land and their presence in the settlement 
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attract political lobbying that increases the security of informal plots. However, the 
unauthorised developments of Delhi are unlike Karachi's where residents are exploited to 
transform a tract of desert land into an urban area by some of them being given plots free 
of cost (Nientied and Linden, 1990: 234). What is happening in Delhi is the existence of 
informal developments that attract people to own a large size of unplanned and un- 
serviced plot, instead of a small planned and serviced plot. This phenomenon has 
encouraged colonisers to carry on their business confidently. These agents have utilised the 
opportunities of inadequate delivery of formal land supply, the abundance of agricultural 
land within the Delhi area, and a political context in which politicians are accountable to 
the population. 
6.4.5.6 Effects Of The Sustained Existence And Regularisation Of 
Unauthorised Land Developments 
Regularisation of unauthorised subdivisions in Delhi is not a unique phenomenon. In 
Bogota, a three stage program-me has apparently been undertaken that consists of 
upgrading settlements with basic services, legalising and granting titles and finally 
providing full infrastructure (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). The DDA (1984: 131) defined 
regularisation in Delhi as preparation, finalisation and approval of layout plan. Land 
acquired according to that plan required facilities and the development included the laying 
of infrastructure, the construction of roads, community facilities, the conversion from 
freehold to leasehold system, the collection of development charges, the sanction of 
building plans and finally the protection of land from further encroachments. 
However, it is argued that the flexibility of the informal market coupled with 
widespread availability of other options (Thirkell, 1995; 9) and periodical regularisation and 
provision of services in informal settlements have accelerated the growth of unauthorised 
settlements (Mitra, 1987). They encouraged better-off families to opt for informal means 
(Thirkell, 1995: 9). This study observed that the existence and regularisation increased the 
growth of new unauthorised subdivisions and promoted haphazard plot occupation of land 
without essential services (Chart 6.6). 
The logic leading to the conclusion that regularisation increased the growth of new 
developments is as follows: 
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1. The nucleus of unauthorised developments in Delhi had already formed before the first 
Master Plan in 1962 which earmarked large area to be acquired by the large-scale 
public policy (Jerry, 199 1). 
2. Low rates of compensation awards, and the prolonged delay in declaring the awards of 
compensation created resistance against the public expropriation of land, and motivated 
the landowners to subdivide their land illegally, and/or sell it for higher prices to 
colonisers before notification. 
3. Regularised unauthorised colonies and fresh developments emerged against the 
expropriation policy constraining the acquisition of sufficient amount of land notified 
for formal development. It, in retrospect, created scarcity of land for proposed large- 
scale formal developments and disposal of land for planned uses. 
4. In turn, the scarcity of land for fon-nal proposed planned development reduced the 
amount of fon-nal supply and created unsatisfied demand by delaying the supply to a 
large number of registered household demand. 
5. Prolonged waiting for formal registered land, and an already existing sustained 
unauthorised land market attracted formally registered as well as unregistered 
household demand to unauthorised submarket. They were further encouraged by 
additional advantages from inapplicable planning, building controls, and accessibility to 
large plot sizes at cheaper prices. Opportunities for self-employment and extra-income 
earning through commercial cum residential use of premises, subdivision of plots during 
price rise, and other flexibilities have provided with resistance against government 
action. 
6. The demand for informal land increased due to inadequate quantities of formal land 
supply at a quick phase, and the unavailability of fon-nal modes of land supply attracted 
a large number of informal agents (such as farmers, colonisers, property dealers). This 
informal demand resulted from the inadequate formal supply and sympathetically gained 
informal support from local leaders, political parties and local administrative personnel. 
7. The policy of regularisation of unauthorised units and the provision of essential 
infrastructure on them encouraged higher income demand for commercial use and 
investment on informal land. 
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8. The commencement of regularisation further restricted the formal supply by reducing 
the available land for formal land developments and consequently an unauthorised land 
market became well established. 
Chart 6.6 Feed back effect created by the regularisation of unauthorised land 
developments 
Feed back effect of regularisation of unauthorised land subdivisions 
I Land available for urban development I 
Agricultural land not notified for acquisition (ýýend notified for large scale acquisition, dove and urban development and disposal and urban development 
land acquired land notified unacquired Cna oemopt 
IvInq vacant 
týý & disposed 
unauthorised land subdivisions 
of notified vacant and 
unacquIred lands due to 
expropliation 8, off market 'fFormai unsatisfied dernE 
pdces 
R. guladsationiol unauthorised 
subd visions 
I 
, ýý Active role-played by land -1, 
owners , colorilsors , property dealers 
-- and residents - 
ormal land supply constrained 
unauthorlsed land subdivisions 
Although logically, most unauthorised land supply went to the unsatisfied formal supply, it 
did not ensure proper density standards, prescribed plot size and appropriate land use in 
accordance with policy. The actual informal supply is composed largely of low density, 
single owner occupied spacious plots without proper avenues for the provision of 
infrastructure (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Had it obtained this land, the DDA could have 
developed it with plots or flats at higher densities with proper services and it would have 
met the needs of a larger number of households than the present situation. The supporting 
researchers' belief is that regularisation of illegal development has functioned as a green 
light for large-scale informal developments in Delhi. This has expanded the potential for 
the commercialisation of informal developments on a massive scale, causing a great 
difficulty to the DDA in carrying out its public policy of large-scale planned development. 
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6.5. CONCLUSION 
It is observed in this Chapter that informal settlements exist in substantial numbers in 
Delhi. Three types of infon-nal settlements can be distinguished: squatter settlements, 
unauthorised or illegal developments, and unauthorised building constructions that 
emerged under the operation of the large-scale public land policy. 
Squatter areas contain substandard living units occupied mostly by the economically 
weaker section of the population. These people are very poor and cannot afford to invest 
in land and standard housing unit due to their lack of earning capacity and savings. 
Therefore, they encroach on government and empty or private land. It is observed that the 
number of these squatters is increasing in spite of the formal relocation of a large number 
of them by the local governments and the efforts taken by the Slum Clearance Wing and 
Delhi Development Authority to include this group in the formal land allotment schemes. 
The reason for their increase in number is observed to be the constant growth of the 
economically weaker sections and low income households caused by in-migration of the 
rural mass from mostly neighbouring states besides natural growth. Definitely, an empirical 
investigation about their existence and the large-scale public land policy's contribution 
towards their increase in large number would have been interesting. But a detailed 
empirical field work could not be undertaken because of time constraints. 
Unauthorised constructions are violations carried out against the building permits, 
most often for commercial reasons or adding extra space to existing approved residential 
units. It is observed that under the operation of large-scale built-flat allotment schemes of 
government, a large number of flats or rooms in the flats are converted into commercial 
units. The phenomenon of conversion of serviced formal plots (partly or fully) into 
commercial buildings and the selling of the ground floor space (without roof) for 
commercial shops along main roads was observed in the Rohini formal plotted scheme. A 
similar phenomenon is seen on a large-scale in previously unauthorised colonies which 
have been regularised. The reasons for their existence and growth seem to be the lack of 
political and bureaucratic commitment that relaxes the enforcement of laws to promote 
planned development, and the prevailing corruption of the plan approval process that 
gives rise to a lack of monitoring and enforcement. This condition is almost the same in 
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all segments of the formal housing land market: freehold, leasehold, regularised 
unauthorised and demarcated urban area of villages. 
The third and largest type of informal settlement in Delhi is the unauthorised land 
developments. It is observed that unauthorised developments commenced before the 
operation of the large-scale public land policy, which was designed to curb these 
unauthorised settlements. Interestingly, these unauthorised developments accommodate a 
larger number of low (41%), middle (31%) and high income (19%) groups than 
economically weaker sections (7%) and most of these households are engaged in their own 
self-employed private enterprises (45%). Most of these settlements are located on former 
agricultural land and/or have sprung up on lands notified for acquisition or already 
acquired vacant lands with the support of a variety of actors. Furthermore, after three 
regularisation drives, they grow by the active commercial roles played by landowners, 
colonisers and property dealers. 
The analysis concludes that insufficient quantities of supply of formal affordable 
housing land compared to its demand have encouraged the housing aspirants to opt for 
unauthorised and/or illegally transferred land. The responses of the interviewed indicate 
that the ineffective expropriation law has attracted landowners' stiff resistance. 
Landowners took advantage of the ineffective compulsory acquisition policy to enhance 
their profits by illegal subdivision of transfers to informal developers and/or individuals. 
This process affected the acquisition and assembly of adequate land for public 
development and constrained the public allocation. As a result, public land delivery 
accumulated a large unsatisfied registered as well as unregistered demands. The unsatisfied 
demand later exploited by the active role played by informal developers to promote the 
un-serviced illegal subdivisions quickly with varying standards and flexible norms, 
conditions and payments. 
A large number of households liked to take the risk of buying these illegal plots 
because they were affordable according to their earning capacity, quicker than formal 
deliveries, cheaper and they imposed no regulation, norms, condition and procedures. This 
illegal land also provided extra income to some households and especially to self-employed 
business aspirants who felt that the DDA prices were higher than what they could afford. 
Furthermore, the cheaply-priced large plots are equivalent to the standards of higher 
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income group formal auctioned plots; unenforced planning and building controls attracted 
different fractions of households. Confidence gained from the initial regularisation of 
previously unýauthorised areas, and the possibilities of obtaining infrastructure to them 
have also attracted households who were already allocated, had applied, and were waiting 
for formal land. The feeling that little attention is being paid by all political parties and the 
opportunity of owning a home within the city limits have attracted a large number of 
households to opt for illegal land supplied with the owner initiated minimal essential 
services. Their responses indicate that most depended upon the community services 
available in the neighbouring formal and/or regularised settlements. 
It is observed in this Chapter that some characteristics of Delhi's informal 
settlements and their development processes are similar to the experiences of other 
informal settlements world wide. However, the unique condition that is peculiar to Delhi is 
the operation of the large-scale public land acquisition, development and disposal policy 
that gave the DDA a monopoly hold on the formal land supply. Some of the other 
conditions that contributed to illegal developments are the slow action of the government 
to effectuate land laws, the lack of adequate institutional capacity for independent policy 
implementation. The availability of large amounts of agricultural land within the city-state 
territory, and the constant migration that adds large numbers to household demand have 
contributed positively to illegal developments. The active role played by land owners, 
colonisers, property dealers and informal households themselves, and the socio-economic 
set up of the households make the situation in Delhi different from that of other developing 
cities. 
Endnotes of Chapter 6 
' They are called Jhuggi-Jhonpri clusters in Delhi. 
2 DDA (1984: 11) categorised four types of unauthorised constructions: (1) squatter 
clusters; substandard initially temporary and later established as permanent shelters that 
accommodate migrant labours; (2) unauthorised and informal markets - unauthorised 
construction of shops, building materials and eatables areas around the vicinity of new 
colonies turned to established market; (3) small additions in built-up structures; additions 
in the shape of one room on the terrace (barsati) covering of court-yard and minor 
alterations in set backs; and (4) unauthorised colonies (subdivisions). 
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3 This type informal developments are called unauthorised colonies in Delhi: a settlement 
consisting many houses or plots. 
4 DDA (1984: 13-14) subcategorises unauthorised colonies into ten: - (1) good colonies: 
those are good in terms of road width, available quantity and quality of infrastructure and 
services ex. Sant Nagar, Hari Nagar, Shiv Nagar and Virender Nagar; (2) poor colonies: 
those have inadequate width of roads and do not have infrastructure and comi-nunity 
facilities ex. Gobindpuri, Gondha and parts of trans-yamuna area; (3) poorest colonies: 
those have plots sizes less than 21 Sqm, 3 metre roads and designated as slums, ex. Bapa 
Nagar, Amrit Kaur Puri, Gobind Garh, Khalsa Nagar, Khazan Basti, etc.; (4) colonies in 
slum designated areas: those are better than category three; (5) colonies on public land: 
mostly on trans-yamuna area; (6) large colonies in agricultural green belt and look like 
medium towns ex. palarn complex, nangloi jat extension; (7) very small colonies with less 
than 30% built up structures in agricultural green belt; (8) colonies existing since 1977 but 
has less than 40% built structures, ex. Chajjupur, Kabir Nagar, Sanjay Nagar, Mohinder 
Park, etc.; (9) independent names or extension of old colonies ex. Harijan Basti, Ashok 
Nagar, Ganesh Nagar south, Pandev Nagar block, Joshi Mohalla, Mandavalli Block-c, 
Vinod Nagar Block- a, d &e, New Ashok Nagar and Farooqi enclave; and (10) colonies 
came up on land allocated for cooperative housebuilding socieities, ex. Krishan Kunj, East 
Guru Angad Nagar and Part of gagan Vihar in trans-yamuna area. Mishra(1991) Classifies 
land trnasactions in Delhi in to four broad Categories: (1) public land; (2) private lands; 
and (3) speculators and land grabbers and further sub classified them in to formal and 
informal of commercial and non commercial nature. 
5 DDA (1984: 3), In June 1972, the government enforced the Delhi Lands (restrictions on 
transfer) Act to ban sale of land notified for acquisition as unauthorised builders advanced 
the plea that they were duped by the colonisers to get their sale deeds registered. Since 
then, under the provision of the aforesaid act, the notified land continued to change hands 
through 'Power of Attorney' which helped unauthorised builders to prevent speedy action 
being taken against them by resorting to the civil and obtaining stay orders. 'Power Of 
Attorney' has right to use tenure status done through the official legal provision and the 
transaction under this remains valid until either party revokes it, and in case of sale of 
formal leased land, seller has to surrender 50% of the unearned increased price to the 
government (Misra, 1991: 21). 
6 Coloniser is a developer and/or financier who subdivide plots and develop a settlement in 
the form of a colony. 
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Chapter 7 
EFFECTS OF LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC LAND 
ACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT AND DISPOSAL 
POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CREATION OF 
UNAUTHORISED LAND DEVELOPMENTS 
7.1. PREAMBLE 
This Chapter examines the effects of policies of large-scale land acquisition, development 
and disposal scheme in Delhi (DDA) on the creation of unauthorised housing land 
developments. The prime reasons for unauthorised settlement, and the ways in which the 
large-scale public policy affects settlers are analysed from field data yielded by 
households and property agents. 
This Chapter uses three sources of data: primary data from the informants 
themselves; office records; and secondary sources. The data was collected from office 
records (such as registers) and structured interviews of households living on unauthorised 
land and formal plotted developments promoted by the Delhi Development Authority at 
Rohini (see Section 3.4). This research required special effort, interviews being sought 
with original allottees of Rohini plots who had sold off their plots illegally: 28 were 
interviewed. Another group of DDA land allottees (22 households) was found living on 
surveyed unauthorised plots. These two groups of 50 households in total were taken to 
represent genuine allottees under the formal housing land allocation implemented by the 
large-scale public land policy in Delhi. 
The post-facto theory of this research (see Chapter 3) observed that the relationship 
between public land policies and unauthorised developments is a complex one involving 
the inter-relationship of many elements (see Chapter 2). Some of these finer links are 
analysed here. The impacts of land policies on creation of illegal developments are 
accordingly studied under the following sub-headings: public land acquisition; housing 
land supply and regulated delivery; land planning controls; land price controls; 
investment and speculation controls; and institutional and administrative mechanisms. 
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7.2. PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION, HOUSING LAND DEMAND 
AND SUPPLY 
The literature suggests that the informal/illegal land developments emerge in 
circumstances where the demand for residential land exceeds the supply through formal 
channels (Ferreira et al., 1985: Soares and Stussi, 1990; Kombe, 1993). Specifically, the 
UNCHS (1983) argues that the phenomenon of squatting and illegal sub-divisions of 
urban land in developing countries is mainly the result of the insufficient quantities of 
affordable land that are made available through the formal process. Specific to South 
Asia, Mitra and Nientied (1989) argue that metropolitan governments do not supply the 
number of plots required for settling the growing numbers of low income groups. This 
means that when the formal supply is limited under conditions of increasing demand, 
there is a possibility of informal channels of supply meeting the demand. The 
explanations therefore emphasise one or the other aspect of the same phenomenon: unmet 
formal demand (Ferreira et al., 1985), insufficient quantities of affordable formal land 
supplied (presumably most of it going to middle and high income groups) (UNCHS, 
1983), and inadequate supply of cheap formal land to growing number of low income 
house-holds (Mitra and Nientied, 1989). 
It may be worth noting here that the large-scale land policy of Delhi sought to 
reconcile affordability for middle and low income groups with the supply of land for 
lowest income group (Economically Weaker Sections) by a cross subsidy formula. 
Interestingly, the DDA records show that subsidy was provided to selected income 
groups, and as an alternative allotment to landowners whose land was acquired by the 
large scale land policy. In this way, housing land in the form of plots or flats has been 
supplied for about 40 years'. Government allocation has replaced the land market in Delhi 
and supplied land on a large scale. The evidence suggests that informal developments 
occur because land is delivered wrongly in quantity and/or quality. The amount may fall 
short of demand, or be supplied too late. More than one parcel may be given to a 
household, or a plot provided which is inappropriate in size, location, cost, prescribed use, 
etc. 
The land market will be 'clear' only as supply keeps up with increasing demand in 
any market. The peculiarities of the urban land market in practice make it difficult to ever 
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reach such equilibrium. Unlike other markets, urban land markets are characterised by a 
heterogeneity of product, a limited number of sellers, varying access according to location 
and physical attributes, and a very limited and frequently highly distorted view of market 
conditions. In the case of Delhi, supply was regulated by the large-scale land policy, and 
land was allocated according to policies that aimed to prevent speculation in land and 
control land price inflation. 
An autonomous city development authority (namely the Delhi Development 
Authority) was entrusted with exclusive operation of the land policy with some financial 
and administrative support from central and state governments'. Moreover, the Delhi 
Development Authority was assigned the responsibilities of Master Plan preparation and 
implementation, land development, and land disposal. It was given all the powers, 
authority and policy instruments necessary to keep supply in excess of demand (Sarin, 
1983; Pugh, 1991). Therefore, it should have been able to quickly develop the land 
needed for residential use. Formal land in sufficient quantities should have been made 
available, if the government was determined to supply enough land to the increasing 
demand and curb unauthorised developments. 
However, this calculation is not as simple and straightforward as it appears to be, 
because the actual demand is not easily predictable, and, equally, the demand may not be 
as genuine and non-speculative or profiteering as hoped by the public land policy (DA, 
196 1: 1). In a situation like Delhi, a wide unequal distribution of land existed even as the 
city's public land policy was being formulated (Howland, 1977). Genuine demand means 
the need for residential land of its users, rather than for investment and/or speculation. 
Carr and Smith (1977: 131) argue that even non-speculator participants who primarily 
need land for their own use, in a broad sense have some speculative motive because of the 
unexpected price rise of their land must have affected timing of their purchase or sale 
decision. However, Delhi's non-speculators are not expected to sell their land in view of 
the lack of formal alternatives, and the imposition of lease conditions such as rationing 
(delivering only one plot per household) and a 10-year ban on resale. Thus, households 
receiving land are discouraged from reselling it. 
There could be other reasons for the creation of unauthorised developments where 
government allocation has replaced the land market, as in Delhi. Actual demand may be 
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incorrectly predicted (consequently wrong and/or insufficient delivery to the target 
group), or adequate land may not be acquired and/or developed at the appropriate time for 
development and disposal. Or, as argued by Howland (1977: 69), the authority mandated 
for the operation of the large-scale land acquisition and allocation policy (in this case, the 
DDA), may have undertaken its role as a speculator much more zealously than its role of 
releasing land in adequate quantities and controlling the price at which it was supplied. It 
thereby becomes necessary to examine the overall demand and supply of land for all 
purposes resulting from the operation of large-scale land acquisition and allocation policy, 
and the ways in which the resulting demand and supply of residential land could have in 
turn helped to create unauthorised land developments. Chart 7.1 presents a formulation of 
the ways in which unmet general demand and unsatisfied formal demand may have 
encouraged unauthorised land developments in Delhi. 
In theory, it is argued that there are many ways through which excess, un-estimated 
demand could emerge, and unmet demand accumulates, in a land market. In fact, in 
simple terms, the land demand can be categorised into two categories such as household 
(non-speculative) and speculative demand. Ratcliff (1949) argues that shelter is one of the 
necessities of life: we may assume that there exists an aggregate potential demand for a 
quantity of housing sufficient to accommodate the entire population. The demand may 
also rise occasionally due to increasing number of families entering the market to improve 
their current housing status (ibid). It is argued that the total demand in a particular time 
might increase or decrease depending upon on factors, such as changes in household 
composition: new families created by marriages as an important source of increase in the 
demand for dwellings (ibid), and due to increase of need for single family dwellings 
(Acosta and Renard, 1993). 
The bulk of the new demand arises from net in-migration pressures but is 
augmented by sociological changes within the existing population (Smith and Walker, 
1977; Ratcliff, 1949) and the 'undoubling' (where two or more families share a dwelling) 
of families (Ratcliff, 1949). Ratcliff (1949) also argues that the elasticity of actual 
household demand at a particular time could vary depending upon the number of 
households interested to buy land for owner occupied housing and their preference in 
terms of type, size, style, location, price range, services availability and desired use. 
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In rcgard to Delhi, it is argued that the continued process of urbanisation and the 
quest for stable jobs and higher earnings economically lift the low income group (who 
otherwise may not be able to own a house) to a level where they can enter the housing 
inarket at the stage of un-serviced suburban plots on the basis of their own financial 
resources (Baross and Linden, 1990). The encouragement of home ownership by way of 
SUbsidies to low and middle income groups, and their ability to pay higher rents and 
prices have affected the expectation of households for new homes and increased the 
demand with households who otherwise may not try to enter into home ownership 
(Walters et al., 1974). Howland (1977) and UNCHS(1984) also argue that the influx of 
various groups and classes of migrants (i. e., post-partition migration and un-predicted 
migrants frorn neighboring areas, and the more affluent non-resident Indians, and foreign 
officials and staff) have increased the demand beyond all expectation. In the case of 
Delhi, it was hypothesised that the public land policy failed to allocate adequate plots at 
reasonable prices, when and where needed (Howland, 1977). Thus, a large unsatisfied 
dernand accumulated and a fierce competition was created for affordable formal plots 
offered by the Government, which created pressure on those in low income groups to sell 
their plots or their plot allocation papers before occupation of their lands (Mitra and 
Nientied, 1989). Therefore, the unsatisfied demand along with the unpredicted household 
demand encouraged these low income households to took for informal channels of land 
supply. 
The second kind of dernand is the speculative demand arising from the desire for 
investment and profit making. Although, Delhi's public land policy specifically aimed to I 
eliminate the speculation and profiteering from land, Howland (1977) argues that the 
success of this policy was frustrated by new demand factors. In addition to excess 
household demand, new speculative demand was created by general economic insecurity 
on the one hand, and, on the other, remittance of foreign earnings from the Gulf states. All 
these unforeseen sources of demand swelled the informal sector in land and housing 
(Steinberg, 1990). 
In regard to formal land supply, it is argued by the DDA that the large-scale public 
land policy has supplied a large amount of housing land that would not have been 
supplied by the open market in its absence. In fact, an undated DDA report claims that, 
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11 a glorious record of achievements replete with hard-won laurels and even a few 
brickbats... DDA has had to work hard to keep pace with the needs of its fast 
growing population and the migratory population that comes every year. And since 
it was virtually the first development authority in India, DDA has had to shoulder 
responsibilities much beyond its set obiectives " (added emphasis). 
Furthermore, it appears from the DDA records that the large-scale public land 
policy has achieved the best that any public land allocations can ever achieve. The DDA 
has supplied housing land in the form of different schemes designed for specific target 
income groups (see Chapter 5). However, it is observed from the records that DDA has 
not supplied plots/flats in terms of customer preference (in terms of type, size, style, 
location, price, services etc. ) except for a few schemes in which tentative locations were 
announced. Consequently, a large unsatisfied demand was created even among those 
households allocated formal land. Furthermore, researchers argue that the DDA did not 
supply what it could have really supplied through the large-scale public land policy. 
Willcox (1983) suggest that actual supply in Delhi's land market was constrained by 
DDA procedures in the following ways. 
First, supply was constrained by land acquisition procedures of large-scale land 
policy. The policy of expropriation - compulsory acquisition of all land and its corollary, 
the freezing of price despite delays in payment - has led to prolonged court battles with 
landowners claiming market prices, leading to serious delays in acquisition. This 
stringency in acquisition procedure helped to curtail the extent of fresh land that could 
have been acquired. It not only delayed the supply of land as proposed, but also motivated 
landowners to subdivide their already disputed land, or farm it and thereby render it rural, 
or sell it outright to colonisers for higher prices (contravening the terms of agreement with 
the DDA). 
Second, the policy of acquiring land cheap (often below market value) and later 
auctioning the developed plots to the highest bidder among high income groups or among 
commercial and industrial consumers in order to subsidise low and middle income 
groups, had unfortunate effects. It encouraged speculation among private landowners 
(farmers) and put upward pressure on unacquired fresh agricultural land, and made 
landowners acutely conscious of the development value 'floating' over their land. 
Third, as McAuslan (1985) also argues, there will be always temptation as in Delhi 
to finance urban development by selling land to highest bidder. But this gives neither 
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seller nor buyer any incentive to allocate resources for housing the poor. Therefore, the 
DDA's action of auctioning plots to the higher income group, commercial and industrial 
use in order to raise financial resources ended up biasing the system towards higher 
income groups, and diluted its commitment to low income housing (UNCHS, 1984). As a 
result, the government's control over the supply of land for urban development (with its 
subsidised housing and bidding of commercial and industrial land) introduces the 
possibility of the undersupplying of housing. Yet, this method of allocation all has the 
capacity to allow development projects to finance infrastructure investment through 
income of land sold to developers, to pay the subsidies to low income rental housing in 
development projects and to make government profit from urban development (Hannah, 
Kim and Mills, 1993). 
Fourth, it is also argued by UNCHS (1984) that the delay in supplying land in Delhi 
has in effect been institutionally based, because of the land banking policy that results in a 
quasi monopoly of raw land supply. Due to their legal powers, public authorities have 
been found to act like private land lords, protecting their interest in the land and refusing 
to use the acquired land for housing, and consequently adequate land is not supplied for 
low income housing. 
Fifth, interestingly, Buch (1984) argues that the DDA have been forced into a 
'spiral' of huge profitmaking which is then channelised into high visibility ventures such 
as parks and other schemes of city beautification, city highways which bear little traffic, 
and expensive commercial complexes and stadia, etc. However, he argues that the time 
lag between acquisition, development, sale/allotment and returns is so unpredictable that 
the DDA has found itself in grave cash flow difficulties from investing in projects like the 
Asian Games village, because it could get no returns from these for quite some time. This 
in turn affected the gross supply of formal land for housing despite DDA's financial 
capacity and institutional autonomy. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to analyse the kinds of demand and supply which 
emerged in the informal as well as formal segments of the land distribution system under 
the operation of large-scale public land policy. The next Section (7.2.1) analyses the 
demand and supply process as observed in the operation of large-scale land policy of 
Delhi. The Section attempts to answer the following questions, and the answers will 
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partly test the working hypothesis discussed in Section 1.5. These questions have been 
raised by other authors previously, but their conclusions are not based on close empirical 
evidence from illegal settlers and illegal transactions. 
1. Why do illegal settlements emerge in circumstances where the demand for residential 
land is much greater than formal channels of supply? 
2. How did the procedures and operation of the large-scale public land policy constrain 
formal land supply, contributing to the emergence of illegal settlements? 
3. Did the operational method of fixed long term leases, public land delivery and other 
lease conditions enforced as part of allocation contributed to the creation of informal 
land developments? That is, did the safeguards and protective mechanisms lay the 
ground for their own subversion? 
7.2.1. Demand And Supply Of Housing Land In Unauthorised Land 
Developments 
A detailed analysis of formal housing land demand and supply and its effect on Delhi's 
land market was described in Chapter 5. This Section examines the effect of this overall 
demand and supply on unauthorised land developments. In order to make the discussion 
simple and straightforward, the supply and demand factors are discussed with reference to 
distinct market situation (i. e. formal and informal markets). It must be borne in mind that 
they operate simultaneously. 
With regard to its unpredicted excess demand, as argued by many researchers Delhi 
has witnessed large in-migration from neighbouring states (Ratcliff, 1949; Smith and 
Walker, 1977; Howland, 1977; UNCHS, 1984; Basu, 1988; Suri, 1991; Srinivas, 1995). 
The field survey conducted in 300 unauthorised plots reveals that 77% of the heads of the 
households have moved from neighbouring states. In fact, it is a commonly accepted fact 
that a national capital city like Delhi, with ample business, employment and other 
opportunities, offers a powerful pull factor to migrants. Also, a large number of 
households in-migrated during Partition in 1947. Delhi, as capital, has offered a refuge 
over the decades from communal, ethnic and terrorist violence. In addition to seasonal 
migration, there is, for example, evidence of longer migration by households from the 
Punjab during terrorist operations in that state in the 1980s. 
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There are many reasons to think that an open private market would have provided 
sufficient land to these migrants. Though land prices could have been highly inflated, 
supply would not have been denied. Allocation policies which give only one plot to a 
household, ask for evidence of residence in Delhi for a minimum length of time and 
forbid the resale of formal land allotted by DDA, may make sense when looked at from 
the angle of regulating in-migration and speculative private investment in housing land, 
but it does not stop households from migrating to Delhi. 
In the absence of a legal supply of housing land, it is realistic to expect that the 
in-migrant households will look for another channel that provides them appropriate land. 
Of interest here are the migration status and duration of residence of surveyed households 
in Delhi before acquiring their unauthorised plots. Table 7.1 shows that about 65% of 
surveyed households bought their unauthorised plots less than 10 years after arriving in 
Delhi. The rest had lived between 11 and 21 years in the city before acquiring their plot. 
This suggests that not many in-migrant households bought their unauthorised land for the 
purpose of speculation, and a substantial number of them preferred unauthorised land to 
formal land allocated by DDA, with all the waiting implied by the latter. The data also 
supports the understanding among analysts that, in the absence of alternative channels of 
authorised land, migrants who failed to meet the official criterion of a long stay in Delhi 
choose unauthorised settlements. Other reasons for their choice to opt for informal land is 
analysed in other sections. 
Table 7.1. Duration of residence of surveyed households prior to acquisition of their 
unauthorised land. 
Number of Cumulative 
Duration of stay in Delhi Households Percent Percent 
Acquired before moving to Delhi 10 4.4 4.4 
Up to five years 84 36.7 41.0 
Six to ten years 53 23.1 64.2 
Eleven to twenty years 47 20.5 84.7 
More than twenty one years 35 15.3 
------- 
100.0 
Total 
------- 
229 100.0 
Number of counted cases: 229; missing cases: 7 1. 
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Regarding the argument that informal developments are encouraged by the 
inadequacy of the formal supply, the survey conducted in unauthorised plots indicated 
that illegal land caters to two types of households (Table 7.2). The first type is those 
households dissatisfied with the formal land supplied to them and, the second, those not 
in receipt of any formal land whatever. Eight per cent participated in the processes of 
formal land supply and later moved to informal land developments. 
Table 7.2. Fo=al land allocation status of households living on 
unauthorised land 
Categories 
Applied but withdrew later 
Applied and still waiting 
Plot/flat was allotted 
Plot/flat was refused 
Never applied for formal land 
No response 
Missing cases 30 
Total 
Cumulative 
Households Percent Percent 
10 3.7 3.7 
16 5.9 9.6 
22 8.1 17.8 
2 0.7 18.5 
218 80.7 99 .3 2 
-- 
0.7 100.0 
----- 
270 
------- 
100.0 
------- 
100.0 
The second type of households, who have never participated in DDA processes of 
formal land supply, accounted for 81% of the sample. This category also includes 
households who have applied for formal land and later withdrew their applications, 
households who applied for formal land and are still waiting for allocations, and 
households who were refused formal land for some reason. 
The question arising here is, could the demand met by unauthorised land have been 
met by DDA? Table 7.3 shows that about 80% of surveyed households stated that they 
own only one plot. This would seem to rule out acquisition for investment or speculative 
purposes. However, it cannot be denied that a considerable number of households (21%) 
did take advantage of the development potential of their correctly allotted land, choosing 
to move afterward to unauthorised land. They cited commercial use of residential space as 
the prime reason for their moving. About half of all households said they are self- 
employed private entrepreneurs on unauthorised land; this indicates their demand for 
commercial land. 
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Table 7.3. Formal land allocation status and investment/speculation motive 
Ownership Applied Applied Plot/ Plot Never No Total 
Status and and Flat Refused Applied Response 
Withdrew Waiting Allotted 
Own more 2 - 14 37 2 55 
than one (3.6) (25.5) (67.3) (3.6) (20.8) 
plot [20.01 [63.6] [17.2] [100] 
Own one 8 14 8 2 178 - 210 
plot (3.8) (6.7) (3.8) (1.0) (84.8) (79.2) 
[80.01 [100] [36.4] [1001 [82.81 
Total 10 14 22 2 215 2 265 
(3.8) (5.3) (8.3) 1 (0.8) (81.1) (0.8) (100) 
Note: Figures in brackets shows row percentages and figures in parenthesis shows 
column percentages 
Number of Missing Observations: 35 
A majority (80%) of surveyed households residing on unauthorised plots stated that 
they obtained their land within reasonable time, and when they had sufficient finance and 
willingness to invest in housing. About 42% of households also declared that they could 
indeed afford to buy formal DDA land at the time they obtained their unauthorised plot. 
Nevertheless, it is also observed from field results that 40% households who never 
applied for formal land found their incomes were inadequate for acquiring formal land 
and regarded formal plots as too expensive. 
It can be inferred, therefore, from survey results that the majority of the informal 
households' needs were genuine, although they have not applied for land allocation from 
DDA. The need is genuine in that it was restricted to owner occupied housing. As 
discussed in previous Chapters, a long queue of households waiting for formal land 
existed for long periods, varying between two and fourteen years, and it was not possible 
for the DDA to eliminate the backlog of housing land demand accumulated over the years 
(see Table 7.7). Therefore, in the case of Delhi, unauthorised land developments can be 
seen to be a channel of housing land supply that filled the gap raised by the inadequate 
and slow supply of formal land. 
However, the majority of households surveyed were high and middle income 
groups most of whom stated that they could afford to buy a formal plot at the time they 
had acquired an informal plot. One may well argue that this casts doubt upon the 
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genuineness of their demand. The DDA for its part could have auctioned plots to these 
higher income households and used the revenue for more land development and 
subsidised housing. But DDA land and housing allocations were slowed not only by the 
ever increasing demand (attraction of large number of middle and higher income 
households) but also by the prior delay in large-scale land acquisition and development 
caused by unauthorised land subdivisions (see Chapter 5). In contrast to the formal 
allocation process, the survey also showed that as many as 75% of surveyed households 
faced little difficulty taking possession of unauthorised plots. That is, the procedure is less 
cumbersome. The majority of them stated they are satisfied with informal plots. The 
actual unauthorised land delivery performance is discussed in Section 7.2.3. 
Therefore, the household interviews reveal that it is not the unpredicted excess new 
demand caused by in-migration that encourages unauthorised land developments. Rather, 
the failure of regulated public land deliveries to provide adequate access to land for 
housing, commercial and investment purposes, has encouraged households to obtain such 
lands through illegal channels. 
7.2.2. Demand And Supply Of Land In Formal Developments 
Earlier Sections of this Chapter argued that inadequate formal supply does contribute to 
unauthorised land development. This Section examines the institutional procedures by 
which supply was forthcoming. Devoy and Rodrungruang (1983) argued that an essential 
requirement of land banking is that the agency responsible for land acquisition be staffed 
by qualified professionals who give all their time to land banking responsibilities. The 
agency must also have the right tools and proper legal authority to act quickly, flexibly 
and decisively; the domain or expropriation power is essential. This section accordingly 
focuses also on the DDA's internal characteristics in these respects. 
In order to ensure proper operation, the land planning, acquisition, development and 
disposal powers along with the autonomy of semi-public status were assigned to the 
DDA. Land acquisition was assisted by the Delhi Administration (city administrative 
body) and financial assistance provided by the Central Ministry of Urban Development. 
In order to ensure equitable distribution and curb speculation, the following major 
conditions were observed: (1) the land to be supplied only on leasehold basis; (2) no plot 
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to be allotted to a person who or whose dependents already owned one in Delhi; (3) 
construction on allotted land to be monitored to detect idle (speculative) land; and (4) no 
transfer of vacant plots to be permitted, although built-up plots could be transferred after 
payment of 50% of the unearned increase in value (DDA, undated). However, after about 
35 years of operation, in which about a million residential plots have been supplied in 
Delhi, the DDA is criticised for its persistent inability to satisfy demand. This makes it 
necessary to analyse both the sources of this demand and the restrictions on supply. 
As discussed earlier, it is argued by many researchers (Baken and Linden, 1992; 
Acharya, 1988; Misra, 1986; Sarin, 1983) that the compulsory acquisition procedures 
used in Delhi did not ensure the complete possession of all the land notified and proposed 
to be acquired, and, in consequence, land that slipped this official net was illegally 
developed. Table 7.4. shows that, despite attempts by the Delhi Administration and DDA 
to acquire all the land notified, 6% of the survey land which was already acquired or 
notified for public acquisition had been illegally developed. 
About 90% of informally developed land was agricultural land illegally subdivided 
before its notification for public acquisition (Table 7.4). Although the percentage of 
acquired land illegally subdivided seems to be low, the inaction by government on this 
category, and the further inability of the DDA to notify and purchase the vast farmland, 
all add up to suggest a marked weakness of enforcement. This has affected fresh land 
acquisition and encouraged yet more illegal developments (see Section 6.4.4). This 
confirms the ineffectiveness of policy in conditions of sluggish acquisition. 
Table 7.4. Tenure status of the unauthorised plots surveyed 
Category 
Valid Cumulative 
Households Percent Percent Percent 
Subdivided from farmland 
Subdivided notified area 
Subdivided acquired area 
Declared area of urban village 
Hill area subdivided 
No response 
Total 
Valid cases: 283; Missing cases: 17 
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12 
6 
6 
11 
5 
300 
81.0 85.9 85.9 
4.0 4.2 90.1 
2.0 2.1 92.2 
2.0 2.1 94.3 
3.7 3 .9 98.2 1.7 1.8 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
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To investigate the reasons for delay in compulsory and off market price acquisition, 
and their contribution in turn to motivating landowners and households into illegal land 
developments, this research interviewed nine landowners who subdivided their land 
instead of selling to DDA. These formerly legal owners of land now retain illegal 
possession in violation of DDA acquisition. These once-and-current landowners who have 
developed their farmland on their own and/or in association with colonisers represent the 
consensus of landowners. Their responses are grouped in Table 7.5. 
Sixty percent of responses of the original landowners indicate that the prices 
offered by government were too low and that the potential profit from alternative, 
unauthorised land development and sale was more attractive. The long process of public 
land acquisition and the resulting corruption and prolonged court cases have also 
encouraged the landowners to develop their land illegally. 
Table 7.5. Reasons for the illegal subdivision of land by landowners 
Reasons Responses 
Problems involved with public land acquisition 38.9 
Corruption/bribes 3 16.7 
Long process of acquisition/harassment 2 11.1 
Prolonged court cases 2 11.1 
Profit motives of landowners 61.2 
Cheaper land rates of public land acquisition 6 33.3 
Realisation of DDA making profit 1 5.6 
Commercial reasons 1 5.6 
Developed before notification for public acquisition 3 
----- 
16.7 
----- 
Total 18 100.0 
Number of cases: 9 
It is clear from the field data (see Section 6.4.5.4) that, of 45 responses recorded 
from 40 unauthorised colonies surveyed, as many as 60% of plots were subdivided by 
colonisers, who bought or contracted the land from landowners and developed them for 
profit. There were many agents: the landowners themselves, colonisers, property agents 
and religious-based societies were all engaged in the supply of informal plots. The 
inability of the public land policy to capture increased land values through expropriation 
has encouraged various agents to extract profit out of the demand for land. 
The profit motive of landowners and informal agents, which was a primary reason 
for large-scale unauthorised land developments, was stimulated by inefficient land 
acquisition and inadequate land supply of the public land policy. It not only encouraged 
239 
unauthorised subdivisions of farmland by colonisers and agents, but also attracted the 
households to choose these illegal lands over official ly-disbursed land. Due to slow 
provision of formal land by DDA, an effective legal action could not be enforced. This 
prolonged the uncertainty for households who were not resettled or whose land was not 
regularised. 
Therefore, the data suggest that, although the large-scale public land policy did 
indeed supply a considerable quantity of land for housing in Delhi, the institutional 
weaknesses relating to land acquisition and delivery have contributed to a shortfall of 
supply relative to demand which promote illegal land transactions. 
7.2.3. Land Allocation Systems And Their Delivery Procedures, Rules 
And Conditions 
Many researchers, referring to prior studies and experiences, argue that informal land 
delivery is quicker and more efficient, and that such delivery ensures that basic 
requirements and interests of people are met (Payne, 1988; Vernez, 1973; Soares and 
Stussi, 1990; Yonder, 1987; Pezzoli, 1987). The literature also argues that informally 
delivered land has locational. advantages over formal land, and provides adequate 
documents of land title as well as flexible conditions for payments and construction of 
houses (Siembieda, 1994; Baross and Linden, 1990; Basu, 1988; Benninger, 1986; 
UNCHS, 1983; Ward, 1978). 
7.2.3.1. Land Delivery In Unauthorised Land Developments In Delhi. 
In regard to speed of land delivery, it is observed in Delhi that unauthorised land 
developments promoted by private developers perform better than formal land 
developments. The responses of households living on unauthorised land support this. 
Speed of land Delivery 
This research found that unauthorised land developments promoted by private developers 
perform better than formal land developments. The field data from 300 households living 
on unauthorised land bears this out. An overwhelming 98% of surveyed households 
stated that they had obtained their land in an unauthorised colony within a year (Table 
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7.6). By contrast, the formal land supplied by the Delhi Development Authority at the 
Rohini plotted scheme proposed to supply plots 'as quickly as possible'. The application 
brochure promised that "the allotment of plots will be made in phases spread over a 
period offive years by draw of lots among the eligible applicants and different draws will 
be heldfor different categories ". 
Table 7.6. Time taken to process the delivery of land in unauthorised settlements. 
Time took 
Less than 31 days 
31 - 60 days 
61 - 90 days 
91 - 120 days 
121- 150 days 
151- 180 days 
181- 385 days 
More than one year 
Total 
Missing cases: 18 
Cumulative 
Households Percent Percent 
132 46.8 46.8 
56 19.9 66.7 
33 11.7 78.4 
9 3.2 81.6 
2 0.7 82.3 
25 8.9 91.1 
19 6.7 97.9 
6 2.1 100.0 
------- 
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------- 
------- 
100.0 
------- 
------- 
100.0 
------- 
Information collected from DDA records in 1994 (Table 7.7) reveals that 49% of 
the 80,855 households registered in 1981 were still waiting for allotment. In the case of 
public housing, it takes more than a decade for the allotment of formal flats as seen in the 
Table 7.7. Sundararn and Gambhir (1991) have also observed that the release of houses 
and plots by the DDA is slow and that no new applicants from the target group have been 
registered in the last few years. 
The data pertaining to formal land delivery shown in Table 7.7 was obtained from 
the DDA office and cross-checked with other secondary sources. This data compiled from 
all formal land delivery schemes represents the formal market situation in Delhi and 
shows the exact number of registrants awaiting land allocation from DDA, the only 
formal land supplier in Delhi. 
The large number of households already in the queue (Table 7.7) and lack of new 
schemes support the conclusion that formal supply of housing land done through the 
large-scale public land ownership policy is slow. 
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Table 7.7. Backlog of housing registrants waiting for allotment as on 
15.9.1993. 
Name of Year Number Number of Registrants Waiting Percentage Time 
Scheme Regis- Regis- for Housing Land Allotment Registrants Waiting 
tered tered waiting (years) 
SFS MIG LIG EWS Total 
Self August 34631 2128 2128 16 11 
Financing - 1982 
Special 
Retired 
Persons 
scheme V 
Self August 17805 7274 7274 41 8 
Financing 1985 
Retired 
Persons 
Scheme VI 
New Pattern Sept. 171272 - 20910 24002 - 44912 26 14 
Registered 1979 
Scheme 
Ambedkar Dec. 20000 - 7000 9556 2133 18689 93 4 
awas 1989 
Yojna 
Rohini February 80855 - 14431 20583 4665 39679 49 12 
Plotted 1981 
Scheme 
lphase I&II I 
Source: compiled from DDA records. 
In fact, unauthorised colonies are a quick source of plots because land owners alone 
or in partnership with colonisers can subdivide the undeveloped land into different sizes 
for sale to households without obtaining development permission, satisfying checks of 
building bye-laws, or laying roads and providing services. It was observed during the 
field survey that only in few colonies' colonisers had provided vacant plots for the 
purpose of parks and community services, but these had been later encroached on by 
neighbouring land users. Yet, 90% of households greatly valued their house as a 
permanent structure offering a secure home, and as many as 79% expressed satisfaction 
with their plots. Only 10% of households are dissatisfied with as colonisers' failure to 
fulfil their promise of providing services in due course. 
Acceptable Land Title 
A majority (88%) of interviewees had obtained the power of attorney from the landowner, 
allowing them legal right of resale of leasehold property. This is to be seen against the 
introduction of leasehold tenure system and abolition of freehold registration in Delhi. 
About I I% of households registered their land in an authorised land registry under the 
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head of farming land transactions, and 1% have got a lease from a foundation. Although 
these are not valid ownership documents and they cannot provide ownership title on the 
lines of the lease deeds provided by DDA, they are accepted within the State of Delhi as 
a use tenure title (see Section 6.4). These documents do, therefore, protect ownership 
rights to some degree, giving households some security and permitting resale of land 
occupation. 
Simple Administrative Formalities 
Unauthorised land developments do not require application forms or advance payments, 
nor do colonisers follow other discouraging procedures such as requiring specific uses of 
the land or limiting the range of plot sizes as is done by the DDA. ' These households had 
many opportunities to choose the appropriate size of the plot they required and could 
afford. A negligible number of interviewees stated that they had difficulties such as 
obtaining possession of the land, being charged double the going rate, being sold a plot 
already sold to another, or being provided faulty documents. 
Nearly a fifth of households said they did not apply for land from the DDA for fear 
of administrative difficulties given their own illiteracy and unawareness of DDA's legal 
land deliveries (10%), bribes involved in formal land allocation (3%), complicated 
procedures (4%) and no faith in DDA operations (2%). In addition, 40% of households 
who felt their incomes to be inadequate for expensive DDA plots could comfortably buy 
land in unauthorised colonies. As many as 55% of interviewees were able to buy their 
land when they had money and willingness to invest for housing. As many as 74% did not 
face any difficulty (administrative and allocation) in buying land, and in all about 68% 
had made their purchase without having to seek financial assistance. 
Flexibility in Payments and Construction of Houses 
The responses indicate that unauthorised land delivery provides flexibility in payment. 
About 35% of LIG and MIG and 50% of Economically Weaker Section households said 
that they paid their land costs in instalments. Such an opportunity is almost unavailable in 
formal developments promoted by DDA because the successful applicant must pay the 
total cost within a specified time limit. A punitive interest is charged at 12%-18% per 
annum if the applicant fails to pay, and the allotment cancelled if the entire payment is not 
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made in six months (DDA, 198 1). However, in the case of public housing, DDA executed 
hire purchase schemes in which the cost of the flat was paid in instalments. Inefficient 
cost recovery and lack of replicability led to some schemes being made self-financing and 
taking the form of plot allocations. However, DDA records report that there had once 
been provisions to pay land price in installments at the rate of 25% on allotment, 50% 
after handing over possession of plot and 25% at the end of the year or on completion of 
services, but this scheme does not appear to have operated for very long. 
In regard to house construction, 59% of the informants (composed of 77% of EWS, 
60% of LIG, 58% of MIG and 52% of HIG) had built their houses in phases. This 
opportunity too is unavailable under the DDA. In fact, as part of formal allotment 
procedure and lease conditions (see Chapter 4), the lessee is required to erect the 
residential structure within two years of taking possession of the plot. The building must 
conform to an approved building plan and be completed at one stretch rather than 
piecemeal before the final lease deed of ownership title is issued. 
In fact, the formal restriction on building plans and construction is justified in view 
of long vacancy or attracting speculation and investment on land. Similarly, formal 
permission to built houses in phases may attract illegal commercial uses and sale of floor 
space for non-residential uses. However, it is found in this research that such formal 
restrictions have not stopped misuse of residential space for commercial use and 
conversion of parts of buildings into commercial shops, and sales of ground floor space 
(without roof) for commercial use after obtaining planning permission for bonofide 
residential use. 
Locational Advantage 
A majority of interviewees residing on unauthorised land reported having the choice of 
their plots close to work and urban services (36% very near, 10% near and 13% a little 
away). Table 7.8 shows that a majority of respondents (about 68% of EWS, 58% of LIG, 
62% of MIG and 50% HIG) were able to choose their workplace within little away 
distance from their unauthorised residence. 
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Table 7.8. Households views on distance to workplace from residences on 
unauthorised land 
Monthly Distance to Workplace 
Income 
Very Near Near Little Far Total 
Awa Away 
Less than Rs. 1250 10 3 2 7 22 
(45.5) (13.6) (9.1) (31.8) (7.6) 
Rs. 1251 - 2650 44 9 13 48 114 
(38.6) (7.9) (11.4) (42.1) (39.4) 
Rs. 1251 - 4450 36 4 16 
- 34 90 
(40.0) (4.4) (17.8) (37.8) (31.1) 
Above Rs. 4451 12 11 5 28 56 
(21.4) (19.6) (8.9) (50.0) (19.4) 
No income - I I 
(100.0) (0.3) 
No response 1 1 1 3 6 
(16.7) (16.7) (16.7) (50.0) (2.1) 
Total 103 28 37 121 289 
(35.6) (9.7) (12.8) (41.9) (100.0) 
Note: Figures in the brackets shows percentage to their total. 
Number of Missing Observations: 11. 
The majority of those interviewed engaged in formal sector employment such as 
salaried persons in government offices (63%), public undertakings (50%) and private 
enterprises (53%) have stated that they live far away from their work places. Three 
quarters of self-employed private entrepreneurs (including shopkeepers, property dealers 
and other agents) said that they live close to their place of employment. 
Yet, interestingly, a majority (83%) of households who had moved from DDA 
allotted plots/flats to unauthorised land denied that the workplace was a factor in the 
move. Nonetheless, 46% of households who gave up their formal plots at Rohini stated 
their workplace as a reason and 31% saying that workplace was the foremost reason for 
the illegal sale. Surprisingly, none of the 216 interviewees living on unauthorised land, 
who had never applied for formal land, mentioned workplace as a factor. This means that 
the possibility of living near work, not always possible under DDA allocation, encouraged 
a large number of households, especially those intending self-employment, to choose 
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unauthorised land. This may be partly fostered by the policy of auctioning plots to 
commercial, industrial and higher income residential use (see Section 7.4). 
A number of studies hold that informal land follows formal land developments, 
indeed, depend on the latter's infrastructure. This seems to be the case in Delhi too; three 
quarters of unauthorised settlers interviewed reported shopping nearby, in a formal 
settlement (14% very near). As many as 84% reported a bus stop nearby (17% very near), 
and over half stated also that their children's school was close by (12% very near). 
Therefore, the household responses indicate that unauthorised land delivery organises 
itself around formal public infrastructure, consequently, most households on unauthorised 
land are able to satisfy their infrastructure needs with respect to household and 
community services, and transport. Of course, utilities such as water, electricity, 
sewerage, and rubbish disposal continue to pose severe problems. This clearly swells the 
business prospects of shopkeepers on formal settlements, but also adds to the strain on 
transport, schooling, and other services. 
Irrespective of all these qualities of informal land delivery, it must be said the 
conditions of civic infrastructure and site developments in unauthorised colonies are 
pathetic. About 18% of interviewees reported nil access to any kind of water supply, and 
about 24% have no electricity at all, while about 49% steal it (see Section 6.4.5). 
Municipal sewerage is totally absent, but 81% of interviewed stated that they have their 
own septic tanks. Furthermore, features such as internal roads and green areas are absent 
in these unauthorised colonies. Their appearance is not very different from that of sub- 
standard squatter settlements in Delhi. 
7.2.3.2. Methods Of Formal Land Delivery 
The literature observes that the lease conditions exercised as part of land delivery to 
control speculation, prices and use have affected some of the above reasons that 
encourage informal developments. On the contrary, DDA records show speedy supply 
under the large-scale public land policy of Delhi with proper land registration titles, on 
easy payment terms (by instalment) (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the housing land 
delivered by the DDA included proper planned infrastructure provisions for trunk services 
such as water, electricity and sewerage, and developed according to the Master Plan 
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standards. This basic infrastructure and planned environment were virtually lacking in 
informal developments. This has made it necessary to analyse how terms and conditions 
of housing land delivery in the public land policy of Delhi have contributed to the 
motivation of households to opt for unauthorised land and housing. 
Earlier, it was established that unauthorised land developments in Delhi are quick, 
administratively simple and locationally advantaged. These characteristics explain the 
steady growth of unauthorised developments. Also, the private colonisers are observed to 
be better placed to supply land in a quick, efficient and flexible manner because of their 
disregard of equity, essential services and infrastructure, and ensuring planned 
development. In fact, the field survey shows that these colonisers have just subdivided the 
land for sale to households who approached them. Their costs, too, are often lower than 
formal costs because they do not contain a component for development and infrastructure 
(trunk services). 
Furthermore, the colonisers' administrative procedures were simple because they 
did not have to follow a formal administrative requirement to curb speculation and 
investment on land. These informal land developers have incurred very little financial 
burden because they alone or in association with landowners subdivided land, and such 
'development' did not involve substantial land acquisition and development costs. They 
cleverly offered land on instalments to acquaintances. It therefore becomes necessary to 
analyse how the formal land delivery procedures have discouraged the general public 
from partaking of formal land allocations. 
Public Land Delivery Terms And Conditions 
Official terms and conditions of land allocation can be categorised into three: (1) general 
terms and conditions, including selection of beneficiaries, residential ownership status in 
the city, space entitlement as per earning capacity, ability to make the advance deposit 
and pay the prescribed pre-determined or auctioned prices. (2) lease deed conditions 
include regulation of use, subdivision, timebound building permits and resale, utilising 
the allocated plot or building thereon only for the purpose of residential use; never to 
subdivide the plot or amalgamate it with any other; prohibited from transferring the plot 
before or after the erection of the building without the prior permission of the lessor and 
usually not before ten years from the commencement of the lease, compulsory remittance 
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to the lessor of 50% of the unearned increase in value at the time of transfer. (3) tenurial, 
financial and legal obligations, including allocation of land only on 99 years leasehold 
right, compulsory payment of ground rent as prescribed and additional sum if any decided 
by the lessor, and obligatory payment of taxes, charges and other assessments if any. 
It is logically agreed by all researchers that a policy may not be able to operate 
without prescribed terms and conditions and legal obligations. Therefore, like any other 
land policy, Delhi's public land policy required considerable administrative formality, 
filling of forms, submission of proof, undertaking of legal bindings, and the deployment 
of full-time staff. In fact, these formalities aimed to regulate the number of households 
desiring more than one house and prevented speculations in land market. Supporting this, 
Sandercock (1979) notes with reference to the well known Municipal site leasehold 
programme of Sweden, that the conditions written in to leases allow planning authorities 
to exercise much more control over the timing of development, over what is built and 
what buildings are used with what kind of regulations. 
But Howland (1977) argues that administrative formalities obstructed many low 
income people (illiterate and/or those who are not accustomed to dealing with 
bureaucracies) from benefiting from Delhi's formal land disbursement. The failure to 
allocate adequate quantity of plots at affordable prices, when and where needed (i. e. right 
land to the right party at the right time) precipitated heavy demand and fierce competition 
for the more affordable plots offered by government (ibid). Low income groups 
responded to this pressure by selling their plots or plot allocation papers before 
occupation (Mitra and Nientied, 1989). 
Besides, the policy of provision of land and services almost free of charge under 
subsidised public housing schemes has attracted a large number of speculators and 
ineligible applicants who have enticed original allottees to move away from their plot into 
informal settlements (Misra, 1986). In this process the subsidy provided to low income 
groups mostly reached the middle and upper income households (Ratzka, 1981). And the 
lease condition of prevention of resale of formal plot/flat in the resale market has 
provided wide opportunity for property agents to strengthen their role of transaction of 
illegal sales in the illegal resale market. Mitra and Nientied (1989) argue that in Rohini, 
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about 80% of the DDA allocated plots were transferred by original allottees through 
power of attorney to property brokers who in turn transferred those plots to a third party. 
Another side of the argument is the public authority's action of auctioning plots to 
HIG and general bias towards higher and middle income groups. Both in Delhi and 
Karachi, the actual practice of public owned land allocation tended to favour the middle 
class and plot speculators (Baross and Linden, 1990). In addition, the ever changing 
criterion of income which is the base for selection of beneficiaries has drawn increasing 
numbers of high income families into the middle and low income category, pushing the 
very poor further to the bottorn. Taking advantage of the circumstances, and in defiance 
of policies against private subdivision, private developers with underground connections 
subdivide and sell public lands (Yonder, 1987) to people who can not compete in the 
formal land delivery. UNCHS (1984) also states that the subsidised public housing 
prograrnmes directed towards low income groups are often appropriated by middle 
income groups through illegal transfers or bureaucratic favouritism. Therefore, the 
following sub-sections analyse the existing formal land disposal situation in Delhi. 
Contribution Of Lease Terms And Conditions 
The field survey reveals that not all terms and conditions followed in the large-scale 
public land delivery of Delhi have directly contributed to the creation of unauthorised 
developments. Only negligible number of interviewees living on unauthorised 
developments (who never applied for formal land) stated that the formal delivery based 
reasons such as leasehold land allocation, lengthy and complicated procedures, 
restrictions on commercial use, restriction on design, expansion and free construction 
have encouraged them to obtain illegal land. 
However, it could be judged from the existing commercial nature of illegal 
settlements (39% of houses with commercial space built into their residence; 44% of 
households owning shops nearby) that restriction of commercial use in formal plots could 
be a strong reason for unauthorised land developments. The large-scale land disposal does 
not allocate land on predetermined (subsidised) rates for commercial and industrial uses 
(except for few categories) and rather commercial land is auctioned to the highest bidder. 4 
Moreover, residential land is allocated in the form of schemes, as and when they are ready 
for allocation. Therefore, a person interested in land (commercial or commercial cum 
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residential, or with commercial intent and inability to pay commercial rates) has no option 
but for formal land. 
Nevertheless, the beginning of this Section discussed the fact that a majority of 
households on unauthorised plots are self-employed. This fact is now further supported by 
the statement of a majority of households (70%) who moved from DDA allotted plots to 
unauthorised colonies that restriction of commercial use in formal developments was the 
reason for their movement to unauthorised land developments. Their initial registration 
with DDA had been in the hope of obtaining any housing land at all. 
Therefore, it is inferred that the lease deed condition of restriction of commercial 
use in formal plots, and the policy of auctioning land for commercial and industrial use, 
was a reason for unauthorised land developments in Delhi. In addition, this research 
provides confirmation of the view that public land delivery has not met its objectives of 
providing the right land to the right party in the appropriate time, resulting, therefore, in 
heavy illegal reselling. This then pushed up land prices beyond control. 
Disposal Of Formal Land 
The condition of prevention of resales of formal land for a period of ten years and 
compulsory remittance of 50% of the unearned increase in the value of land to the lessor 
in the event of resale, has encouraged the opposite: widespread illegal resales of formal 
land in the regulated formal market. Table 7.9 shows that at Rohini, where a large number 
of subsidised plots are allotted by DDA, more than 50% of EWS and LIG plots and about 
33% of MIG plots were resold illegally against the formal condition. 
Table 7.9. Illegal resells of formal plots at Rohini plotted scheme 
Plot 
Category 
Households 
Contacted 
Number of 
Resells 
Number of 
Originals 
Allotments 
No response/ 
Unassertained 
EWS 72 42(58%) 21(28%) 9 (13%) 
LIG 116 71 (61%) 15(13%) 30(26%) 
MIG 178 59(33%) 53(30%) 66(37%) 
Total 366 172(47%) 89(24%) 105(29%) 
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These plots have been mostly sold to property agents who in turn sold and/or 
arranged sales to households who could afford higher prices. About 63% of those 
interviewed who sold off their formal land, and 83% of households who procured resale 
plots, reported having used a property agent. It is, in fact, quite difficult to trace the initial 
owners of the plots. Yet it is clear from the majority of responses (87%) that illegal and 
repetitive resells were common, and that property dealers played an act've role in the 
illegal land market. After identifying a majority of low income households reselling their 
subsidised plots, the critical question arising here is: why do they resell their land? 
The field results indicate that acquisition of land before and/or after the formal plot 
allocation against the condition of owning only one plot in the city was a reason for illegal 
sales. As seen in Table 7.10,64% of households who sold off their Rohini formal land 
stated that they had already obtained a plot/flat before their Rohini land allotment. About 
25% of interviewed stated that they had obtained another plot after their Rohini allotment, 
and about 10% of households had succeeded in obtaining more than one plot before as 
well as after their Rohini allotment. Most who bought other plots before and after were 
households allocated plots under the MIG category; 40% of households who had already 
obtained a plot before their Rohini allotment, were self-employed private entrepreneurs 
(40%) followed by salaried persons in Government offices and public undertakings. 
Table 7.10. Households who obtained land before and after formal land allotment at 
Rohini. 
Plot Plot/flat Plot/flat Plot/flat Acquired Total 
Category Acquired Acquired Before and After 
Before After Allocation 
Allocation Allocation 
Economically Weaker 7 2 1 9 
Section (EWS) (38.9) (28.6) (33.3) (32.1) 
Low Income Group (LIG) 7 2 - 13 
(38.9) (28.6) (46.4) 
Middle Income Group (MIG) 4 3 2 6 
(22.2) (42.9) (66.6) (21.4) 
Total 18 7 3 28 
(64.3) (25.0) (10.7) 
_ 
(100.0) 
Note: Figures given in the brackets shows the percentage to column total. Among 
interviewed, 2 households residing in staff houses and 4 living in rented accommodation 
have also sold-off their plots allotted at Rohini. 
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Table 7.11 shows that most of those interviewed (who sold off their Rohini plots) 
are now residing on formal land. This implies that either they managed to obtain more 
than one formal plot/flat under different categories, schemes and names of family 
members, or they are not interested in accepting the offer at Rohini for which they had 
earlier applied. It was also observed during the field survey that most of these households 
never moved from the residence they occupied before formal allotment at Rohini, and 
some bought resale plots close to these earlier residences. 
Table 7.11. Present tenure status of households who illegally transferred their 
formal plots 
Present Tenure Plot/flat 
Acquired 
Before 
Plot/flat 
Acquired 
After 
Plot/flat 
Acquired 
Before 
and After 
Plot/flat 
not Acquired 
but sold-off 
Rohini plot 
Formal leased land 
DDA plot allotted 3(20.0) 
DDA plot auctioned 1 (6.6) 2(66.6) 
DDA flat allotted 1 (6.6) 1(25.0) 
Group housing society flat 1 (25.0) 
MCD plot/flat 2(13.3) 
Freehold land 
Freehold land 4(26.6) 1 (25.0) 1 (33.3) 
Unauthorised regularised and fresh unauthorised land 
Regularised 
unauthorised plot 
3(20.0) 1(25.0) 
Unauthorised plot 1 (6.6) 
Rented accommodation 
Staff house 2(33.3) 
Rented plot/flat 4(66.6) 
Total 15(53.5) 4(14.2) 3(10.7) 6(21.4) 
Note: Figures in brackets shows the percentages to column total. 
Table 7.11 also shows that a large number of those interviewed who sold off their 
formal Rohini plots have managed to get more than one formal plot from DDA/MCD. 
They cited distance from work as the most important reason for sale; second most 
important reasons were that their plots fetched a good price (36%), and having acquired 
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another plot (22%). Such resale seemed more frequent among higher income households 
(mostly self-employed private entrepreneurs). They too cited distance from work and 
small size and high price of the Rohim plots as the reason for sale; some also managed to 
obtain formal flats supplied by DDA and group housing societies after allocation at 
Rohini. 
Income criteria followed in public land allocation have not ensured that only one 
plot is allocated per household. Table 7.12 shows that the household income at the time of 
survey is different from that of the income category on which they were allocated 
subsidised plots at Rohini. Except for 23% of the low income group, all the households 
belong to new income groups. This implies that either upper income households are mis- 
appropriating subsidised plots in the name of lower income households, or that the 
income earning capacities of the former have fallen drastically. 
Table 7.12. Current monthly income of households who were allocated subsidised 
formal plots at Rohini 
Plot Category Monthly Income of Interviewed Households 
Rs. 1250-2650 Rs. 2651-4450 Above Rs. 4451 Total 
(LIG) (MIG) (HIG) 
EWS 2 7 9 
(22.2) (77.8) (32.1) 
LIG 3 4 6 13 
(23.1) (30.8) (46.2) (46.4) 
MIG - 1 5 6 
(16.7) (83.3) (21.4) 
Total 3 7 18 28 
(10.7) (25.0) (64.3) (100.0) 
Note: FigLIFes in the brackets indicate percentage to row total. C, 
A large number of interviewees who had sold off their Rohim plots in the illegal 
resale market, reported obtaining more than one formal plot/flat in the name of their 
spouses and family members: Table 7.13 shows this was true of as many as 50% of 
interviewed households. This was typical of extended families, where couples lived under 
the same roof as their parents; land would then be sold if it fetched a higher price in the 
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illegal resale market. A large number (44%) of self-employed entrepreneurs used this 
means to obtain more than one subsidised plot allocated by DDA. 
Table 7.13. Social relation of allottee to households who obtained more than one plot 
Relation Obtained plot before allocation Obtained plot Total 
aftei- allocation 
Head (44.4) 3(42.9) 12(48.0) 
Wife 3(16.7) 2(28.6) 5(20.0) 
Father I, 5 6-j I-4 -1 .-0 
Mother 1 (5.6) 1 (4,0) 
Sot) 4(22.2) 1 (143) 4(16.0) 
Sister 1 (5.6) 1 (14.3) 2(8.0) 
Total IS 43 7(25.0) 25893 
Notc: Figures in the brackets indicate percentage to column total. 
The data indicates that the formal housing land allotted in the form of plot/flat by 
DDA and MCD did not reach the right person, resulting in accumulated unsatisfied 
demand in the formal market. To make matters worse, the duplication of allocation 
exacerbated the growth of the informal market by expanding its supply side: households 
allocated land twice resold a plot at a profit. 
This research had also assumed (see Section 1.5) that the delivery of formal land to 
households who have already found land in unauthorised settlements would encourage 
them to sell their formally obtained land in the resale market. This has been found true of 
22% of households who had already acquired unauthorised regularised or fresh 
unauthorised land. But eight percent of households on unauthorised land reported moving 
from formal plots, while most own more than one plot. This indicates that a minority of 
households have obtained formal land after buying unauthorised land, but some prefer 
unauthorised land for reasons of price, amenability to commercial use, and size. 
7.2.3.3. Effect Of Formal Land Delivery In Promoting Downward Mobility 
The household survey conducted at Rohim shows that a majority of low income groups 
and a large number of middle income households (see Table 7.9) allocated formal land 
decided to sell their land to upper income groups (Table 7.14), who prefer formal land. 
254 
Table 7.14 Allocated plot categories and income group of present occupiers of 
formal land at Rohini 
Plot Category I Monthly Income of Resale Purchasers 
Rs. 1250-2650 Rs. 2650-4450 Above Rs. 4450 Total 
(LIG) (MIG) (HIG) 
EWS 5 17 10 32 
(15.6) (53.1) (31.3) (30.2) 
LIG 5 16 25 46 
(10.9) (34.8) (54.3) (43.4) 
MIG - 3 25 28 
(10.7) (89.3) (26.4) 
Total 10 36 60 106 
(9.4) (34.0) (56.6) (100.0) 
Note: Figures in the brackets shows the percentage to row total. 
The important reasons for resales to high income groups are the immediate 
availability of another plot, work place being far away from home, and inconvenient size 
of formal plots. On the other hand, the provision for complete infrastructure, the 
possibility of commercial use through high rise, comparatively low price of legal land, 
and better environment of formal land along with the need for good accommodation have 
encouraged most of the middle and high income households to buy these plots illegally. C, 
This implies that these resales were not accessible to income groups actually eligible for 
these plot sizes due to overbidding by upper income groups despite the size being below 
that for which they are eligible. 
7.3. PLANNING CONTROLS: LAND USE REGULATION, 
BUILDING BYE-LAWS, DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS AND PLOT 
SIZES 
The theory recognises that planning controls such as land use and building regulation, and 
various development standards promoted by land policies can encourage unauthorised 
land developments (see Chapter 2). These regulations are believed to restrict housing land 
supply by introducing high standards of plot sizes, developments and infrastructure 
provisions (Dowall, 1992: 19; Baken and Linden, 1992: 75; Zetter, 1984). In the absence of 
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maintaining the required standards and other requirements, people have no option than to 
behave in illegal ways if they are to survive (Mattingly, 1993; Baken and Linden, 1992; 
Dowall, 1992; UNCHS, 1984; Okpala, 1980). There is another view that illegal 
developments often constitute the required plot size standards and even larger sizes but 
they are illegal because they have not obtained planning and building permissions 
(Haaarhoff, 1983; McAuslan, 1985). These developments have outbreak due to dominant 
use of foreign earnings (Steinberg, 1984) and preference for informal as alternative 
investment for wealthy families (Mitra, 1990). In Delhi, these standards are also said to 
have encouraged illegal transfers of subsidised land to higher income groups (Mitra, 
1990: 216; Baken and Linden, 1992: 64). 
The foregoing effects of policy are seen in the usual characteristics of informal 
developments: absence of a pre-determined plot size, flexible provision of services, and 
standards (Vernez, 1973; Payne, 1989). In due course, this has facilitated spontaneous 
settlements, side-stepping the need for planning permission for conformity to standards, 
land servicing, and land use locations (Baken and Linden, 1992: 54). 
In order to systematically examine these theoretical explanations, the following 
questions have been addressed by the present research: 
1. Did planning controls practised as part of Delhi's public land policy encourage 
unauthorised land developments? and 
2. Do the high legal standards become so unaffordable as to promote unauthorised land 
developments? 
Of the informants who had moved from formal to unauthorised colonies, about 
30% said that the building bye-laws applied to formal developments were a reason; 57% 
of these are self-employed private entrepreneurs. About 70% expressed specific concerns 
over the restriction on commercial use of formal housing land. 
The negative impact of land use regulation in Delhi can also be measured in terms 
of frequency of land use violation, and general misuse of residential space for commercial 
and non-residential uses. About 39% of interviewees' residences include commercial 
space in the form of a shop or workshop. Further, 23% of households living on formal 
resold plots misuse their residential plots similarly. In both, the informal and formal 
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segments of the land market, the majority (59% in unauthorised land and 87% in Rohini) 
violators are self-employed private entrepreneurs/shopkeepers. This is empirical 
confirmation that public land use regulation frightens households. The data also indicate 
that households who were unable to afford commercial prices of formal allocated or 
auctioned land have found cheap land that also allows them the option of commercial, 
especially retailing, activity in the suburban unauthorised land market. 
Land Development Standards And Plot Sizes 
Table 7.15 shows that the plot sizes provided under Delhi's large-scale public land policy 
were not uniform. Prior to the inception of large scale land policy, the Delhi Land and 
Finance (DLF) private agency which started operating in 1947 (before DDA) supplied 
plots ranging between 167 and 836 square metres (Sqm) with spacious houses and wide 
lawns (Maitra, 1991). Later, when DDA took up large-scale public land delivery, it 
promoted plots ranging between 67 and 334 square metres (21 square metre plots 
provided for squatter relocations) until 1982. Since 1982, the plot sizes were reduced to 
26 square metre (Sqm) for EWS, 32-48 Sqm for LIG, 60-48 Sqm for MIG and 120-150 
Sqm for HIG. This radical downward revision of minimum plot sizes, researchers had 
suggested, could be a means of catering to more families (Howland, 1977). 
Table 7.15. Housing land standards of large-scale public land policy 
Year Plot Size in Square Metres 
EWS LIG MIG Auction Alternative 
Allotment 
1966 67 Upto 105 106-167 167-334 105-669 
1970 21-67* Upto 105 106-167 167-334 105-669** 
1980 21-67 Upto 105 106-167 167-334 105-334 
1982 21-67 Upto 105 106-167 167-334 105-334 
1982 revised 
(Rohini) 
26 32-48 60-90 120-150 33-334 
Note: * Plots allotted on rent for squatter dwellers to resettle them. 
** 40% of area acquired from person concerned. 
Note: DDA (disposal of nazul land) rules prescribes maximum size of plot allotted to 
individual for residential purpose shall be (1) 104 square metres in the case of an 
individual belonging to LIG (ii) 167 square metres (but not less than 165 square metres) 
in the case of individual belonging to MIG and 500 square metres in any other case. 
Source: Compiled from records and annual administrative reports of DDA 
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Fifty-seven percent of households who moved frorn formal to informal plots cited 
smallness of plot size as a reason. A small number of households (less than 5%) who 
moved from formal plots stated that large size of the plot allotted by DDA was a reason 
for their movement. Therefore, it is not the Unaffordability of larger plots but the 
smallness of plots allocated under the public land delivery which attracted households to 
opt for unauthorised land in Delhi. On the contrary, it is observed from Rohim formal area 
that resale plots are mostly bought by higher income groups who are entitled for large size 
of plots due to unavailable provision for formal allocation of larger plots (see Table 7.14). 
The field survey results reveal that the plot sizes in unauthorised colonies vary 
between 8 and 836 square metres with a mean of 123 square metres (median and mode is 
84 sqm). Although there is no uniformity in plot sizes, Chart 7.2 shows that the Plot Sizes 
such as 42 sqm, 63 sqm, 84 sqm, 125 sqm and 167 sqm are among the most prevalent in 
the unauthorised colonies surveyed. This is because of the absence of regulated plot 
sizes, method of subdivision of colonisers, and further subdivision of plots by plot 
owners themselves. Neither is there evidence of any fixed relationship between income 
and plot size owned, unlike the clear standards in formal land development schemes. This 
suggests that the flexibility afforded by illegal land attracts a large number of households. 
Chart 7.2 Plot sizes existing in surveyed unauthorised land developments 
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7.4. LAND VALUES AND PRICE CONTROLS 
Unauthorised developments are said to be an outcome of steadily increasing land prices in 
various segments of land (see Chapter 2). The higher costs of formal land are said to be 
caused by: supply constraints created by land planning regulations (Hannah, Mm and 
Mills, 1993; Parsons, 1992; Dowall, 1992; Monk, Pearce and Whitehead, 1991; Misra, 
1986; Dowall, 1981; Geisse & Sabatini, 1980; Cullen and Woolery, 1982); unforeseen 
demand for single family dwellings (Acosta and Renard, 1993) due to migration, 
motivations to investments on land, and speculation (Howland, 1977); high standards of 
development and provision of complete infrastructure (Mohan and Villamizar, 1982); and 
higher land rates charged by the public authorities (UNCHS, 1984) and competition 
created by land allocations carried out on the basis of lottery and auction. 
Specifically in regard to Delhi's public policies, researchers found that the wide gap 
between public allocation prices and 'market' (resale and auction) price attracted illegal 
resales of formal land, in turn attracting investment which then further in turn encouraged 
households to sell off their formal land and move to illegal developments (Mitra, 1990; 
Baken and Linden, 1992: 67). Besides, the attempt to convert informal land to formal by 
providing infrastructure has raised land prices (Mitra, 1990). 
It is argued that informal developments are 'no-cost' land options (Baken, 1990: 4), 
and/or carry lower cost to entry (Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Doebele, 1987; Yonder, 1987; 
Mitra and Nientied, 1989), involve private developers (Baross and Linden, 1990), and are 
marked by illegal status, insecure tenure and bad locations (Benninger, 1986; Ward, 1984; 
Basu, 1988; Baross and Linden, 1990) which further reduce the initial costs of entries. 
On the other hand, contrary, it is argued that there is no price difference between 
legal and illegal settlements, but the opportunity which the latter offer to phase payments 
through initial low costs and incremental building and servicing encourages illegal land 
developments (Baross, 1990: 7; Mitra and Nientied, 1989; Baken and Linden, 1992: 77). 
Siembieda (1994: 147) observed that buying land in irregular settlements continues to 
offer a series of 'progressive' cost arrangement that facilitate land access. 
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Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine the effect of large-scale land policy on 
land value and its contribution to the creation of informal land developments. This section 
aims to answer the following questions: 
1. Is the initial cost of entry in unauthorised land lower than formal land? 
2. Has land regulation contributed to the increase of land prices? 
3. Has the regularisation of previously unauthorised colonies and provision of 
infrastructure on them raised land prices? and 
4. Has the high cost of available land resulting from the above factors encouraged 
households to use alternative strategies for obtaining land which were illegal? 
7.4.1. Land Values In Formal Segments Of Land Market In Delhi 
It is observed in this study that under the operation of large-scale public land policy there 
are about five kinds of major land rates prevailing in Delhi: (1) pre-determined rate's 
(PDR) fixed by DDA for subsidised land allocations to low and middle income groups, 
alternative allotment to landowners whose land was acquired, co-operative societies and 
government institutions; (2) the auctioned rates on which land is sold to a higher income 
group for residential use, and plots (shops/estates) for commercial and industrial use; (3) 
the market rate fixed by the Ministry of Urban Development in regard to freehold land, 
and by the Delhi Administration in respect of resold leasehold land for the purpose of 
calculating unearned increase to be charged from resold formal land, mis-use and 
conversion charges; (4) the leasehold resale market rate on which formal land is sold 
illegally; and (5) the freehold market rate prevailing in freehold and unauthorised 
(regularised/fresh) segments of land market. 
Table 7.16 details the different kinds of rate in existence in 1980-81 in different sub- 
markets, and a range of rates within the leasehold submarket promoted by the public land 
delivery policy. In addition, land price of individual land parcels varies by prime attribute 
such as use, location (roads and distance from CBD), plot size, services available in and 
around the plot, and the duration of transaction. It became very difficult to figure out the 
detailed picture of land prices in all sub-markets existing in Delhi due to inadequacy of 
reliable data from secondary sources. Given this existing complexity of the land market, 
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the cost of entry could not be estimated for all submarkets. However, the following 
sections analyse the comprehensive difference in land prices that motivated the residents 
to choose illegal land in unauthorised colonies. Chart 7.3 shows the different forms of 
demand moving to illegal land due to land prices. 
Table 7.16. Residential land rates (Rs. per square metre) prevailing in 1980-81 
Location/ 
Name of 
the Colony 
PDR 
Rate 
Auctioned 
Rate 
Market 
Rates 
Fixed 
Leasehold 
Resale 
Rate 
Freehold 
Market 
Rate 
Informal 
Market 
Rate 
North Delhi 
Sliafiniai- bqh 155-358 474-1262 392-600* 1100-1500 
Az, idpU1- - - 400 NA 
Budh Vlhai- - 48-721 
South Delhi 
East of 
Kailasli 179-269 615-1885 627* NA 
Gre, im- 
Kailasli I - 1500 
Kalka, ji 400** - - 
S, ing, ini Viliar - 299 
West Delhi 
VILISI)III-i 144-19 t 198-710 202* NA 
Tihik- Ntgai- - - 200*1- NA 
Uttani Nagai- 74- 155 
* Market rates fixed by the Delhi Administration for purpose of calculating unearned 
increase, mis-use charges, conversion charges etc., in DDA allocated leasehold land. -'* 
Market rates fixed by the Ministry of Urban Development for purpose of calculating 
unearned increase, mis-use charges, conversion charges etc., in freehold land not allocated zn 
by DDA. 
Source: Compiled form authors field survey data, DDA records and unpublished 
dissertations. 
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It may be worthwhile noting here that there are many sub-markets in land, such as 
freehold market (formally approved freehold, approved parts of urban and rural villages), 
leasehold market (formal land and resale market), informal market (fresh and regularised), 
emerging under the operation of large-scale public land delivery policy in Delhi (see 
Chart 5.7). The ranges of land prices are not similar in these submarkets due to their 
varying legal status as well as other attributes that determine land prices. However, it is 
observed that there are not many resales taking place in the freehold market, and builders 
mostly operate in this market. Therefore, the sub-markets that are easily accessible for 
fresh land and comparatively cheaper prices are leasehold market (formally allocated and 
resale market) regulated by the public land delivery policy, and informal market 
(regularised and fresh) operated by colonisers, land and plot owners. 
7.4.2. Initial Cost Of Entry In Formal And Informal Sub Markets 
Mitra and Nientied (1989) worked out a logical cost of entry for formal and informal plots 
for twenty years and concluded that the informal are cheaper than formal land supplied by 
public land deliveries. An attempt has been made to work out the cost of entry in formal 
and informal plots with the empirical data gathered from different sources. But, the 
attempt did not prove reliable as the regularisation and infrastructure costs recorded from 
households do not match, and the concerned government departments could not supply 
the required information. However, the general response of the informants suggests that 
the initial land prices paid at the time of purchase mattered more to them than an 'entry 
cost' derived over a period of ten/twenty years. About 59% of interviewees residing on 
informal land built their houses in phases, and about 33% had paid their land prices in 
instalments. Thus, affordability and choice of tenure of a large number of households are 
determined by their ability to pay initial costs than entry costs averaged out over a period. 
Chart 7.4 shows that the informal land prices (average prices) mostly match only 
the subsidised pre-determined land rates on which land is allocated to low and middle 
income groups. The household land prices (average and median) compiled for the 
northern part of Delhi (Table 7.17) shows that the minimum range of the formal land 
prices is the pre-determined prices on which land was allocated (subsidised) to low and 
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middle income groups. The maximum range of formal land prices is the resale market 
prices prevailing at Rohim plotted development scheme promoted by the DDA under the 
large-scale public land policy. The minimum range of informal land prices was always 
lower than both, pre-determined land rates as well as resale market prices. The maximum 
range of informal prices, on the other hand, was always higher than the pre-determined 
rates but lower than resale market prices. 
Chart 7.4 Unadjusted sub-market average land prices as reported by interviewed 
households in Delhi 
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These prices indicate that initial cost of entry is lower in informal settlements for (i) 
those who could not pay formal pre-determined rates (low and middle income group who 
have not been allocated land in time and who could not apply due to the high cost of 
land), and/or (11) those who wanted to pay lowest prices (higher income group and self- 
employed private entrepreneurs who could not and/or did not bid in the commercial 
auctions). 
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Table 7.17. Unadjusted land prices (household sell-prices) in formal and informal 
plots in northern part of Delhi, 1985-94. 
Household I, ano prices (Rs per square meter) in informal and formal plots 
Informal Pre-determined rates** Fo__ý_ 
M 
resale price Price -3 Year Range(North) Average edi. an Range : J(PDR))averaag1Range(Roh i niAve rage 
85 84-389 173 112P 125-250 190 1146-2967 2057 
86 108-1,017 
__,.., 
4.. 05 450,125-250 1902917 2917 
87 120-598 366 K9 205,7410 31 
'4 
1538-1667,1 60,3ý 
88 275-2870 
'901 
5M 205-410 314 2308-4688 3324 
891ý 108-2392 771 598248-496 380: 1250-5208 3451 
90 574-1196 921, 957'498-996 1 763ý 1269-6667 3838 
9V598-106 ... 753ý 74'8 498-996 763: 2083-8654 4476 
92 84-1674 844 718498-996 763il538-14844 6643 
93i 1017-1674 1256 1076 790-1580*, 1210* 2500-8750 1 4898 
94,120-5681 1560,1435 790-1580*: 1210* 2604-14167 7999 
Proposed rates. 
. ........................................ PDR rates for LIG & MIG. 
Concerning variation among unauthorised land prices (due to their legal status, and 
availability of infrastructure and services) Tables 7.18 and 7.19 show that the land values 
differ depending upon regularisation status and physical attributes. Table 7.18 shows the 
price difference among various segments of unauthorised plots. Although land prices of 
all categories of unauthorised plots have increased, the following observations have been 
made from the household data: 
(i) In an average, plots that are yet to be regularised (also some of the regularised ones) in 
the regularised colonies were obtained paying prices lower than the others. This is due to 
their uncertainty in obtaining both regularisation orders and required services to plots 
(that were not regularised during their turn). 
(2) Plots located in newly subdivisions and colonies where regularisation is in progress 
demand prices higher than others. This is because of their locational advantages for 
commercial and non-residential uses. 
(3) Plots that are yet to be regularised but have some sort of access to some services have 
also demanded comparatively higher prices than those located in regularised colonies. 
This indicates their advantage towards future resale and possibility of their regularisation. 
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However, considering the limitations in sample size that constrained the number of 
transactions obtained from households, we suggest that this phenomenon needs a detailed 
analysis of both primary and available secondary data. 
Table 7.18. Unadjusted land prices of different categories of unauthorised plots 
Regarding variation of land prices affected by availability of services, Table 7.19 
shows that the values of informal land vary depending upon their location, physical 
condition and accessibility to services. Although, it is difficult to segregate the picture of 
land price variation by location of surveyed colonies due to the limited data obtained from 
household land transaction, overall price range indicates the following: 
I- Plots subdivided from plain terrain obtained higher price than those located in water 
logged area, steep slopes and flood prone areas. 
2. Plots that avail generator facilities and legal electricity connections priced higher than Z7, 
those having illegal connections or none. C, 
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Note: Blank cells indicate unavailability of household data 
3. Plots having individual sewer connections or septic tanks priced higher than others. 
4. Plots havin, -, individual municipal water connections and public water supply 
commanded higher minimum prices than others; and 
5. Plots that avail advantage for commercial use (along major roads) cornmand higher 
range of prices than plots put to residential use. 
7.5 INVESTMENT, INCOME EARNING, BUSINESS AND 
SPECULATION 
The literature observes that illegal developments are encouraged by various reasons to do 
with investment and speculation in land (see Chapter 2). The prominent reasons suggested 
in the literature are: (i) dorninant use of foreign earnings against lack of investment 
opportunities created by the public land deliveries (Steinberg, 1990; Baross and Linden, 
1990); (11) alternative investment to affordable households (Mitra, 1990); (iii) 
opportunities of extra-revenue and income earning through informal economic activities 
such as workshop or shop, renting, sub-letting or sale (Silas, 1988; UNCHS, 1984); and 
(iv) a risk that a landowning elite accepts in order to maintain ownership and capitalise 
the surplus values (Zetter, 1984). Similarly, the literature also states that the speculation 
promoted by rising land prices (Baross and Linden, 1990), and subsidised public land 
deliveries attract a large number of ineligible people to speculate on land (Misra, 1986). It 
is also believed that the institutional speculation promoted by the DDA by auctioning land 
to higher incorne residential, commercial and industrial use has attracted private 
speculation (Howland, 1977). 
The field survey conducted in unauthorised colonies reveals that a negligible 
number of households (I %) had sources of foreign funds (i. e., remittances) to invest on 
their illegal land. Also, investment is not the primary reason for the creation of 
unauthorised land in Delhi: only two per cent of interviewees who had moved from 
formally allocated plots gave investment as a reason. 
However, Table 7.20 shows that 64% of interviewed who moved from formal 
plots, who applied for formal plot but withdrew their application later (20%), and 17% 
who never applied for formal land, own more than one plot. A large number of these 
households belong to high income (39%) and middle income (23%) groups. Therefore, 
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though a majority of households who prefer informal settlements are not investors on the 
land, the data shows that a considerable number of high and middle income households 
who were already allocated land and still awaiting formal land took advantage of the 
emerging informal land market and sales, and turned it into their capital market. The land 
itself was their investment or they were small speculators. These households opted for 
unauthorised land for various reasons such as opportunity of obtaining large size of plots, 
inapplicability of land use and subdivision regulation, and possibility of commercial use, 
plot subdivision in a later stage and also possible vertical expansions (see Chapter 6). 
Table 7.20. Formal land allocation status and ownership of more than one plot 
Applied DDA Own other plot 
Yes No Total 
Applied and withdrew 2 8 10 
(20.0) (80.0) (3.8) 
Still Waiting - 14 14 
(100.0) (5.3) 
Land allocated 14 8 22 
(63.6) (36.4) (8.3) 
Land denied - 2 2 
(100.0) (0.8) 
Never applied 37 178 215 
(17.2) (82.8) (81.1) 
No response 2 - 2 
(100.0) (0.8) 
Total 55 210 265 
(20.8) (79.2) (100.0) 
Missing cases: 35 
Besides, a considerable number of landowners, colonisers and property dealers, are 
taking advantage of the lack of formal land supply, and undertake the risk of subdividing 
their land in the name of households in order to capitalise the surplus land values 
associated with rising prices (see Chapter 6). 
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7.6. INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS 
Literature state that malpractice such as corruption, bribes, nepotism and favouritism in 
land allocations, and institutional deficiencies resulting from administration of public land 
deliveries, encourage illegal land developments (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, the 
involvement of many politically motivated actors and sponsors against the public land 
policy operations encourages the growth of large-scale informal land allocation practices 
(Kombe, 1993; Mitra and Nientied, 1989; UNCHS, 1984; Amis, 1984; Payne, 1984). 
The responses of surveyed households indicate that the existence of malpractice 
(corruption, bribes and favouritism) has not played a crucial role in encouraging 
unauthorised land developments in Delhi. A negligible number of interviewees (5%) 
stated that the malpractice was a reason for their choosing unauthorised land. However, 
about 17% of interviewees among landowners stated that bribes in land compensation 
attracted them to illegally subdivide their land, and some of the households and agents 
interviewed voiced their concern over corruption. 
Similarly, a large number of interviewees (63%) stated that they were are not 
assisted by any actor or sponsor (see Table 6.15). However, 29% of interviewees stated 
that they were helped by property dealers and about 3% sated that they received some 
assistance from colonisers. This indicates that unauthorised land developments in Delhi 
are mostly assisted by informal developers than by any politically motivated actors and 
sponsors. 
It is observed that there are a number of small private developers and property 
dealers operating in formal and informal segments of land market in Delhi. The policy of 
preventing private developers in formal developments is probably a reason for this 
increasing number of landowners, colonisers and property agents who turn into small 
scale land developers and builders. 
7.7. APPLICATION OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS TO 
ASCERTAIN THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORY VARIABLES 
OF PUBLIC LAND POLICY 
Multivariate analysis to ascertain the significant contributory variable and to identify 
relationships or associations among variables could not be extended to this study. 
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Because, the analysis for this study was carried out in different levels (see Chart 3.1) in 
order to answer the research questions, and the study emerged as exploratory research 
(than hypothesis testing) due its synthetic/holistic perspective and necessity of analysing 
four data sets that were inconsistent. The situation of inconsistency arose due to a high 
element of illegality in all sets of data that were required for this study and lack of prior 
research that could yield reliable variables to be tested for their significance of 
contribution in this study. Consequently, this research found difficulty in isolating the 
dependent and independent variables among numerous variables that are assumed to be 
correlated among themselves. This study by careful exploration of inconsistent data sets 
by exploratory analysis yields some new findings that were unanticipated and can also 
lead into a position to generate testable hypotheses for future researches. 
Although multivariate regression/ correlation (simple linear or stepwise regression) 
analysis could have helped to understand the significant contribution and 
interrelationships among variables (Chatterjee and Price, 1977) for which data was 
collected, this study found following difficulties in using this technique: 
1. the data sets were inconsistent in terms of their number of cases and variables due to 
the element of illegality of land that were occupied by respondents of attitudinal 
survey; 
2. this study being pioneer on investigating the public land policy factors (so called 
"independent" variables) contributing to illegal land developments and sales (so called 
"dependent" variable), it could not identify all relevant variables (due to reliability and 
accuracy of attitudinal data supplied on illegal issues, unavailable reliable prior 
researches, and lack of secondary data that constrained the accuracy of sample frame 
for probabilistic random sample) whose inclusion or exclusion could cause serious 
residual error and can produce undesirable effects on the results (Schroeder, Sjoquist 
and Stephan, 1986: 66; Chatterjee and Price, 1977); 
3. most of the potential independent variables (such as land prices and land use 
regulation) whose value depend on many other factors (example physical attributes) for 
which we have no access to the reliable data, as a result, their accurate values could not 
be realised in the study leading to incompleteness of the data; 
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4. the study on composite effect of land policy factors demanded more of analysis of 
cause and effect that are not indicated by the complex regression and correlation 
techniques, because association and relationship does not prove causal relationship 
between two variables (Hannagan, 1986: 214); 
5. as this research primarily analyses the determinants of illegal land development and 
sales on the policy-effect angle both formal and informal land deliveries had to be 
analysed for which comparable variables of data could not be collected due their 
differential market statuses; and 
6. there were no complete theories or models to guide this typical research to formulate 
specific hypotheses prior to this research. 
Therefore, as implied in the choice of research methodology, the approach of 
'heuristic' or hypothesis generating research with exploratory data analysis enabled this 
research to answer research questions and find aspects of the data that were not expected. 
Further, this study could identify certain new contexts which are very important for the 
policy formulation (such as the ways in which land policies contribute to illegal land 
developments) which are not amenable to statistical testing. Therefore, restricting the 
study to statistical testing would lead to discarding of a set of data that is important from 
this research perspectives. Nevertheless, by this approach, the researcher could observe 
and record some new contexts that were unknown and the study could attempt to include 
as much of the contextual information as possible. Furthermore, the descriptive or 
exploratory data analysis applied in this study allowed so much as different ways of 
manipulating data in different configurations or combinations to answer research 
questions. 
Inter-related analysis of the different causes identified as major reasons that are 
influential in the formation of unauthorised settlements 
In this study different sets of inconsistent data collected from three different investigation 
methods were used: (1) attitudinal data provided by households of formal and 
unauthorised land; (2) opinions of concerned groups; and (3) data collected from 
secondary sources. The data has been analysed in the form of four perspectives: (1) 
individual analysis of current contextual situation; (2) comparative analysis of formal and 
infornial situations; (3) in-depth analysis of specific indicators derived from de-facto 
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theory (literature review in this case); and (4) analysis of secondary data. With this 
multistage exploratory analysis, this study could identify major causes/primary reasons 
that influenced the formation of unauthorised settlements in Delhi. 
Since the aim of this research design was to enlist the effects of public land policy 
on formation of informal settlements and the ways in which the policy of large-scale 
public land delivery contributed to their formation, the quantitative testing of causes and 
reasons could not be performed. However, a simple qualitative assessment is carried out 
on the basis of survey data. The policy related reasons that are found to substantial causes 
that influenced the formations of unauthorised settlements have been categorised into 
three major groups to represent the prime elements of land policy. They are: (1) public 
land delivery terms and conditions; (2) planning controls; and (3) land values/price 
controls. The survey data indicate that the reasons concerning public land delivery have 
been most influential for the formation of unauthorised settlements in Delhi. This fact is 
supported by the social survey data as well as secondary data analysed for this study. 
Their group wise and individual assessment is explained below. 
Group 1: Public land delivery terms and conditions: 
The analysis for this study indicates that the public land delivery encouraged the 
formation of unauthorised settlements due to four major reasons shown by data: (1) the 
public land policy; 's inability to allocate formal land within a reasonable time; (2) 
cumbersome land delivery procedures; (3) its failure to provide adequate land for 
commercial use and investment purposes; and (4) rigid conditions on construction of 
houses on formally allocated land. Among this, the first reason is more influential than 
others as the study found that 80% of surveyed households living on unauthorised plots 
obtained their land within a reasonable time provided they had sufficient finance and 
willingness to invest in housing. 
Similarly, the second reason is next influential as 75% of respondents have stated 
that they had faced little difficulty in obtaining unauthorised land. The conditions of land 
allocation (i. e., only one plot to be allocated and that too be allocated to those households 
who were already living in Delhi for a considerable time) have also considerably 
influenced the formation of unauthorised settlements. This reason attracted about 65% of 
migrant households to buy unauthorised land. Although the failure of public land delivery 
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to provide adequate affordable land for commercial and investment purposes were not a 
the major cause that attracted respondents to choose illegal land, its influence is traced 
from illegal resales and movement of large number of households motivated by self- 
employment/ shopkeeping to unauthorised colonies. 
The data also indicate that the DDA's lease conditions (such as rationing of 
allocation, i. e., delivery of only one plot per household, a 10-year ban on resale of 
formally allocated land, and compulsory remittance of 50% of the unearned increase in 
the value of land to the lessor in the event of resale have been influential for unauthorised 
sales as well. As indicated by survey data these conditions have influenced unauthorised 
sales due to: (1) the inability of the formal land delivery mechanism to check the 
allocation of more than one formal plot/flat (often more than one obtained in the name of 
their spouses and family members); and (2) inadequate supply of formal land for housing 
and investment purposes. Thus, the situation of unsatisfied demand resulted from the 
public land delivery has encouraged 86% of respondents who had never applied for DDA 
plot/flat to buy illegally resold formal plots. Further, income criteria that determined the 
subsidised formal allotments of predetermined plot sizes were not successful in finding 
the right income groups because as much as 57% of allottees felt their plot sizes were not 
according to what they need and can afford. In effect, they moved to larger size of plots 
of illegal status. 
Group 2: Planning Controls And Building Bye-Laws 
The analysis of household data shows that the smallness of formal plots allocated by the 
public land policy, restriction of commercial use in formally allocated land and building 
bye-laws applied to formal developments were reasons for the formation of unauthorised 
settlements. Among them, smallness of formal plots is more important reason because 
57% of households who moved from formal to informal plots cited smallness of plot size 
as a primary reason. The restriction of commercial use in formal plots is another 
important reason for unauthorised land developments and illegal acquisitions of formally 
allocated land. Because about 70% of who moved from formal land expressed specific 
concerns over the restriction on commercial use of formal housing land. Furthermore, 
increasingly, the effect of building bye-laws applied to formal developments influence the 
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formation of unauthorised settlements because 30% of informants who had moved from 
formal to unauthorised colonies expressed this. 
Group 3: Land Values And Price Controls 
The analysis of data indicates that increasing formal land prices (the inability of public 
land delivery policy to control rising land prices) have influenced the formation of 
unauthorised settlements because the majority of respondents' opinion indicate that the 
initial cost of entry is lower in informal settlements. This reason encouraged the 
respondents who could not pay formal subsidised land rates and those who wanted to pay 
lowest prices to opt for informal land that is comparatively cheaper. 
7.8. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has established that large-scale public land delivery contributed to 
unauthorised land developments by allocating inappropriate land to some households, and 
leaving unmet demand among others, especially among those who never applied for 
formal land. 
The analysis of field data has revealed that 77% of the residents of unauthorised 
land have moved from neighbouring states. Most of them bought their unauthorised land 
for owner-occupied housing, and a substantial number of them preferred illegal land 
rather than to wait for formal land allocated on the basis of regulatory conditions. In the 
absence of alternative channels of adequate options of authorised land supply, the 
migrants who fail to fulfil the required formal procedures and the condition of a 
significant period of stay in Delhi opted for unauthorised settlements. 
The analysis indicates that the suitability of unauthorised land towards the majority 
of households appropriate time of affordability of housing land that was unavailable 
through large-scale public land delivery. The responses of the majority of interviewees 
residing on unauthorised land reveal that they could obtain their informal plots in the time 
they desired, and when they could afford sufficient finance and were willing to invest on 
housing. Illegal settlers faced little difficulty in taking possession of their land and most 
of them are satisfied with their land. 
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The cheaper land rates paid by the government for compulsory public land 
acquisition and resulting attraction of profitmak-ing to landowners has motivated them to 
illegally subdivide and sell their land. Hence, the inability of public land policy to 
mobilise finance through expropriation of land at off-market prices has encouraged 
various agents to assume an unauthorised role in the land development process. The 
weaknesses in public land acquisition and delivery under the large-scale public land 
ownership have contributed to a shortfall of supply relative to demand, motivating 
households to recognise and also to opt for the unauthorised land developments. 
The unauthorised land developments in Delhi are quicker, administratively simpler 
and locationally better advantaged in regard to distance from place of work and access to 
services than are formal developments. Informants on unauthorised land report that the 
illegal land was released more quickly than formal housing land supplied by the Delhi 
Development Authority. All but two per cent of interviewees reported a waiting period for 
unauthorised land of less than a year. Neither were there any administrative procedures, 
form-filling nor other paperwork, nor advance payments. The interviewees had many 
opportunities to choose the appropriate size of the plot they could afford and required, and 
most of them had not faced difficulties in obtaining possession of the land and paying 
higher rates, or of cheating and supply of faulty documents. Unauthorised land delivery 
does seem to provide flexibility towards payment of land cost and built houses in phases, 
and attendant choices of distance from work. 
The lease deed condition of restriction of commercial use in formal plots and the 
policy of auctioning land for higher income residential and commercial uses were a 
reason for unauthorised land development in Delhi. The existing commercial nature of a 
large number of houses having in-built commercial spaces in their residences and 
households owning shops near their residence reveal that restriction of commercial use in 
formal plots is a reason for unauthorised land developments. In both informal and formal 
segments of the land market, the majority (59% in unauthorised area and 87% in formal 
Rohini area) of land use violators are self-employed private entrepreneurs/shopkeepers. A 
person interested in land (commercial or commercial cum residential), or a person 
interested in commercial enterprise but unable to afford auctioned commercial plot) has 
no option than choosing informal land. This fact is supported by the responses of a 
majority of households (70%) who moved from DDA allotted plots to unauthorised 
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colonies, that restriction of commercial use in formal developments was the reason for 
their movement to unauthorised land. 
The field data also reveal that the stringency of the condition preventing resale of 
formal land within ten years, and compulsory remittances thereupon of 50% of the 
unearned increase in the value of land to the lessor, have encouraged immediate illegal 
resales of formal land in the regulated formal market. These plots have been mostly sold 
to property agents who in turn sold and/or arranged sale to households at a higher price. 
Being allocated a second plot despite checks by the public land delivery system, and the 
higher price commanded by such resale plots were the major reasons behind such illegal 
sales. 
It is observed from field results that the income criteria followed in public land 
allocation have not checked the mis-appropriation of formal plots against the condition of 
allocating only one plot to a household in the city. The households' income at the time of 
survey is different from that of the income category on which they were allocated 
subsidised plots at Rohini. 
The data show that the formal housing land allotted in the form of plot/flat by 
public land delivery did not reach the right person, aggravating the unsatisfied demand. 
Because public land delivery does not result in land demand being matched with formal 
supply, upper income households procure small sized formal plots illegally. This induces 
a large number of households who have been allocated subsidised formal plots and/or 
those who obtained more than one plot to resell their formal plots illegally for a higher 
price. 
The majority of interviewees moved from formal to informal plots due to the 
smallness of the former, and for the flexibility afforded by unauthorised land. The 
majority of households who prefer informal settlements are not investors, but there is a 
considerable number of high and middle income groups already allocated land, still 
waiting to take advantage of the emerging informal land market. 
The informal land prices (average prices) mostly match subsidised pre-determined 
land rates on which land is allocated to low and middle income groups. The prices 
indicate that initial cost of entry is lower in informal settlements for those households 
unable to pay formal pre-determined rates (low and middle income groups who have not 
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been allocated land in time and could not apply due to high cost of land), and/or those 
who were prepared to pay only the lowest pEi[ge (higher income group and self-employed 
private entrepreneurs who could not and/or did not bid in the commercial auctions). 
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Endnote for Chapter 7 
' Refer Chapter 5 for more details on housing land delivery and provision of subsidy. 
2 State government is a provincial administrative body responsible for provincial/state or 
city administration. In Delhi, it was called Delhi Administration until 1993. Now, it is 
called "state government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. 
' See for example the application brochure " Rohini -a new approach to comprehensive 
planning, " DDA, 1981. 
4 Commercial and industrial land is allotted on predetermined (subsidised) rate to only 
few special designated categories of households. For details refer Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. PREAMBLE 
This final Chapter qualitatively tests the hypothesis set in the beginning of this research, 
and answers the research questions and propositions. The inferences drawn from the 
findings of the analysis are discussed with reference to their implications on the post 
facturn theory built in Chapter 2. The Chapter also discusses the implications of major 
findings on the emerging theoretical knowledge from the experience of implementation of 
large-scale land policy schemes in Delhi and on the viability of the concept of large-scale 
public land policy on the provision of access to land for housing and the prevention of 
unauthorised land developments in the cities of developing countries. The implications of 
these major findings are examined discussed with reference to the formulation of more 
efficient and effective public land policy in Delhi and the possibility of extending Delhi's 
public policy concept to other cities in India. 
8.2. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND THEIR RELATION 
TO THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS, QUESTIONS AND 
PROPOSITIONS 
This research which analysed the operation of large-scale land policy and unauthorised 
land developments has found that there is a relationship between policies and the 
households attitude to create unauthorised land developments in Delhi. The major findings 
of this and their relation to the hypothesis are discussed in detail in the following 
subsections. 
8.2.1. Research Findings 
This research found substantial evidence that large-scale land acquisition, development and 
disposal policies which govern the public authority's delivery of land for housing have 
been major contributors to the creation of unauthorised land developments and housing in 
280 
Delhi. Despite the DDA's efforts to provide sufficient land for planned development 
through regulatory supply mechanism, the formal housing land delivery has failed to cope 
with the growing demand. Using interviews with 300 households living on illegally 
developed land, 106 households living on illegally resold (but legally developed land), 28 
households who illegally resold their plots, and 69 property agents, this research obtained 
explanations of their actions which can be linked to the principal land management policies 
of the DDA. Their accounts indicate that a substantial portion of them sought to obtain 
illegally developed land or to illegally obtain land because DDA policies: 
-failed to offer them legal alternatives which were affordable; 
-failed to provide legal alternatives in sufficient quantities which allowed those interviewed 
access to available land; 
-failed to make available alternative choices of size, house type, location and options of 
tenure and standards that were legal; 
-failed to ensure adequate legal land was available at the time a household preferred to 
obtain land or housing; 
-failed to make available adequate affordable land that could offer investment opportunity, 
non-residential use and/or income earning or employment opportunities; and 
-failed to provide cheap land with sufficiently flexible lease terms, use and design 
conditions, and delivery procedures. 
The accounts of interviewed households who moved to unauthorised land despite DDA's 
allocation of housing land to them, and of households who illegally resold their subsidised 
plots at Rohini indicate that the DDA's land delivery mechanism: 
-failed to offer the right plot sizes and affordable prices for their preferences; 
-allowed them to obtain substantial unearned profits in the illegal resale market; 
-failed to prevent families from illegally obtaining more than one allocated plot; 
-failed to offer legal options for future expansion of an allocated 
housing unit. 
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The accounts of households living on unauthorised land developments indicate that 
the land delivery mechanisms of informal markets are effective in providing access to land 
to these households because of their ability to supply plots: 
-at preferred or necessary times, in contrast to the long waiting period required for DDA 
allocated land; 
-in varying sizes that are affordable (especially sizes larger than the DDA supplied); 
-at cheaper prices than legal land obtainable at that moment; 
-permitting flexible payments of land prices which fit the financial capacities of households; 
-on which house construction can be carried out incrementally and in phases. 
This research has also found that the policy of regularisation of some of the 
unauthorised developments has also encouraged investment in additional illegal 
development. This attracted small portions of households who had applied and were 
waiting and of others who were already provided with legal land by DDA. They were 
encouraged by the possibilities of investment, and extra-income earning opportunities such 
as shop-keeping and commercial-cum-residential use of their space, in the face of the lack 
of affordable legal alternatives. 
In order to systematically achieve the aims of this research (see Section 1.0), a 
working hypothesis was conceived, and a few research questions and a number of 
theoretical propositions were posed (see Section 1.4) to qualitatively test the hypothesis. 
The relation of hypothesis to research findings is surnmarised in the following section. 
8.2.2. Findings With Regard To The Research Questions And 
Propositions 
Certain research questions and propositions have been posed at the start of this research 
(see Section 1.4). With regard to the first of those questions, the analysis of the data 
gathered from the household survey and office records showed that large-scale 
unauthorised land developments and illegal transfers of fonnal land emerged during the 
operation of public land policy in Delhi. This is because the operation of public land policy 
in Delhi has not provided adequate legal land for housing. By the end of thirty years of 
operation, the DDA had supplied only about one million dwelling units against an 
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estimated demand of approximately 1.5 million. Besides, a backlog had accumulated by 
August 1993 of about 112,682 households, who have registered and have been waiting for 
formal land over a period varying between 4 and 14 years. 
This accumulated backlog arises from the DDA's inability to acquire adequate land 
for its land bank which has delayed the development and delivery of land. Thus, it is no 
wonder, in a capital city like Delhi where there is a limited cheap rental accommodation 
available, that the public policy could not achieve its aim of fully preventing unauthorised 
land developments and sub-standard squatting. This research observed that the DDA was 
the only source of legally developed or acquired land. It supplied land for leasehold 
ownership and there were no legal channels to provide rental housing except some 
government departments who built limited accommodation for their staff. The response of 
81% of those interviewed living on unauthorised plots, and 86% of those interviewed 
living on illegally resold formal plots show that they never applied for formal land. 
The responses of those interviewed indicate that the DDA has not provided 
adequate access to land for housing through its policy instruments. They indicate that the 
DDA's land delivery mechanism has not controlled land prices, land speculation and/or 
profiteering from land, and could not re-capture unearned increments from the resold 
formal land. From the responses gathered, it can be concluded that the DDA's land 
delivery system has not supplied the right lands, to the right persons/parties, at the right 
time and at reasonable prices. The most important effect was to encourage the creation of 
illegal land development and transactions. This had other negative impacts, such as the 
downward raiding of higher income households into low and middle income subsidised 
plots. The policy has not promoted adequate access to legal land for all. The effects of the 
DDA's regulated land delivery as stated by those interviewed are summarised below. 
DDA's policy of delivering affordable legal land on priority allocation, through 
discrin-finatory prices (subsidised for low and middle income and auctioned for higher 
income groups, and commercial and industrial use) and the policy of preventing investment 
in land, have encouraged the illegal transfer of land legally delivered by the DDA. Its 
failure to control illegal resells has encouraged extensive 'downward raiding or filtration' 
of higher income households into subsidised formal plots allotted to low and middle 
income households. Most higher and middle income households interviewed who have not 
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registered with the DDA under the land delivery schemes, have bought these resold DDA 
plots paying higher prices. Their responses indicate that the substantial reasons for 
obtaining illegally resold land are: the DDA's policy failure to provide alternative legal 
channels, to cater for the changing needs of housing; and to provide adequate quantities 
of affordable land for investment and commercial use. 
The lack of alternative channels of affordable legal land delivery has stimulated 
large number of households to look for other alternative options. The colonisers' ability to 
promote unserviced unauthorised plots quickly of varying sizes, and with flexible norms, 
conditions and payments, encouraged large numbers of households to opt for these illegal 
plots. Meanwhile, as stated by households who left legally allocated land to occupy 
informal plots, the availability of affordable illegal plots equivalent to the sizes of formal 
plots supplied for the higher income group through auction sales, plus the expectation that 
their plots would eventually be regularised, have motivated a large number of households 
to opt for unauthorised plots with a minimum of essential services. 
The interviews indicated that the DDA's method of allocating land at pre-determined 
prices to EWS, LIG, MIG households, while auctioning for higher income group plots and 
all corru-nercial land, has also motivated many households to choose unauthorised land 
developments. The DDA's lease conditions prohibiting commercial use or commercial 
cum residential use in residential areas have made unauthorised plots attractive to many 
households. 
The research has also found that the DDA's inability to implement its land delivery 
policies, unrestricted by only one formal plot allocation per family, has permitted middle 
and higher income households to obtain more than one formal plot in different schemes. 
Later, they can resell them for higher prices than they paid, and some times they have used 
the money to buy comparatively cheaper plots in regularised and new unauthorised 
colonies. In spite of increasing formal land prices, this process contributed to the failure of 
attempts to tackle speculation and control land values by supplying the right lands to the 
right parties at reasonable prices. 
Those interviewed indicated that the availability of unserviced affordable plots, in 
sizes, at locations and at times they preferred, along with flexible payments that were not 
available from the DDA, were the prime reasons why they choose to occupy illegal plots. 
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They stated that unauthorised land was available for construction in phases, and as wel-I as 
in large size plots at cheap prices. This substantially motivated most the households who 
could not, or had not applied for, formal land to choose unauthorised land straight away. 
Many interviewed also stated that the unauthorised developments provided flexibility from 
income restrictions, as well as choices provided choices of plot sizes and locations which 
made it easier to find an affordable plot at a suitable place, About 98% of the interviewees 
said they were able to obtain their unauthorised plots within one year, against the average 
wait of 5 years for formal land, which strongly contributed to their opting for 
unauthorised land even though it carried risks. 
The research has found that the weaknesses of the public land acquisition, delivery 
and enforcement policies have contributed to the insufficiency of the formal land supply. 
The formal plots that fell short under the circumstances of slow supply facilitated the 
effective informal land demand which became a basis for the creation of large-scale 
informal developments. Furthermore, circumstances such as increasing formal land prices, 
lengthy and complicated procedures for lease execution, and restrictions on building 
design and expansion have also played effective roles in determining the illegal choices of 
these households. 
The interviews indicated that a large number of households' ability to obtained a 
formal plot before or after formal plot allocation in violation to delivery conditions 
contributed to the resale of those plots. A small number of households were found to have 
already bought land in unauthorised settlements, and this encouraged them to sell their 
formally obtained land in the market for illegal land transactions for substantial profits. 
From these findings, the research concludes that the inability of the DDA's policies 
to provide adequate access to legally developed land and the higher prices of the legally 
provided land that was available encouraged substantial numbers of those interviewed to 
use alternative strategies for obtaining land which was illegal in use and/or sale. 
In addition to confin-ning the propositions, and research questions and finally the 
hypothesis, this investigation gave rise to some new research questions. It was found that 
96% of households living on unserviced unauthorised plots and 79% of the surveyed 
households over all feel happy and satisfied with their unauthorised plots. This poses a new 
research question: whether or not city governments can supply land with minimum 
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services? What is the level of infrastructure that is required and will be accepted in order to 
promote large-scale planned development in a effective and efficient manner? 
It is interesting to observe that out of the 300 households interviewed, 77% are 
migrant families which came from outside Delhi. Most stated that they arrived after the 
second drive of regularisation of unauthorised developments in 1969. A large number also 
stated that they arrived after the third regularisation drive in 1977. Interestingly, most of 
these households are engaged in self-employed private commercial business. Thus, their 
presence raises the question: is there any relation between regularisation and in-migration 
of large number of self-employed households into Delhi? 
Considering the totality effect of Delhi's land policy which combined few public 
policy instruments, and the existence of similar informal developments in other 
circumstances where such policies do not exist, a post factu theory (see Chapter 2) was 
framed from these theoretical observations to corroborate the empirical findings with the 
existing theoretical debate. The research findings' relation to the theoretical debate is 
summarised in the following Section 8.3. 
8.3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR 
EXISTING THEORY 
The research found in the earlier section that large-scale land policy has contributed to the 
creation of unauthorised land developments. This was true because the regulatory 
mechanism followed by large-scale land policy has failed to provide adequate access to 
affordable legal land for all. As a result, it has contributed to increasing illegal transactions 
of formal land, rising land prices, and ultimately peoples' attraction to unserviced informal 
lands that were available at that moment as per their preference. Thus, this section 
discusses the implications of these research findings for the existing theoretical debate on 
informal land developments and land policies effects theory: the post facturn theory and 
its modifications in view of the new findings. 
The post facturn theory of this research (see Chapter two) postulated that informal 
developments are created as an effect of: a mismatch between the overall demand and the 
legal supply of land; land planning regulations executed in the form of use zones, 
subdivisions, building bye-laws and development standards; unaffordable legal land prices; 
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investment and speculation motives; and institutional and administrative deficiencies. This 
section is expanded under five major groups. 
8.3.1. The Contribution of Demand And Formal Supply differences to 
the Creation Of Informal Land Subdivisions 
The research found substantial empirical evidence to support the theoretical observation of 
many academics that overall demand exceeding the formal channels of supply will 
contribute to the creation of informal land developments (Ferreira et al., 1985; Soares and 
Stussi, 1990; Kombe, 1993; Mitra and Nientied, 1989; Maasdrop and Pillay, 1983; 
Pezzoli, 1987; Basu, 1988). This research found that Delhi's housing land supply provided 
through DDA's public housing and serviced land programmes to co-operatives and 
individual registrants has failed to deliver land fast enough. In due course, it not only 
accumulated a large backlog of fori-nal registered unsatisfied demand, but it also failed to 
register all of those who were eligible for legal land. 
The theoretical debate argues that government, if sufficiently active as a land 
developer, can dominate the market and can largely determine the supply of land 
(Sandercock, 1979). But it is counter argued that a government land delivery system 
cannot cope with the urban demand (Kombe, 1993) due to public authorities' inability to 
provide sufficient land on a large-scale (Misra, 1986; Yonder, 1987), because public land 
delivery tends to favour the middle class and plot speculators (Baross and Linden, 1990), 
and because inappropriate delivery to households is unavoidable (Mitra and Nientied, 
1989). This research found from the responses of those interviewed that the DDA, in spite 
of being active for more than thirty years, could not provide adequate access to housing 
land for all. The supply constraints occurred in acquiring proposed land in time, developing 
acquired land as proposed, and delivering the developed land to the right party. As a 
result, it not only delivered formal land in a slow and uncertain manner, but it also could 
not ensure that delivery was regulated by the land disposal terms and conditions. There 
was substantial evidence that the delivery process allocated more than one formal plot to a 
household in many cases and that these extra plots were resold for higher prices. 
There is also an argument that low income groups - the poor (Yonder, 1987) and 
disadvantaged (UNCHS, 1984) - who are excluded from legitimate access to land find no 
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option except through informal supply (Mitra and Nientied, 1989; Howland, 1977; 
Yonder, 1987; UNCHS, 1984). This research found that it is not only the unsatisfied low 
income demand that is encouraged to opt for unauthorised developments but also a 
substantial number of high and middle income households were encouraged to do so. A 
similar finding is reported by Pervar (1993) about Hyderabad where public development is 
active. 
This research empirically supported the observation of UNCHS (1984) that the 
DDA's attempt to slow down the demand and discourage migration by a formal land 
eligibility requirement of five years of residency has encouraged large number of 
households to choose informal land where there are no such conditions. 
This research found substantial empirical evidence from users that informal land 
sources are attractive because of their quick delivery (World Bank, 1980), flexible 
standards of sizes and services (Vernez, 1973; Payne, 1989), flexible procedures 
(Benninger, 1986), easily access (Doebele, 1987; Yonder, 1987), their developers are far 
more pragmatic and efficient in identifying what most people want and are willing to pay 
for (Payne, 1988: 40), and they provide a realistic alternative choice to the poor (Doebele, 
1987). But, there was no evidence that informal developments exist by violent acquisitions 
as noted by the World Bank (1980) elsewhere. This research found empirical evidence to 
the arguments such as subsidised public housing programmes directed towards low income 
groups are often appropriated by middle and high income households through illegal 
transfers or bureaucratic favouritism (UNCHS, 1984). And this downward mobility of 
speculation encouraged original formal allotees to choose different sizes of illegally sold 
formal plots and informal settlements as suggested by Misra (1986) and Yonder (1987). 
However, this research found that unauthorised land developments in Delhi accommodate 
more low, middle and high income households than the very poor. This suggest a new 
observation that when there is large-scale government intervention in land market, the 
resulting unauthorised developments restrict access to the poor because of their 
comparatively higher standards of subdivisions which forces the poor to very substandard 
living such as squatting. 
It is argued that it is easier for a private developer or an individual to acquire, 
develop and also dispose of plots than the public sector (Soares and Stussi, 1990), and 
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they are quicker and better organised (Vernez, 1973). This research found evidence that 
informal developments cannot be compared with formal developments because most of 
the unauthorised land developers have not followed any planning, and have made no 
provision for infrastructure. Their primary role is to negotiate with land owners, cut the 
raw land into different plot sizes leaving little space for paths and sell them as and when 
buyers contact them. Until recently, these unauthorised subdivisions were done by a large 
number of land owners, colonisers, property dealers and plot owners. They develop them 
on in a very small scale: therefore they are quicker and better organised. 
8.3.2. The Contributions of Land Planniniz Reimlations To The Creation 
Of Informal Developments and Transactions 
The World Bank (1980) argues that the history of lax enforcement of land use and 
subdivision regulation makes informal subdivision existent on a wider scale. This research 
found contrary evidence to this argument. A substantial number of those interviewed 
indicated that the absence of land planning regulations in terms of plot sizes, service 
standards, uses and construction motivated them to opt for unauthorised land. Lack of 
these regulations has also attracted some of those interviewed who had been already 
allocated formal land by DDA. 
Theoretical arguments state that the policies of land use control restrict the range of 
choices available to land users. They restrict the locational. advantages, employment and 
investment opportunities, ways and options of land development and tinting of 
development (Monk, Pearce and Whitehead, 1991), they restrict the availability of land 
which can legally be developed (Parsons, 1992; Dowall, 1992), and in turn encourage 
users to look for informal land. This research found substantial evidence from the 
responses received that the restrictions imposed with formal residential land allocation 
were a reason for opting for informal land. A large number of households also mentioned 
the lack of choices of work place close to residence, rigid building bye-laws, no space for 
future expansion in formal plots, to be prominent reasons for their motivation to entry to 
informal plots. The empirical evidence indicates that these reasons have also promoted 
substantial number of illegal sales of formal plots. 
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Theoretical analysis has concluded that the use of high standards of formal land 
delivery has encouraged informal land subdivisions by leaving no option for households 
who cannot maintain the required standards (Okpala, 1980; UNCHS, 1984; Baken and 
Linden, 1989; Dowall, 1992). They also encourage higher income group households to 
take over the low income formal housing (Mitra, 1990). The insistence on high standards 
of development and the provision of complete infrastructure increase the formal costs 
beyond the affordability of low income households (Mohan and Villamizar, 1982). 
However, this research found that the DDA's attempt to deliver affordable plots have 
encouraged households to look for better choices in terms of plot sizes. A large number of 
households mentioned that their ability to afford larger plots than the DDA offered was a 
reason for choosing unauthorised land developments. 
The presence of many middle and high income households in unauthorised colonies 
and their occupation of larger plots than formal standards empirically support the 
observation of Mattingly (1993: 107) that informal land occupation is an alternative to 
paying higher prices and/or accepting smaller plots. Although a majority of those 
interviewed stated the formal plot sizes are smaller than they wanted, a substantial number 
of higher income households illegally bought the smaller formal plots from allocatees at the 
higher resale prices indicating that other factors may determine the choice of plot size, 
such as planned development and assured services. 
Researchers also have observed that informal settlements can offer better locations 
with reference to work places and urban services, and employment opportunities that are 
ignored in formal schemes (Benninger, 1986; Basu, 1988; World Bank, 1980),. This 
research found evidence from the majority of respondents living on unauthorised plots of 
their residences being close to their work place and a majority expressed their satisfaction 
on urban services that are available around their residence. However, this research 
observed that fresh unauthorised subdivisions are quiet distant from city centres and most 
do not have adequate economic activities that could enhance local employment 
opportunities and real wages. 
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8.3.3. The Contribution of Land Prices To The Creation Of Informal 
Land developments 
The theoretical debates argue that the cost of entry is low to informal land market (Gilbert 
and Ward, 1985; Doebele, 1987; Yonder, 1987; Mitra and Nientied, 1989). Informal 
lands' lack of legal status, insecure tenure and bad locations make them initially cheaper 
(Benninger, 1986; Ward, 1984; Payne, 1984; Basu, 1988; Baross and Linden, 1990). In 
addition, there are fewer services. In contrast, it is argued that informal subdivisions 
charge higher prices (Mitra and Nientied, 1989) perhaps taking advantage of long delays 
caused by legal development processes (World Bank, 1980). From the analysis of the 
prices of different segments of land market (informal, subsidised and resale formal prices) 
this research found empirical evidence that the upper range of the informal median prices is 
higher than the average subsidised prices of the DDA and far lower than resale formal 
prices of DDA allocated plots. This indicates that the entry prices of informal land are 
lower than formal subsidised prices and far lower than resale formal market prices. 
Prices for plots of a particular legal status varied in terms of whether it was newly 
unauthorised or likely to be regularised or already regularised, and of its distance to the 
main road. Secured, tenured or regularised lands have commanded slightly higher prices 
than insecured ones. This research found no evidence that informal prices are low due to 
bad locations. Neither was there any evidence that informal developers distributed free of 
cost or charged lowest prices that users intended to pay. But there was evidence that a 
large number of households obtained plots by instalments. This research observed that land 
prices often increased on the basis of the number of resells and their attraction to 
commercial use along access roads. 
Although a large number of respondents said that the informal prices are affordable, 
the unauthorised land studied in this research was not cheap enough to accommodate the 
lowest income group. Respondents from the economically weaker sections, a negligible 
number, indicated that prices charged by informal subdividers excluded the lowest income 
groups from unauthorised land market. This caused a shift in the nature of the socio- 
economic groups entering into unauthorised settlements like those found by Durand- 
Lasserve (1987), Soares and Stussi (1990) and Thirkell (1995: 9) and argues that the 
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majority of the poorest must be sheltered in informal squatter settlements as already 
observed by some acaden-ks (Basu, 1988; Ali, 1990; SPA, 1994). 
Sandercock's (1979) contention that, if a government becomes sufficiently active as 
a developer, it can determine the general level of prices for both raw and developed land, 
is opposed by many writers. They argue that government development has raised land 
prices by creating artificial scarcity (Misra, 1986), auctioning the developed plots to 
achieve the highest prices (Misra, 1988; McAuslan, 1985), creating backlogs which result 
in speculative price levels (Yonder, 1987), setting allocation prices which have no 
relationship with the affordability of low and middle income groups (UNCHS, 1984; Basu, 
1988), and regularising unauthorised colonies and providing infrastructure. Delhi's 
experience shows that the public land delivery failed to control price raise. 
This research found that the DDA's land delivery was inordinately slow due to delay 
in the acquisition of proposed land and its voluntary activities that distracted its primary 
attention. It accumulated a backlog of registrants waiting for a long period, and also 
resulted in the accumulation of unsatisfied demand that was beyond the ability of the 
DDA's land delivery policies. This process created an acute shortage of available legal land 
and encouraged illegal resales of formal plots and downward filtration of higher income 
households into subsidised plots. It is observed that besides slow supply of land, DDA's 
periodic rises of subsidised prices, auctioning prices that created uncertainty in 
determining affordability and fixing government prices, and illegal reselling of formally 
allocated land, have raised prices tremendously, especially cheap land for investment and 
commercial opportunities in planned colonies where non-residential land is mostly 
auctioned. 
8.3.4. The Contributions of Investment, Business And Speculation To 
The Creation Of Unauthorised Land Subdivisions 
Theories argue that informal housing is encouraged by income-earning activities (Silas, 
1988; UNCHS, 1984). Baross and Linden (1990) argue that informal development occur 
due to lack of investment opportunities and/or speculation, and Zetter (1984) argue that 
illegal development is a risk accepted by the landowning elite. Empirical evidence of this 
indicates that informal land developments are encouraged by income-earning activities. A 
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large number of households interviewed reported that they own a commercial shop in and 
around their colonies and most them are self-employed commercial entrepreneurs. It is 
also indicated that a large number of low income households among the interviewed own 
commercial shops in their colonies. Therefore, although it is not substantial, the possibility 
of economic activities and income earning opportunities have also encouraged those 
interviewed to opt for informal subdivisions. 
8.3.5. The Contribution of Institutional And Administrative Deficiencies 
To The Creation Of Illegal Land Developments 
This research found that the case study speculations that malpractice, corruption, nepotism 
and favouritism in the formal land allocations (kombe, 1993); involvement of land owners, 
subdividers and local officials (councillors, police, etc. ) (Baross and Linden, 1990) were 
not substantial causes in the creation of unauthorised land developments in Delhi. Only 5% 
of the interviewed households and 17% of the interviewed landowner farmers stated that 
these reasons motivated them to opt for informal land developments. Similarly, in regard 
to UNCHS's (1984) observation that a variety of actors, organisers of invasions and 
politicians render assistance for informal developments, the majority of households 
indicated that they were not assisted by anyone. However, a large number of households 
mentioned that they were assisted by property dealers. This research has not found 
substantial evidence in Delhi of premeditated and planned involvement by real estate 
sharks, politicians, local leaders, Mafioso racketeers and directors of housing agencies with 
clear interests in sponsoring unauthorised developments (Payne, 1984) and/or by 
entrepreneurs with underground connection subdividing and selling public lands (Yonder, 
1987). 
Misra's (1988) observation that the advanced acquisition of land of below market 
value and later auctioning of the developed plots at the highest price have encouraged a 
large number of land owners to realise the development value "floating" over their lands to 
be gained by illegally subdividing them. Responses received from farmers living on 
informal plots revealed that a large number of them decided to illegally subdivide their land 
due to the lower rate compensation paid by public land acquisition. 
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Zetter (1984) observed that the deficiencies of weak institutional structures for land 
administration, surveying and title registration accentuate market imperfections and create 
opportunities for speculation. This research found evidence that the institutional structure 
of the large-scale land policy operation was inefficient. In spite of DDA's large staff, 
financial abilities and legal tools, it could not supply adequate quantities of legal land for 
the demand. This was caused mostly by DDA's operations as planner, land developer, 
promoter of housing, services and infrastructure, and ultimately planned development for 
the whole Delhi, which nullified the importance of the quick and timely supply of 
residential land for housing. 
8.4. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR THE 
CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAND POLICY 
The findings of this research confirm that the DDA's experience of large-scale public land 
policy has been unsuccessful in providing adequate access to legal land for housing. 
Although they differ somewhat from the basic conceptual arguments that land banking 
can, over time, increase public authorities' control over city growth, increase their 
influence over land prices (UNCHS, 1983; Atmer, 1987; Carr and Smith, 1975), supply 
affordable land to the poor (Devoy and Rodrungruang, 1983), appropriate unearned 
increments of land value increases (UNCHS, 1984; Dunkerley, 1983), eliminate the 
speculative profit (Carr and Smith, 1975; Rober and Sevensson, 1977; Roberts, 1977), and 
ensure efficient land use, and social equity in land distribution, the current achievements of 
DDA demonstrates their possible success. The DDA's experience shows that the concepts 
of land banking, public acquisition, development, leasehold disposal and cross- 
subsidisation did facilitate planned development of services, infrastructure and the 
provision of considerable amount of housing to low income groups. 
As observed in this research, the policy of price freezing and acquisition of land has 
not worked successfully due to the long procedure of land acquisition, low compensations 
and inadequate legal provisions to ensure development of the land acquired. The policy of 
advance land acquisition and banking is possible provided reasonable prices for 
compulsory acquisition are awarded to farmers whose livelihood is taken away once and 
for all. 
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However, expropriation is a necessary tool to acquire land for a land bank when dealing 
with large numbers of low income groups whose life style is usually accustomed to 
substandard squatter/informal shelters with minimum services, and government is unable to 
change the socio-political set-up of a large number of land owning elite. The experience of 
Sweden, in contrast to Delhi, where expropriation took more than five years to complete, 
indicates that special legal provisions in the form of acquisition/expropriation courts and flexible 
procedures to pay higher rates in certain cases can ensure the quick and sufficient acquisition of 
land for public land bank. 
Delhi's experience confirms that cheap land acquisition on a large-scale and 
auctioning land for higher income housing, commercial and industrial use can facilitate city 
beautification and some basic community infrastructure, but it drastically constrains the 
supply of fori-nal subsidised land for housing. This is due to financial uncertainty and 
institutional management set-up. Therefore, it becomes inevitable that either 
decentralisation of the institutional structure in the form of the multi-municipality models 
of Sweden and the Netherlands or a new model of a multi-city development authorities 
with distinct functions to be established. The DDA, a single authority with tremendous 
staff, could not utilise its full man power due to various institutionally-based reasons. 
This research found that long term residential leasehold demonstrated some ability as 
an instrument to control increasing land prices, discouraging speculation by reducing 
resales, and providing standard formal shelter to all income groups. However, the lease 
condition prohibiting resales for 10 years and payment of 50% of unearned profit after that 
period has not only experienced a large number of illegal resales but has also failed to 
avoid increased resale prices and to recover unearned increments. On the one hand, 
managing to obtain more than a plot against the allocation rules and profiteering were 
reasons for reselling formal plots. On the other hand, resold plots were bought because of 
an inadequate formal land supply and the lack of reasonably priced formal land for higher 
income housing, commercial and investment purposes. This mostly affected subsidised 
plots provided to EWS, low and middle income households, resulting in a large number of 
subsidised plots being resold to high and middle income households. A similar trend is 
noticed by Ratzka (1981) in Stockholm where leasehold subsidy benefited middle and 
upper income brackets. 
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The research also found that, in spite of reducing direct speculation in formal land by 
allocating one plot per family, discouraging vacant plots by heavy penalties and preventing 
resells, the large-scale land policy could not regulate overall price rises and the resale of 
formal land at higher prices. Although the overall prices increased due to increased 
inflation and the acute demand for cheap and quickly supplied land, formal land resale 
prices increased mostly because of repeated number of resales. There are also no evidence 
that Delhi's land policy reduced prices by reducing the level of speculation, aflowing 
cheaper land assembly and enabling lower carrying costs and servicing costs. But it could 
supply subsidised land for low and middle income households from the benefits of 
auctioned land revenues. 
8.5. SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research emphasised on how and why unauthorised land developments emerged under 
the operation of a unique and ambitious integrated large-scale public land acquisition, 
development and disposal policy which contained a special mechanism of land supply to 
control land values and prevent informal/illegal/unauthorised developments of any kind. 
The research concentrated on the policy impact on the housing land supply part. To judge 
the full effect of the public policy and to pinpoint its effect on different components of city 
land planning, development, supply and management, more empirical researches need to be 
undertaken. The priority fields are: 
-similar studies on the other segments of land markets such as squatters and freehold land; 
-reasons for the failure of DDA's public land acquisition policies; 
-comparative study of Delhi's experience with Netherlands, Sweden and Iran where the 
public policy has been observed to be successful 
-effect of the large-scale land policy on the supply of adequate commercial and industrial 
lands. 
This research could not address some of the issues raised by the literature that 
government ownership of land creates lower levels of productive investment and labour 
absorption, a regressive spatial structure, very high costs of urban infrastructure, reduction 
of growth potential of house building industry. Although it is possible that the operations 
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of the DDA have pulled large sums of finance from national banks and revolving fund, 
there are very few channels for private developersibuilders investment (only the 
construction of houses on serviced plots supplied by the DDA for individuals and co- 
operative societies, and on freehold plots). This research observed that the DDA's 
construction staff has grown many times during its operation of more than three decades. 
However, it is possible that the labour absorption capacity of the private building 
industry could have been higher than the DDA's monopolistic operation of house building 
and land development, due to the latters operational, supervisional and institutional 
limitations. Therefore, the DDA's construction and building investment and its possible 
impact on potential growth of the building industry emerges as a new research area which 
would determine the strategy for building construction in growing cities of developing 
countries. Similarly, the costs, quality and adequacy of urban infrastructure required and 
provided under the operation of large-scale land policy is another area that has 
implications for a local government monopoly in land and housing development. This area 
is a potential issue for further research. 
DDA records show that during the period 1985-87, the financial resources were tight 
mainly due to the allocation of funds to Asiad works in 1982, and the non-imbursement of 
expenditures incurred on the maintenance of resettlement colonies. However, the DDA was 
able to continue its land development and disposal without any interruption with the help of 
land auction revenues. The performance of a revolving fund as a major source for urban land 
development under these circumstances emerges as a challenge for research. 
Willcox (1980) believes that the price rise would have been higher in the absence of 
the large-scale land policy. This point could not be explored due to DDA's monopoly and 
the absence of a parallel market that was not controlled by the large-scale land policy. 
Therefore, a comparative study of an open market and a market with substantial 
government intervention such as Delhi would make the facts clearer. 
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8.6. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS FOR 
PUBLIC LAND POLICY TOOLS 
Some of the research findings revealed that the public policy tools followed in Delhi's 
public policy have not worked satisfactorily. However, lessons of experience strongly 
argues that the public policy tools have worked satisfactorily in Sweden, Netherlands and 
Iran. The belief here is that the negative effect of these policy instruments in Delhi could be 
context specific and that changes in these tools, techniques and mechanisms can produce 
better results than the DDA achieved with its intervention. With this in mind this section 
discusses the implications of the major findings on public land policy. 
This research has observed that problems with the expropriation of land make it 
difficult to bank adequate land for future development. Legal complications were caused 
by the Central Land Acquisition Act and Delhi Development Act. This research found 
from the responses of those interviewed that the low rates of compensation paid, delays in 
the payment, and/or corruption and harassment of farmers have affected the quick and 
smooth operation of land acquisition processes. This encouraged a large number of 
farmers to subdivide the land alone or with the association of colonisers. 
The arrangements of Land Acquisition Collectors of the Delhi Administration to 
acquire land for the DDA and to transfer the acquired land through the Land and Building 
Department was an ineffective method for large-scale land acquisition. This method, which 
aimed for proper scrutiny of land acquisition procedures and maintenance of more than 
one set of records, has created duplication of work and administrative delays in the 
transfer of possession of land acquired. This particular method is good as it is, if the land is 
acquired for limited development. It is also observed from the field survey that the 
expropriation of land has promoted the incidents of bribes/corruption and harassment 
during acquisition. 
Another issue that needs attention is the limitations of a single authority in taking up 
a task with multiple functions. The planning responsibilities of DDA and its allied 
functions such as house construction, city beautification in the form of flyovers, highways, 
sports/games complexes, city forests, industrial estates, expensive commercial and 
prestigious office complexes, have slowed its activities which are essential to adequate 
land acquisition, development and supply. Furthermore, its partial functions for the 
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provision of services to squatter resettlement colonies, the maintenance of its newly 
developed colonies, the provision of interstate bus terminus and the operation of Delhi 
lotteries have reduced its operational efficiency towards planning and land development 
and diverted DDA's land revenues from use towards the objective of providing and 
utilising adequate and affordable land supply. 
Importantly, the necessary cautions emphasised by the major findings of this research 
are the tools of public land delivery instrument. This research found substantial evidence of 
weaknesses in Delhi's land delivery policies. The income criteria followed to identify 
beneficiaries for flat/plot allotment was found to be causing harassment and generating 
dissatisfaction with the public land allotment system. This seems to have played a crucial 
role in attracting corruption, submission of false information and violation of procedures 
due to inadequate supply of formal land that could not match the overall demand and long 
delays in disposing developed land for the households who have already registered with 
DDA. 
It is observed in this research that the inadequate legal provisions towards actions 
against the misuse of premises have led large number of buildings to be misused and in 
addition the delay in formal land disposal has discouraged large scale administrative 
actions against these misuses and as a result it led into corruption in building regulation 
and land use monitoring system. 
8.7. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH FOR LARGE- 
SCALE LAND POLICY IN DELHI AND ITS EXTENSION TO 
OTHER CITIES OF INDIA 
The empirical evidence gathered by this research prompts many policy changes in order to 
enable the public policies to be capable of achieving their policy goals and objectives. As 
Mitra (1990) has argued it would be worthwhile to consider the land banking policy 
stimulants and ways and means to improve its performance, rather than discarding the 
policy in view of its negative impact that contributed to the creation of large-scale 
unauthorised land developments and sub-standard squatters. The findings of this research 
have implications for the improvement of Delhi's current policy and the possibility of 
replicating its instruments and tools to other cities of India. 
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8.7.1. The Implications Of This Research For Large-scale Land Policy In 
Delhi 
This research finds that Delhi's large-scale public land policy needs substantial revision in 
regard to its land acquisition, development and disposal strategies. The inadequate access 
to legal land for housing being the major group of reasons that attracted a substantial 
number of interviewees to informal housing and illegal resells, the delivery policy needs 
to be reviewed with regard to the possible creation of extra channels or actors of legal land 
supply within the existing policy framework. This research found that most interviewees 
moved to informal and/or illegal resells because of the allocation criteria that selected 
registrants/beneficiaries on the basis of their income group, affordability, plot sizes and 
current ownership status. This encouraged them to look for illegal sales that fit their 
requirements. This policy needs reviewing with regard to efficient and effective criteria 
that are logical, possible and easily monitored by the public authority. 
At a lower level, the unaffordability of formal commercial land being a contributor to 
occupation of informal land for commercial based reasons and occupation of illegally 
resold plots or conversion of residential plots into commercial plots and/or commercial 
cum residential plots, the auction policy needs to be reviewed. Furthermore, as this 
research has also observed that unavailable opportunities for investment in property have 
attracted a large number of households to move to informal plots or buy resale plots, this 
needs to be considered when supplying land on auction or allotments. 
The research community criticises DDA's cross-subsidisation formula. It is argued 
that the DDA has not effectively utilised this tool towards providing sufficient land for low 
income housing land. The policies regarding cross-subsidisation and utilisation of revolving 
fund need changes which would provide adequate land for the growing volume of low 
income households. This research has found that most of the land delivery conditions have 
contributed to the selection of inappropriate beneficiaries, thus discouraging a large 
number of households from following the DDA's procedures. Attention should also be 
given to removing the bad reputation which the DDA seems to have earned due to its 
expropriation policies, restricted delivery of formal housing land and long procedures in 
lease administration. Finally, it was observed that the information supplied in the annual 
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records do not tally with other sources of published and compiled information, suggesting 
that proper records and management skills are missing. 
8.7.2. The Implications Of This Research For Extending The Large-scale 
Land Policy To Other Cities Of India 
The research community observes (Howland, 1977; Jha, 1984; Misra, 1986: 35; Acharya, 
1988: 1430) that proposed replication of the Delhi model in other Indian cities would not 
be successful as in Delhi. They argue that the regional status, financial position, city 
economy, income distribution and administrative limitations (Howland, 1977) would play a 
crucial role in the successful execution of this model of policy. The findings suggest that 
the Delhi policies would be able achieve success elsewhere with some changes in the 
policy framework. More clear land acquisition laws, increased channels of legal land 
development, reductions in infrastructure standards or involvement of non-governmental 
organisations for the provision of infrastructure, simplicity and flexibitlity in planning 
standards, procedures and lease conditions would ensure more success than what could be 
expected by replicating the model as it is. 
8.8. OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions of the research are first, that the large-scale land acquisition, 
development and disposal scheme (referred as large-scale land policy of Delhi) has 
contributed to the creation of informal land developments and illegal land transfers in 
Delhi, especially unauthorised housing. The emergence of unauthorised or illegal land 
developments was encouraged mostly by the inability of the large-scale land policy to 
deliver timely and adequate quantities of affordable land in varying plot sizes, with 
flexible lease conditions. In Delhi, unauthorised land development was seen as an 
alternative channel of housing land supply that filled the gap created by the inadequate and 
slowly-provided supply of formal land. This research found that the public land policy 
which aimed to fully prevent the haphazard or informal development by eliminating private 
free open market speculation, and providing access to land to everybody at the right time 
and at reasonable prices has failed to achieve its primary objective. 
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This research using empirical evidence gathered from office records and 
questionnaire interview of households living on informal land, households living on resold 
formal land, households who resold their formal plots, and property agents, found that the 
large-scale land policy has not provided adequate access to legal land for housing through 
its regulatory mechanism of land delivery. The responses of households residing on 
informal land indicated that substantial portions of them sought to obtain illegally 
developed land, or to obtain land illegally because of the opportunities which existed to 
obtain varying sizes (larger than formal eligibility) of plots, at comparatively cheaper 
prices, at the desired time, and with flexible payments, construction and use terms. 
This research has also found evidence from those interviewed that the large-scale 
land policy's failure to deliver the right land to the right persons/party at reasonable prices 
prompted unauthorised resales of formal plots and thus resulted in a large number of 
higher income households buying subsidised plots at higher prices. The higher resale prices 
of formal plots, and households managing to obtain more than one formal plot against the 
formal allocation norms, encouraged large number of households to resell their subsidised 
plots in an informal resale market. 
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APPENDIX I 
1. ADMINISTRATION OF FIELD SURVEY INVESTIGATION 
The main aim of this was to identify reasons for the increasing number of unauthorised 
colonies and the influence of large-scale land policy upon them. Thus, this research had 
to proceed investigation despite the lack of an accurate universe of public and private 
developed housing land. In order to overcome the problem of universe, and ensure the 
accuracy and reliability of survey data, this research conducted a reconnaissance and pilot 
survey prior to the final household survey. The details of these surveys follow. 
Reconnaissance Survey 
This survey was a preliminary settlement listing survey with informal discussions of 
selected property agents located in that area conducted before pilot survey. This survey 
showed that unauthorised subdivisions do not have a uniformity of size, income group 
and fixed area. Their characteristics vary depending upon their location, date of 
establishment and regularisation status. It was also observed that an accurate estimate of 
plots, population and their area coverage would be time consuming. 
During this survey, the major unauthorised settlements were visited and informal 
discussions held with property agents, developers and local residents having knowledge 
on the development and growth of these settlements. Information such as number of 
colonies, area coverage, number of plots, average plot sizes, prices, regularisation status, 
agents and socio-economic groups involved in the land development and sales was 
collected. This survey was conducted by the author with the help of local experts from 
NGOs and helped in understanding the development process for choosing appropriate 
sample frame, target groups and samples. 
Pilot Survey 
Prior to conducting the actual survey, a pilot test was conducted to reveal any 
unanticipated problems such as language, local terminology and clarity in the questions of 
the survey. The pilot survey ensured that the items covered by the questionnaire were 
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comprehensive for the purpose of gathering the required information. Pilot testing 
checked the variation of answers, the meaning of the questions, redundancy, scalability, 
non response etc. The results of the pilot test checked against past research findings 
showed many characteristic traits of the settlement that could be recorded in the research 
questionnaire. It also helped to train some of the interviewers. 
Some of the common errors found in data recording were the use of different units 
of measurement other than specified and unmarked refusals or answers not known. This 
test helped to add a few items in the questionnaire to gather information important to test 
the hypothesis. On the basis of its experience, some questions posed to the respondents 
were made shorter or longer depending upon their understanding, as the long questions 
allow them to think and also recall more information (Lee, 1993: 78). Similarly, it helped 
to replace new terms with familiar terms, making respondents more relaxed and aiding in 
understanding the question (ibid). Simple questions were placed in the beginning 
followed by the most important questions in the middle and least important questions in 
the end. In order, to convince both Hindi-speaking as well as English-speaking 
households, the questionnaires were made bilingual. It helped to introduce uniformity of 
flow, question skips and time factors, and respondents' interest and attention in the final 
survey. 
Final Field Survey And Training 
The interviewers for the field survey were recruited with the help of the School of 
Planning and Architecture and staff of Delhi Development Authority. The author took 
assistance from 11 interviewers in different contexts and tin-ýings. Most of them were 
graduate students aware of local areas and who could communicate in English and Hindi. 
Data for unauthorised colonies were obtained in the presence and supervision of the 
author, and data on Rohini formal plots were obtained by the author personally with the 
help of local persons who are aware of the area and could convince people by their 
recognition as local residents. The data from resold formal allottees were gathered by the 
author personally. 
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Special Aspects Of Research And Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed from the outset, keeping computer processing in mind. 
Although there were many open questions, the pre-coding was already done in the 
questionnaires, and also while designing the questionnaire the data entry requirement is 
taken into consideration. Units of measurement and scaling techniques were used to 
ensure right data. 
The questionnaire consisted of open-ended as well as closed options. The most 
important questions were placed first and sensitive questions asked in the end. 
Consistency checks were built into the questionnaires. The questionnaires were designed 
such that the data is obtained by interviewing as well as by observation. Adequate thought 
was given to data processing at the time of questionnaire design and care taken to keep 
most of the questions close ended in order to enable easy data coding and processing. 
However, the questionnaire contained a sufficient number of open questions to tap varied 
reasons that encourage informal land developments in Delhi. Items in the questionnaire 
were designed as far as possible with multiple choice options with special care to keeping 
the choices exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The questionnaire is piloted to identify 
ambiguities or mistakes and for the ambiguity yes/no questions used. 
The questionnaires contained extra papers to make notes of suggestions of the 
respondents and other information that did not refer to any of the questions. This helped 
in assigning ambiguous data into specific categories and also in creating new categories in 
instances where the multiple choice offered in the questionnaire were not exhaustive. 
Confirmation Of Skills And Experiences Of Field Survey 
Dowall's (1994: 35) methodology of arriving at a representative price (median value) from 
the assessment done by three brokers was found to be a complicated technique for 
collecting reliable land prices in Delhi. This is because most of the brokers do not 
maintain proper records for income tax reasons and they have least interest in reporting 
accurate market price prevalent in that year. Considering the fluctuations in transaction 
cost, it would need a fortnightly or monthly monitoring of appraisals for which real estate 
brokers have financial interest and commitment. Most of the property dealers were 
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reluctant to provide the right information from their records and, depending upon their 
volume of business, they either under quoted or over quoted the prices. Large numbers of 
households felt that the property prices were also rising due to bargaining powers of 
property dealers and not many were interested to quote the right price. 
A list of 200 each of EWS, LIG and MIG non-allottees waiting for about a 10 year 
period was obtained from the DDA. In spite of the best efforts, only 7 households out of a 
large number of samples could be contacted due to wrong/incomplete addresses, the 
registrant having moved away from the address available, to house being locked/could not 
be contacted and address could not be traced. Considering the very small number of these 
samples against a large number of waiting households, the facts collected from this survey 
have not been used in this research. Similarly, an attempt to interview the government 
officials was unsuccessful as very few experienced staff involved in the operation of 
large-scale land policy were available at that moment and time did not permit to search 
for those expert administrators. 
The unauthorised plots are still a sensitive issue for household survey in Delhi. 
Because a large number of households refused to participate without the consent of their 
president of the colony/settlement and it was extremely time consuming and an effortful 
job to identify the president and convince him to introduce the interviewers to some of 
the households and who would in turn introduce them to their neighbour households. The 
author had to accompany some of the colony presidents to colonisers' offices and in turn 
had to be supply his address and other details for further inquiries with regard to the 
identity of the researcher. As these incidents luckily happened during the end of the 
survey, it had not affected the survey. The most sensitive part of the unauthorised 
household survey is the farm houses where even property agents refused to participate in 
the survey. 
Another factor that ensured more reliable data and good rate of response, was the 
meetings with the members of colony associations where they existed prior to 
approaching respondents, and gaining assistance with a common letter addressed to or 
personal introduction by the president/secretary of the colony association to some of the 
households. In many cases, depending upon the locality, visits made during evenings and 
public holidays have also increased the response rate. 
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The researcher had a very important role in convincing the households. Therefore, 
soon after gaining the advice of president/secretary/office bearer of colony associations, 
the number of plots to be surveyed were sorted out and a group of two interviewers were 
despatched together and the supervisor (researcher) monitored the progress of the 
interviews. In the end, questionnaires verified and external consistencies were filled in by 
the concerned interviewer and in necessary cases households were clarified then and 
there. 
Although the survey investigation was sensitive, the government's recent move to 
approve unauthorised colonies, withdrawing the condition of resale of built flats/houses 
and attempt to streamline the property dealings, increased the response rate and 
encouraged a large number of respondents to participate in the survey. Overall, the 
situation of the household survey was frightening but it became manageable with the help 
of the presidents of the colonies and property agents around the settlements surveyed. 
Methods Of Data Coding, Processing And Analysis 
In order to assess the validity of a hypothesis constituent concepts were translated into 
variables (Bryman and Cramer, 1990: 4). Most policy researches being multidimensional 
and multi-methodical, this study used both qualitative and quantitative to ensure 
perceived validity of the study and provision of additional insight that one method could 
not provide (Smith, 1983; Majchrzak, 1984) The qualitative data analysis aimed to 
preserve chronological flow, assess local causality and derive fruitful explanations. They 
not only led to new theoretical integration but also helped to go beyond initial 
preconceptions and frameworks (Huberman, 1984). 
Data Coding And Processing Techniques 
Due to the magnitude of the data to be collected from office records, questionnaire data 
could not be processed in the field itself. However, a preliminary coding, rechecking of 
entries were done in order to ensure the availability of required data. A final trip was 
carried out to fill in the gaps in the questionnaire survey. Later, responses were coded by 
assigning individual values to each variable and missing values were distinguished from 
no response given and/or stated don't know or undecided or not applicable (Foster, 1993; 
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Bryman and Cramer, 1990: 20). Ordinal scaling was used for income data in order to 
enable easy categorisation of income groups where as nominal data was used for 
descriptive variables. 
The data coding, editing and processing analysis was undertaken in the following 
sequential steps: editing inconsistencies and converting data into measuring units; 
preparing a code book with the inventory of all variables, and making data entry and 
checking the errors and consistencies (Foster, 1993). 
Computer Packages Used For The Analysis 
The coded data from the questionnaires were entered into spreadsheets of Quattro pro 
pacakage in Lotus 123 file type and converted into Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) data files. The matrixes of 150 columns by 300 rows for informal plots, 65 
columns by 106 rows for formal plots, and 122 columns by 69 rows for property agents 
were developed and analysed as required. The data analysis was conducted using SPSS, 
Lotus 123, Microsoft Excel and Quttro pro statistical/spreadsheet packages. The 
contextual data base developed from the field interviews and secondary sources was taken 
to analyse the cause and effect of informal land subdivisions. 
Some of the simple operations such as mean, median, conversion of measuring units 
from square yards to square metres etc. were done in spreadsheet packages. This 
spreadsheet method gave access to few other similar packages such as Lotus 123 and 
Microsoft Excel. The sophisticated data analysis such as frequencies, cross tabulation, 
descriptive analysis and scattered plotting etc., were done using SPSS for windows. 
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APPENDIX II 
SCHOOL OF PLANNINC AP'ID ARCHI TFCTU9E 
'jr-7,1--T ýffqrl -'04hrZ7,1956 7TI 4M 3T 3FM-, T ? T'Tn)-JT, 7r-T- 
fIll F- L') T0UA UM V Fli UtI ED ERCT 1'-, 'j 3 C,, Fi ý-i E L; 
6 October 1994 
Sub: Survey of residents of residential development& in 
Delhi 
Dear Resident/Plot owner, 
A survey on land development and allocation in Delhi is 
being organized by Mr. K. Sriranaan. Research Scholar at 
DPU, the University College London, in collaboration with 
the Department of Urban Planninq. the School of-Plannincl 
& Architecture, New Delhi. as part of his Ph D research. 
This research study explores the possibility of improvinq 
the existing large scale land allocation system in D-elhi 
towards providing access to land to the every needy and 
encouraginq tt-He individuals to build their own houses 
with the required essential infrastructure. It is a pure 
-ar: ad--4pi, c- re%, earch study and has no conne-r-ticens-to th- 
government functions. The information provided by you is 
strictly confidential and will be used only for academic 
purpose. No details about any individual will be passed 
on under any circumstances -to any officials. 
Therefore I request you to kindly cooperate with him/his 
investigators who will be visiting you to fill a proforma 
betwee-n 7 Oc: tober and 25 YOWI-)Lber 1994 and provide us with 
the information that is factual (not officially 
recorded). We assure you that this information will be 
used solely for the purpose of acade-mic study of policy 
analysis and your response will be kept anonymous. 
Thanking you, 
Yours sincerely, 
Head 'of the Dept. Of Urban Planning. 
'T! t,: TOt- 110002 0 11-3319435 i"rmTT 1177 PLOCK. 
- 
IC-WOELHl-tlOO02 FAX : 011-3319435 PHONE GRAMS: 
-'-Cl 10C)l PLAN 
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APPENDIX III 
Survey No. Coloony Phase Serial No. Type Interviewer 
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIýIIIIIIIII 
-LI 
RESIDENTS OF INFORMAL DEVELOPMENTS 
INTRODUTION : 
We are doing a survey for a research study on the land allocation system in 
Delhi. We believe that by this study we would be able to find out the reasons for 
delay in allotment of formal land to the needy and solutions to provide enough land 
for the needy. Any information you give us is strictly confidential. No. details about 
individuals will be passed on under any circumstances to any officials. My first task 
is to find the right person to interview. Are you head of the household ? (If yes) 
I have a questionnaire to fill in. Please could you help rne with this now ? 
fT; qzr : 
f4qqTq 4 fEF ; ýff i; ruzrzfq 4; ýýTu fff zffzf ff T EFTTvr TY qM 
ffff U47ITT 4h ý5ýTffff; q ýAfft 47 ktTlfdc-l 'Ifff ffiýM EFTI`4 Tt ff-qT4; TT, 0 q; T qfff fflT ; ff4i; TT I 
, ffý T zFý 
@ ff;: Tzý zF-< ffik* I Eff [IF i-qf ýTTT qýqr q; Tq a fýF # ffTqrcFR zý fffq ft a Effi zi iq Wff -Iff iff 
Tf 5r[qt/-4PTrfriZTT ffý 4ý qfff qT 5Rff TE[ffý W 11-i -4Tff f t, EMT j; rTcr 1ý4 -4ý 
? 
LOCATION OF THE PLOl.. 
...... 
PLOT SIZE 
..... ..... ............ ............ .I........ I........ ...... 
STATUS OF THE PLOT ............ ...................................................... 
INTERVIEWERS NAME ................ ...... ..... .... ..................................................... 
NAME OF THE COLONY ................. ........................................................ 
DATE OF INTERVIEW ................. ............................................................... 
Time : Start ............... am/pm. 
fini,, h 
......... am/pm 
Length of interview ............... 
SUPERVISED BY 
CHECKED BY ..................................... ........................................................ 
CONFIDENTIAL 
1- All information collected for this survey will be treated in the strictest confidence 
2. In reporting on the survey, no information will be released to individuals or govt. 
officials 
Call rEcord (give date/time) Code final result below 
1 st call C1 . -'Completed interview 
2nd call 2. Deadwood eg. empty/demolished 
3rd call 3. Refusal: Reasons 
4th call 4. Individual not contacted in the hous ehold 
INTERVIEWERS RECORD (TIME OF INTERVIEW): 
Interview took place at Week day morning 9 am-1 p. m. 
Afternoon after 1 pm 2 
Evening after 6 pm 3 
Weekend morning 9am-1 pm 4 
Afternoon after 1 pm 5 
Evening after 6 prn 6 
Il I 
ASK ONLY PLOT/FLAT OWNERS Code 
1. Which is your place of origin ? 
Name of the Place .................. 
District 
................ 
3tate 
................ 
2. If not born in Delhi, When did you come to Delhi ? 
Year.... ...................................................................................... 
3. When did you acquire this land (Plot/1-louse) ? 
Date/Year . ........................... . ....... .................................................. 
4, What is the physical condition of your plot before construction ? 
Flood zone area/Low ly, ng area 1 
Steep Slope 2 
Water Logging area 3 
Hills/upland 4 
Others (specify) 
.... ........ ...... 5 
5. What is th-- tenure status of the Plot/Flat you are living now ? 
Subdivided from freehold agricultural land 1-, 
Subdivided from notified area of DDA 2 
Subdivided from the DDA acquired land 3 
I-aldora area of urban village 4 
Others (Please specify) .............................. 5 
6. How did you acquire this plot/house ? 
In-herited parental property 1 
Purchased from private owner/coloniser 2 
Purchased from agent/broker 3 
Purchased from previous owner 
Occupied the vacant land 5 
Others (please specify) ................................. 6 
7. Have you received any written documents from the coloniser/ 
developer ? Ye 
No2 
If yes what kind of document ? I--. I .... ........ ....... ... 
8. Do you remember the details of property dealer/government staff/ 
constructors etc. who helped you to purchase this PlOt/flat ? 
Property dealer ..................... ..... ...................................................... 1 
Govt. staff ............... ...... ......... ...................... ................................. 
2 
Constructors ........................... ............ .... .... ................................. 3 
Politicians ............................... ........................................................... 4 
Local leaders ................... .... ........ ................................... ............... 5 
Others (specify) ................ . ........................................................ 6 
I Route 
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9. How much time did it take to process the purchase of this plot ? Code 
Months/years 
........................ ........... ...................................... 
10. What is the approximate size of your plot ? 
......... 
I-II............................... Sq. W-. ýft. /yard 
0 
1. How many rooms are there in your flat/house ? 
No, of rooms ? ........... ....... . ......... 
Average size ? .......... 
12. How much did you pay for per square mt/ft/yard at the time you bought 
this here ? 
Plot/flat Rs 
..... ........... .............. I .... .............................. 
Single payment 6-11 
Instalments 2 
Others (specify) 
.......................................... 
3 
13. What was the mode of payment ? 
14. Have you paid for any subsequent charges such as development 
charges and registration fee etc. to coloniser or govt. ? If yes 
how much ? 
Development fee Rs ... 
........... year ................ whom 
Regi-, tration fee Rs ......... ..... year ......... /hom ................ 
Other (specify) .... ...... . ........ year ....... ...... whom ................ 
15. How did you built your house ? 
Little little 
All in once 2 
16. Where the neighbouring a, -eas built-up at the time of purchase ? 
Fully built-up 1 
Partly built-up 2 
Un built (3 
17. Do you know the current selling price of the 
land near your plot 
of any vacant sale ? Yes/No- 
If yes, Rs- ......... I ................................ 
Per Sq; mt/ft/yard 
18. Please give details of the distance from the plot boundary to the 
nearest building line (EXPLAIN TO RESPONDENT) 
Front set back .......... . ...... I .... 
ft Rear 
Rear set back ......... ..... 
ft Side 
I Side-11 
Side set back 1 ........................... 
ft 
-1 
Side set back 2 .......... .............. 
ft Front 
19. What is the total floor area of the building ? 
.............................. 
Sq. ft. 
20. How many households are living with in the building ? 
................................ 
Nos 
21. How many floors are there in the building ? 
............ .. 
Nos 
I Route 
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22. Were you ever evicted from any squatter or unautorised colony ? Code 
Yes/No 
23. Are you satisfied with this plot/flat in terms. of size, space, 
location etc ? Yes/No 
If not, can you give specific reasons ? 
24. How close is your plot to the essential infrastructure centres ? - 
Very near near little away far away 
Employment (work place) 23 
Commercial 
, 
/shopping centre 12 ý-3!. 
Transport/major bus stop 124 
School/college etc. 12 (3' (4- 
25. Did the coloniser or land owner delivered any services ? 
If yes what are the servicees: Water 1 
Electricity 2 
Sewerage 3 
Internal transport 4 
Others(specify 
................................. 
5 
26. Did the coloniser or land owner promised you to delivery any 
services in the past and present ? 
If yes what are the services Past Present 
Water 11 
Electricity 22 
Sewerage 33 
Internal transport 44 
Others (Specify) .................. 
55 
27. What was the likely source of water at the time of purchase ? 
Individual Municipal Supply 
--B, ore-well/hand pump with 
in plot 2 
Mobile water tanks 3 
Public (municipal) water supply 4 
Public bore well/hand pump 5 
None 6 
28. What is the present source of water supply to your plot 
Individual municipal supply 1 
--Bore well/hand pump with in plot (2 
Mobile water tanks 3 
Public (municipal) water supply 4 
Public bore well/hand pump 5 
None a 
29. What is the present source of electricity to your plot ? 
DESU supply 1 
Illegal arrangements 2', 
No electricity 3 
30. What is the present source of drainage/sewer to your plot ? 
Sceptic tank 1 
Closed (MCD) sewer 2 
Open (MCD) drains 3 
Make-shift drains with in colony 4 
Other (specify) .... ..... 
5 
Route 
31-1 
31. Which of the following type: 3 of permission for building Code 
construction does your plot have ? 
DDA approval 1 
Municipal approval 2 
Court orders 3 
No permission ý-4-) 
Other (specify) ..................... 
5 
32. Do you have any other plans for the extension of the building ? 
Construct another floor 1 
Construct a commercial unit 2 
Construct a industrial unit 3 
Other (specify) ............. . ....... 
4 
33. Do you have any other dwelling/plot ? YeýNo 
If yes where and how many ? (IF NO SKIP Q-34) 
With in the settlement/colony Nos ............... 
In the city Nos ............... 
In the periphery Nos ............... 
34. What is the status of the other plots/flats you own ? 
Private provided 1 
Same as this 2 
Govt. developed (DDA/staff house) 3 
Rented 4 
Others (specify) 
............... 
5 
35. Do you own a shop and/or industry in this plot or near by ? 
Yes 
No 
36. Are you aware of DDA allotting plots/flats for residential purpose ? 
(IF NO SKIP Q-37) 
Yes 
No 
37. If yes have you ever applied for a DDA plot or flat ? 
Yes applied and got it cancelled 1 
Applied but still in the waiting list 2 
Plot/flat was allotted 3 
Plot/flat was not allotted 
'14 Did not apply at all ýý5 
38. If not applied, can you state specific reason for not applying for 
DDA plot/flat ? 
39. If in waiting list/allotted a plot/flat, any specific reason for 
buying this plot instead of your own allotment ? 
(IF REQUIRED FILL MORE THAN ONE) 
Anticipated further price rise 1 
Anticipated regularisation 2 
Not satisfied with the plot/flat allotted 3 
DDA did not provide plot/flat 4 
In-expensiveness (Cheaper) 5 
Close to employment 6 
Possibility of commercial/inclUstrial use 7 
Due to prevailing favouritism/corruption 8 
Others (specify) ................................. 9 
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40. To know your affordability, did you have sufficient money to buy Code 
a plot from DDA at the time of buying this plot here 7 
Yes 
No 2 
41. Could you able to buy land at the time you had money and 
willing to invest for housing ? 
Yes 
No 2 
42. What is the composition of --ir family ? 
. 
No. of adults ...................................................... 
No. of children .................. 
43. What is the nature of your employment ? 
Salaried person in government I 
Salaried person in publc sector -2 Own private enterprise .............................. 3 
Employee in private enterprise 4'ý 
Other (specify) 
..................... 
44. Do you receive money from any one overseas ? 
Yes I 
No 2' 
45. What is your average household income per month ? 
Le: 3s than Rs. 1250 1 
Rs. 1250-2650 2 
Rs. 2650-4450 3 
Above 4450 (4ý 
46. Did you find any difficulty in purchasing this plot ? 
If yes, please specify them. 
................. .. I...................................... ............................. ....... 
47. Have you received any financial assilstance/help for housing ? 
If yes what kind ? 
...................... .... I ................................................................. 
If yes What kind ? -__, 
48. If you are the land owner is there any special reason for 
subdividing land on your own instead of selling it to the DDA, 
Who is authorised for housing/development in Delhi ? 
49. Your age at the time of attaining ownership of this plot/flat ? 
Years .................................... .................................................. 
The reasons for neglecting the plot Allotted by the public 
authority (Ask only allottes of plot/flat of DDA, MCD, and Other 
government agencies) 
50. Was the plot allotted (DDA, I. ACD, /,, NDMC) larger/s-nall than t 
requii-ed size ? 
Yes 
NO 2 
I Route 
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51. Was the working place away from the pl()t ? Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
52. Already have a DDA plot ? Yes 1 
No 2 
53. Was the finance a problem for buying a plot and construct in the 
plot allocated by the DDA ? Yes 1 
No 2 
54. Was construction according to building bye laws a problem in a 
plot allocated by DDA ? Yes 1 
No 2 
55. Commercial / industrial We was not permitted along with 
residential use ? Yes 1 
No 2 
56. The sale price of DDA plots are high therefore prepared to buy this ? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
57. Was not satisfied with the plot allotment in terms of its ? 
Yes No 
No space for expansion 1 2 
Restriction for further sub-division 1 2 
Restriction for renting 1 2 
Restriction for starting business 1 2 
Restriction for vertical expansion 1 2 
Restriction for horizontal expansion 1 2 
Quality of construction 1 2 
Any other reason (specify) ............... 1 2 
58. Note down the history of the development of this colony. 
59. How did the plot subdivision started ? 
60. Their suggestions and recommendations. 
Thank you very much for your help in answering these questions. 
FOR INTERVIEWER : (TO BE FILLED AT THE PLOT/FLAT) 
61. Is the built up area in the plot is the following ? 
Single storied detached/attached unit 1 
Double storied detached/attached unit (2 
Multi-storied detached/attached unit 3 
Vacantland 4 
62. How many residenti, -' units exist in the plot ? 
Nos 
........................ ................................................... ... 
63. Does this plot consi: -ýts ot any of the following structures 
partially or fully ? (Check one or more) 
Yes No 
Residential unit 1 2 
Commercial unit 2 
Industrial unit 2 
Other (Specify) .................. 1 2 
64. Classify the structure in terms of their construction 
Permanent structure C 
Semi-permanent structure 2 
Temporary structures 3 
Fake structures 4 
Vacant plot 5 
Route 
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APPENDIX IV 
Survey No. Colony Phase Serial No Type Interviewer 
RESIDENTS OF FORMAL LAND/ALLOTTEES OF THE FORMAL LAND 
Dear Resident/Plot owner, 
We are doing a survey for a research study on the land allocation 
system and the operation of real estate market in Delhi. We 
believe that by this study we would be able to f ind out the 
reasons for delay in allotment of formal land to the every needy 
and investors interested to participate in the property market. 
The study also aims to investigate the policy options to provide 
enough land on cheaper rate to the every needy. My first task is 
to find the right person to interview. Are you the plot 
owner/resident of this plot? (If yes) I have a questionnaire to 
fill in. Please could you help me with this now? 
N; 4 kýHA/7fwg Alf4F. "i 
T"T461, CTUTý Pý17 q-Q 08M P-o-m -up -m Rmw t P7, -E, 7[ ý3r, -M. T; i 5ýýT, 
., 
UiEftýý tFý ATýj fq-ý, Tt =-7. - 7M -ý; flfl-qq --, rýuft Z7" Tffl -ým -ýý7 z-r-ýTZFq -c. -, T U-: 
W, ýi IN T-. Týf -,, -rt # f4iýl Tt I #; a q-mýll c7.. '-M - f-, - 
1 Zrz[T 
T; ýý iT jý I qT(j 3jTq ýýj -, T: ýF ýk t? qfý -l ýý 0w 7E7, Pmq--, t 4 Mt I 
LOCATION OF THE PLOT ----------------------------------------- 
PLOT SIZE ----------------------------------------------------- 
STATUS, OF THE PLOT -------------------------------------------- 
INTERVIEWERS NAME --------------------------------------------- 
DATE OF INTERVIEW --------------------------------------------- 
TIME: Start ---- am/pm. Finish ---- am/pm Length of interview- 
SUPERVISED BY ---------------------- CHECKED BY ----------------- 
CONFIDENTIAL 
1. All information collected for this survey will be treated in 
the strictest confidence. 2. In reporting on the survey, no 
information will be released to individuals or government 
official. 
Call record (give date/time) Code final result below 
ist call 1. Completed interview 
2nd call 2. Deadwood eg. empty 
3rd call /demolished 
4th call 3. Refusal: Reasons 
4. Individual not contacted 
in the household 
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RESIDENTS OF FORMAL LAND/ALLOTTEES OF THE FORMAL LAND 
PART I 
1. Was this plot allocated in your name? 
Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(IF Yes, ASK NAME OF THE ALLOTTEE AND DO NOT 
FILL THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WHEN THE NAME MATCHES WITH 
THE NAME IN THE LIST PROVIDED. IF NO, PART I TO BE 
FILLED FROM THE PERSON LIVING NOW AND PART II TO BE 
FILLED FROM THE ACTUAL ALLOTTEE) 
2. If No, Who's name was it allocated? 
Name ------------------------------------------------- 
3. Is the allottee a member of your family at 
the time of allotment? 
4. Kindly give the address of the actual allottee ? 
5. What is your tenure status in this plot? 
6. How did you procure this plot? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Owner I 
Tenant 2 
Through property agent 1 
Through personal contact 2 
Through advertisement 3 
Through family offer 4 
others (please specify) -------- 5 
7. When did you purchase this plot? 
Date/Year -------------------------------------------- 
a. Were you able to change the power of attorney 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Route 
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9. If No, what are the specific reasons for the delay? 
10. What was the actual market cost of similar plot at 
the time you bought this here? 
Rs --------------------------------------------------- 
11. Have you applied for a DDA plot or flat? 
(IF ANSWER IS NO SKIP Q12) 
12. Any specific reason for buying this plot instead of 
waiting for your own allocation? 
13. Do you own any other plot in this locality/Delhi? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
14. If yes, who is living in that plot? 
Family member 1 
Vacant 2 
Tenant 3 
15. What is the nature of your employment? 
Salaried person in government 1 
Salaried person in public sector 2 
own private enterprise 3 
Employee in private enterprise 4 
other (specify) ------------------ 5 
16. What is your monthly average household income? 
Less than RS. 1250 1 
Rs 1250-2650 2 
Rs. 2650-4450 3 
Above RS 4450 4 
3 )() 
17. Did you find any difficulty in purchasing 
this plot? 
If yes, please specify them. 
Thank you very much for your help in answering these 
questions. 
FOR INTERVIEWER: 
Ia. Is the plot vacant? 
19. Is there a built up area in the plot such as? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Single detached/attached unit 1 
Double detached/attached unit 2 
Multistoried detached/attached unit 3 
others (specify) -------------------- 4 
20. How many residential units exist in the plot? 
21. Number of floors existing in the building? 
No -------------------------------------------------- 
22. Does that plot consists any of the following 
structures? 
Residential unit 
commercial unit 
Industrial unit 
Other (specify) -------------------- 
Yes No 
2- 
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PART II: ALLOTTEES OF FORMAL LAND BY THE DDA 
I. PRELIMINARY DETAILS: 
1. DDA records shows that you have been allotted a plot. 
Do you remember the year of allotment of this plot? 
Date/year --------------------------------------------- 
2. Who's name was it allotted? 
Name: ------------------------------------------------ 
3. What is the relation of allottee to the head of the 
household? 
4. When did you sell out this plot provided by the DDA? 
Year ------------------------------------------------- 
5. To whom did you sale? 
Property agent 1 
Private individual 2 
others (specify) ---------- 3 
II. DETAILS ABOUT PRESENT LIVING: 
6. What is the size of the built up space/plot you are 
living now? 
------------------------------------- sq. mt/ft/yard. 
7. Is this plot same size of built up space/plot allotted 
by the DDA? 
Smaller 1 
Larger 2 
Same 3 
S. What is the tenure status of the plot/flat you are 
living now? 
Plot/flat allotted by the DDA 1 
self built private flat (regularised) 2 
Self built private flat (not regularised) 3 
Free hold property 4 
Tenant 5 
9. How much did you pay for the plot in which you are now 
living in? 
Rs per --------------------------------------- Sq ft/mt 
1O. What is the nature of your employment? 
salaried person in government 1 
salaried person in public sector 2 
Own private enterprise 3 
Employee in a private enterprise 4 
Other (specify) --------------------- 5 
11. What is your average household income per month? 
Less than Rs. 1250 1 
Rs 1250- 2650 2 
Rs 2650-4450 3 
More than Rs. 4450 4 
THE REASONS FOR LEAVING THE PLOT ALLOTTED BY THE PUBLIC 
AUTHORITY 
12. Was the plot size larger than you required? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
13. Was the working place away from the plot? 
Yes I 
No 2 
14. Have you acquired another plot? (BEFORE /AFTER 
ALLOCATION) 
Yes 1 
No 2 
15. Was the sale price higher therefore you prepared to 
sale it? 
Yes I 
No 2 
16. Was the finance a problem for construction? 
Yes I 
No 2 
17. Was construction according to building bye laws a 
problem? 
Yes I 
No 2 
was there a problem to pay for the cost of plot/ 
loans borrowed for purchasing and construction? 
Yes I 
No 2 
19. Were you not satisfied with the plot in terms of its; 
Yes No 
Space for expans ion 1 2 
Restriction for further sub division 1 2 
Restriction for renting 1 2 
Restriction for startina business 2 
Restriction for vertical expansion 2 
Restriction for horizontal expansion 2 
Any other reason (specify) ----------- 1 2 
20. Please rank reasons listed for disposing off the plot 
according to your priority? (Starting the most 
important as number one) 
Reason 
Plot size was large/small 
Work place away from the plot 
Acquired another plot 
Fetched for higher price 
Finance was a problem for construction 
Could not pay for the debts 
Eye laws were problem 
Vo space for expansion 
Restriction for further sub division 
Restriction for renting 
Restriction for starting business 
Restriction for horizontal expansion 
Restriction for vertical expansion 
Priority 
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Thank you very much for your help in answering these 
questions. 
FOR INTERVIEWER: 
21. Is the plot vacant? 
22. Is there a built up area in the plot such as? 
Yes II 
No 2! 
Single detached/attached unit 
Double detached/attached unit 2 
Multi storied detached/ attached 3 
Others (specify) -------------------- 4 
23. How many residential units exist in the plot? 
No -------------------------------------------------- 
24. Number of floors of the existing building? 
No --------------------------------------------------- 
25. Does that plot consists any of the following 
structures? 
Yes No 
Residential unit II 
Commercial unit 22 
Industrial unit 33 
Other (specify) -------------- 44 
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auivvy v4u. %, uiony r-nase berial No. i ype interviewer No. APPENDIX 
11 111 1 1111111-17.1 1-11 ý-1,1117111 
SEMI STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROPERTY DEALERS/AGENTS 
INTRODUCTION : 
We are doing a survey for a research study on the land allocation system in 
Delhi. We believe that by this study we would be able to find out the reasons for 
delay in allotment of formal land to needy and solution to provide enough land tor 
the needy. My first task is to find the right person to interview. Are you owner/ 
Incharge of this agency (if yes) I have a questionnaire to fill in. Please could you 
help me with this now ? 
, Tfv-:; Tz: r : 
T-rT '-TT7 TFIEZTzr; T k F-77 79 74V13T NzrT 7T TIOT A' I Tl: rl 
fýTqPT ý f* -7T '9'E4zFr 4; ;,: T TIT f; Tzrfl-rT -ýfipT 3ýrý2:; r iý zFT-TaT zFT crFTr 
97T TF+7T qtT -3iý7ýTTT-, 7 ý; Wf ;T Nq crzrjrff ;, TFr-, T WTT; T ýFf 7TITTZF7ýi EFT ITFTT 7,: ýTTT q*71T I 
ý7T 79,7T zFTIT ýTRMWT7 fff 7, ; T-, ^T EzrfýF' jT -,, ^r TT 7T. I ; PTT 3ýrm -ý; T ýýqfT 
777ýT ýF qf -, -, Z T FTT TF ITPT FrT 95; 7q7ýT 
4 f7f#, 'Tý -ITT; iT zfzrT Trm T? T 4T; T 
? 
INTERVIEWER'S NAME ..................... ........................................... ........ 
LOCATION OF AREA ............... 
. 
... ............ . .......... ........... . .............. . .......... ........... 
DATE OF INTERVIEW ............. 
Time : Start. I. ')-: ). ', -. '... a. m . /p. m. Finish ............ a. m. /'p. m. 
Length of interview ............ 
SUPERVISED BY 
CHECKED BY .................................................................. ........................................ 
CONFIDENTIAL 
All information collected for this survey will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. 
in repcrting on the survey, no information will be released to individuals or govt. 
officiais. 
Call record (give date/time) Code final result below 
1 st call 
ý-1. Completed intei-view 
2nd call 2. Deadwood eg. empty/demolished 
3rd call 3. Refusal : Reasons 
4th call 4. Individual not contacted in the household 
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SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTION N. A, IRE.. FOR. PRqPE, RT., Y Dý.., ýLERS/, ý. G. ENTS,:. 
- '' 1, .1ý 
When did YOU start this business ? 
Year 
.................. ...... .................................... . ...................... . 
2. What is your highest qualifications attained ? 
........... ........ ...... . ....................... ..... 
Do you have prior experience in this property business ? 
Position 
11 ... I ......... .I....... ..... 
No. of Years experience 
What is the jurisdiction of your property dealing 
Yes/No 
5. Can you Indicate the kind of properties are being dealt by your property agency? 
Free hold properties 1 
Lease hold properties (DDA Plot/Flat) 2 
Un authorised/regularised 3 
Un authorised (not regularised) 
(Private, /RuWk Land) 
C4 
Others (specify) 
.... .................... ...... ........... 
5 
How many units (Flats/Plots) you transacted under the following categories of 
ons in the past one year period ? (Note down the details if property transactil II. price 
varies by location/floor/size etc. In a seperate sheet) 
Category 1ý lats 
No' Average 
Price per 
sq. yard/ft. 
I Residential 
N Slum tenements 
(i 1) Economically Weaker Sections (E. W. S. ) 
(61) Low Income Group (L. I. G. ) 
(i V) Middle Income Group (M. I. G. )-, SFS 
(v) High Income Group (H. I. G. ) 
(vi) Un authorised regularised units 
(vil) Un authorised not regularised 
11 Commercial units 
III Industrial units 
IV Others (specify) 
7. Do you have any terms and - conditions in the trai 
kindly give details. 
Plots 
No's Average 
Price per 
sq. vard, ft. 
isaction of property ? If yes 
Give details about Govt. rules and regulations if any you follow in your property 
transactions. 1 
32 7 
T Now much is your transaction fee/commission charge for each trangaction 7 
10.1 want sorne details about prevailing characterstics in regard to type of property, 
location, size, year of sale and market price etc. Can you kindly give details on 
the kind of transaction and their market sale price since beginning of youl 
property dealing from your property records ? (Kindly provide whatever 
information is available). 
12. Some people say that the housing land delivery/ahotment system of Delhi is not 
workin 
'g 
well. What do you think about it. ? If yes, can you state reasons for 
your vfews ? 
13. What is your opinion about the housing land prices whether they are increasing 
or decreasing ? Can you give some examples ? 
14. What is your opinion about the functioning of DDA's land allotment and land 
management system ? 
15. Do you deal with Plots/Flats of unauthorised colonies ? If yes, is thorf, ; )ny 
difference between DDA's Plots/Flats and unauthorised developments in telms, )f 
Plot si7e, location, prices and preference etc. ? 
16. Ate there any resale of Plots/Flats ? If yes, are they ', imilar Income group ? 
Give examples. 
Do you have any special preference towards any specific type of property 
transaction such as leasehold/freehold/unauthorised plots or flats etc. ? If yes, 
state reasons starting from the most important one. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
DA, 1961. Acquisition and Disposal of Land for Urban Development in Delhi. A priced 
pamphlet. Published by Delhi Administration: New Delhi. 
DDA, (Annual Administration Reports), 69-70,80-81,87-88,1992-93. Delhi 
Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1979. Problems and Solutions of unauthorised Colonies. Special Planning Unit, 
Delhi Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1982. Role of Private Developers in the context of Delhi-2001. An Unpublished 
document (circulated for restricted use). Delhi Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1983a. Dimensions of squatter settlements in a super metropolitan city-Delhi, Delhi 
Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1983b. Window on DDA. An Unpublished document. Delhi Development 
Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1984. Project report on policies and regularisation of unauthorised colonies. Delhi 
Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1985. Challenge on urban development in Dell-ii: Delhi as an example. An 
Unpublished paper prepared for the Association of Metropolitan Development Authorities. 
Delhi Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA, 1986. Some Critical issues Delhi 2001. An Unpublished document. Perspective 
Planning Wing, Delhi Development Authority: New Delhi. 
DDA (Vikas Varta), 1991. Delhi Vikas Varta, Volume. 2, No. 3, July -Septembe . Delhi 
Development Authority: Delhi. 
DDA, 1992. Guidelines on land management, volume I and II. Unpublished documents for 
internal use only (not be quoted). DDA, 1992. 
DDA, undated (probably 1990). Delhi by DDA', Delhi Development Authority: New 
Delhi. 
GOI, 1989. Report of the committee on reorganisation of Delhi set-up, part 1 and 11. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India: New Delhi. 
Government, 1990. Master Plan for Delhi 2001. Notified by the Gazette of India, New 
Delhi. 
NCRPB, 1988. Regional Plan 2001, National Capital Region Planning Board. Ministry of 
Urban Development: New Delhi. 
SPA (School of Planning and Architecture), 1994. Planning issues and development 
strategies for the informal settlements -a case study of Dell-ý. A final sponsored research 
report submitted to Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi. 
329 
NEWSPAPERS 
Hindu, (1.4.94). Water connection to Unauthorised colonies. The Hindu and the India 
Information: Madras. 
Hindustan Times, (11.8.92). Minister assurance on unauthorised colonies. The Hindustan 
Times Group: New Delhi 
Hindustan Times, (28.12.92). Delhi still chaotic with encroachments. The Hindustan Times 
Group: New Delhi 
Hindustan Times, (20.2.94). Humane policy on slums needed. The Hindustan Times 
Group: New Delhi 
Hindustan Times, (5.3.94). Delhi in Parliament-unauthorised colonies. The Hindustan 
Times Group: New Delhi 
Hindustan Times, (21.3.94). DDA demolishes farm houses. The Hindustan Times Group: 
New Delhi 
Hindustan Times, (12.8.94). Slums regularisation sought. The Hindustan Times Group: 
New Delhi 
Indian Express Metro News, (1.1.93). House collapse case being hushed up; MCD looks 
away as illegal constructions sprout. The Indian express group: Bombay. 
Indian Express, (2 1.3.9 1). Hike in land prices only option. The Indian express group: 
Bombay. 
Indian Express. (19.9.92). Rohini becoming encroachers bastion. The Indian Express 
Group: Bombay. 
Indian Express, (14.1.93). DDA fails to put an end to Batla house encroachment. The 
Indian express group: Bombay. 
Sunday times of India, (21.2.93). Demolitions in sainik farms. The Times of India Group, 
Delhi. 
REFERENCES 
Acosta, R., and V. Renard, 1993. Urban land and property markets in France. University 
College London (UCL) Press: London. 
Acharya, B. P., 1987. Policy of land acquisition and development, analysis of Indian 
experience. Third world planning review, Volume 9, Number 2, pp 99-116. Liverpool 
University Press: Liverpool. 
Acharya, B. P., 1988. The instruments of urban land policy in India: opportunities for 
future direction, Environment and planning Vol. 20, No. 11, pp. 1427-1447. Pion 
publication: Great Britain. 
330 
Acharya, B. P., 1989. Equity in plot reconstitution schemes: a tale of three Indian cities. 
Third World Planning Review, Volume 11, Number 1, PP. 71-96. Liverpool University 
Press: Liverpool. 
Ali, A., A., 1987. Khuda ki Basti. The Herald, December 1987. 
Ali, S., 1990. Slums within Slums, a study of Resettlements Colonies in Delhi. Har-anand 
publications: New Delhi. 
Ali, S., 1995. Environmental Apathy and urban utilities in slums and resettlement colonies 
of Delhi. Institute of Town Planners India (ITPI)'s Journal, Volume 13, No. 3&4 (161 & 
162), pp 73-78, March - June. ITPI: Delhi. 
Amis, P., 1984. The commercialisation of unauthorised housing in Nairobi. In World 
development, Vol. 12, No. 1. 
Anýiitabh, 1991. Methodological issues related to urban land value research in the Indian 
context. An unpublished paper. Department of Geography, University of Cambridge. 
Arnitabh, 1994. Residential land price changes in selected peripheral colonies of Lucknow 
city, India, 1970-1990. An unpublished PhD thesis submitted to University of Cambridge. 
Amos, J., 1993. Planning and Managing urban services. In managing fast growing cities, 
new approaches to urban planning and management in the developing world, Nick Devas 
and Carole Rakodi. Longman scientific and technical publications: England. 
Angel et. al., 1983. Land for housing the poor. Select books: Singapore. 
Angel, et al., 1987. The land and housing markets of Bangkok: strategies for public sector 
participation. PADCO. 
Atmer, T., 1987. Land Banking in Stockholm, Habitat International, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp 47- 
55. Pergamon press: Great Britain. 
Baken, R. J., and Van der Linden, 1992. Land Delivery for Low Income Groups in Third 
World Cities. Avebury: England. 
Baken, R. J., 1990. The high price of cheap plots: the rising threshold to consolidation of 
low income households in Karachi (1974-1988). Urban research working papers 25. Free 
University: the Netherlands. 
Baross et al., 1983. Substandard commercial residential subdivision: lessons from a pilot 
project. Institute for Housing studies. 
Baross, 1990. Sequencing Land Development: the price implications of Legal and Illegal 
Settlement Growth. In the transformation of land supply systems in third world cities, 
Baross P., and Van der Linden,. Avebury: England. 
Baross, P., and Jan Van der Linden, 1990. The transformation of land supply systems in 
third world cities. Avebury: England. 
Barrett, S., and Patsy Healey, 1985. Land policy: problems and alternatives. Avebury: 
England. 
Basu, A. R., 1988. Urban Squatter Housing in third World. Mittal Publications: Delhi. 
Benjamin, S. J., 1991. Jobs, land and urban development, the economic success of small 
manufacturers in east Delhi. Lincoln institute of land policy: 
331 
Benninger, C., 1986. Formal and semi formal strategies of land acquisition. Centre for 
Development Studies: Poona. 
Blaesser, B. W., 198 1. Clandestine development in Colombia. USAID. 
Bose, A., 1973. Studies in India's urbanisation 1901-1971. Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company Ltd: New Delhi. 
Bose A, 1977. Urbanisation in India: a demographic perspective. In Patterns of 
Urbanisation: comparative country studies, Goldstein and Sly. Ordina editions: Belgium. 
Bryman, A., and Cramer Duncan, 1990. Quantitative data analysis for social scientists. 
Routledge: London. 
Buch, M. N., 1984. Land policy and the urban poor. In Nagarlok, Vol. XVI, No. 4, PP I- 
10. Indian Institute of Public Administration: New Delhi. 
Bulmer, M., and D., Warwick, 1993. Social research in developing countries: surveys and 
censuses in the third world. UCL Press: London. 
Carr, J., and L. B. Smith, 1975. Public land banking and the price of land. In Land 
Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 316-330. 
Carr Jack and Lawrence, B. Smith, 1977. Public Land Banking and the Price of Land. In 
Public Property? the Habitat debate continued, essays on the price, ownership and 
government of land, Lawrence B. Smith and Michael Walker. The Fraser Institute: 
Vancouver. 
Castells, M., 1979. The Urban question. Edward Arnold: London. 
Census of India, 1971-1991. Primary Census Abstract General Population, India. Part I 
and 11 (Volume I& II). Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. 
Chatterjee, S., and B., Price, 1977. Regression Analysis by Example. John Wiley & Sons. 
Collier, R., 1976. Squatters and Oligarchs. John Hopkins University press: London. 
Cook, J. L., 1991. Conversion Factors. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Cullen, M., and S., Woolery, 1982. World congress on land policy, 1980. Lexington 
Books: Lexington. 
De Vaus, D. A., 1991. Surveys in social research. Allen and Unwin: London. 
Devas, N., and C. Rakodi, 1993. Managing fast growing cities, new approaches to urban 
planning and management in the developing world. Longman Scientific & Technical: 
England. 
Devas, N., 1993. Evolving approaches. In managing fast growing cities, new approaches 
to urban planning and management in the developing world, N. Devas, and C. Rakodi. 
Longman Scientific & Technical: England. 
Devoy, S. R., and C. Rodrungruang, 1983. Basic land banking concepts and their 
application to Low-cost housing in Thailand. In land for housing the poor, Angel, et. al. 
Select books: Singapore. 
332 
Doebele, W. A., 1983. Concepts of Urban Land Tenure. In Urban Land Policy issues and 
opportunities, H., B., Dunkerely. Oxford University press: Oxford. 
Doebele, W. A., 1983. The provisions of land for the urban poor, concepts, instruments 
and prospects. In land for housing the poor, Angel et al. Select Books: Singapore. 
Doebele, AW, 1987. Land Policy. In Shelter, settlement and development, L. Rodwin. 
Allen and Unwin Press: Boston. 
Doebele, W. A., 1994. Urban land and macro economic development: moving from access 
for the poor to urban productivity. In methodology for land and housing market analysis, 
Jones, G., and Peter M., Ward. University College London press: London. 
Dowall, E. D., 1981. Reducing the cost, effects of local landuse controls. Journal of 
American Planning Association, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 145-153. APA: Baltimore. 
Dowall, D. E., 1988. Land and housing market assessment: an importanttool for increasing 
housing delivery in the third world cities. In Habitat International, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 135- 
150. Pergamon Press: Great Britain. 
Dowall, E. D, 1991. Comparing Karachi's informal and formal housing delivery systems. 
In Cities, the international 
- 
journal of urban policy and planning, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 217- 
227. Butterworth - Heinemann Ltd: Oxford. 
Dowall, E. D., 1992. The benefits of minimal land development regulation. Habitat 
International, Vol. 16, NoA pp. 15-26. Pergomon press: Great Britain. 
Dowall, D. E., 1994. An overview of land-market assessment technique, In methodology 
for land and housing market analysis, G. Jones and Peter M. Ward, University College 
London press: London. 
Dowall, E. D., and G. Clarke, 1991. A framework for reforming urban land policies in 
developing countries. Urban management programme paper number 7. 
Drakakis-Smith, D. W, 1981. Urbanisation, housing and the development process. Croom 
Helm: London. 
Dunkerley, B. H., 1983. Urban land policy, Issues and opportunities. A World Bank 
publication. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Durand-Lasserve, 1990. Articulation between fori-nal and informal land markets in cities in 
developing countries: issues and trends. In the transformation of land supply systems in 
third world cities, P. Baross and Van der Linden. Avebury: aldershot. 
Durand-Lasserve, A., 1987. Land and housing in the third world cities: are public and 
private strategies contradictory? In Cities, the international journal of urban policy an 
planning, Vol. 4, NoA Novembe , PP 
325-338. Butterworth - Heinemann Ltd: Oxford. 
Etzioni A., 1983. On Policy Research. In introduction to Social Research, Vol. 1, Hand 
Book of Social Sciences Methods. Robert Smith: BP Company. 
Eve Gerald et al., 1992. The relationship between house prices and land supply. 
Department of the Environment, Planning Research Programme: London. 
Farvacque, C., and Patrick McAuslan, 1991. Urban management and Reforming urban land 
policies and institutions in developing countries, Urban Management Program, Urban 
Management Program Policy Paper No . 5. 
333 
Ferreira et. al, 1985. The clandestino-social profile and strategies. ISCTE. 
Fiori J., and Ramirez, R., 1992. Notes on Self-Help Housing Critique: towards a 
Conceptual framework for the analysis of Self-Help housing policies in Developing 
Countries. In Beyond Self-Help housing, Kosta Mathey and Profil Verlag. Mansell 
Publishing limited: London. 
Fitzwilliarn Memorandum, 1991. On land markets and land price research. International 
Research Workshop: Land value changes and the management of urban policy upon land 
polarisation processes in developing countries held at Fitzwillian College, July, 1991 in 
Cambridge. In International Journal of urban and regional research, vol. 15, no. , pp. 
623- 
628. 
Flatt, A et al., 1982. Workshop reports. In World congress on land policy, 1980, M. 
Cullen and S. Woolery. Lexington book: Lexington. 
Flechner, H. L., 1974. Land banking in the control of urban development. Praeger 
publishers: New York. 
Foster J. Jeremy. 1993. Starting SPSS/PC+ and SPSS for Windows, a beginners guide to 
data analysis. Sigma press: UK. 
Gambhir, J. C., 199 1. Delhi housing -200 1, Scenario. Delhi Vikas Varta, Vol. 2, No. 11 Jan- 
march. DDA: New Delhi. 
Geisse G., and Sabatini F., 1982. Urban Land Market studies in Latin America: issues and 
methodology. In World Congress on Land Policy, 1980, M. Cullen and S. Woolery. 
Lexington Books: Lexington. 
Geisse, G., and Sabatini, D., F, 1980. Urban land policy problems in Latin America. 
Habitat International, Vol. 4-6, PP 671-690. Pergamon press: Great Britain. 
Gilbert, A., and Gugler, J., 1981. Cities, poverty and development, urbanisation in the 
third world. Oxford press: Oxford. 
Gilbert, A., 1990. The costs and benefits of illegality and irregularity in the supply of land. 
In the transformation of land supply systems in third world cities, P. Baross and Jan Van 
Der Linden, Avebury, Aldershot. 
Gilbert, A., and Ward, P., 1985. Housing the state and the poor, policy and practice in 
three Latin American Cities. Cambridge University press: Cambridge. 
Gilbert, A., 198 1. Pirates and invaders - land acquisition in urban Colombia and Venezuela. 
In World development, Vol. 9, No. 7, pp. 657-678. 
Grimes, O. F., 1974. Urban land and public policy: social appropriation of Betterment. 
Unpublished Staff working paper Number. 179. International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
Gupta H. C., 1991. The strategy of land protection in Dwarka (Papankala). In Delhi Vikas 
Varta, Volume 2, No. 3, July-Sept, PP. 32-34. DDA: New Delhi. 
Gupta, 1994. Greening Delhi. In Delhi Vikas Varta, Volume 5, No. 1, January-March, 
1994, PP. 7-18. Delhi Development Authority: New Delhi, 1994. 
Gupta, D. B., 1985. Urban Housing in India. World Bank Staff Working papers, Number 
730. The World Bank: Washington. 
334 
Gupta, S. C., 1991. Development implications of Delhi Master Plan regulations. In Delhi 
Vikas Varta, Vol. 2, No. 2, April-June, PP. 31-35. DDA: New Delhi. 
Haarhoff, E., 1983. Shelter in informal settlements. Working paper. University of Natal?: 
South Africa. 
Habitat-11 Delhi (New Delhi Declaration), 1996. Global conference on access to land and 
security of tenure as a condition for sustainable shelter and urban development. 17-19 
January. New Delhi. 
Hakim, C., 1987. Research Design, Strategies and choices in the design of social research. 
Allen and Unwin. 
Hallett, G, 1988. Land and housing policies in Europe and the USA, a comparative 
analysis. Routledge: London. 
Hallett, G., 1979. Urban Land Economics, principles and policy. The Macmillan press: 
London. 
Han-filton, W. S., and Baxter, E., D., 1977. Government Ownership and the price of Land. 
In Public Property? The Habitat debate continued, essays on the price, ownership and 
government of land, Smith B Lawrence and M. Walker. The Fraser Institute: Vancouver. 
Hannah, Kim and Mills, 1993. Land use controls and housing prices in Korea. In Urban 
studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp 147-156. Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh. 
Hardey J. E., and Satterthwaite, 1989. Squatter citizen. Earthscan Publications: London. 
Hasan, A., 1987. Orangi Pilot Project's low-cost sanitation Programme: six questions. 
Sustainable development conference, 28-30 April 1987. International Institute for 
Environment and Development: London. 
Hasan, A., 1992. Seven reports on housing: government policies and informal sector and 
community responses. A publication of the Orangi Pilot Project- research and training 
institute for the development of Katchi abadis: Karachi. 
Howland, M., 1977. Delhi's large-scale land acquisition, development and disposal policy, 
In ITTC review, Vol. 6, No. 3, PP. 53-83. 
Huberman, M 1984. Qualitative data analysis, a source book of new methods. Sage 
publications: London. 
Jain, M. K., Minati G., and W. B. Kim, 1993. Emerging trends of urbanisation in India: an 
analysis of 1991 census results. Census of India, Occasional paper number 1. Office of the 
Registrar General, India. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government Of India: New Delhi. 
Jan, J. Van der Linden, 1989. Successful supply of plots for the poor: the case of 
Hyderabad, Pakistan. Urban Research Working Papers 22, Institute of Cultural 
Anthropology/Sociology of Development. The Netherlands: Free University. 
Jerry, A., 1991. Patterns and processes of illegal land subdivision, a case study of Delhi. 
An unpublished Master of Planning dissertation. School of Planning and Architecture: 
Dew Delhi. 
Jha, G., 1984. Revolving fund as technique of financing land development: a critique. In 
Nagarlok, Vol. XVI, No. 4, PP 62-78. Indian Institute of Public Administration: New 
Delhi. 
335 
Jolly, U. S., 1994. Mangement of Urban Land. In Delhi Vikas Varta, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
January-March, PP. 39-42. DDA: New Delhi. 
Jones, G., and P. M., Ward, 1994. Methodology for land and housing market analysis. 
Uiniversity College London press: London. 
Kanazawa, T. M., 1996. Possession is nine points of the law: the political economy of 
early public land disposal. In Explorations in Economic Histou, Vol. 33, No. 2, PP 227- 
249. Academic Press: Orlando. 
King, A, D., 1976. Colonial urban development: culture, social power and environment. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. 
Kitay, M. G., 1985. Land acquisition in developing countries: policies and procedures of 
the public sector. A Lincoln institute of land policy book: Boston. 
Koehn, P., 1983. State land allocation and class formation in Nigeria. In Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 2 1, No. 3, pp 461-48 1. 
Kombe, J. W. M., 1993. The demise of public urban land management and the emergence 
of pseudo land markets in Tanzania, a case of Dar-es-Salaam city. An Unpublished paper. 
University Dortmund. 
Kool, M. L., Dik Verboom and Jan J. Van der Linden, 1989. The mid-term impacts of 
squatter settlement upgrading: a longitudinal study of Baldia Township, Karachi. Urban 
Research Working Papers 22, Institute of Cultural Anthropology/Sociology of 
Development. The Netherlands: Free University. 
Lean and Goodall, 1966. Aspects of land economics, the estates. Gazette limited: London. 
Lee, M. R., 1993. Doing research on sensitive topics. Sage publications: London. 
Lichfield, N., and Drabkin, H. D., 1980. Land policy in planning. George Allen & Urain: 
London. 
Lim, W. S. W., 1980. Application of land policy instruments in the third world - with special 
reference to Asian Countries. Unpublished paper presented at World Congress On Land 
Policy: Strategies and Instrumentation of Implementation. June 23-27,1980. Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy: Massachusetts. 
Lim, W. S. W., 1982. Major differences between developed and developing countries in 
application of land policy instruments. In World Congress on Land Policy, 1980, Cullen 
Matthew and Sharon Woolery. Lexington Books: Lexington. 
Linn, J. F., 1979. Policies of Efficient and Equitable growth of cities in developing 
countries. World Bank Staff Working paper 342. The World Bank: Washington. 
Lloyd, P., 1980. Young towns of Lima, aspect of urbanisation in Peru. Cambridge. 
Maasdorp, G., and Pillay, 1983. Informal settlements: socio-econontic profiles. Project 
No. 2. Economic Research Unit: Durban. 
Maitra, S., 1991. Housing in Delhi - DDA's controversial role. In - 
Economic and Political 
Weeklv, Volume 26, No. 7, pages 344-346. Sameeksha Trust: Bombay. 
Majchrzak, A, 1984. Methods for policy research. Sage publications: London. 
336 
Martin, R. G. L., 1977. The impact of Government Policies on the supply and Price of 
Land for Urban Development. In Public Property? the Habitat debate continued, essays on 
the price, ownership and government of land, L. B. Smith and M. Walker. The Fraser 
Institute: Vancouver. 
Mathur, D. D., 1992. Encroachment on Public lands. Delhi Vikas Varta, Vol. 3, No. 1/2, 
Jan-June, DDA: New Delhi. 
Mattingly, M., 1993. Urban management intervention in land markets. In managing fast 
growing cities, new approaches to urban planning and management in the developing 
world, N. Devas and C. Rakodi. Longman Scientific & Technical: England. 
McAuslan, P. M., 1985. Urban land and shelter for the poor. Earthscan, International 
Institute for Environment Development: London. 
Misra, B., 1982, Urban Development Policies in india: Focus on Land Management. In report 
of International Seminar on Urban Development Policies: Focus on land Management 13-18 
October, 1982, Haruo Nagamine. Nagoya, Japan. 
Misra, 1984, Public intervention and urban land management - experience of three major 
cities of India. 91h EAROPH International Congress: Hong Kong. 
Misra, B, 1986. Public intervention and urban land management, the experience of three 
metro-cities of India. Habitat International, Vol. 10,1/2, pp. 59-78. Pergamon press: Great 
Britain. 
Misra, B., 1990. A comparative study of urban land management in selected developing 
Asian countries and Japan. Economic Research Center, Nagoya University: Nagoya. 
Misra, B., 1991. Urban land markets in Asia: the role of private developers and guidelines 
on public acquisition of land. Otaniemi: Japan. 
Misra, G. K., and Gupta, R., 1981. Resettlement policies in Delhi. Indian Institute of 
Public Administration: New Delhi. 
Mitra, B. C., and P. Nientied, 1989. Land Supply and Housing Expenses for low income 
families: a rationale for government intervention. Urban research working paper No. 19. 
Free University : the Netherlands. 
Mitra, B. C., 1990. Land supply for low income housing in Delhi. In the transformation of 
land supply systems in third world cities, P. Baross, and Jan J. Van der Linden. Avebury: 
Aldershot. . 
Mitra, B. C., 1987. Land supply for low income housing in Delhi, Mimeo, IHS: Rotterdam. 
Mohan, R. , 1992. Housing and urban 
development policy issues for 1990s. In Economic 
and Political Weekly, Volume 27, Number 36 (PP. 1913-1920) & 37 (PP. 1990-1996). 
Sameeksha Trust: Bombay 
Mohan, R., and Villarnizer, R., 1982. The evolution of land values in the context of rapid 
urban growth: a case study of Bogota and cali (Columbia). In World Congress on Land 
Policy, 1980, M. Cullen and S. Woolery. Lexington Books: Lexington. 
Monk, S., Pearce, B., and Whitehead, C., 1991. Planning, Land supply and House prices, a 
literature review. Dept. of Land Economy: University of Cambridge. 
337 
Mumtaz, B., 1991. Housing through incremental development: a case study of the khuda 
ki bustee (1), Hyderabad, Pakistan. In successful shelter strategies, ODA Shelter seminar, 
World Habitat day 1991. Overseas Development Administration and Development 
Planning Unit: England. 
Needham, B., 1992. A theory of land prices when land is supplied publicly: The case of the 
Netherlands. Urban studies, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 669-689. Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh 
NGO Profile, 1995. Orangi Pilot Project, Urban Poverty 11: From understanding to action. 
In Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 7, No. 2, PP. 227-236. 
Nientied, P., and S. I. Kalim, 1991. Policy constraints on planning land for low-income 
groups in Karachi. In Karachi: Migrants, housing and housing policy, Jan van der Linden 
and Frits Selier. Amsterdam Free university: Lahore. 
Nientied, P., and Jan van der Linden, 1990. The role of the government in the supply of 
legal and illegal land in Karachi. In the transformation of land supply systems in third 
world cities, P. Baross and Jan Van der Linden. Avebury: Aldershot. 
Noronha, C., 1991. Delhi 2001: emerging issues of housing development. Delhi Vikas 
Varta, Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan-March.. DDA: New Delhi. 
Nowlan, M. D., 1977. The Land Market: how it works, in Public Property? the Habitat 
debate continued, essays on the price, ownership and government of land, Smith B. 
Lawrence and M., Walker. The Fraser Institute: Vancouver. 
Ofori, 1., 1982. Comments on Current Land Policy Issues in a Changing World. In World 
Congress on Land Policy, 1980, Matthew Cullen and Sharon Woolery. Lexington Books: 
Lexington. 
Okpala, D. C. 1,1980. Accessibility distribution aspects of Public Urban Land 
Management, a Nigerian case. Habitat international, Vol. 4, Nos. 4-6, pp. 593-609. 
Pergamon press: Great Britain. 
Parasher, P., 1994. Slums in Delhi. Delhi Vikas Varta, Vol. 5, No. 2, April-June, DDA: 
New Delhi. 
Parsons, G. R, 1992. The effect of costal land use restrictions on housing prices -A repeat 
sale analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 
25-37. Academic press. 
Patton, V., Carl and Sawicki, S. David, 1993. Basic Methods of Policy analysis and 
Planning. Prentice Hall: New Jersey. 
Payne, G. K., 1977. Urban Housing in the third world. Leonard Hill: London. 
Payne, G. K., 1978. Ankara: Housing and Planning in an expanding city, Mimeo. 
Payne, G. K., 1984. Low-income housing in the developing world : the role of sites and 
services and settlement upgrading. Johns Wiley and Sons: Chichester. 
Payne, G. K., 1985. Some issues of housing planning standards. Shelter, services and the 
urban poor. Third world planning seminar. University of Wales: Cardiff. 
Payne, G. K., 1988. Unregulated urban housing submarkets in the third world, a review of 
the literature. Center for Development and Environmental Planning: Oxford Polytechnic. 
338 
Payne, G. K., 1989. Informal housing and land subdivisions in third world cities: review of 
literature. CENDEP, Oxford Polytechnic: Oxford. 
Penalosa, E., 1982. Current Land Policy Issues in a Changing World. In World Congress 
on Land Policy, 1980, M., Cullen and Sharon Woolery. Lexington Books: Lexington. 
Pervar, P., 1993. Effects of land-use policies and land prices in middle income housing, 
Hyderabad, India. An unpublished PhD thesis submitted to the University of London. 
Pezzoli, K., 1987. The urban land problem and popular sector housing development in 
Mexico city. Environment and Behaviour, Vol. 19, No. 3,1987. pp. 371-397. Safe 
publications. 
Pugh, C., 1989. Housing Policy reform in Madras and the World bank. In Third World 
Planning Review, Volume 11, Number 3, PP. 249-273. Liverpool University Press: 
Liverpool. 
Pugh C., 1991. Housing and land policies in Delhi. In Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, PP 367-382. JAI Press Inc. 
Qadeer, M, A., 1983. Lahore: Urban development in the third world. Vanguard books 
Ltd. 
Rakodi, C. and N. Devas, 1993. Conclusions: assessing the new approaches. In managing 
fast growing cities, new approaches to urban planning and management in the developing 
world, Nick Devas and Carole Rakodi. Longman scientific and technical publications: 
England. 
Rakodi C., 1993. Planning for Whom? In Managing fast growing cities, New approaches 
to urban planning and management in the developing world, Nick Devas and Carole 
Rakodi.. Longman scientific and technical publications: England. 
Ramirez, R., J. Fiori, H. Harms and Kosta Mathey, 1992. The commodification of Self- 
Help housing and State Intervention, household experiences in the Barrios of Caracas. In 
Beyond Self-Help housing, Kosta Mathey and Profil Verlag. Mansell Publishing limited: 
London. 
Ratcliff, R. U., 1949. Urban land economics. McGraw-Hill company: London. 
Ratzka, A D., 1981. Land banking in Stockholm, An evaluation of municipal residential 
leasehold as a public finance and housing subsidy instrument . Journal of American 
Planning Association, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp 279-289. APA Press: USA. 
Ribeiro, E. F. N., 198 1, An Overview of Urban Land Policies and Land Use control measures 
in India, Unpublished paper, New Delhi. 
Ribeiro, E. F. N., 1992. Vacant land in urban India, status development issues and action 
plan. Society for Development Studies: New Delhi. 
Robben, P. J. M., and P. A. V. Stuijvenberg, 1986. India's Urban Housing Crisis, Why the 
World Bank's Sites and Services Schemes are not Reaching the poor in Madras. Third 
World Planning Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, PP. 335-351. Liverpool University Press: 
Liverpool. 
Robert, A. and R. Svensson, 1977. An introduction to Swedish land policy. In the 
government land developers, N. A. Roberts. Lexington books: Lexington. 
339 
Roberts, N. A., 1977. The government land developers. Studies of public land ownership 
policy in seven countries. Lexington books: Lexington. 
Rowntree, D., 1981. Statistics without tears a primer for non-mathematicians. Penquin 
books, 1981. 
Sandercock, L., 1979. The land Racket: the real costs of property speculation. Silverfish 
books: Canberra. 
Sarin M., 1980. Policies towards urban slums: slums and squatter settlements in the 
ESCAP region - case studies of seven cities. United Nations Publications. 
Sarin, M., 1983. The rich, the poor, and the land question. In land for housing the poor, 
Angel, S., Archer, R. W., Tanphiphat, S., and E. A. Wegelin. Select Books: Singapore. 
Schroeder, L, D., Sjoquist, D. L, and P. E. Stephen, 1986. Understanding regression 
analysis. Sage publications: London. 
Selier, F., and Klare, Y., 1987. Are thresholds of migrant-consolidation changing? Family 
and low-income housing in Karachi. Institute of Cultural Anthropology/Sociology of 
Development. The Netherlands: Free University. 
Seliger, H. W., and E., Shohamy, 1989. Second language research methods. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Serageldin, M., 1990. Regularising the informal land development process. Working 
paper. US agency for International Development. Cambridge/Washington. 
Shakur, M. T., 1987. An analysis of squatter settlements in Dhaka, Bangladesh. An 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, UK. 
Shakur, M.. T., 1987. Approaches toward housing low income communities in the third 
world: a literature review. Department of Civic Design, University of Liverpool. 
Shakur, T., 1991. Squatters of no hope? A critical analysis of spontaneous settlements and 
re-settlement camps in Dhaka. In Past Present Future, Sharif Uddin Ahmed. The Asiatic 
Society of Bangldesh Publications. 
Shakur, T., 1994. Regulating the un-regulated urban housing sub-markets: an antidote to 
squatter settlements? International Centre for Development and Environmental Studies, 
Edge Hill University College: UK. 
Shilling, J. D, Sirmans, C. F and Guidry, K. A, 199 1. The impact of state land use controls on 
residential land values. In Journal of Regional Science, Vol.. 3 1, No. 1, pp. 83-92. 
Siddiqui, T. A., and M. A. Khan, 1990. Land supply to the urban poor: Hyderabad's 
Incremental Development Scheme. In the transformation of land supply systems in third 
world cities, P. Baross and Jan Van der Linden. Avebury: Aldershot. 
Siddiqui, T. A., and M. A. Khan, 1994. The Incremental Development Scheme. In Third 
World Planning Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, PP 277-291. Liverpool University Press: 
Liverpool. 
Siembieda, W. J, 1994. Measuring the price and supply of urban land markets: insights on 
sources. In methodology for land and housing market analysis, G. Jones, and Peter M. 
Ward. University College London press: London. 
340 
Silas, 1983. In Land for housing the poor, Angel et. al. Select books: Singapore 
Silas, 1988. A case study of Surabaya, Indonesia. Presented in Informal housing and Land 
subdivisions in third world cities: review of literature, Payne, GX (1989). CENDEP, 
Oxford polytechnic: Oxford. 
Singh, V., 199 1. Planned urban development in a metropolitan city: a spatial analysis of 
land acquisition process and socio-economic implications. An unpublished PhD thesis 
submitted to JNU, New Delhi. 
Smith, B. L., and M. Walker, 1977. Public Property? The Habitat debate continued, essays 
on the price, ownership and government of land. The Fraser Institute: Vancouver. 
Smyth, H., 1988. Land banking, land availability and planning private house building. In 
Land and Housing policies in Europe and the USA, a comparative analysis, G. Hallett. 
Routledge: London. 
Smyth, M., 1982. Land banking, land availability and planning for private house building. 
Working paper 23. School of advanced urban studies. University of Bristol. 
Soares et al., 1984. Clandestine housing developments in the greater Lisbon region. 
Habitat, Mimeo. 
Soares, B., and R. Stussi, 1990. Paralel land marksts in the Lisbon region. In the 
transformation of land supply systems in third world cities, P. Baross and Jan Van Der 
Linden. Avebury: Aldershot. 
Srinivas, D. S. R. K., 1995. Managing urban environment- a case of Delhi. In Institute of 
Town Planners India's Journal, Volume 13, No. 3&4 (161 & 162), PP 65-72, March - 
June. ITPI: New Delhi. 
Srinivasan, K., 1981. Land and Housing for Poor in Bombay. In Economic and Political 
Weekly, Volume 16, Number 35, PP. 1411-1412. Sameeksha Trust: Bombay 
Srirangan, K., 1994. Cost recovery in EWS and LIG housing projects, a case study of 
Uttar Pradesh Housing Development Board. Working paper 14. Human Settlement 
Management Institute (HUDCO): New Delhi. 
Steinberg, F., 1990. Cairo: informal land development and the challenge for future. In the 
transformation of land supply systems in third world cities, P. Baross and Jan Van Der 
Linden. Avebury: Aldershot. 
Strong, L. A., 1979. Land Banking, European reality, American prospect. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 
Sundaram, P. S. A., 1989. Bombay: can it house its millions? Clarion Books: New Delhi. 
Sundram, P. S. A., and J. C. Gambhir, 1990. Improving metropolitan living environments 
through strengthening housing sector activities. Delhi case study presented at second 
international housing training seminar, 1-14 March. United Nations Centre for Regional 
Development, Nagoya, Japan. 
Sundram, P. S. A., and J. C. Garnbhir, 1991. Reviewing and strengthening the performance 
of metropolitan housing policies and programmes. Delhi case presented at third 
international housing training seminar, 14-26 March. United Nations Centre for Regional 
Development, Nagoya, Japan. 
341 
Suri, P., 1991. Critical issues in Delhi Master Plan 2001, squatter housing. Delhi Vikas 
Varta, Vol. 2, No. 2, April-June, PP. 25-26. Delhi Development Authority: New Delhi. 
Thirkell, A. J., 1995. The informal land market in the Cebu city, the Philippines; 
accessibility, settlement development and residential segregation. An unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of London. 
UNCHS, 1983. UN seminar of experts on land for housing the poor. 14-19 March 
Tallberg, Sweden,. 
UNCHS, 1976. Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, 
recommendations for national action, item 10 of the provisional agenda., 31 May to 11 
June 1976. Vancouver. 
UNCHS, 1984. Land for human settlements. United Nations Centre for Human 
Settlements (Habitat): Nairobi. 
UNCHS, 1986. Supporting the informal sector in low income settlements. United Nations 
Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat): Nairobi. 
UNCHS, undated (possibly 1987). Land for housing, a training module... United Nations 
Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), Nairobi. 
Varley, A., 1994. Housing the household, holding the house. In methodology for land and 
housing market analysis, G. Jones, and P. M. Ward. University College London press: 
London. 
Vernez, G., 1973. Bogotas pirate settlements. Mimeo, University of California: Berkeley. 
Vetter, D. M., and H. C. Rzezinski, 1980. The Brazilian case; land policy for Whom? 
Habitat international Vol. 4, No. 4/5/6, pp. 485-498. Pergamon press: Great Britain. 
Walters, A. S. H., Pennance, F. G., West, W. A., Denman, D. R., Milnes, B. B, 1974. 
Government and the land. IEA readings 13. The Institute of Economic affairs. 
Ward, 1984. Mexico: beyond sites and services. In low income housing in developing 
world, G. K. Payne. John Wiley and Sons: Chichester 
Ward, P., 1990. The politics and costs of Illegal Land Development for Self-help Housing 
in Mexico City. In the transformation of land supply systems in third world cities, Baross 
Paul and Jan van der Linden. Avebury: England. 
Weber, K. E., 1984. Research in planning for human settlements: guidelines and practical 
example. Reference material No. 2. AIT: Bangkok. 
Whitehead, C. M. E., 1983. The rationale for government intervention. In Urban Land 
Policy, issues and opportunities, H. B. Dunkerley. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Willcox, L. D., 1980. Urban land policy: the 'U' in urban is for unique. Habitat 
International, Vol. 4, No. 4-6, pp. 399-418. Pergamon press: Great Britain. 
World Bank, 1980. Pirate subdivisions and the market for residential lots in Bogota. Staff 
working paper No. 435. World Bank publications. t: ' 
World Bank/Intemational Development Administration, 1980. Lahore Urban Development 
and Traffic Study. Unpublished final report, Volume IA. Lahore Development Authority. 
342 
Yiannakou, A., 1993. Residential land development and urban policy in Greece, the case 
of Greater thessalonini. An unpublished PhD thesis of University of London. 
Yonder, A., 1987. Informal land and housing markets: the case of Istanbul, Turkey. In 
Journal of American Planning Association, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 213-219. APA press: USA. 
Zetter, R., 1984. In Low income housing in developing world: roles of sites and services 
and settlement upgrading, G. K. Payne. John Wiley and Sons: Chichester. 
343 
